Paul Goble
Staunton, October 8 – The 2010 Russian Census which will take place October 14-25 in most places – a few distant locations have already been surveyed – is going to suffer from “a multitude of problems,” experts say, some of which are likely to undercut public confidence in its results and possibly, as happened after the last count, force officials to issue corrections later.
In “Novaya politika” today, Mikhail Diunov recalls what happened during the last census (in 2002) in order to highlight some but far from all of the problems that the current census seems certain to encounter, including official interference, corruption, and both bureaucratic and practical shortcomings (novopol.ru/-vseh-poschitayut-text90949.html).
The 2002 count, he reports, found that “the size of the population did not correspond with the officially declared numbers.” In the Far East and North, officials had overstated the numbers, while in Moscow and Chechnya, they had understated them, differences that led many to conclude that officials had played with the figures.
That some regional officials may have overstated the numbers in order to get more assistance from Moscow, however, was not the only problem. In some places, such as Bashkortostan, the republic leaders actively worked to boost the number of ethnic Bashkirs relative to Tatars for their own nationalistic reasons.
Such divergences generated enormous distrust in the 2002 census results, distrust so deep and widespread that four years later, the Russian statistical agency, Rosstat, was forced to issue corrected data, although in the view of many people the changes were insufficient to overcome “the contradictions between census data and current reporting information.”
Russian statistical officials began planning for the 2010 enumeration in 2007, at least in part out of the hope that such lengthy preparations would allow them to conduct a better and more authoritative enumeration than they had been able to carry out the last time around and thus avoid the embarrassment of having to issue corrections.
As part of this process, Diunov continues, they conducted a preliminary mini-census in the fall of 2008, trying out various survey methodologies on some 300,000 people in the Moscow suburb of Balashikha, the Petrograd district of St. Petersburg, and Khabarovsk, a major city in the Russian Far East.
Then, he notes, the financial crisis hit, and many officials wanted to delay the census until 2013, a move that appeared likely as the government cut back on funding for the enumeration and one that led some to conclude that the upcoming count would show such a decline in the country’s population that Vladimir Putin did not want it to happen before the elections.
But then, either to silence such suggestions or out of a belief that going ahead would ultimately same money, Moscow decided to retain the original schedule, even though it cut financing from its own budget and shifted much of the burden for the count to regional and city governments, whom the center will reimburse only over the course of several years.
“In addition,” Diunov notes, “the central government placed on the organizers of the census limitations which have a perfectly anecdotal character.” It has prohibited local officials from hiring guards for census offices unless those guards are specially certified even though in most parts of the country, there are no such people available.
As a result, many offices where census data are assembled will not be guarded, a situation that almost certainly guarantees that many will suspect that the data on numbers or nationality composition or something else will be falsified by officials or others who have a vested interest in the outcome.
Moscow officials have acknowledged these and other problems and are trying to deal with them and with the problems censuses encounter in every country, and consequently, there is some hope that the results this time around will be accepted more readily than were those from the 2002 enumeration.
But however that may be, there is already a rising tide of complaints about two aspects of the census: its failure to ask about religious affiliation, something that has been done only in two previous censuses (1897 and 1937), and its list of national self-identifications which many see as a form of manipulation as well (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusnews/13844/).
With regard to the former issue, Experts like Vladimir Zorin of the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology argue that it would be a mistake to ask about religion because that would lead to “an excessive politicization” of the question, but others argue that not asking does the same thing, albeit in a different direction.
And with regard to the latter, many non-Russians complain that the Moscow list of more than 1800 ethnic self-designators is designed to divide their communities and thus reduce their power, although increasingly it appears that such multiple listings may affect the ethnic Russian community at least as much, with Cossacks, Siberians and others insisting on their identities.
Russian officials counter that the list of 1800 names is not a list of nationalities, but their arguments on that point trouble many who thus feel that some unknown bureaucrat will group the answers and thus be in a position to determine the size of the various nationalities of the Russian Federation with all the consequences that would have on budgets and politics.
Friday, October 8, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Turkey -- Far More than Iran -- Promoting Growth of Islam in Post-Soviet States
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 8 – One of the most widely and deeply held convictions among Western leaders and specialists in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union was that Iran would promote the spread of Islam and especially its more radical forms into the post-Soviet states while Turkey could be counted on to promote the growth of secular societies there.
That assumption reinforced the commitment of Western governments to seek to isolate Iran from contacts in the region, such as by the use of the OSCE, of which Iran is not a member, in dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and to promote Turkey in the post-Soviet states as a surrogate for the West more generally.
But as some analysts pointed out from the very beginning, there were serious reasons to question this assumption and its utility as a guide to policy. On the one hand, Iran’s brand of Islam had relatively few adherents in the post-Soviet states (only Azerbaijan had a Shiite majority) and Iran’s radicalism put off far more people there than it attracted.
And on the other, Turkey was never as secular as many in the West had assumed and has become less so with each passing year, and Turks because of their linguistic and cultural ties with five of the six Muslim majority former Soviet republics have enjoyed an influence there, on religion as well as on other matters, far greater than Iran.
In the 1990s, for example, Muslims in the post-Soviet states, including the Russian Federation, often travelled to Turkey either to study in medrassahs there or a way station on their route to Muslim educational institutions in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. Almost none of these people went to or through Iran.
And both the Turkish government and Turkish Muslim groups not only provided scholarship assistance to these people and religious literature for those back in the former Soviet republics but also provided enormous funds for the construction of mosques and religious schools in these countries, far more than Iran did.
One result of this difference is that the largest and most prominent mosque in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku was built by the Turks and one of the largest commercial facilities was the Bank of Iran, precisely the opposite of what Western governments and experts had expected and predicted.
Today brought two new reports which suggest that Turkey continue to play a far greater role in the rebirth of Islam in the former Soviet republics, including the Russian Federation. In the first, Gidayat Orudzhev, the chairman of the Azerbaijani State Committee on Work with Religious Structures, presented a report on foreign financing of mosques in that country.
According to Orudzhev, Kuwait has built the most, 71, but Turkey is in second place with 21, while Saudi Arabia has financed only one. He did not mention Iran’s role in this regard, but in the last decade at least, it has certainly been significantly smaller of that of Turkey and Turkish groups however much Iran has tried (www.islamnews.ru/news-27083.html).
The second report highlights Turkey’s role among Muslims in the unstable North Caucasus republics of the Russian Federation. This week, a group of Turkish Muslim leaders and businessmen visited Ingushetia along with Bekir Gerek, the counselor for religious affairs of the Turkish embassy in Moscow (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusnews/13837/).
