Paul Goble
Staunton, October 3 – Because the Russian Federation inherited from Soviet times a system which deprived the Russian nation of any “mechanism permitting it to defend its interests,” ever more people who should identify as Russians are choosing to identify as Siberians or Ingermanlanders, according to a Moscow commentator.
In an essay on the “Chastny correspondent” portal today, Aleksandr Khramov says that in most countries, declarations about nationality “would be of only ethnographic interest. But Russia is a special case,” one where “since Soviet times, the state has been organized on the basis of nationalities (www.chaskor.ru/article/russkie_i_ili_sibiryaki_20207).
That means that Tatars or Chuvash or Chukchis are interested in maximizing the number of those who declare for their titular nationality in order to achieve more influence and resources, he continues, but this reality extend to all nationalities except one – the ethnic Russians – because the Soviets and now the post-Soviet government never gave them an ethnic territory.
On the one hand, this means that ethnic Russians lack many of the reasons members of other groups have for declaring their nationality in the census. And on the other, it means that groups within that ethnos such as the Siberians are seeking to promote their identities in the hopes of acquiring an autonomous territory.
In the Russian Federation census later this month, Khramov argues, ‘there is every chance that in Siberia there really will appear a new people – the Siberians. How large it will be is difficult to say, but one thing is clear: Russians as a people at the level of subjects of the Federation do not have a mechanism permitting it to defend its interests.”
“And the more people who recognize that fact, the more Siberians or Ingermanlanders (as certain residents of St. Petersburg and its environs call themselves) will appear.” That is a reality that most Russian nationalists refuse to understand, Khramov says, even though the evidence for it is overwhelming.
The Tatars of Tatarstan have been able to keep more profits from the oil industry than the Russians of Siberia because they have the institutional and political mechanisms to do so, and even the numerically small Evenks have been able to block the construction of a hydro-electric dam they don’t like while the much larger Russian community has not.
That reality rather than some “splitting of a single Russian nation” is what explains the Siberian drive, he says. But there is more to the issue as well, Khramov argues. “In the Russian Empire there was an effort to create ‘an all-Russian nation’ of Ukrainians, Belarusians and Great Russians.” But it “failed.”
“A new effort to construct a Russian nation was not undertaken,” he says, “and the majority of so-called Russian patriots up to now continue to discuss matters in all-Russian categories,” adding that “as a result, the Great Russians up to now have not been transformed into a single nation but rather remain an amorphous mass without rights.”
Indeed, Khramov continues, “those who see the Russians as some kind of ‘product of empire,’ formed in its depths are incorrect: the empire sought to build an all-Russian nation but it was not able to achieve that, and the Russian nation (itself relative to that project a form of separatism) up to the present simply has not taken shape.”
Because the Siberian “nation” movement highlights that reality too, it has drawn fire from many “nationalist” groups, including from the Russian Orthodox Church which has its own concerns about the census, fearful that if the percentage of those declaring themselves to be ethnic Russians declines so will the status of the Church.
That is because the Moscow Patriarchate has insisted that all ethnic Russians are to be counted as Orthodox Christians because that faith is the traditional one of the Russian nation, a claim that sociological research does not support but one that the powers that be in Moscow find comforting at least so far (news.babr.ru/?IDE=88695).
There is a way out of the current identity crisis, Khramov says. “If the Russians of Siberia, sensing their attachment to the Russian nation, receive the opportunity to defend their regional interests through effective federal institutions, the regional Siberian identity will remain an important element of the Russian nation,” instead of powering the rise of a Siberian “nation.”
For many in Moscow, such demands for genuine federalism are yet another reason to campaign against declarations of Siberian nationality, but those behind that campaign are certainly playing to it. One activist says that all Russians should declare their solidarity with Siberia by declaring themselves Siberians in the census as well (globalsib.com/8434/).
Sunday, October 3, 2010
Saturday, October 2, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Proposed Congress of Peoples of Daghestan Could Prove Explosive
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 2 – Daghestani President Magomedsalam Magomedov has called for the convention of a congress of peoples of his republic in order to consolidate society against extremism, but many fear this will be only a public relations stunt and some are concerned that it could prove explosive, given the high level of tensions there.
On Wednesday, Magomedov called for the organization of a congress of all the peoples of Daghestan, modeled on the one his father who preceded him as president held, in order to “show the true attitude of Daghestanis to the criminal activity of the extremist underground and condemn terrorism” (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/174964/).
But condemning extremism in and of itself is not enough, the Daghestani leader said, arguing that “this Congress must serve as an impulse to the consolidation of society and of all healthy forces in the republic … and mark the beginning of an all-Daghestani dialogue about the future of Daghestan.”
