Paul Goble
Staunton, October 7 – Most commentators on the newly approved “Strategy for the Social-Economic Development of the North Caucasus Federal District out to 2025” have focused on its plan to dispatch ethnic Russians to the region and non-Russians from that region to other parts of the Russian Federation.
While many of them support the idea of reversing ethnic Russian flight from that region, few appear to believe that Moscow or the governments in the region will be able to do that. And overwhelmingly, these Russian analysts have expressed concern about the impact of the arrival of even more “persons of Caucasus nationality” into the center of Russia.
Moreover, the reluctance of most Russians to move to a region they see as still extremely unsettled and their opposition to additional gastarbeiters in Russian cities and towns means that in the short term at least the Russian powers that be are unlikely to be able to achieve much in either of these areas.
But one Russian analyst, Konstantin Novikov, has focused on an aspect of this program that Moscow does appear likely to implement -- even though it is certain to lead to a further deterioration of ethnic relations in the North Caucasus and possibly to intensify violence there
(ruskline.ru/analitika/2010/10/07/strategiya_zamireniya_kavkaza_generalgubernatora_hloponina/).
Novikov argues that as part of what he calls “Governor General Khloponin’s pacification strategy” – the complete text of that 25,000-word document is available online at government.ru/media/2010/10/4/35578/file/1485.doc -- Moscow will replace local non-Russian officials with ethnic Russian ones brought in from other parts of the country.
In his analysis of the strategy document, Novikov says that its authors believe that the North Caucasus will remain “primarily agrarian,” something that if true will make the transfer of significant populations that the strategy anticipates even more difficult than might otherwise be the case.
What the strategy calls for to make it attractive for ethnic Russians is the development of tourism and transportation and selected industries, sectors the center through Aleksandr Khloponin, the presidential plenipotentiary, is prepared to provide massive financing at least in the short term.
And despite earlier denials, Novikov continues, the strategy calls for boosting outmigration of non-Russians from the region from 17,500 a year to as many as 40,000, a number that will create problems elsewhere because the North Caucasians will not, as the authors of the strategy believe, replace Central Asian gastarbeiters but compete with them.
That in turn, the Moscow analyst argues, will lead to more crime and more xenophobia among ethnic Russians, developments that will simultaneously limit these flows and require Moscow’s intervention to maintain order in places where the situation at present is more or less stable.
But the most interesting aspect of the strategy, Novikov continues, is that it identifies “the outflow of the ethnic Russian population from the North Caucasus” as “one of the main causes of the destabilized situation,” reversing what most analysts say is the cause and the effect, and commits Moscow to returning ethnic Russians to the region.
“For the first time in the history of post-Soviet Russia,” he writes, the powers that be have set as their task “the social-economic development of places of compact settlement of the ethnic Russian population, including the implementation of investment projects and the creation of the infrastructure of Russian culture in the North Caucasus.”
To that end, Novikov notes, the strategy calls for providing those who move there with housing and compensation for resettling. Moreover, it “includes the creation of social preferences for the ethnic Russian population (as sometimes were given to representatives of Soviet national minorities) including in the sphere of education and science.”
The strategy calls for “quotas” for ethnic Russians in republic higher educational institutions and offers ethnic Russians “the opportunities for government and municipal service especially in places of their compact settlement” in the non-Russian republics of the North Caucasus.
But perhaps most significantly, the strategy, which is based on a recognition of “the danger of mono-national formation of the quasi-state formations in the North Caucasus,” calls for “attracting the ethnic Russian element into the administrative and economic structures of the republics,” through the use of “the old Soviet method of national quotas – but now for Russians.”
(In an aside, Novikov suggests that this goal helps to explain why Stavropol kray was included in the North Caucasus Federal District. That was done, he said, “consciously” in order to create a “’neutral’” territory within the district “so that the organs [of the district] could remain primarily ethnic Russian.”)
It remains to be seen, Novikov concludes, “how far the powers that be are prepared to go for the realization of their goals in the North Caucasus.” It is, however, clear that they will face enormous resistance from non-Russians there, who view their ability in post-Soviet times to put members of their own nationality into office as a major step forward.
But Khloponin’s proposals point to a development with consequences far beyond the North Caucasus: His suggestions, which have now been approved by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, suggest that the Russian Federation is moving toward a system in which the majority nationality – the ethnic Russians – will be given preferences at the expense of non-Russians.
That may win Moscow points from some ethnic Russian nationalists, but this taking back of something the non-Russians won after the fall of the Soviet Union will likely trigger new non-Russian challenges to the center just as Mikhail Gorbachev’s turn to the right at the end of 1990, after he had promoted liberalization, had the effect of accelerating the demise of the USSR.
Thursday, October 7, 2010
Wednesday, October 6, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Acting Moscow Mayor Calls for Public Hearings on All Plans to Build Churches, Mosques and Synagogues
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 6 – Vladimir Resin, the acting mayor of the Russian capital, yesterday called for holding public hearings about all projects for the construction of churches, mosques, and synagogues, a plan that could threaten existing relationships between the city and the Moscow Patriarchate even as it creates new venues for protests against building more mosques.
During a meeting of the city government at which some religious leaders were present, Resin said that “it is necessary to initiate public hearings on each project for the construction of new churches, mosques and synagogues” so as to ensure conformity by the projects to the city’s development plan (www.rian.ru/moscow/20101005/282425392.html).
But like all such programs, this one, if it is in fact carried out, will have very different consequences for the two largest religious communities in Moscow, Russian Orthodox Christians and Muslims, and the way they interact with the official bureaucracy and with the civil population there.
For the Russian Orthodox, such hearings could complicate the cozy relationship the Moscow Patriarchate has had with the city authorities, a relationship that in the past has meant that the city government has responded to the Church’s requests without either seeking input from the population.
Now that would appear likely to change, and while few Muscovites may be opposed to church construction per se, some may object to the building of a church in a particular location or of a particular size. Indeed, polls have shown that some residents of Russian cities are inclined to oppose any new construction.
Moreover, the holding of such hearings could easily become the occasion for representatives of other faiths, particularly Muslims, to make their own cases for construction of mosques or other religious sites, arguing that if the Orthodox are allowed to build more churches, they should be allowed to construct additional religious facilities as well.