The Turkish group was received by Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, the head of the republic, who discussed with them the building of a new mosque in the republic capital, Magas, something that the Muslims of that republic have long sought. The Turks promised to fund the construction of the mosque as “a gift” to the Ingush Muslims.
The two sides also discussed the possibility of young Ingush receiving Muslim higher education in Turkey, something Gerek and his Turkish colleagues said they backed and would be happy to take full responsibility for funding, something that will make such training especially attractive given the high level of unemployment in Ingushetia.
Staunton, October 8 – One of the most widely and deeply held convictions among Western leaders and specialists in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union was that Iran would promote the spread of Islam and especially its more radical forms into the post-Soviet states while Turkey could be counted on to promote the growth of secular societies there.
That assumption reinforced the commitment of Western governments to seek to isolate Iran from contacts in the region, such as by the use of the OSCE, of which Iran is not a member, in dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and to promote Turkey in the post-Soviet states as a surrogate for the West more generally.
But as some analysts pointed out from the very beginning, there were serious reasons to question this assumption and its utility as a guide to policy. On the one hand, Iran’s brand of Islam had relatively few adherents in the post-Soviet states (only Azerbaijan had a Shiite majority) and Iran’s radicalism put off far more people there than it attracted.
And on the other, Turkey was never as secular as many in the West had assumed and has become less so with each passing year, and Turks because of their linguistic and cultural ties with five of the six Muslim majority former Soviet republics have enjoyed an influence there, on religion as well as on other matters, far greater than Iran.
In the 1990s, for example, Muslims in the post-Soviet states, including the Russian Federation, often travelled to Turkey either to study in medrassahs there or a way station on their route to Muslim educational institutions in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. Almost none of these people went to or through Iran.
And both the Turkish government and Turkish Muslim groups not only provided scholarship assistance to these people and religious literature for those back in the former Soviet republics but also provided enormous funds for the construction of mosques and religious schools in these countries, far more than Iran did.
One result of this difference is that the largest and most prominent mosque in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku was built by the Turks and one of the largest commercial facilities was the Bank of Iran, precisely the opposite of what Western governments and experts had expected and predicted.
Today brought two new reports which suggest that Turkey continue to play a far greater role in the rebirth of Islam in the former Soviet republics, including the Russian Federation. In the first, Gidayat Orudzhev, the chairman of the Azerbaijani State Committee on Work with Religious Structures, presented a report on foreign financing of mosques in that country.
According to Orudzhev, Kuwait has built the most, 71, but Turkey is in second place with 21, while Saudi Arabia has financed only one. He did not mention Iran’s role in this regard, but in the last decade at least, it has certainly been significantly smaller of that of Turkey and Turkish groups however much Iran has tried (www.islamnews.ru/news-27083.html).
The second report highlights Turkey’s role among Muslims in the unstable North Caucasus republics of the Russian Federation. This week, a group of Turkish Muslim leaders and businessmen visited Ingushetia along with Bekir Gerek, the counselor for religious affairs of the Turkish embassy in Moscow (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusnews/13837/).
The Turkish group was received by Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, the head of the republic, who discussed with them the building of a new mosque in the republic capital, Magas, something that the Muslims of that republic have long sought. The Turks promised to fund the construction of the mosque as “a gift” to the Ingush Muslims.
The two sides also discussed the possibility of young Ingush receiving Muslim higher education in Turkey, something Gerek and his Turkish colleagues said they backed and would be happy to take full responsibility for funding, something that will make such training especially attractive given the high level of unemployment in Ingushetia.
Window on Eurasia: ‘In Uzbekistan, It’s 1937 Again’ with Show Trial of VOA Correspondent
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 8 – The ongoing Tashkent trial of a VOA stringer, Ferghana.ru says, shows that “in Uzbekistan, it’s 1937 again,” with the major difference being that the regime does not feel it has to use torture to gain confessions to crimes those charged did not commit but rather can count on elastic laws and equally flexible “expert conclusions” for the same ends.
Yesterday, the trial of Abdumalik Boboyev (the pseudonym for Malik Mansur, 41) began in the Uzbek capital. The Voice of America Uzbek Service correspondent is charged with slander, libel, illegal border crossing, and “the preparation of materials containing a threat to public security and public order” (www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=6754).
Under Uzbekistan law, the severity of the fourth charge is increased because “the crime was committed ‘with the use of financial or other material support received from religious organizations and also from foreign governments, organizations and citizens” – in this case from the US government’s Voice of America. If convicted, Boboyev could face eight years in jail.
The way this case has been handled highlights just how political it is and how little the facts have to do with either the charges being brought or the verdict reached. According to Ferghana.ru, internal evidence from the experts’ conclusion suggests that the case was prepared almost a year ago.
Boboyev, however, was not shown these documents until the end of September and his lawyer withdrew ostensibly because of a crowded schedule. This conjunction of events highlights the political rather than legal nature of the case. But the real evidence for such a conclusion is to be found in the statement of the experts.
Prepared by Rustam Mukhamedov of the Center for Monitoring Mass Communications of the Uzbek Agency for Media and Information – an institution that has acquired notoriety in the past (see www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=6472), this document is, in the words of the Ferghana.ru translator, the most “stupid and illiterate” text he had ever encountered.
That 6700-word document, available online as of yesterday in Russian, is Kafkaesque both in the language it uses and in the logic it employs, qualities that are most clearly demonstrated by extensive quotations as the expert who prepared this is nothing if not long-winded.
For example, the expert concludes that Boboyev used materials from the media of Uzbekistan itself without checking whether the facts were correct and moreover took money “from abroad” in order to “distract the population of Uzbekistan, violate good neighborly relations among citizens and awaken in them distrust to the powers that be and judicial system … sow panic among the population, detract from the dignity and image of Uzbekistan among society, create conditions for the commission of crimes” by disseminating “unchecked one-sided information about Uzbekistan, about [its] existing customs and traditions and cultural wealth.”
In support of such sweeping and obviously political conclusions, the expert offers quotations from the broadcasts and web posting that Boboyev made. One of these that the expert argues violates Uzbekistan’s law reported that “Uzbekistan is one of the countries where freedom of speech is severely limited and where officials exert pressure on journalists, In the country has been established full control over television, radio and the press. Independent internet sites are blocked.”
According to the Uzbek expert, Boboyev’s crime in this case reflected his failure to indicate “from what source” he got this information,” which the expert continues both “baselessly shows “the unjust actions of the judicial system of the country” and “openly defiles the employees of the judicial organs and the law enforcement structures of Uzbekistan.”