Both those possibilities, however, have prompted some in that increasingly unstable North Caucasus republic to question the utility of such a meeting, even though, as a survey of opinion there by the Kavkaz-uzel.ru portal makes clear, Magomedov can count on the support of his own bureaucracy if not on the backing of others.
Gadzhimet Safaraliyev, who represents Daghestan in the Duma, said that he believes the measure would play “a positive role in the life of the republic,” all the more so because “the president of Daghestan … told me that he needs people who will speak the truth at the congress however bitter that truth might be.”
Akhmed Azizov, a deputy of the republic’s Popular Assembly, agreed and said that among those who should be invited would be “moderate Salafites” [those who advocate “pure” Islam against the Sufi traditions of the republic] because “now the time has come for open dialogues” not just with those who support the powers that be but also with those who oppose it.
And Akhmed Azimov, the chairman of the executive committee of the Russian Congress of Peoples of the Caucasus as well as an advisor to the leadership of the Council of Muftis of Russia (SMR), also supported the idea, arguing that if those who take part are prepared to speak “the truth in every case,” that could help “restore order and justice.”
He suggested that “today, Daghestan is at the edge of the abyss and needs an open conversation with the participation of genuinely authoritative personalities.” To that end, he suggested, the congress must include “representatives of all strata of the population, including Daghestanis living beyond the borders of the republic.”
But Isalmagomed Nabiyev, the head of the independent drivers and entrepreneurs union, expressed skepticism, noting that such meetings had been tried before without success, were bureaucratic exercises and did not offer any real possibility for a breakthrough. Indeed, he said, after Magomedov’s father held one, the situation got “much worse.”
Nabiyev said that the fight against terrorism and corruption should not be presented as “the work of one day” but rather must become “part of the routine” over a long period of time. Holding meetings is fine, but unless the actions of the powers that be change, nothing will be improved.
Zaur Cherilov, a Makhachkala resident with whom Kavkaz-uzel.ru spoke, also opposed the idea of the meeting. He said that he had never encountered terrorism but “on the other hand, each day I see incompetence, corruption, and the clanic quality of the bureaucrats, their triumph, the arbitrariness of the siloviki, the death of young people, and the collapse of infrastructure.”
As for himself, Cherilov said, “it would be funny to see on the tribune of [such a] congress a corrupt and incompetent bureaucrat who will call all of us to the struggle with terrorism as if we were in equal circumstances.” If that happens, it could easily make the situation worse.
Just how angry Daghestanis are was highlighted on Thursday when approximately 100 people assembled there to protest against state terrorism in the republic, including cases of kidnapping by official forces (www.zaprava.ru/component/content/article/89-k-akczii/2484-maxachkala-miting-protiv-gosudarstvennogo-terrorizma).
The meeting called on Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to take steps to protect the rights of Daghestanis as “Russian citizens” and pointedly warned that this week’s meeting is “only the beginning” because “we will no longer put up with the illegality and ignoring of our rights. Our patience is at an end and it is better that you understand that.”
Staunton, October 2 – Daghestani President Magomedsalam Magomedov has called for the convention of a congress of peoples of his republic in order to consolidate society against extremism, but many fear this will be only a public relations stunt and some are concerned that it could prove explosive, given the high level of tensions there.
On Wednesday, Magomedov called for the organization of a congress of all the peoples of Daghestan, modeled on the one his father who preceded him as president held, in order to “show the true attitude of Daghestanis to the criminal activity of the extremist underground and condemn terrorism” (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/174964/).
But condemning extremism in and of itself is not enough, the Daghestani leader said, arguing that “this Congress must serve as an impulse to the consolidation of society and of all healthy forces in the republic … and mark the beginning of an all-Daghestani dialogue about the future of Daghestan.”
Both those possibilities, however, have prompted some in that increasingly unstable North Caucasus republic to question the utility of such a meeting, even though, as a survey of opinion there by the Kavkaz-uzel.ru portal makes clear, Magomedov can count on the support of his own bureaucracy if not on the backing of others.
Gadzhimet Safaraliyev, who represents Daghestan in the Duma, said that he believes the measure would play “a positive role in the life of the republic,” all the more so because “the president of Daghestan … told me that he needs people who will speak the truth at the congress however bitter that truth might be.”
Akhmed Azizov, a deputy of the republic’s Popular Assembly, agreed and said that among those who should be invited would be “moderate Salafites” [those who advocate “pure” Islam against the Sufi traditions of the republic] because “now the time has come for open dialogues” not just with those who support the powers that be but also with those who oppose it.
And Akhmed Azimov, the chairman of the executive committee of the Russian Congress of Peoples of the Caucasus as well as an advisor to the leadership of the Council of Muftis of Russia (SMR), also supported the idea, arguing that if those who take part are prepared to speak “the truth in every case,” that could help “restore order and justice.”