For the Muslims, in contrast, such hearings almost certainly would be the occasion for those Muscovites such as the residents of the Tekstilshchiki neighborhood who oppose the building of mosques in their neighborhoods on principle to express their views, quite possibly giving them the chance to mobilize even more people to their point of view.
But such hearings, far more than the demonstrations and petitions against mosques so far, will also give the Muslim community and its leaders the opportunity to mobilize and express their view, something that could easily land those city officials charged with making a decision after such hearings in a politically difficult position.
Just how sensitive these issues are and how complicated the discussion of them in such forums will be is reflected in two items just posted online in Moscow. The first is the text of the presentation Ravil Gainutdin made to the meeting of the city government yesterday, and the second is a report by Komsomolskaya Pravda on new church construction in Moscow.
Gainutdin, head of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), said that the extreme shortage of mosques in the Russian capital is “an objective fact” and harms both Moscow’s image and the ability of Islamic leaders to help integrate Muslim workers into the life of the Russian capital (www.muslim.ru/1/cont/33/35/2155.htm).
A mosque, he pointed out, “is not only a play for carrying out divine services and offering prayers. The main thing is that in mosques, parishioners receive instruction, spiritual, moral and political training, and correct guidance on their life paths,” often things migrants can get nowhere else.
And his organization, Gainutdin said, seeks to devote “great efforts in education work to prevent or cure extremist attitudes and the radicalization among Muslim young people, especially those who come to work in Moscow from the North Caucasus and from countries abroad.”
Such people, the SMR head continued, especially “the young who are cut off from their families and from parental guidance” very much need to be able to come to the mosque “for adaptation in the new for them milieu of the megalopolis and for the preservation of the best that genuine Muslim education can give.”
“In the mosque,” he said, “they will find true words and guidance which will help them orient themselves in the new situation and not commit act which alienate the residents of the capable and are capable of giving birth to conflict.” Consequently, Gainutdin concluded, Moscow needs to have more than the four mosques open there now.
Meanwhile, the “Komsomolskaya Pravda” report shows why Russian Orthodox hierarchs and laity are going to fight for the construction of more churches in Moscow. The article notes that while most people speak about the existence of 836 Orthodox Church facilities there, the real number is only 263 (http://www.kp.ru/daily/24570/742375/).
That is because the others are inside institutions and thus not available “for all.” According to the Moscow Patriarchate, the city needs to have 591 more public churches in order that there be one church for every 11,200 residents, a ratio that it says is found throughout the rest of the country.
To that end, the Church is engaged in a building boom with 35 new churches either under construction or soon to be – the paper provides a list of their addresses and a map of their locations – with most of them inexpensive pre-fabricated buildings so that the Church can get them up in a hurry at the lowest possible cost.
Those 35 are part of the 200 that Yuri Luzhkov supposedly approved in conversation with Patriarch Kirill and his hierarchs shortly before the mayor’s ouster. But given Resin’s call for hearings about all new construction, it remains to be seen whether there will be new fights about any of these, just as there continue to be about possible new mosques.
Staunton, October 6 – Vladimir Resin, the acting mayor of the Russian capital, yesterday called for holding public hearings about all projects for the construction of churches, mosques, and synagogues, a plan that could threaten existing relationships between the city and the Moscow Patriarchate even as it creates new venues for protests against building more mosques.
During a meeting of the city government at which some religious leaders were present, Resin said that “it is necessary to initiate public hearings on each project for the construction of new churches, mosques and synagogues” so as to ensure conformity by the projects to the city’s development plan (www.rian.ru/moscow/20101005/282425392.html).
But like all such programs, this one, if it is in fact carried out, will have very different consequences for the two largest religious communities in Moscow, Russian Orthodox Christians and Muslims, and the way they interact with the official bureaucracy and with the civil population there.
For the Russian Orthodox, such hearings could complicate the cozy relationship the Moscow Patriarchate has had with the city authorities, a relationship that in the past has meant that the city government has responded to the Church’s requests without either seeking input from the population.
Now that would appear likely to change, and while few Muscovites may be opposed to church construction per se, some may object to the building of a church in a particular location or of a particular size. Indeed, polls have shown that some residents of Russian cities are inclined to oppose any new construction.
Moreover, the holding of such hearings could easily become the occasion for representatives of other faiths, particularly Muslims, to make their own cases for construction of mosques or other religious sites, arguing that if the Orthodox are allowed to build more churches, they should be allowed to construct additional religious facilities as well.
For the Muslims, in contrast, such hearings almost certainly would be the occasion for those Muscovites such as the residents of the Tekstilshchiki neighborhood who oppose the building of mosques in their neighborhoods on principle to express their views, quite possibly giving them the chance to mobilize even more people to their point of view.
But such hearings, far more than the demonstrations and petitions against mosques so far, will also give the Muslim community and its leaders the opportunity to mobilize and express their view, something that could easily land those city officials charged with making a decision after such hearings in a politically difficult position.
Just how sensitive these issues are and how complicated the discussion of them in such forums will be is reflected in two items just posted online in Moscow. The first is the text of the presentation Ravil Gainutdin made to the meeting of the city government yesterday, and the second is a report by Komsomolskaya Pravda on new church construction in Moscow.
Gainutdin, head of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), said that the extreme shortage of mosques in the Russian capital is “an objective fact” and harms both Moscow’s image and the ability of Islamic leaders to help integrate Muslim workers into the life of the Russian capital (www.muslim.ru/1/cont/33/35/2155.htm).
A mosque, he pointed out, “is not only a play for carrying out divine services and offering prayers. The main thing is that in mosques, parishioners receive instruction, spiritual, moral and political training, and correct guidance on their life paths,” often things migrants can get nowhere else.
And his organization, Gainutdin said, seeks to devote “great efforts in education work to prevent or cure extremist attitudes and the radicalization among Muslim young people, especially those who come to work in Moscow from the North Caucasus and from countries abroad.”
Such people, the SMR head continued, especially “the young who are cut off from their families and from parental guidance” very much need to be able to come to the mosque “for adaptation in the new for them milieu of the megalopolis and for the preservation of the best that genuine Muslim education can give.”
“In the mosque,” he said, “they will find true words and guidance which will help them orient themselves in the new situation and not commit act which alienate the residents of the capable and are capable of giving birth to conflict.” Consequently, Gainutdin concluded, Moscow needs to have more than the four mosques open there now.