Such quotations could be multiplied at will to show that the accusations against Boboyev in fact serve as an indictment of the Uzbek officials and the Uzbekistan government who brought them in the first place. But they also call attention to two other realities that deserve more attention than they often receive.
On the one hand, governments like the one in Uzbekistan have learned that they can write and use laws in ways that subvert the very meaning of law with the additional benefit for themselves that many outside observers will limit their criticism of these regimes because it appears that they are law-based. In fact, as this case shows, they are only “law-like.”
And on the other, the attack on Boboyev, for that is what it is, highlights the continuing importance of international broadcasting and the increasing role of the Internet – throughout the Uzbek expert’s document, the web is referred to almost as many times as broadcasts – in limiting government assaults on freedom of information and promoting freedom more generally.
For all those reasons and so that justice will be done in what is clearly an unjust political system, people of good will there and around the world need to support Boboyev in what will otherwise be his unequal struggle against a regime that by its actions shows why courageous people like himself remain so important.
Staunton, October 8 – The ongoing Tashkent trial of a VOA stringer, Ferghana.ru says, shows that “in Uzbekistan, it’s 1937 again,” with the major difference being that the regime does not feel it has to use torture to gain confessions to crimes those charged did not commit but rather can count on elastic laws and equally flexible “expert conclusions” for the same ends.
Yesterday, the trial of Abdumalik Boboyev (the pseudonym for Malik Mansur, 41) began in the Uzbek capital. The Voice of America Uzbek Service correspondent is charged with slander, libel, illegal border crossing, and “the preparation of materials containing a threat to public security and public order” (www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=6754).
Under Uzbekistan law, the severity of the fourth charge is increased because “the crime was committed ‘with the use of financial or other material support received from religious organizations and also from foreign governments, organizations and citizens” – in this case from the US government’s Voice of America. If convicted, Boboyev could face eight years in jail.
The way this case has been handled highlights just how political it is and how little the facts have to do with either the charges being brought or the verdict reached. According to Ferghana.ru, internal evidence from the experts’ conclusion suggests that the case was prepared almost a year ago.
Boboyev, however, was not shown these documents until the end of September and his lawyer withdrew ostensibly because of a crowded schedule. This conjunction of events highlights the political rather than legal nature of the case. But the real evidence for such a conclusion is to be found in the statement of the experts.
Prepared by Rustam Mukhamedov of the Center for Monitoring Mass Communications of the Uzbek Agency for Media and Information – an institution that has acquired notoriety in the past (see www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=6472), this document is, in the words of the Ferghana.ru translator, the most “stupid and illiterate” text he had ever encountered.
That 6700-word document, available online as of yesterday in Russian, is Kafkaesque both in the language it uses and in the logic it employs, qualities that are most clearly demonstrated by extensive quotations as the expert who prepared this is nothing if not long-winded.
For example, the expert concludes that Boboyev used materials from the media of Uzbekistan itself without checking whether the facts were correct and moreover took money “from abroad” in order to “distract the population of Uzbekistan, violate good neighborly relations among citizens and awaken in them distrust to the powers that be and judicial system … sow panic among the population, detract from the dignity and image of Uzbekistan among society, create conditions for the commission of crimes” by disseminating “unchecked one-sided information about Uzbekistan, about [its] existing customs and traditions and cultural wealth.”
In support of such sweeping and obviously political conclusions, the expert offers quotations from the broadcasts and web posting that Boboyev made. One of these that the expert argues violates Uzbekistan’s law reported that “Uzbekistan is one of the countries where freedom of speech is severely limited and where officials exert pressure on journalists, In the country has been established full control over television, radio and the press. Independent internet sites are blocked.”
According to the Uzbek expert, Boboyev’s crime in this case reflected his failure to indicate “from what source” he got this information,” which the expert continues both “baselessly shows “the unjust actions of the judicial system of the country” and “openly defiles the employees of the judicial organs and the law enforcement structures of Uzbekistan.”
Such quotations could be multiplied at will to show that the accusations against Boboyev in fact serve as an indictment of the Uzbek officials and the Uzbekistan government who brought them in the first place. But they also call attention to two other realities that deserve more attention than they often receive.
On the one hand, governments like the one in Uzbekistan have learned that they can write and use laws in ways that subvert the very meaning of law with the additional benefit for themselves that many outside observers will limit their criticism of these regimes because it appears that they are law-based. In fact, as this case shows, they are only “law-like.”
And on the other, the attack on Boboyev, for that is what it is, highlights the continuing importance of international broadcasting and the increasing role of the Internet – throughout the Uzbek expert’s document, the web is referred to almost as many times as broadcasts – in limiting government assaults on freedom of information and promoting freedom more generally.
For all those reasons and so that justice will be done in what is clearly an unjust political system, people of good will there and around the world need to support Boboyev in what will otherwise be his unequal struggle against a regime that by its actions shows why courageous people like himself remain so important.
Thursday, October 7, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Russia ‘a Company Not a Country’ -- Like Europe’s East India Companies Were -- Moscow Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 7 – The dismissal of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov highlights the fact that “there is no Russia,” a Moscow analyst argues. Instead, “there is only a Sovietoid copy which has been converted into the RF Corporation,” something everyone involved needs to recognize in order not to continue to pay a high price for making a mistake on this point.
In an essay posted on the Folksland.net portal, Aleksey Shornikov says that “the Russian Federation is not a state, although it dresses itself up in the clothes of a power. The RF is instead a commercial company or as it can be expressed in terms familiar to us, ‘RF Inc.’” (folksland.net/m/articles/view/Aktsionernoe-obschestvo-Rossiyskaya-Federatsiya).
According to Shornikov, “the various European East Indian companies” prefigured the form that RF Inc. has taken since 1991. The most famous of these was the British one in India, a public-private partnership chartered by the king that performed many of the functions of a state but was organized and acted like a corporation pursuing profit.
Moreover, the British East India Company colonized that territory in two ways. On the one hand, its top managers directly ruled much of the population, while on the other, the corporation concluded agreements, “the so-called subsidiary treaties,” with Indian rulers usually called maharajahs.
In all this, Shornikov continues, what is interesting for present purposes is that “the colonization of India [under the East India Company] took place on the money of the Hindus themselves, was paid for by Hindu labor, and washed with Hindu blood!” But in the end, London disbanded the company for its shortcomings and introduced direct royal rule.
All this has been recapitulated during the Soviet period and since in what is now RF Inc., he says. Because of the enormous losses the USSR absorbed in fighting World War II, the Soviet system as an historical project was really finished in 1941, but the wealth of the territory allowed it to limp along for another half-century.