He suggested that “today, Daghestan is at the edge of the abyss and needs an open conversation with the participation of genuinely authoritative personalities.” To that end, he suggested, the congress must include “representatives of all strata of the population, including Daghestanis living beyond the borders of the republic.”
But Isalmagomed Nabiyev, the head of the independent drivers and entrepreneurs union, expressed skepticism, noting that such meetings had been tried before without success, were bureaucratic exercises and did not offer any real possibility for a breakthrough. Indeed, he said, after Magomedov’s father held one, the situation got “much worse.”
Nabiyev said that the fight against terrorism and corruption should not be presented as “the work of one day” but rather must become “part of the routine” over a long period of time. Holding meetings is fine, but unless the actions of the powers that be change, nothing will be improved.
Zaur Cherilov, a Makhachkala resident with whom Kavkaz-uzel.ru spoke, also opposed the idea of the meeting. He said that he had never encountered terrorism but “on the other hand, each day I see incompetence, corruption, and the clanic quality of the bureaucrats, their triumph, the arbitrariness of the siloviki, the death of young people, and the collapse of infrastructure.”
As for himself, Cherilov said, “it would be funny to see on the tribune of [such a] congress a corrupt and incompetent bureaucrat who will call all of us to the struggle with terrorism as if we were in equal circumstances.” If that happens, it could easily make the situation worse.
Just how angry Daghestanis are was highlighted on Thursday when approximately 100 people assembled there to protest against state terrorism in the republic, including cases of kidnapping by official forces (www.zaprava.ru/component/content/article/89-k-akczii/2484-maxachkala-miting-protiv-gosudarstvennogo-terrorizma).
The meeting called on Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to take steps to protect the rights of Daghestanis as “Russian citizens” and pointedly warned that this week’s meeting is “only the beginning” because “we will no longer put up with the illegality and ignoring of our rights. Our patience is at an end and it is better that you understand that.”
Window on Eurasia: Post-Soviet States Involved in ‘Dangerous’ Arms Build Up, Russian Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 2 – Despite the absence of real foreign threats, all the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States are rapidly increasing their military spending, not only diverting funds from other uses but creating a series of regional arms races that represent “an extremely dangerous trend” for the region, according to a Russian commentator.
Yuri Sigov, Washington bureau chief for “Delovoye lyudi,”, says that “the latest events in Kyrgyzstan, the signing of a [basing] agreement between Moscow and Yerevan, the purchase by Azerbaijan of anti-aircraft complexes and the strengthening of the Russian military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia” are only the most visible aspects of this process.
And while military build ups in and of themselves do not necessarily create wars, such preparations for conflict by one country inevitably provoke others into doing the same. That means that the continuation of peaceful relations is put at risk and any cooperation among these countries less likely (topwar.ru/1604-vooruzhayushheesya-sodruzhestvo.html).
Moreover and perhaps even more important in many of these countries, the growth of the military not only is used by the powers that be to maintain tight control over their populations but ensures that senior officers have a major voice in the direction these countries take in the future, thus limiting the prospects for democratization.
Sigov notes that “not one” of the violent conflicts which broke out as the Soviet Union collapsed has been resolved by peaceful means, and that reality, plus the impact of the spillover of violence from Afghanistan, provides all the justification most of these countries feel they need for expanding their defense capabilities even at the sacrifice of social needs.
But what this means, Sigov continues, is that in the 20 years since the collapse of the USSR, “not one of its former republics has been living a peaceful life and all of them to one degree or another continue to arm themselves at an increasing rate,” often acquiring arms from Russia, NATO, Turkey, China and the United States.
Military spending in the 11 CIS countries rose “approximately 5.5 percent” this year, Sigov says, a figure that does not include the much higher rate of growth in such spending in Georgia which left the Commonwealth after the August 2008 war and which now enjoys substantial military assistance from NATO and the United States.
“The most rapidly arming” countries now in this region are Armenia and Azerbaijan, the journalist says. That is “not surprising” given that “the possibility of a military confrontation between the two neighbors in the CIS is very great.”
At present, Sigov says, Azerbaijan has increased its military budget “up to 10 percent of GDP. And Armenia’s increase while less is also large given that on the Armenian side, one must add the increased spending on the military units in Nagorno-Karabakh and the other occupied territories.
The situation in Central Asia is even more alarming. On the one hand, none of the militaries there is in a position to counter any external aggression from the Taliban. But on the other, each is trying to build up its forces either to control the borders it shares with its neighbors or even more often to maintain a tight hold over its own population.
Uzbekistan currently spends “approximately 3.5 percent of its GDP on the armed forces,” while Kazakhstan spend about one percent. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan spend less but that is because they hope for assistance from the outside and especially on the defense capabilities of Russian or American bases.
Meanwhile, Turkmenistan, which proclaims its neutrality, “nonetheless spends large amounts in the support of its armed forces,” but this almost certainly has more to do with maintaining the powers that be in Ashgabat against any domestic challenge than responding to any foreign threat.