Meanwhile, the “Komsomolskaya Pravda” report shows why Russian Orthodox hierarchs and laity are going to fight for the construction of more churches in Moscow. The article notes that while most people speak about the existence of 836 Orthodox Church facilities there, the real number is only 263 (http://www.kp.ru/daily/24570/742375/).
That is because the others are inside institutions and thus not available “for all.” According to the Moscow Patriarchate, the city needs to have 591 more public churches in order that there be one church for every 11,200 residents, a ratio that it says is found throughout the rest of the country.
To that end, the Church is engaged in a building boom with 35 new churches either under construction or soon to be – the paper provides a list of their addresses and a map of their locations – with most of them inexpensive pre-fabricated buildings so that the Church can get them up in a hurry at the lowest possible cost.
Those 35 are part of the 200 that Yuri Luzhkov supposedly approved in conversation with Patriarch Kirill and his hierarchs shortly before the mayor’s ouster. But given Resin’s call for hearings about all new construction, it remains to be seen whether there will be new fights about any of these, just as there continue to be about possible new mosques.
Window on Eurasia: Counting Russian Federation’s Nationalities Far from an Exact Science, Tishkov Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 6 – Russian experts and statisticians have worked hard to ensure that the question of national identities in the upcoming census will not be as controversial and politicized as it was in the 2002 count, according to Academician Valery Tishkov, director of the Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology.
But that does not mean, Tishkov says in an article in today’s “Rossiiskaya gazeta,” that all problems in this area have been solved –the enormous complexity of the situation means there will always be disagreements on which groups to include or exclude – or that the census later this month will not spark controversy (www.rg.ru/2010/10/06/perepis.html).
In 2002, the academician recalls, then-Patriarch Aleksii asked then-Russian President Vladimir Putin to add to the nationalities list the Kryashens, a sub-group of Tatars who practice Orthodox Christianity. Tishkov’s institute agreed, and then-Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiyev accused Moscow of trying to “split the Tatar nation on religious lines.”
Following that and other controversies, Russian scholars and officials agreed on “a compromise in the form of dual ethnic membership according to the principle of ‘group-sub-group,’” that Tishkov says corresponds to “the real presence among part of [the residents of Russia] of a complex ethnic self-consciousness.”
Even that compromise, however, has not made everyone happy, he continues, because activists in many groups are certain that this arrangement is intended to reduce their number to the benefit of other groups, something that they believe threatens the status and income of their own nationality.
This time around, Tishkov argues, “it is important to rein in political ambitions and ethno-centrism,” saying that the latter is “the more scandalous” because promoting one identity necessarily has the impact of reducing another. Thus, those who say “describe yourself as a Tatar” are in fact saying “don’t be a Kryashen.”
The history of Moscow’s compilation of lists of ethnic groups extends back to the 1920s when the Commission for the Study of the Tribal Composition of the Population of the Soviet Union first compiled them. Its list was used in the 1926, 1937 and 1939 censuses. For more recent ones, in 1959, 1970, and 1989, his institute drew up the lists.
There can be no final list because ethnic self-consciousness is something changeable for any number of reasons as well as being subject to multiple interpretations both by those making declarations and those recording them, Tishkov says. Instead, the lists are going to constantly change, something some will see as politicized even when it is not.
In 1989, the list included 128 “nations and peoples.” In 2002, there were 142 “basic” ethnic names and 40 “sub-groups” included within those. Some of those changes reflected changes abroad – the breakup of Yugoslavia – and others domestic concerns – Daghestani fears of upsetting the ethnic balance there.
Because approximately 40 non-Russian peoples have some form of administrative-state status within the Russian Federation and because more than 40 have the status of “numerically small indigenous peoples,” the census must count them as accurately as possible so as to provide the basis for the distribution of funds.
Doing so, however, is not always easy, Tishkov points out. Within the districts where they have such official recognition, officials are careful to count them, but when representatives live beyond the borders of those entities, officials there may have less experience with and interest in counting them, something that can be a source of problems.
That can affect large groups like the Tatars and Bashkirs but it can also affect small ones like the Nivkh. Moreover, this pattern can sometimes take the opposite form: In 2002, for example, the Botlikhs, a numerically small ethnic community in Daghestan, were counted as a nationality in Moscow, Rostov, and Chelyabinsk but not in their home republic.
As Tishkov’s extensive discussion of these and other issues makes clear, it is probably unrealistic to expect that the findings of the 2010 census on nationality will be accepted as absolutely accurate by everyone. Instead, this enumeration like its predecessors almost certainly will revive old disputes and provoke new and unexpected ones as well.
Staunton, October 6 – Russian experts and statisticians have worked hard to ensure that the question of national identities in the upcoming census will not be as controversial and politicized as it was in the 2002 count, according to Academician Valery Tishkov, director of the Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology.
But that does not mean, Tishkov says in an article in today’s “Rossiiskaya gazeta,” that all problems in this area have been solved –the enormous complexity of the situation means there will always be disagreements on which groups to include or exclude – or that the census later this month will not spark controversy (www.rg.ru/2010/10/06/perepis.html).
In 2002, the academician recalls, then-Patriarch Aleksii asked then-Russian President Vladimir Putin to add to the nationalities list the Kryashens, a sub-group of Tatars who practice Orthodox Christianity. Tishkov’s institute agreed, and then-Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiyev accused Moscow of trying to “split the Tatar nation on religious lines.”
Following that and other controversies, Russian scholars and officials agreed on “a compromise in the form of dual ethnic membership according to the principle of ‘group-sub-group,’” that Tishkov says corresponds to “the real presence among part of [the residents of Russia] of a complex ethnic self-consciousness.”
Even that compromise, however, has not made everyone happy, he continues, because activists in many groups are certain that this arrangement is intended to reduce their number to the benefit of other groups, something that they believe threatens the status and income of their own nationality.
This time around, Tishkov argues, “it is important to rein in political ambitions and ethno-centrism,” saying that the latter is “the more scandalous” because promoting one identity necessarily has the impact of reducing another. Thus, those who say “describe yourself as a Tatar” are in fact saying “don’t be a Kryashen.”