Throughout this period, there were various attempts to reorder life in the USSR, from Khrushchev with his planting of corn to Mikhail Gorbachev with his preference for the Swedish form of socialism. But others in the nomenklatura didn’t want that, seeing it as a threat to their power and wealth. And so they chose the variant of “wild capitalism.”
Indeed, these nomenklaturshchiki were so intent on gaining profit that they were prepared to sacrifice the Russian people and even the entire Soviet project on the basis of the principle: “The Moor has done his work; the Moor can go.” And they organized into what were formally countries but in reality were corporations, from Russia to the other former Soviet republics.
At first, some people dreamed of a “USSR-2, Inc.” but that idea died with the October 1993 clash between the RF Supreme Soviet and RF President Boris Yeltsin. And consequently by the end of that year, he says, “the present political system of a Sovietoid type” took shape, one directed at “the total theft of the former Soviet property.”
RF Inc., he continues, “has all the signs of a commercial enterprise:” its founding agreement, its rules of operation, its managers, its workers, its internal accounting system (the ruble), its “corporate ideology,” and its top managers who have a certain independent standing because of the large number of shareholders.”
The corporation’s basic profits, Shornikov says, come from the sale abroad of natural resources like oil, gas, timber and the like. Some of those profits have to be used to build roads and other infrastructure needed to export more and earn more profits for the corporation. Thos projects “are not for You, Indians or Hindus.” They are for the top managers.
Like most corporations, RF Inc. deals with other corporations – in this case Ukraine Inc. and the like – and sets up “daughter” corporations to take care of certain tasks that RF Inc. needs performed but would like to have handled by a nominally independent agent such as FSB Inc. or the RF Army Inc.
Moreover, again like all corporations, RF Inc. is internally divided with such subordinate “daughter companies” as Moscow Inc., Daghestan Inc., and so on. RF Inc. retains ownership of these “daughter” companies and deals with them as any corporation would with the daughter corporations it has established.
Corporations, even RF Inc., are not immortal. They come into existence and pass out of existence, and RF Inc. may pass away either because of a conflict with China, because of the independent actions of those the corporation controls, or because of outside assistance to those individuals and groups allowing them to displace the corporation.
Which path RF Inc. will follow is difficult to say, Shornikov continues, but he insists that the current RF Inc. elite is hardly committed to its survival if the corporation ceases to be profitable. Its members send their money and children abroad, behave like occupiers, and their Russian means nothing: Administrators of the British East India Company spoke Hindi.
In sum, the commentator says, “we live in RF Inc. We do not have a motherland in the form of a state. Russia was killed by the Bolsheviks in1917. And Russia did not arise in 1991. Instead, RF Inc. appeared.” Russians must take off their “rose colored glasses” and face this harsh reality.
There has not been a Russia “for more than 90 years. RF Inc. “is not Russia, but a commercial enterprise.” In fact, the Moscow commentator says, “RF is a large Soviet collective farm – and no more than that,” however much many of the people who live within it would like to believe otherwise.”
Staunton, October 7 – The dismissal of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov highlights the fact that “there is no Russia,” a Moscow analyst argues. Instead, “there is only a Sovietoid copy which has been converted into the RF Corporation,” something everyone involved needs to recognize in order not to continue to pay a high price for making a mistake on this point.
In an essay posted on the Folksland.net portal, Aleksey Shornikov says that “the Russian Federation is not a state, although it dresses itself up in the clothes of a power. The RF is instead a commercial company or as it can be expressed in terms familiar to us, ‘RF Inc.’” (folksland.net/m/articles/view/Aktsionernoe-obschestvo-Rossiyskaya-Federatsiya).
According to Shornikov, “the various European East Indian companies” prefigured the form that RF Inc. has taken since 1991. The most famous of these was the British one in India, a public-private partnership chartered by the king that performed many of the functions of a state but was organized and acted like a corporation pursuing profit.
Moreover, the British East India Company colonized that territory in two ways. On the one hand, its top managers directly ruled much of the population, while on the other, the corporation concluded agreements, “the so-called subsidiary treaties,” with Indian rulers usually called maharajahs.
In all this, Shornikov continues, what is interesting for present purposes is that “the colonization of India [under the East India Company] took place on the money of the Hindus themselves, was paid for by Hindu labor, and washed with Hindu blood!” But in the end, London disbanded the company for its shortcomings and introduced direct royal rule.
All this has been recapitulated during the Soviet period and since in what is now RF Inc., he says. Because of the enormous losses the USSR absorbed in fighting World War II, the Soviet system as an historical project was really finished in 1941, but the wealth of the territory allowed it to limp along for another half-century.
Throughout this period, there were various attempts to reorder life in the USSR, from Khrushchev with his planting of corn to Mikhail Gorbachev with his preference for the Swedish form of socialism. But others in the nomenklatura didn’t want that, seeing it as a threat to their power and wealth. And so they chose the variant of “wild capitalism.”
Indeed, these nomenklaturshchiki were so intent on gaining profit that they were prepared to sacrifice the Russian people and even the entire Soviet project on the basis of the principle: “The Moor has done his work; the Moor can go.” And they organized into what were formally countries but in reality were corporations, from Russia to the other former Soviet republics.
At first, some people dreamed of a “USSR-2, Inc.” but that idea died with the October 1993 clash between the RF Supreme Soviet and RF President Boris Yeltsin. And consequently by the end of that year, he says, “the present political system of a Sovietoid type” took shape, one directed at “the total theft of the former Soviet property.”
RF Inc., he continues, “has all the signs of a commercial enterprise:” its founding agreement, its rules of operation, its managers, its workers, its internal accounting system (the ruble), its “corporate ideology,” and its top managers who have a certain independent standing because of the large number of shareholders.”
The corporation’s basic profits, Shornikov says, come from the sale abroad of natural resources like oil, gas, timber and the like. Some of those profits have to be used to build roads and other infrastructure needed to export more and earn more profits for the corporation. Thos projects “are not for You, Indians or Hindus.” They are for the top managers.
Like most corporations, RF Inc. deals with other corporations – in this case Ukraine Inc. and the like – and sets up “daughter” corporations to take care of certain tasks that RF Inc. needs performed but would like to have handled by a nominally independent agent such as FSB Inc. or the RF Army Inc.
Moreover, again like all corporations, RF Inc. is internally divided with such subordinate “daughter companies” as Moscow Inc., Daghestan Inc., and so on. RF Inc. retains ownership of these “daughter” companies and deals with them as any corporation would with the daughter corporations it has established.