Ukraine has been increasing its military spending as well, apparently out of concerns about the Transdniestria situation and its territorial disputes with Romania as well as to present itself as an independent actor or potential partner, east and west. And Moldova too has boosted defense spending, Sigov says.
As for Belarus, the Russian commentator continues, evaluating the military budget is hard because it is “difficult and with regard to certain things impossible” to separate out “the ‘purely’ Belarusian military budget” from the expenditures of the Union State with Russia. But even given that, it is clear that Minsk now spends nearly 1.5 percent of GDP on defense.
Staunton, October 2 – Despite the absence of real foreign threats, all the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States are rapidly increasing their military spending, not only diverting funds from other uses but creating a series of regional arms races that represent “an extremely dangerous trend” for the region, according to a Russian commentator.
Yuri Sigov, Washington bureau chief for “Delovoye lyudi,”, says that “the latest events in Kyrgyzstan, the signing of a [basing] agreement between Moscow and Yerevan, the purchase by Azerbaijan of anti-aircraft complexes and the strengthening of the Russian military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia” are only the most visible aspects of this process.
And while military build ups in and of themselves do not necessarily create wars, such preparations for conflict by one country inevitably provoke others into doing the same. That means that the continuation of peaceful relations is put at risk and any cooperation among these countries less likely (topwar.ru/1604-vooruzhayushheesya-sodruzhestvo.html).
Moreover and perhaps even more important in many of these countries, the growth of the military not only is used by the powers that be to maintain tight control over their populations but ensures that senior officers have a major voice in the direction these countries take in the future, thus limiting the prospects for democratization.
Sigov notes that “not one” of the violent conflicts which broke out as the Soviet Union collapsed has been resolved by peaceful means, and that reality, plus the impact of the spillover of violence from Afghanistan, provides all the justification most of these countries feel they need for expanding their defense capabilities even at the sacrifice of social needs.
But what this means, Sigov continues, is that in the 20 years since the collapse of the USSR, “not one of its former republics has been living a peaceful life and all of them to one degree or another continue to arm themselves at an increasing rate,” often acquiring arms from Russia, NATO, Turkey, China and the United States.
Military spending in the 11 CIS countries rose “approximately 5.5 percent” this year, Sigov says, a figure that does not include the much higher rate of growth in such spending in Georgia which left the Commonwealth after the August 2008 war and which now enjoys substantial military assistance from NATO and the United States.
“The most rapidly arming” countries now in this region are Armenia and Azerbaijan, the journalist says. That is “not surprising” given that “the possibility of a military confrontation between the two neighbors in the CIS is very great.”
At present, Sigov says, Azerbaijan has increased its military budget “up to 10 percent of GDP. And Armenia’s increase while less is also large given that on the Armenian side, one must add the increased spending on the military units in Nagorno-Karabakh and the other occupied territories.
The situation in Central Asia is even more alarming. On the one hand, none of the militaries there is in a position to counter any external aggression from the Taliban. But on the other, each is trying to build up its forces either to control the borders it shares with its neighbors or even more often to maintain a tight hold over its own population.
Uzbekistan currently spends “approximately 3.5 percent of its GDP on the armed forces,” while Kazakhstan spend about one percent. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan spend less but that is because they hope for assistance from the outside and especially on the defense capabilities of Russian or American bases.
Meanwhile, Turkmenistan, which proclaims its neutrality, “nonetheless spends large amounts in the support of its armed forces,” but this almost certainly has more to do with maintaining the powers that be in Ashgabat against any domestic challenge than responding to any foreign threat.
Ukraine has been increasing its military spending as well, apparently out of concerns about the Transdniestria situation and its territorial disputes with Romania as well as to present itself as an independent actor or potential partner, east and west. And Moldova too has boosted defense spending, Sigov says.
As for Belarus, the Russian commentator continues, evaluating the military budget is hard because it is “difficult and with regard to certain things impossible” to separate out “the ‘purely’ Belarusian military budget” from the expenditures of the Union State with Russia. But even given that, it is clear that Minsk now spends nearly 1.5 percent of GDP on defense.
Window on Eurasia: International Turkic Peoples’ Congress Calls on Moscow to Restore Rights of Nogays
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 2 – Turkey’s efforts to promote an alliance of Turkic-language countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia have attracted a great deal of attention from other states around the world, but a parallel drive to promote unity among Turkic peoples, many of whom are minorities in other countries, has not even though it may prove equally important.
That is because each of these minorities has its own grievances and aspirations, many of which enjoy support from other Turkic peoples and governments but most of which are supported by too few people within the countries in which these nationalities find themselves to make a difference.