The history of Moscow’s compilation of lists of ethnic groups extends back to the 1920s when the Commission for the Study of the Tribal Composition of the Population of the Soviet Union first compiled them. Its list was used in the 1926, 1937 and 1939 censuses. For more recent ones, in 1959, 1970, and 1989, his institute drew up the lists.
There can be no final list because ethnic self-consciousness is something changeable for any number of reasons as well as being subject to multiple interpretations both by those making declarations and those recording them, Tishkov says. Instead, the lists are going to constantly change, something some will see as politicized even when it is not.
In 1989, the list included 128 “nations and peoples.” In 2002, there were 142 “basic” ethnic names and 40 “sub-groups” included within those. Some of those changes reflected changes abroad – the breakup of Yugoslavia – and others domestic concerns – Daghestani fears of upsetting the ethnic balance there.
Because approximately 40 non-Russian peoples have some form of administrative-state status within the Russian Federation and because more than 40 have the status of “numerically small indigenous peoples,” the census must count them as accurately as possible so as to provide the basis for the distribution of funds.
Doing so, however, is not always easy, Tishkov points out. Within the districts where they have such official recognition, officials are careful to count them, but when representatives live beyond the borders of those entities, officials there may have less experience with and interest in counting them, something that can be a source of problems.
That can affect large groups like the Tatars and Bashkirs but it can also affect small ones like the Nivkh. Moreover, this pattern can sometimes take the opposite form: In 2002, for example, the Botlikhs, a numerically small ethnic community in Daghestan, were counted as a nationality in Moscow, Rostov, and Chelyabinsk but not in their home republic.
As Tishkov’s extensive discussion of these and other issues makes clear, it is probably unrealistic to expect that the findings of the 2010 census on nationality will be accepted as absolutely accurate by everyone. Instead, this enumeration like its predecessors almost certainly will revive old disputes and provoke new and unexpected ones as well.
Window on Eurasia: Those Who Say Authoritarianism Inevitable in Russia Share Blame for Putin’s Suppression of Freedom, Ryzhkov Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 6 – People in Russia and the West who provide support for “the myth of Russia’s historically predetermined path toward enslavement and authoritarianism” are contributing “to the continued suppression of human rights” there and thus providing “a valuable service to Vladimir Putin,” according to a former Duma deputy and now Ekho Moskvy host
But such people should remember, Vladimir Ryzhkov continues, that “each new article or book promoting these shame theories leads directly to … Russia’s continued backwardness, poverty and enslavement and [also to] an increase in Russians who emigrate to the West seeking freedom and prosperity” (www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/historically-determined-to-be-an-autocrat/418431.html and www.echo.msk.ru/blog/rizhkov/715893-echo/ ).
Putin and those around him such as Kremlin first deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov “don’t believe Russians can be trusted to vote,” Ryzhkov says, because the Russian prime minister and his supporters do not believe that the Russian people are “smart or civilized enough to vote responsibly.”
But that “condescending” view, the Ekho Moskvy journalist says, “is by no means limited to voting.” Putin and his entourage also “believe that the masses are not able to do anything,” that “Russia needs ‘a benevolent tsar’ with an iron-like power vertical to explain to the ignorant masses what is best for the country.”
When Putin eliminated the election of governors in 2004, he argued that this “would somehow help defend the country against terrorism,” but he also said that “if the people were allowed to vote, they might elect the ‘wrong’ candidates.” And since that time, he has repeated that argument “as a justification for squashing [all] political competition.”
Given that in Putin’s view, Russia’s “liberal and leftist opposition” parties are “a radical and revolutionary force,” he is fully justified in blocking them from being “elected by naïve and misguided” citizens. Only “the ‘systemic opposition’” can be permitted because those parties “obey his orders and help the Kremlin create the impression” that democracy exists.
Further, Ryzhkov continues, “to help ‘the kind tsar’ carry out his duties,” Putin placed “the major television channels under government control” and ensured that his pocket party, United Russia “dominated” those places where elections did take place or was in a position to “falsify” the outcomes, a classic example of “the end justifying the means.”
“The only exception” to Putin’s belief that “the people are ignorant and can’t be trusted with electing officials,” of course, was the elections of 2000 and 2004 when “by some miraculous stroke of fate,” Russians showed “unprecedented wisdom and responsibility” and voted for him.
In order to buttress his claims, Ryzhkov says, “Putin and his ideologues” – liked Surkov – “try to package their disdain in pseudo-historical terms,” arguing that “Russia has a unique ‘historical tradition’” and has “always been dominated by a strong autocrat in the Kremlin,” something no one is in a position to change at least for the present.
And while “Putin allows for the possibility that one day Russians might be able to overcome this 1000-year-old legacy” and become “mature and responsible enough” to take charge of their own affairs,” he makes it clear that that will occur only “sometime in the future, presumably long after Putin retires.”
This view, Ryzhkov says, allows Putin and his supporters to argue that “the systematic destruction of [Russia’s] democratic institution” that they have carried out was “not the result of manipulation, usurpation and the abuse of power but rather a natural and unavoidable manifestation of [the country’s] ‘predetermined historical path.’”
Such an argument “completely ignores” the history of liberal reform movements in Russia’s past, “including those pursued by Alexander II, Nicholas II, and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev,” Ryzhkov says, and thus should be dismissed as “cynical” and “cheap” political propaganda.
But at least, Putin is pushing this line to advance his own power. What is worse, Ryzhkov suggests, is when others in Russia and even more abroad “reinforce the myth of Russia’s historically pre-determined path toward enslavement and authoritarianism” by their writings.
They are whether they know it or not “providing a valuable service to Putin” and other opponents of democracy and freedom in Russia and thus making “their own contribution to the continued suppression of human rights in Russia now” whose people deserve the chance to take control of their own fate.
Staunton, October 6 – People in Russia and the West who provide support for “the myth of Russia’s historically predetermined path toward enslavement and authoritarianism” are contributing “to the continued suppression of human rights” there and thus providing “a valuable service to Vladimir Putin,” according to a former Duma deputy and now Ekho Moskvy host
But such people should remember, Vladimir Ryzhkov continues, that “each new article or book promoting these shame theories leads directly to … Russia’s continued backwardness, poverty and enslavement and [also to] an increase in Russians who emigrate to the West seeking freedom and prosperity” (www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/historically-determined-to-be-an-autocrat/418431.html and www.echo.msk.ru/blog/rizhkov/715893-echo/ ).