Corporations, even RF Inc., are not immortal. They come into existence and pass out of existence, and RF Inc. may pass away either because of a conflict with China, because of the independent actions of those the corporation controls, or because of outside assistance to those individuals and groups allowing them to displace the corporation.
Which path RF Inc. will follow is difficult to say, Shornikov continues, but he insists that the current RF Inc. elite is hardly committed to its survival if the corporation ceases to be profitable. Its members send their money and children abroad, behave like occupiers, and their Russian means nothing: Administrators of the British East India Company spoke Hindi.
In sum, the commentator says, “we live in RF Inc. We do not have a motherland in the form of a state. Russia was killed by the Bolsheviks in1917. And Russia did not arise in 1991. Instead, RF Inc. appeared.” Russians must take off their “rose colored glasses” and face this harsh reality.
There has not been a Russia “for more than 90 years. RF Inc. “is not Russia, but a commercial enterprise.” In fact, the Moscow commentator says, “RF is a large Soviet collective farm – and no more than that,” however much many of the people who live within it would like to believe otherwise.”
Window on Eurasia: Circassians Increase Efforts to Secure Recognition of 1864 Genocide
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 7 – The Circassian community is intensifying its efforts to gain international recognition for the Russian killing of their ancestors in 1864 in Sochi where Moscow wants to hold the Olympic Games in 2014, the 150th anniversary of those horrific events.
Last week, Circassians continued to lobby the Georgian parliament, many of whose members appear prepared to hold the Russian Empire responsible for the events of 1864 and to give Moscow a black eye in advance of the planned Olympiad. But in addition and, perhaps to greater effect, the Circassians asked the Estonians to push their cause in European institutions.
The International Circassian Council turned over to members of the Estonian parliament in Tallinn an appeal for assistance and then in Brussels met with Indrek Tarand, an Estonian representative to the European Paarliament as well as with the members of that body’s sub-committee on human rights (kavkasia.net/Russia/2010/1286478926.php).
The Circassian appeal began with the assertion that “the Circassian people is a victim of genocide,” something it insisted the international community must take note of, especially given Moscow’s preparations for the 2014 Olympic Games and Russia’s failure to protect human rights or the environment there.
“In recent years,” it continued, the situation in the North Caucasus with regard to human rights has become sharply worse, and incidents of the persecution of journalists have achieved a critical level. In addition, the Russian government [in its preparations for Sochi] has ignored all ecological norms,” something that has already had a negative impact on people living there.
“Circassians living through the entire world together with their compatriots do not intend to accept the existing situation and thus want to gain the attention of the international community to these facts,” the appeal said, in the hope and expectation that “civilized countries” will take a clear and forceful position against what Moscow is doing.
“The reputation of Estonia as a reformist country, member of the European Union and NATO,” it continued, “permits the hope that this appeal will receive the necessary attention of the Estonian government and society, promote timely intervention in this situation, and guarantee an active part in the resolution of these questions by its partner countries.”
Meanwhile in Georgia, support for the Circassian position appears to be growing. Alexander Rondeli, a prominent commentator, said that justice required reaching a conclusion about the events of 1864 on the basis of facts, even though Moscow would use any Georgian declaration on this point against Tbilisi (kavkasia.net/interview/article/1286427893.php).
Most Georgians who have looked into the matter have concluded that “the physical destruction of the Circassians by Russia on an ethnic basis in the 19th century” took place, although debates about the interpretation of specific facts continue, all the more so because of the complexities of the relationship between the Russian Federation and Georgia now.
Moscow, however, invariably tries to blame Georgia for anything bad that happens in the region especially when it can be tied to the Sochi Olympics, Rondeli pointed out, and many people dismiss Georgian responses as nothing more than tit-for-tat, without being willing to examine the evidence offered by the various sides.
Consequently, even though most Georgian experts accept that Russian Imperial officials killed Chechens on an ethnic basis, the key characteristic of a genocide, Rondeli continued, Georgian officials cannot ignore that “the fact of recognition by Georgia of the genocide of the Circassians will also be used against Georgia.”
Indeed, he pointed out, “a decision of the Georgian parliament [on this point] will be used for anti-Georgian propaganda,” and that reality means that even those who have seen the evidence and reached a conclusion about historical truth have “various opinions” about what they should do next.
As for himself, Rondeli said, it is his view that simple justice requires taking a position. “If they force us to recognize historical facts which in reality do not exist, then why cannot we join with the voices of those who assert that [the killing that took place in Sochi 150 years ago] was a genocide?”
Staunton, October 7 – The Circassian community is intensifying its efforts to gain international recognition for the Russian killing of their ancestors in 1864 in Sochi where Moscow wants to hold the Olympic Games in 2014, the 150th anniversary of those horrific events.
Last week, Circassians continued to lobby the Georgian parliament, many of whose members appear prepared to hold the Russian Empire responsible for the events of 1864 and to give Moscow a black eye in advance of the planned Olympiad. But in addition and, perhaps to greater effect, the Circassians asked the Estonians to push their cause in European institutions.
The International Circassian Council turned over to members of the Estonian parliament in Tallinn an appeal for assistance and then in Brussels met with Indrek Tarand, an Estonian representative to the European Paarliament as well as with the members of that body’s sub-committee on human rights (kavkasia.net/Russia/2010/1286478926.php).
The Circassian appeal began with the assertion that “the Circassian people is a victim of genocide,” something it insisted the international community must take note of, especially given Moscow’s preparations for the 2014 Olympic Games and Russia’s failure to protect human rights or the environment there.
“In recent years,” it continued, the situation in the North Caucasus with regard to human rights has become sharply worse, and incidents of the persecution of journalists have achieved a critical level. In addition, the Russian government [in its preparations for Sochi] has ignored all ecological norms,” something that has already had a negative impact on people living there.
“Circassians living through the entire world together with their compatriots do not intend to accept the existing situation and thus want to gain the attention of the international community to these facts,” the appeal said, in the hope and expectation that “civilized countries” will take a clear and forceful position against what Moscow is doing.
“The reputation of Estonia as a reformist country, member of the European Union and NATO,” it continued, “permits the hope that this appeal will receive the necessary attention of the Estonian government and society, promote timely intervention in this situation, and guarantee an active part in the resolution of these questions by its partner countries.”
Meanwhile in Georgia, support for the Circassian position appears to be growing. Alexander Rondeli, a prominent commentator, said that justice required reaching a conclusion about the events of 1864 on the basis of facts, even though Moscow would use any Georgian declaration on this point against Tbilisi (kavkasia.net/interview/article/1286427893.php).