And consequently, the construction of such alliances for the Turkic peoples appears likely to play a role similar to the one Finno-Ugric groups have which add the strength of three independent countries – Estonia, Finland, and Hungary – to the numerically small Finno-Ugric groups within the Russian Federation.
A month ago, the International Organization of Turkish Youth and the Gagauz Social Organization Umut held the first International Congress of Turkic Peoples in Komrat, the Gagauz capital within Moldova. That five-day session has now been described in detail by a Daghestani journal (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/4877/109/).
Among the groups represented, Ayshat Batyrmurzayeva reports, were Daghestani Nogays, Siberian Tatars, Chuvash, Crimean Tatars, Azerbaijanis, Kyrgyz, Turks, Serkels, Iranian Azerbaijanis, Bulgarian Turks, Iraqi Turkmens, Mafuns (Karelians, Finns and Maris, and the host Gagauz.
The meeting was opened by Semsettin Kuzeji, the deputy president of the International Organization of Turkic Youth, Nikolay Dudoglo of the Komrat mayor’s office, and A.Kh. Kharlamenko, the chairman of the Popular Assembly of Gagauzia, who said he was especially pleased that the meeting was gaining so many new friends for his people.
Dudoglo for his part stressed “the importance of this forum for [all] the peoples of the Turkic language world” and noted that Komrat “for seven years has been a member of the Union of Municipalities of the Turkic World,” another body that seeks to link Turkic groups across the world.
But in one of the meetings most important actions – and the reason that the session was reported in such detail by a Makhachkala journal – the session adopted an appeal to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin about the problems of the Nogays of Daghestan.
Noting that Nogays have “more than once raised the questions of building a civil society in Daghestan” but that “the policy conducted by certain highly placed officials in the power structures of the republic” has not taken the necessary steps to ensure it for “indigenous numerically small Nogay people,” the international meeting is calling on Moscow to intervene.
In order to overcome “the difficult social-economic situation of the Nogay people and the infringements of its constitutional rights in the Russian Federation,” the appeal continues, the central Russian government should take the following six steps, all of which would represent a challenge to the way business is done in Daghestan.
First, Moscow needs to evaluate and then move to quash the September 1996 Daghestan law which “infringes on the right of the Nogay people to use the territories” traditionally belonging to its members but that have now been taken over by other larger ethnic communities in that republic.
Second, the document says that “for the preservation of the native language, cultural customs and traditions, and the preservation and development of the unique culture of the Kum Nogays, it would be useful to consider and accelerate the re-establishment of the Nogay district in Stavropol kray centered on Kayasul which existed until 1944.”
Third, it calls for a revision of Makhachkala-imposed division of fighting rights on the Caspian so that the Nogay living on the shores of that sea can make a living. Fourth, it calls for “the construction of a hard-surface road” connecting Nogay auls and the extension of gas lines to heat the houses in these villages.
Fifth, it urges Moscow to investigate the ecological situation in all Nogay regions and to clean up contaminated areas. And sixth, it urges Moscow to “create a commission to consider the further correction of the illegal and criminal points concerning the Nogay people” in the January 1957 RSFSR decree allowing deported peoples to return.
None of these demands is new: the Nogays have been making them for more than 20 years. But what is new is that they and presumably other Turkic peoples in the region now have an international body they can use to gain greater attention and that Turkey has gained yet another means of projecting Ankara’s interests into the Caucasus and beyond.
Staunton, October 2 – Turkey’s efforts to promote an alliance of Turkic-language countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia have attracted a great deal of attention from other states around the world, but a parallel drive to promote unity among Turkic peoples, many of whom are minorities in other countries, has not even though it may prove equally important.
That is because each of these minorities has its own grievances and aspirations, many of which enjoy support from other Turkic peoples and governments but most of which are supported by too few people within the countries in which these nationalities find themselves to make a difference.
And consequently, the construction of such alliances for the Turkic peoples appears likely to play a role similar to the one Finno-Ugric groups have which add the strength of three independent countries – Estonia, Finland, and Hungary – to the numerically small Finno-Ugric groups within the Russian Federation.
A month ago, the International Organization of Turkish Youth and the Gagauz Social Organization Umut held the first International Congress of Turkic Peoples in Komrat, the Gagauz capital within Moldova. That five-day session has now been described in detail by a Daghestani journal (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/4877/109/).
Among the groups represented, Ayshat Batyrmurzayeva reports, were Daghestani Nogays, Siberian Tatars, Chuvash, Crimean Tatars, Azerbaijanis, Kyrgyz, Turks, Serkels, Iranian Azerbaijanis, Bulgarian Turks, Iraqi Turkmens, Mafuns (Karelians, Finns and Maris, and the host Gagauz.
The meeting was opened by Semsettin Kuzeji, the deputy president of the International Organization of Turkic Youth, Nikolay Dudoglo of the Komrat mayor’s office, and A.Kh. Kharlamenko, the chairman of the Popular Assembly of Gagauzia, who said he was especially pleased that the meeting was gaining so many new friends for his people.