Putin and those around him such as Kremlin first deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov “don’t believe Russians can be trusted to vote,” Ryzhkov says, because the Russian prime minister and his supporters do not believe that the Russian people are “smart or civilized enough to vote responsibly.”
But that “condescending” view, the Ekho Moskvy journalist says, “is by no means limited to voting.” Putin and his entourage also “believe that the masses are not able to do anything,” that “Russia needs ‘a benevolent tsar’ with an iron-like power vertical to explain to the ignorant masses what is best for the country.”
When Putin eliminated the election of governors in 2004, he argued that this “would somehow help defend the country against terrorism,” but he also said that “if the people were allowed to vote, they might elect the ‘wrong’ candidates.” And since that time, he has repeated that argument “as a justification for squashing [all] political competition.”
Given that in Putin’s view, Russia’s “liberal and leftist opposition” parties are “a radical and revolutionary force,” he is fully justified in blocking them from being “elected by naïve and misguided” citizens. Only “the ‘systemic opposition’” can be permitted because those parties “obey his orders and help the Kremlin create the impression” that democracy exists.
Further, Ryzhkov continues, “to help ‘the kind tsar’ carry out his duties,” Putin placed “the major television channels under government control” and ensured that his pocket party, United Russia “dominated” those places where elections did take place or was in a position to “falsify” the outcomes, a classic example of “the end justifying the means.”
“The only exception” to Putin’s belief that “the people are ignorant and can’t be trusted with electing officials,” of course, was the elections of 2000 and 2004 when “by some miraculous stroke of fate,” Russians showed “unprecedented wisdom and responsibility” and voted for him.
In order to buttress his claims, Ryzhkov says, “Putin and his ideologues” – liked Surkov – “try to package their disdain in pseudo-historical terms,” arguing that “Russia has a unique ‘historical tradition’” and has “always been dominated by a strong autocrat in the Kremlin,” something no one is in a position to change at least for the present.
And while “Putin allows for the possibility that one day Russians might be able to overcome this 1000-year-old legacy” and become “mature and responsible enough” to take charge of their own affairs,” he makes it clear that that will occur only “sometime in the future, presumably long after Putin retires.”
This view, Ryzhkov says, allows Putin and his supporters to argue that “the systematic destruction of [Russia’s] democratic institution” that they have carried out was “not the result of manipulation, usurpation and the abuse of power but rather a natural and unavoidable manifestation of [the country’s] ‘predetermined historical path.’”
Such an argument “completely ignores” the history of liberal reform movements in Russia’s past, “including those pursued by Alexander II, Nicholas II, and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev,” Ryzhkov says, and thus should be dismissed as “cynical” and “cheap” political propaganda.
But at least, Putin is pushing this line to advance his own power. What is worse, Ryzhkov suggests, is when others in Russia and even more abroad “reinforce the myth of Russia’s historically pre-determined path toward enslavement and authoritarianism” by their writings.
They are whether they know it or not “providing a valuable service to Putin” and other opponents of democracy and freedom in Russia and thus making “their own contribution to the continued suppression of human rights in Russia now” whose people deserve the chance to take control of their own fate.
Tuesday, October 5, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Russian ‘Nationalists’ are Anything But, Moscow Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 5 – Contemporary “Russian nationalism,” according to a Moscow commentator who clearly wishes it were otherwise, is in many respects “just the opposite of what its name suggests,” with its self-identified supporters displaying “a nihilistic” attitude toward “the real Russian nation, its historical memory, its mentality, its saints and its statehood.”
In an essay on the “Russky zhurnal” portal, Andrey Tarasenko says that “there is hardly any other milieu besides that of the Russian nationalists (for brevity, [he says he] will not use quotation marks around [that term]) in which hostility to the Russian nation is manifested so sharply” (www.russ.ru/pole/Portret-russkogo-nacionalista).
This characteristic of Russian “nationalists,” he continues, is displayed in the attitudes of those calling themselves that toward Russian Orthodoxy, Russia as great power, and Russia’s victory in the Great Fatherland War. It isn’t necessary for a Russian nationalist to agree on all of these, but if he disagrees on most, there is a problem.
With regard to Orthodoxy, few “nationalists” declare themselves atheists. Most consider themselves “believers.” But many of these do not have anything to do with the Moscow Patriarchate, preferring instead to be part of the émigré church, which despite its communion with Moscow remains a very different thing.
“The softest form of non-acceptance of the Russian Orthodox Church,” Tarasenko says, “is a rejection of its existing leadership.” But some Russian nationalists reject Christianity altogether, preferring paganism, Gnosticism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism or some other religious faith.
Such people often “consider Orthodoxy as the chief cause of all the misfortunes of the Russian nation.” One consequence of this is that increasingly “Russian nationalists who support Orthodoxy have begun to call themselves nationalists more rarely,” thus leading to a situation in which Russian nationalism and “anti-Orthodoxy” are conflated.
As far as the second factor – support of Russian statehood as it has existed – many Russian “nationalists” believe that the misfortunes of the Russian nation have arisen from the pre-1917 empire and the post-1917 Soviet Union and call for disassembling “what still remains from Russian statehood” or creating “Russian republics” on the country’s current territory.
According to Tarasenko, “a small group of Russian nationalists” who do believe in empire want to make it an empire of a new type. Instead, of it being “a prison house of peoples” as Lenin described it, they want to make it a real “’prison’ for the non-Russian peoples” so that the Russians could become “a nation of rulers.”
And Russian “nationalists” also divide on the third element, Russia’s victory in the Great Fatherland War. “For some this was a victory of ‘the godless communist regime’ with some not forgetting to add ‘Jewish-communist.’” For others, it was purchased at too high a cost. And for still others, the wrong side won.
Obviously, Tarasenko says, “one nationalist can respect the victory of the Russian people in the Great Fatherland War but be a pagan and strive for the separation of ‘a Russian Republic.’ Another can confess Orthodoxy and be a supporter of Russia as a great power but nonetheless be a follower of General Vlasov, Krasnov, Shkuro and von Pannwitz.”