Most Georgians who have looked into the matter have concluded that “the physical destruction of the Circassians by Russia on an ethnic basis in the 19th century” took place, although debates about the interpretation of specific facts continue, all the more so because of the complexities of the relationship between the Russian Federation and Georgia now.
Moscow, however, invariably tries to blame Georgia for anything bad that happens in the region especially when it can be tied to the Sochi Olympics, Rondeli pointed out, and many people dismiss Georgian responses as nothing more than tit-for-tat, without being willing to examine the evidence offered by the various sides.
Consequently, even though most Georgian experts accept that Russian Imperial officials killed Chechens on an ethnic basis, the key characteristic of a genocide, Rondeli continued, Georgian officials cannot ignore that “the fact of recognition by Georgia of the genocide of the Circassians will also be used against Georgia.”
Indeed, he pointed out, “a decision of the Georgian parliament [on this point] will be used for anti-Georgian propaganda,” and that reality means that even those who have seen the evidence and reached a conclusion about historical truth have “various opinions” about what they should do next.
As for himself, Rondeli said, it is his view that simple justice requires taking a position. “If they force us to recognize historical facts which in reality do not exist, then why cannot we join with the voices of those who assert that [the killing that took place in Sochi 150 years ago] was a genocide?”
Window on Eurasia: To Pacify North Caucasus, Moscow Plans to Replace Non-Russian Officials with Ethnic Russian One
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 7 – Most commentators on the newly approved “Strategy for the Social-Economic Development of the North Caucasus Federal District out to 2025” have focused on its plan to dispatch ethnic Russians to the region and non-Russians from that region to other parts of the Russian Federation.
While many of them support the idea of reversing ethnic Russian flight from that region, few appear to believe that Moscow or the governments in the region will be able to do that. And overwhelmingly, these Russian analysts have expressed concern about the impact of the arrival of even more “persons of Caucasus nationality” into the center of Russia.
Moreover, the reluctance of most Russians to move to a region they see as still extremely unsettled and their opposition to additional gastarbeiters in Russian cities and towns means that in the short term at least the Russian powers that be are unlikely to be able to achieve much in either of these areas.
But one Russian analyst, Konstantin Novikov, has focused on an aspect of this program that Moscow does appear likely to implement -- even though it is certain to lead to a further deterioration of ethnic relations in the North Caucasus and possibly to intensify violence there
(ruskline.ru/analitika/2010/10/07/strategiya_zamireniya_kavkaza_generalgubernatora_hloponina/).
Novikov argues that as part of what he calls “Governor General Khloponin’s pacification strategy” – the complete text of that 25,000-word document is available online at government.ru/media/2010/10/4/35578/file/1485.doc -- Moscow will replace local non-Russian officials with ethnic Russian ones brought in from other parts of the country.
In his analysis of the strategy document, Novikov says that its authors believe that the North Caucasus will remain “primarily agrarian,” something that if true will make the transfer of significant populations that the strategy anticipates even more difficult than might otherwise be the case.
What the strategy calls for to make it attractive for ethnic Russians is the development of tourism and transportation and selected industries, sectors the center through Aleksandr Khloponin, the presidential plenipotentiary, is prepared to provide massive financing at least in the short term.
And despite earlier denials, Novikov continues, the strategy calls for boosting outmigration of non-Russians from the region from 17,500 a year to as many as 40,000, a number that will create problems elsewhere because the North Caucasians will not, as the authors of the strategy believe, replace Central Asian gastarbeiters but compete with them.
That in turn, the Moscow analyst argues, will lead to more crime and more xenophobia among ethnic Russians, developments that will simultaneously limit these flows and require Moscow’s intervention to maintain order in places where the situation at present is more or less stable.
But the most interesting aspect of the strategy, Novikov continues, is that it identifies “the outflow of the ethnic Russian population from the North Caucasus” as “one of the main causes of the destabilized situation,” reversing what most analysts say is the cause and the effect, and commits Moscow to returning ethnic Russians to the region.
“For the first time in the history of post-Soviet Russia,” he writes, the powers that be have set as their task “the social-economic development of places of compact settlement of the ethnic Russian population, including the implementation of investment projects and the creation of the infrastructure of Russian culture in the North Caucasus.”
To that end, Novikov notes, the strategy calls for providing those who move there with housing and compensation for resettling. Moreover, it “includes the creation of social preferences for the ethnic Russian population (as sometimes were given to representatives of Soviet national minorities) including in the sphere of education and science.”
The strategy calls for “quotas” for ethnic Russians in republic higher educational institutions and offers ethnic Russians “the opportunities for government and municipal service especially in places of their compact settlement” in the non-Russian republics of the North Caucasus.
But perhaps most significantly, the strategy, which is based on a recognition of “the danger of mono-national formation of the quasi-state formations in the North Caucasus,” calls for “attracting the ethnic Russian element into the administrative and economic structures of the republics,” through the use of “the old Soviet method of national quotas – but now for Russians.”
(In an aside, Novikov suggests that this goal helps to explain why Stavropol kray was included in the North Caucasus Federal District. That was done, he said, “consciously” in order to create a “’neutral’” territory within the district “so that the organs [of the district] could remain primarily ethnic Russian.”)
It remains to be seen, Novikov concludes, “how far the powers that be are prepared to go for the realization of their goals in the North Caucasus.” It is, however, clear that they will face enormous resistance from non-Russians there, who view their ability in post-Soviet times to put members of their own nationality into office as a major step forward.
But Khloponin’s proposals point to a development with consequences far beyond the North Caucasus: His suggestions, which have now been approved by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, suggest that the Russian Federation is moving toward a system in which the majority nationality – the ethnic Russians – will be given preferences at the expense of non-Russians.
That may win Moscow points from some ethnic Russian nationalists, but this taking back of something the non-Russians won after the fall of the Soviet Union will likely trigger new non-Russian challenges to the center just as Mikhail Gorbachev’s turn to the right at the end of 1990, after he had promoted liberalization, had the effect of accelerating the demise of the USSR.
Staunton, October 7 – Most commentators on the newly approved “Strategy for the Social-Economic Development of the North Caucasus Federal District out to 2025” have focused on its plan to dispatch ethnic Russians to the region and non-Russians from that region to other parts of the Russian Federation.
While many of them support the idea of reversing ethnic Russian flight from that region, few appear to believe that Moscow or the governments in the region will be able to do that. And overwhelmingly, these Russian analysts have expressed concern about the impact of the arrival of even more “persons of Caucasus nationality” into the center of Russia.