Dudoglo for his part stressed “the importance of this forum for [all] the peoples of the Turkic language world” and noted that Komrat “for seven years has been a member of the Union of Municipalities of the Turkic World,” another body that seeks to link Turkic groups across the world.
But in one of the meetings most important actions – and the reason that the session was reported in such detail by a Makhachkala journal – the session adopted an appeal to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin about the problems of the Nogays of Daghestan.
Noting that Nogays have “more than once raised the questions of building a civil society in Daghestan” but that “the policy conducted by certain highly placed officials in the power structures of the republic” has not taken the necessary steps to ensure it for “indigenous numerically small Nogay people,” the international meeting is calling on Moscow to intervene.
In order to overcome “the difficult social-economic situation of the Nogay people and the infringements of its constitutional rights in the Russian Federation,” the appeal continues, the central Russian government should take the following six steps, all of which would represent a challenge to the way business is done in Daghestan.
First, Moscow needs to evaluate and then move to quash the September 1996 Daghestan law which “infringes on the right of the Nogay people to use the territories” traditionally belonging to its members but that have now been taken over by other larger ethnic communities in that republic.
Second, the document says that “for the preservation of the native language, cultural customs and traditions, and the preservation and development of the unique culture of the Kum Nogays, it would be useful to consider and accelerate the re-establishment of the Nogay district in Stavropol kray centered on Kayasul which existed until 1944.”
Third, it calls for a revision of Makhachkala-imposed division of fighting rights on the Caspian so that the Nogay living on the shores of that sea can make a living. Fourth, it calls for “the construction of a hard-surface road” connecting Nogay auls and the extension of gas lines to heat the houses in these villages.
Fifth, it urges Moscow to investigate the ecological situation in all Nogay regions and to clean up contaminated areas. And sixth, it urges Moscow to “create a commission to consider the further correction of the illegal and criminal points concerning the Nogay people” in the January 1957 RSFSR decree allowing deported peoples to return.
None of these demands is new: the Nogays have been making them for more than 20 years. But what is new is that they and presumably other Turkic peoples in the region now have an international body they can use to gain greater attention and that Turkey has gained yet another means of projecting Ankara’s interests into the Caucasus and beyond.
Thursday, September 30, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Tatarstan’s New State Holidays Highlight Kazan’s Tilt toward Islam
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 30 – With the Tatarstan State Council’s decision last week to make both the Day of the Acceptance of Islam and Uraza-Bayram official holidays, the number of republic holidays linked to Islam now exceeds secular ones there three to two, a measure of the growing importance of Islam in that Middle Volga republic.
In a comment on this trend, A.Yu. Khabutdinov, a professor of the Kazan branch of the Russian Academy of Jurisprudence, provides details on how this remarkable development came about and about what it means and equally doesn’t mean for the Muslims of Tatarstan and of the Russian Federation more generally (www.islamrf.ru/news/analytics/expert/13740/).
On September 23, he notes, the Tatarstan State council approved two new holidays for the republic which will be days off for most residents: the Day of the Official Adoption of Islam by Volga Bulgaria in 922 and the Muslim Uraza-Bayram holiday. Kurban Bayram had already been a state holiday since the 1990s.
But now that there are three Muslim-related republic holidays, the Kazan scholar continues, they outnumber the two “secular” ones – the Day of the Republic which is also celebrated in Kazan as the Day of the City and the Day of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan.
In the 1990s, Khabutdinov recalls, Tatar leaders sought to declare the day of the Russian occupation of Kazan in October 1552 a state holiday, a holiday that would have commemorated a national defeat in much the say way that the Soviet calendar included such “black dates” as the fall of the Paris commune in 1871.
But the supporters of this idea failed. They were not even able to erect a monument to the defenders of Kazan in 1552 under that city’s Kremlin or, an equally passionate cause among Kazan Tatar nationalists at the time, a monument to the founder of the Kazan khanate, Olug Muhammad.
Thus, Khabutdinov says, in the 1990s, the Tatars focused on national symbols. But “in the first decade of the 2000s, the basic accent was shifted to the religious component,” with the opening of the Kul-Sharif mosque in the Kazan Kremlin and the celebration of Russia’s entrance into the Organization of the Islamic Conference as an observer.
The next shift came the spring of 2010 when, already under the current Tatarstan President Rustam Minnikhanov, the question was raised about how Tatarstan should respond to the new federal holiday, the Day of the Baptism of Rus, and many Tatars argued that Kazan should adopt the Day of the Adoption of Islam.
Up until that time, religious organizations like the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Tatarstan had been the chief advocates of such a move. “However,” Khabutdinov notes, “none of these institutions has the right to propose legislation.” That came from the Tatarstan State Council which on June 9 proposed that the Russian Duma take that step.