“And a third cannot conceal his sympathies to Hitler and Nazism, burn icons at ‘pagan holidays’ and dream about a 100 percent racially pure ‘Nordic’ Rus in the forests of the Northern Dvina River valley,” Tarasenko says, adding that “the level of real Russophobia among these people can be different but the common trend is obvious.”
The commentator says that his use of Russophobia to describe such Russian nationalists is no accident. “How else could you call” such ideas? He asks rhetorically, because it is all too obvious that “Russian nationalists serve not the Russian people as it is but the one that it must become in their imaginations.”
And that is “the root” of the problem, he argues. “Russian nationalists do not like their own people, its history, customs and culture.” Consequently, even though they “angrily deny their Russophobia,” that is exactly the problem with them, and that attitude not only limits their ability to cooperate with others but to win support from Russians.
“Of course,” Tarasenko concedes, “there are some bright spots” in this picture, but given the dominance of these negative trends, one has to ask whether the real nationalists will adapt and be corrupted or whether they will decide that they should not be nationalists at all given what “Russian nationalists” now are.
“The orders of one of these ‘bright spots’ are just,” Tarasenko concludes, noting that that individual gave thanks regularly that the Lord God has “preserved” Russia from what would be worse than its past and current situation: “from the coming to power of the current Russian nationalists!”
Staunton, October 5 – Contemporary “Russian nationalism,” according to a Moscow commentator who clearly wishes it were otherwise, is in many respects “just the opposite of what its name suggests,” with its self-identified supporters displaying “a nihilistic” attitude toward “the real Russian nation, its historical memory, its mentality, its saints and its statehood.”
In an essay on the “Russky zhurnal” portal, Andrey Tarasenko says that “there is hardly any other milieu besides that of the Russian nationalists (for brevity, [he says he] will not use quotation marks around [that term]) in which hostility to the Russian nation is manifested so sharply” (www.russ.ru/pole/Portret-russkogo-nacionalista).
This characteristic of Russian “nationalists,” he continues, is displayed in the attitudes of those calling themselves that toward Russian Orthodoxy, Russia as great power, and Russia’s victory in the Great Fatherland War. It isn’t necessary for a Russian nationalist to agree on all of these, but if he disagrees on most, there is a problem.
With regard to Orthodoxy, few “nationalists” declare themselves atheists. Most consider themselves “believers.” But many of these do not have anything to do with the Moscow Patriarchate, preferring instead to be part of the émigré church, which despite its communion with Moscow remains a very different thing.
“The softest form of non-acceptance of the Russian Orthodox Church,” Tarasenko says, “is a rejection of its existing leadership.” But some Russian nationalists reject Christianity altogether, preferring paganism, Gnosticism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism or some other religious faith.
Such people often “consider Orthodoxy as the chief cause of all the misfortunes of the Russian nation.” One consequence of this is that increasingly “Russian nationalists who support Orthodoxy have begun to call themselves nationalists more rarely,” thus leading to a situation in which Russian nationalism and “anti-Orthodoxy” are conflated.
As far as the second factor – support of Russian statehood as it has existed – many Russian “nationalists” believe that the misfortunes of the Russian nation have arisen from the pre-1917 empire and the post-1917 Soviet Union and call for disassembling “what still remains from Russian statehood” or creating “Russian republics” on the country’s current territory.
According to Tarasenko, “a small group of Russian nationalists” who do believe in empire want to make it an empire of a new type. Instead, of it being “a prison house of peoples” as Lenin described it, they want to make it a real “’prison’ for the non-Russian peoples” so that the Russians could become “a nation of rulers.”
And Russian “nationalists” also divide on the third element, Russia’s victory in the Great Fatherland War. “For some this was a victory of ‘the godless communist regime’ with some not forgetting to add ‘Jewish-communist.’” For others, it was purchased at too high a cost. And for still others, the wrong side won.
Obviously, Tarasenko says, “one nationalist can respect the victory of the Russian people in the Great Fatherland War but be a pagan and strive for the separation of ‘a Russian Republic.’ Another can confess Orthodoxy and be a supporter of Russia as a great power but nonetheless be a follower of General Vlasov, Krasnov, Shkuro and von Pannwitz.”
“And a third cannot conceal his sympathies to Hitler and Nazism, burn icons at ‘pagan holidays’ and dream about a 100 percent racially pure ‘Nordic’ Rus in the forests of the Northern Dvina River valley,” Tarasenko says, adding that “the level of real Russophobia among these people can be different but the common trend is obvious.”
The commentator says that his use of Russophobia to describe such Russian nationalists is no accident. “How else could you call” such ideas? He asks rhetorically, because it is all too obvious that “Russian nationalists serve not the Russian people as it is but the one that it must become in their imaginations.”
And that is “the root” of the problem, he argues. “Russian nationalists do not like their own people, its history, customs and culture.” Consequently, even though they “angrily deny their Russophobia,” that is exactly the problem with them, and that attitude not only limits their ability to cooperate with others but to win support from Russians.
“Of course,” Tarasenko concedes, “there are some bright spots” in this picture, but given the dominance of these negative trends, one has to ask whether the real nationalists will adapt and be corrupted or whether they will decide that they should not be nationalists at all given what “Russian nationalists” now are.
“The orders of one of these ‘bright spots’ are just,” Tarasenko concludes, noting that that individual gave thanks regularly that the Lord God has “preserved” Russia from what would be worse than its past and current situation: “from the coming to power of the current Russian nationalists!”
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Institute Pushes Recognition of ‘Newest States’ in ‘Near Abroad’
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 5 – The director of an independent Moscow institute established just before the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war and which has promoted the diplomatic recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since that time now says that international recognition of the independence of Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh is “inevitable.”
In a comment to the Regnum news agency yesterday, Aleksey Martynov not only made this declaration but elaborated an original legal theory on post-Soviet state construction, one that is clearly at odds with Moscow’s declared position but one that likely has supporters in the Russian capital (www.regnum.ru/news/1332158.html).
The director of the Institute of the Newest States, as his organization styles itself, argues that “the recognition by Russia of the statehood of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in June 2008 and the upcoming recognition of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic and Nagorno-Karabakh put the final period in the history of the USSR.”
That is because, Martynov said, “Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh like Abkhazia and South Ossetia politically and legally need only recognition by Russia as the legal successor of the USSR. Subsequently, the entire world will simply be obligated to recognize these countries just as it recognizes the Russian Federation.”