Moreover, the reluctance of most Russians to move to a region they see as still extremely unsettled and their opposition to additional gastarbeiters in Russian cities and towns means that in the short term at least the Russian powers that be are unlikely to be able to achieve much in either of these areas.
But one Russian analyst, Konstantin Novikov, has focused on an aspect of this program that Moscow does appear likely to implement -- even though it is certain to lead to a further deterioration of ethnic relations in the North Caucasus and possibly to intensify violence there
(ruskline.ru/analitika/2010/10/07/strategiya_zamireniya_kavkaza_generalgubernatora_hloponina/).
Novikov argues that as part of what he calls “Governor General Khloponin’s pacification strategy” – the complete text of that 25,000-word document is available online at government.ru/media/2010/10/4/35578/file/1485.doc -- Moscow will replace local non-Russian officials with ethnic Russian ones brought in from other parts of the country.
In his analysis of the strategy document, Novikov says that its authors believe that the North Caucasus will remain “primarily agrarian,” something that if true will make the transfer of significant populations that the strategy anticipates even more difficult than might otherwise be the case.
What the strategy calls for to make it attractive for ethnic Russians is the development of tourism and transportation and selected industries, sectors the center through Aleksandr Khloponin, the presidential plenipotentiary, is prepared to provide massive financing at least in the short term.
And despite earlier denials, Novikov continues, the strategy calls for boosting outmigration of non-Russians from the region from 17,500 a year to as many as 40,000, a number that will create problems elsewhere because the North Caucasians will not, as the authors of the strategy believe, replace Central Asian gastarbeiters but compete with them.
That in turn, the Moscow analyst argues, will lead to more crime and more xenophobia among ethnic Russians, developments that will simultaneously limit these flows and require Moscow’s intervention to maintain order in places where the situation at present is more or less stable.
But the most interesting aspect of the strategy, Novikov continues, is that it identifies “the outflow of the ethnic Russian population from the North Caucasus” as “one of the main causes of the destabilized situation,” reversing what most analysts say is the cause and the effect, and commits Moscow to returning ethnic Russians to the region.
“For the first time in the history of post-Soviet Russia,” he writes, the powers that be have set as their task “the social-economic development of places of compact settlement of the ethnic Russian population, including the implementation of investment projects and the creation of the infrastructure of Russian culture in the North Caucasus.”
To that end, Novikov notes, the strategy calls for providing those who move there with housing and compensation for resettling. Moreover, it “includes the creation of social preferences for the ethnic Russian population (as sometimes were given to representatives of Soviet national minorities) including in the sphere of education and science.”
The strategy calls for “quotas” for ethnic Russians in republic higher educational institutions and offers ethnic Russians “the opportunities for government and municipal service especially in places of their compact settlement” in the non-Russian republics of the North Caucasus.
But perhaps most significantly, the strategy, which is based on a recognition of “the danger of mono-national formation of the quasi-state formations in the North Caucasus,” calls for “attracting the ethnic Russian element into the administrative and economic structures of the republics,” through the use of “the old Soviet method of national quotas – but now for Russians.”
(In an aside, Novikov suggests that this goal helps to explain why Stavropol kray was included in the North Caucasus Federal District. That was done, he said, “consciously” in order to create a “’neutral’” territory within the district “so that the organs [of the district] could remain primarily ethnic Russian.”)
It remains to be seen, Novikov concludes, “how far the powers that be are prepared to go for the realization of their goals in the North Caucasus.” It is, however, clear that they will face enormous resistance from non-Russians there, who view their ability in post-Soviet times to put members of their own nationality into office as a major step forward.
But Khloponin’s proposals point to a development with consequences far beyond the North Caucasus: His suggestions, which have now been approved by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, suggest that the Russian Federation is moving toward a system in which the majority nationality – the ethnic Russians – will be given preferences at the expense of non-Russians.
That may win Moscow points from some ethnic Russian nationalists, but this taking back of something the non-Russians won after the fall of the Soviet Union will likely trigger new non-Russian challenges to the center just as Mikhail Gorbachev’s turn to the right at the end of 1990, after he had promoted liberalization, had the effect of accelerating the demise of the USSR.
Wednesday, October 6, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Acting Moscow Mayor Calls for Public Hearings on All Plans to Build Churches, Mosques and Synagogues
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 6 – Vladimir Resin, the acting mayor of the Russian capital, yesterday called for holding public hearings about all projects for the construction of churches, mosques, and synagogues, a plan that could threaten existing relationships between the city and the Moscow Patriarchate even as it creates new venues for protests against building more mosques.
During a meeting of the city government at which some religious leaders were present, Resin said that “it is necessary to initiate public hearings on each project for the construction of new churches, mosques and synagogues” so as to ensure conformity by the projects to the city’s development plan (www.rian.ru/moscow/20101005/282425392.html).
But like all such programs, this one, if it is in fact carried out, will have very different consequences for the two largest religious communities in Moscow, Russian Orthodox Christians and Muslims, and the way they interact with the official bureaucracy and with the civil population there.
For the Russian Orthodox, such hearings could complicate the cozy relationship the Moscow Patriarchate has had with the city authorities, a relationship that in the past has meant that the city government has responded to the Church’s requests without either seeking input from the population.
Now that would appear likely to change, and while few Muscovites may be opposed to church construction per se, some may object to the building of a church in a particular location or of a particular size. Indeed, polls have shown that some residents of Russian cities are inclined to oppose any new construction.
Moreover, the holding of such hearings could easily become the occasion for representatives of other faiths, particularly Muslims, to make their own cases for construction of mosques or other religious sites, arguing that if the Orthodox are allowed to build more churches, they should be allowed to construct additional religious facilities as well.
For the Muslims, in contrast, such hearings almost certainly would be the occasion for those Muscovites such as the residents of the Tekstilshchiki neighborhood who oppose the building of mosques in their neighborhoods on principle to express their views, quite possibly giving them the chance to mobilize even more people to their point of view.
But such hearings, far more than the demonstrations and petitions against mosques so far, will also give the Muslim community and its leaders the opportunity to mobilize and express their view, something that could easily land those city officials charged with making a decision after such hearings in a politically difficult position.
Just how sensitive these issues are and how complicated the discussion of them in such forums will be is reflected in two items just posted online in Moscow. The first is the text of the presentation Ravil Gainutdin made to the meeting of the city government yesterday, and the second is a report by Komsomolskaya Pravda on new church construction in Moscow.