At that time, Mintimir Shaymiyev, the former president of the republic and current state advisor, said that “if the State Duma rejects the initiative of the State council then the parliament of Tatarstan can establish this day as a memorial day in the republic,” a prescient description of what in fact happened.
The problem Moscow faced in this regard was two-fold. On the one hand, many Russians objected to the idea that there should be any but an Orthodox holiday of this kind. And on the other, the Muslim communities of the country are divided as to when a holiday commemorating the adoption of Islam should take place.
Daghestani scholars and officials insisted that Islam arrived in their republic in 642, much earlier than in the arrival of Islam in the Middle Volga. Intriguingly, Khabutdinov says, the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR) backed the Tatars, arguing that the Muslims in the Caucasus did not have a state at the time but “the Bulgars did.”
Other Muslims in the Russian Federation don’t agree with the SMR’s logic and continue to present “their own particular history” separately in contrast to what the Tatar leadership had hoped for. But that is far from the most important consequence of what the Tatarstan State Council did last week, Khabutdinov says.
“From the end of the 1980s” until last week, he writes, “the Kazan khanate was considered the symbol of the unity of the Tatar nation” -- even though many Tatar nationalists of a century ago had extremely negative views about that political institution. But now, the nation’s “golden age” is the epoch of the Volga or Volga-Kama Bulgaria and its adoption of Islam.
That change in the understanding of the past both reflects and is certain to have an impact on the nature of Tatar national identity and nationalism in the future, a fact far more important than the appearance of yet another “religious” rather than “secular” “red day” on the calendars of the people of that Middle Volga republic.
Staunton, September 30 – With the Tatarstan State Council’s decision last week to make both the Day of the Acceptance of Islam and Uraza-Bayram official holidays, the number of republic holidays linked to Islam now exceeds secular ones there three to two, a measure of the growing importance of Islam in that Middle Volga republic.
In a comment on this trend, A.Yu. Khabutdinov, a professor of the Kazan branch of the Russian Academy of Jurisprudence, provides details on how this remarkable development came about and about what it means and equally doesn’t mean for the Muslims of Tatarstan and of the Russian Federation more generally (www.islamrf.ru/news/analytics/expert/13740/).
On September 23, he notes, the Tatarstan State council approved two new holidays for the republic which will be days off for most residents: the Day of the Official Adoption of Islam by Volga Bulgaria in 922 and the Muslim Uraza-Bayram holiday. Kurban Bayram had already been a state holiday since the 1990s.
But now that there are three Muslim-related republic holidays, the Kazan scholar continues, they outnumber the two “secular” ones – the Day of the Republic which is also celebrated in Kazan as the Day of the City and the Day of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan.
In the 1990s, Khabutdinov recalls, Tatar leaders sought to declare the day of the Russian occupation of Kazan in October 1552 a state holiday, a holiday that would have commemorated a national defeat in much the say way that the Soviet calendar included such “black dates” as the fall of the Paris commune in 1871.
But the supporters of this idea failed. They were not even able to erect a monument to the defenders of Kazan in 1552 under that city’s Kremlin or, an equally passionate cause among Kazan Tatar nationalists at the time, a monument to the founder of the Kazan khanate, Olug Muhammad.
Thus, Khabutdinov says, in the 1990s, the Tatars focused on national symbols. But “in the first decade of the 2000s, the basic accent was shifted to the religious component,” with the opening of the Kul-Sharif mosque in the Kazan Kremlin and the celebration of Russia’s entrance into the Organization of the Islamic Conference as an observer.
The next shift came the spring of 2010 when, already under the current Tatarstan President Rustam Minnikhanov, the question was raised about how Tatarstan should respond to the new federal holiday, the Day of the Baptism of Rus, and many Tatars argued that Kazan should adopt the Day of the Adoption of Islam.
Up until that time, religious organizations like the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Tatarstan had been the chief advocates of such a move. “However,” Khabutdinov notes, “none of these institutions has the right to propose legislation.” That came from the Tatarstan State Council which on June 9 proposed that the Russian Duma take that step.
At that time, Mintimir Shaymiyev, the former president of the republic and current state advisor, said that “if the State Duma rejects the initiative of the State council then the parliament of Tatarstan can establish this day as a memorial day in the republic,” a prescient description of what in fact happened.
The problem Moscow faced in this regard was two-fold. On the one hand, many Russians objected to the idea that there should be any but an Orthodox holiday of this kind. And on the other, the Muslim communities of the country are divided as to when a holiday commemorating the adoption of Islam should take place.
Daghestani scholars and officials insisted that Islam arrived in their republic in 642, much earlier than in the arrival of Islam in the Middle Volga. Intriguingly, Khabutdinov says, the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR) backed the Tatars, arguing that the Muslims in the Caucasus did not have a state at the time but “the Bulgars did.”