If the members of the international community do not follow Russia’s lead in this, he continued, the director of this institute which has offices in Moscow and many other cities and maintains its own website in Russian and English (www.iines.org/), that would mean their “non-recognition of Russia itself with all the consequences that would flow from that.”
The reason for that, he argued, is that “not one of these newest recognized countries [the former union republics of the USSR] has taken upon itself responsibility for the common Soviet past” preferring instead “to condemn and curse it. Only Russia [which has done so] can as the metropolitan country decide the fate of the newest states in the zone of its strategic interests.”
“After the establishment of the Kosovo precedent” by the Western powers, Martynov continued, “any references to the priority of territorial integrity” need not be recognized. “Borders of states in the contemporary world” are defined by their capacity to prevent their further change, something that can of course be tested at any time.
Elsewhere in his interview, the director pointed to what he clearly viewed as his institute’s latest success, and he did so in a way that highlighted its connections with the Russian powers that be. Martynov noted that last week, a representative of South Ossetia had visited Algeria at the same time as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev,
“Such coincidences in the time of the visits,” he argued, “are far from being accidental.” But to the extent that is the case, his institute might appear to fall into the category of a GONGO, that is “a government organized non-governmental organization,” one capable of promoting the government’s goals without the government having to take responsibility.
And if that is true, then the argument Martynov put forth yesterday may represent something more than the views of a single independent activist. Instead, it perhaps should be read as one part of a debate behind the scenes in Moscow as to how the Russian Federation should proceed in the future in its “near abroad.”
According to its website, “the International Institute of the Newest States is an international non-governmental organization that was created in June 2008 by a group of scholars, political scientists and international experts in the areas of conflict studies and international law” (www.iines.org/node/1).
The institute’s headquarters is in Moscow, but it has representational offices in “Kyiv, Warsaw, Simferopol, Tskhinval, Sukhum, Yerevan, Tiraspol, Western Sahara, Bucharest, Belgrad, Stepanakert and other places.” And it styles itself as “the largest expert discussion space for consideration and study of the phenomenon of the appearance of the newest states.”
The institute, the site continues, organizes “scientific conferences, symposia, and roundtables, the monitoring of social-political development of the newest states and monitoring of the media.” And it supports “the publication of materials and books of [Institute] experts” on these states and “the formation of democratic institutions and civil societies” in them.
Staunton, October 5 – The director of an independent Moscow institute established just before the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war and which has promoted the diplomatic recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since that time now says that international recognition of the independence of Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh is “inevitable.”
In a comment to the Regnum news agency yesterday, Aleksey Martynov not only made this declaration but elaborated an original legal theory on post-Soviet state construction, one that is clearly at odds with Moscow’s declared position but one that likely has supporters in the Russian capital (www.regnum.ru/news/1332158.html).
The director of the Institute of the Newest States, as his organization styles itself, argues that “the recognition by Russia of the statehood of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in June 2008 and the upcoming recognition of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic and Nagorno-Karabakh put the final period in the history of the USSR.”
That is because, Martynov said, “Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh like Abkhazia and South Ossetia politically and legally need only recognition by Russia as the legal successor of the USSR. Subsequently, the entire world will simply be obligated to recognize these countries just as it recognizes the Russian Federation.”
If the members of the international community do not follow Russia’s lead in this, he continued, the director of this institute which has offices in Moscow and many other cities and maintains its own website in Russian and English (www.iines.org/), that would mean their “non-recognition of Russia itself with all the consequences that would flow from that.”
The reason for that, he argued, is that “not one of these newest recognized countries [the former union republics of the USSR] has taken upon itself responsibility for the common Soviet past” preferring instead “to condemn and curse it. Only Russia [which has done so] can as the metropolitan country decide the fate of the newest states in the zone of its strategic interests.”
“After the establishment of the Kosovo precedent” by the Western powers, Martynov continued, “any references to the priority of territorial integrity” need not be recognized. “Borders of states in the contemporary world” are defined by their capacity to prevent their further change, something that can of course be tested at any time.
Elsewhere in his interview, the director pointed to what he clearly viewed as his institute’s latest success, and he did so in a way that highlighted its connections with the Russian powers that be. Martynov noted that last week, a representative of South Ossetia had visited Algeria at the same time as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev,
“Such coincidences in the time of the visits,” he argued, “are far from being accidental.” But to the extent that is the case, his institute might appear to fall into the category of a GONGO, that is “a government organized non-governmental organization,” one capable of promoting the government’s goals without the government having to take responsibility.
And if that is true, then the argument Martynov put forth yesterday may represent something more than the views of a single independent activist. Instead, it perhaps should be read as one part of a debate behind the scenes in Moscow as to how the Russian Federation should proceed in the future in its “near abroad.”
According to its website, “the International Institute of the Newest States is an international non-governmental organization that was created in June 2008 by a group of scholars, political scientists and international experts in the areas of conflict studies and international law” (www.iines.org/node/1).
The institute’s headquarters is in Moscow, but it has representational offices in “Kyiv, Warsaw, Simferopol, Tskhinval, Sukhum, Yerevan, Tiraspol, Western Sahara, Bucharest, Belgrad, Stepanakert and other places.” And it styles itself as “the largest expert discussion space for consideration and study of the phenomenon of the appearance of the newest states.”
The institute, the site continues, organizes “scientific conferences, symposia, and roundtables, the monitoring of social-political development of the newest states and monitoring of the media.” And it supports “the publication of materials and books of [Institute] experts” on these states and “the formation of democratic institutions and civil societies” in them.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow is Alienating More than Minsk, Russian Analysts Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 5 – The war of words between Dmitry Medvedev and Alyaksandr Lukashenka is more than just the product of tensions between Moscow and Minsk, Russian analysts say. Instead, it is part of a broader and growing alienation between the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics, one that has its roots in clashing visions of the future.
But both because of the West’s hostility to Lukashenka and his regime, one usually labeled “the last dictatorship in Europe,” and because of the West’s desire to curry favor with Moscow in pursuit of one or another goal, this general trend, widely noted by commentators in the region, has been largely ignored, let alone exploited, by Europe or the United States.