Gainutdin, head of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), said that the extreme shortage of mosques in the Russian capital is “an objective fact” and harms both Moscow’s image and the ability of Islamic leaders to help integrate Muslim workers into the life of the Russian capital (www.muslim.ru/1/cont/33/35/2155.htm).
A mosque, he pointed out, “is not only a play for carrying out divine services and offering prayers. The main thing is that in mosques, parishioners receive instruction, spiritual, moral and political training, and correct guidance on their life paths,” often things migrants can get nowhere else.
And his organization, Gainutdin said, seeks to devote “great efforts in education work to prevent or cure extremist attitudes and the radicalization among Muslim young people, especially those who come to work in Moscow from the North Caucasus and from countries abroad.”
Such people, the SMR head continued, especially “the young who are cut off from their families and from parental guidance” very much need to be able to come to the mosque “for adaptation in the new for them milieu of the megalopolis and for the preservation of the best that genuine Muslim education can give.”
“In the mosque,” he said, “they will find true words and guidance which will help them orient themselves in the new situation and not commit act which alienate the residents of the capable and are capable of giving birth to conflict.” Consequently, Gainutdin concluded, Moscow needs to have more than the four mosques open there now.
Meanwhile, the “Komsomolskaya Pravda” report shows why Russian Orthodox hierarchs and laity are going to fight for the construction of more churches in Moscow. The article notes that while most people speak about the existence of 836 Orthodox Church facilities there, the real number is only 263 (http://www.kp.ru/daily/24570/742375/).
That is because the others are inside institutions and thus not available “for all.” According to the Moscow Patriarchate, the city needs to have 591 more public churches in order that there be one church for every 11,200 residents, a ratio that it says is found throughout the rest of the country.
To that end, the Church is engaged in a building boom with 35 new churches either under construction or soon to be – the paper provides a list of their addresses and a map of their locations – with most of them inexpensive pre-fabricated buildings so that the Church can get them up in a hurry at the lowest possible cost.
Those 35 are part of the 200 that Yuri Luzhkov supposedly approved in conversation with Patriarch Kirill and his hierarchs shortly before the mayor’s ouster. But given Resin’s call for hearings about all new construction, it remains to be seen whether there will be new fights about any of these, just as there continue to be about possible new mosques.
Staunton, October 6 – Vladimir Resin, the acting mayor of the Russian capital, yesterday called for holding public hearings about all projects for the construction of churches, mosques, and synagogues, a plan that could threaten existing relationships between the city and the Moscow Patriarchate even as it creates new venues for protests against building more mosques.
During a meeting of the city government at which some religious leaders were present, Resin said that “it is necessary to initiate public hearings on each project for the construction of new churches, mosques and synagogues” so as to ensure conformity by the projects to the city’s development plan (www.rian.ru/moscow/20101005/282425392.html).
But like all such programs, this one, if it is in fact carried out, will have very different consequences for the two largest religious communities in Moscow, Russian Orthodox Christians and Muslims, and the way they interact with the official bureaucracy and with the civil population there.
For the Russian Orthodox, such hearings could complicate the cozy relationship the Moscow Patriarchate has had with the city authorities, a relationship that in the past has meant that the city government has responded to the Church’s requests without either seeking input from the population.
Now that would appear likely to change, and while few Muscovites may be opposed to church construction per se, some may object to the building of a church in a particular location or of a particular size. Indeed, polls have shown that some residents of Russian cities are inclined to oppose any new construction.
Moreover, the holding of such hearings could easily become the occasion for representatives of other faiths, particularly Muslims, to make their own cases for construction of mosques or other religious sites, arguing that if the Orthodox are allowed to build more churches, they should be allowed to construct additional religious facilities as well.
For the Muslims, in contrast, such hearings almost certainly would be the occasion for those Muscovites such as the residents of the Tekstilshchiki neighborhood who oppose the building of mosques in their neighborhoods on principle to express their views, quite possibly giving them the chance to mobilize even more people to their point of view.
But such hearings, far more than the demonstrations and petitions against mosques so far, will also give the Muslim community and its leaders the opportunity to mobilize and express their view, something that could easily land those city officials charged with making a decision after such hearings in a politically difficult position.
Just how sensitive these issues are and how complicated the discussion of them in such forums will be is reflected in two items just posted online in Moscow. The first is the text of the presentation Ravil Gainutdin made to the meeting of the city government yesterday, and the second is a report by Komsomolskaya Pravda on new church construction in Moscow.
Gainutdin, head of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), said that the extreme shortage of mosques in the Russian capital is “an objective fact” and harms both Moscow’s image and the ability of Islamic leaders to help integrate Muslim workers into the life of the Russian capital (www.muslim.ru/1/cont/33/35/2155.htm).
A mosque, he pointed out, “is not only a play for carrying out divine services and offering prayers. The main thing is that in mosques, parishioners receive instruction, spiritual, moral and political training, and correct guidance on their life paths,” often things migrants can get nowhere else.
And his organization, Gainutdin said, seeks to devote “great efforts in education work to prevent or cure extremist attitudes and the radicalization among Muslim young people, especially those who come to work in Moscow from the North Caucasus and from countries abroad.”
Such people, the SMR head continued, especially “the young who are cut off from their families and from parental guidance” very much need to be able to come to the mosque “for adaptation in the new for them milieu of the megalopolis and for the preservation of the best that genuine Muslim education can give.”
“In the mosque,” he said, “they will find true words and guidance which will help them orient themselves in the new situation and not commit act which alienate the residents of the capable and are capable of giving birth to conflict.” Consequently, Gainutdin concluded, Moscow needs to have more than the four mosques open there now.
Meanwhile, the “Komsomolskaya Pravda” report shows why Russian Orthodox hierarchs and laity are going to fight for the construction of more churches in Moscow. The article notes that while most people speak about the existence of 836 Orthodox Church facilities there, the real number is only 263 (http://www.kp.ru/daily/24570/742375/).
That is because the others are inside institutions and thus not available “for all.” According to the Moscow Patriarchate, the city needs to have 591 more public churches in order that there be one church for every 11,200 residents, a ratio that it says is found throughout the rest of the country.
To that end, the Church is engaged in a building boom with 35 new churches either under construction or soon to be – the paper provides a list of their addresses and a map of their locations – with most of them inexpensive pre-fabricated buildings so that the Church can get them up in a hurry at the lowest possible cost.
Those 35 are part of the 200 that Yuri Luzhkov supposedly approved in conversation with Patriarch Kirill and his hierarchs shortly before the mayor’s ouster. But given Resin’s call for hearings about all new construction, it remains to be seen whether there will be new fights about any of these, just as there continue to be about possible new mosques.
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