The clearest expression of this argument can be found in a commentary on Grani.ru yesterday. In it, Dmitry Shusharin, a regular writer for that portal, points out that the exchange of angry words between Medvedev and Lukashenka is part Moscow’s current propensity to be angry with all leaders of the post-Soviet states (grani.ru/blogs/free/entries/182276.html).
Russia’s “tandemocracy,” he says,m had placed “great hopes” on new Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, but exactly what these would in fact look like is something that Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, along with the rest of the Russian powers that be, clearly “did not themselves know” at least in any specific detail.
“In an ideal outcome,” the Russian leaders “see relations with Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and the other nearby neighbors if not as they were before in the USSR then as like those which the Soviet Union had with the countries of the Warsaw Pact,” a vision that they and others should have understood was not going to be realized.
For Medvedev and Putin, the orientation of the leaders of these states “toward Western values and norms of politics” is completely “unacceptable,” Shusharin says. That is why they placed such hopes on Lukashenka, whose ideology is a Russophile form of Belarusian identity, and on Yanukovich who “does not have any ideology” at all.
But now the Moscow leaders have been rejected by the first, and soon, they are likely to be rejected by the second as well, the commentator continues, an outcome Medvedev and Putin would have anticipated if they had remembered the real basis of the Warsaw Pact rather than the idealized version of it in which they apparently believe.
That military organization, led by Moscow, “was tank socialism” -- that is, Shusharin continues, “the single source, reserve and guarantee of the communist regimes in these countries was the Soviet Union and its military presence.” When that disappeared so too did the Warsaw Pact.
But even before the events of the late 1980s, Shusharin points out, those leaders who had alternative sources of power like Yugoslavia’s Tito and China’s Mao Zedong could act independently. The only difference was that the first broke with Moscow early on while the second “for a long time led the Soviet Union by the nose and used its assistance.”
Those experiences, Shusharin suggests, should serve as a lesson to Moscow but Russian leaders have not assimilated them. Moscow doesn’t understand that “for the politicians in the former Soviet republics -- even if they are oriented toward Moscow and make use of its support -- relations with Russia are not as critical as relations with their own populations,” “the source of their power within [their] countries.”
Just as Western Europe and the United States dealt with the problems of the former Warsaw Pact countries and post-Tito Yugoslavia “without the particularly active participation of Russia, Shusharin says, so now “the authoritarian regimes in Ukraine and Belarus” will eventually ask for help from “Western Europe and the US, not Russia.”
The reason that is so, he argues, is that Russia “does not guarantee [their] national sovereignty.” Instead, its leaders act as if the former Soviet republics are not full-fledged independent countries but rather something less than that, places where Russia must enjoy greater deference and influence than any of them want to offer.
The current leaders of these countries “do not intend to divide power with Moscow,” and they are very much aware that is what the Russian powers that be want. Consequently, sooner than many may expect, they will turn to Western countries, something that “again will be something completely unexpected” for the latter.
Staunton, October 5 – The war of words between Dmitry Medvedev and Alyaksandr Lukashenka is more than just the product of tensions between Moscow and Minsk, Russian analysts say. Instead, it is part of a broader and growing alienation between the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics, one that has its roots in clashing visions of the future.
But both because of the West’s hostility to Lukashenka and his regime, one usually labeled “the last dictatorship in Europe,” and because of the West’s desire to curry favor with Moscow in pursuit of one or another goal, this general trend, widely noted by commentators in the region, has been largely ignored, let alone exploited, by Europe or the United States.
The clearest expression of this argument can be found in a commentary on Grani.ru yesterday. In it, Dmitry Shusharin, a regular writer for that portal, points out that the exchange of angry words between Medvedev and Lukashenka is part Moscow’s current propensity to be angry with all leaders of the post-Soviet states (grani.ru/blogs/free/entries/182276.html).
Russia’s “tandemocracy,” he says,m had placed “great hopes” on new Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, but exactly what these would in fact look like is something that Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, along with the rest of the Russian powers that be, clearly “did not themselves know” at least in any specific detail.
“In an ideal outcome,” the Russian leaders “see relations with Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and the other nearby neighbors if not as they were before in the USSR then as like those which the Soviet Union had with the countries of the Warsaw Pact,” a vision that they and others should have understood was not going to be realized.
For Medvedev and Putin, the orientation of the leaders of these states “toward Western values and norms of politics” is completely “unacceptable,” Shusharin says. That is why they placed such hopes on Lukashenka, whose ideology is a Russophile form of Belarusian identity, and on Yanukovich who “does not have any ideology” at all.
But now the Moscow leaders have been rejected by the first, and soon, they are likely to be rejected by the second as well, the commentator continues, an outcome Medvedev and Putin would have anticipated if they had remembered the real basis of the Warsaw Pact rather than the idealized version of it in which they apparently believe.
That military organization, led by Moscow, “was tank socialism” -- that is, Shusharin continues, “the single source, reserve and guarantee of the communist regimes in these countries was the Soviet Union and its military presence.” When that disappeared so too did the Warsaw Pact.
But even before the events of the late 1980s, Shusharin points out, those leaders who had alternative sources of power like Yugoslavia’s Tito and China’s Mao Zedong could act independently. The only difference was that the first broke with Moscow early on while the second “for a long time led the Soviet Union by the nose and used its assistance.”
Those experiences, Shusharin suggests, should serve as a lesson to Moscow but Russian leaders have not assimilated them. Moscow doesn’t understand that “for the politicians in the former Soviet republics -- even if they are oriented toward Moscow and make use of its support -- relations with Russia are not as critical as relations with their own populations,” “the source of their power within [their] countries.”
Just as Western Europe and the United States dealt with the problems of the former Warsaw Pact countries and post-Tito Yugoslavia “without the particularly active participation of Russia, Shusharin says, so now “the authoritarian regimes in Ukraine and Belarus” will eventually ask for help from “Western Europe and the US, not Russia.”
The reason that is so, he argues, is that Russia “does not guarantee [their] national sovereignty.” Instead, its leaders act as if the former Soviet republics are not full-fledged independent countries but rather something less than that, places where Russia must enjoy greater deference and influence than any of them want to offer.
The current leaders of these countries “do not intend to divide power with Moscow,” and they are very much aware that is what the Russian powers that be want. Consequently, sooner than many may expect, they will turn to Western countries, something that “again will be something completely unexpected” for the latter.
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