Other Muslims in the Russian Federation don’t agree with the SMR’s logic and continue to present “their own particular history” separately in contrast to what the Tatar leadership had hoped for. But that is far from the most important consequence of what the Tatarstan State Council did last week, Khabutdinov says.
“From the end of the 1980s” until last week, he writes, “the Kazan khanate was considered the symbol of the unity of the Tatar nation” -- even though many Tatar nationalists of a century ago had extremely negative views about that political institution. But now, the nation’s “golden age” is the epoch of the Volga or Volga-Kama Bulgaria and its adoption of Islam.
That change in the understanding of the past both reflects and is certain to have an impact on the nature of Tatar national identity and nationalism in the future, a fact far more important than the appearance of yet another “religious” rather than “secular” “red day” on the calendars of the people of that Middle Volga republic.
Window on Eurasia: Islamist Radicalism in Central Asia Now Threatens Europe, Experts Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 30 – Many in the West have watched with alarm on the growth of Islamist violence in post-Soviet Central Asia, but most of them have concluded that its horrors are far away. Now, however, three experts are warning that this violence now poses a growing threat not only to the region but to Europe as well.
The three -- Tomasz Otłowski of Poland, Aleksandr Knyazev of the Russian Federation, and Marlene Laruelle of France – approach this issue from different perspectives but reach the same disturbing conclusion: Europe and the West more generally need to view Islamist radicalism in Central Asia as a problem that can reach Europe in the near future.
In an essay posted on "Wirtualna Polska,” Otłowski, who works as an analyst at the Bureau of National Security of Poland, argues that “Islamic radicalism in Central Asia is a growing problem” and that it is directly connected with the situation in Afghanistan and a threat to European countries (www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1285821060).
The activity of the Islamists is especially great in Tajikistan, “the poorest and weakest state” of Central Asia, Otłowski says. The other Central Asian states have been more effective in combating this ideological group, but that is beginning to change not only because the ethnic groups are so intermixed in the Fergana valley but also because of high unemployment.
Many unemployed young men are completely “frustrated” with their chances for the future, the Polish analyst argues, and consequently, they find an explanation for their problems and a guide to future action in “the radical variant of Islam which” Al-Qaeda and its representatives offer them.
As a result, he continues, “nowhere in Central Asia does the idea of jihad have as many supporters as in the Ferghana valley,” a place that has been a focus of attention by Al-Qaeda operatives since the end of the 1990s. And it was out of them that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) arose.
The IMU recruited its members in the Ferghana and “dispatched them for preparation in the Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan or in the Pakistani tribal territories.” The Uzbek government’s harsh campaign drove the IMU out of much of that country, but many IMU activists resettled in Pakistan’s Northern Waziristan, “a bastion today of Uzbek Islamists.”
There, along with other Islamist groups, the IMU has “not only more or less formally declared its subordination to Al-Qaeda (in both the ideological and organizational-cadres sense) but also begun to declare its interests in the globalization of its goals and activities,” a hallmark of Al-Qaeda throughout its history.
The IMU and other groups have used their “close ties with Al-Qaeda” to increase their operational possibilities and to broaden “the geography of their activity,” a development that is “useful to Al-Qaeda itself since the grouping provides additional forces and means for planning and conducting broad-scale operations” around the world.
“One of the first organizations” from Central Asia which adopted Al-Qaeda’s worldwide jihadist line was the Union of Islamic Jihad (UIJ), which consists of many activists who were part of the IMU. And the UIJ is now playing a major role for Al-Qaeda not only in Central Asia but in Europe and even the United States.
For Al-Qaeda, Otłowski writes, this focus on Central Asia is entirely understandable. Central Asia for that group, he says, is “a litmus test” of what may be possible. “Countries lying in the heart of the Asian continent with a predominant Muslim population and domestic problems are the ideal starting bases for further operations especially against Russia and China.”
But the UIJ is interested in attacking Europe as well, the Polish analyst says. It has already developed a network in Turkey and in Germany, both among local Muslims, recent Muslim converts, and especially those who have had experience in the fighting in Afghanistan or elsewhere.
“Without a doubt,” Otłowski argues, “it is only a question of time when the UIJ structures will focus on Europe” and launch attacks there. Germany and Turkey are particularly at risk, and UIJ is actively recruiting people who have little interest in what is taking place in Central Asia but a great desire to attack the West in the name of jihad.
Meanwhile, in Almaaty earlier this week, Aleksandr Knyazev of Moscow and Marlene Laruelle of Paris and Washington discussed what they call “the new arc of instability” from Afghanistan through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and the ways in which Islamist radicals in each of those countries are linked with one another (www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=6745).
Among other comments, they provided support for Otłowski’s argument with their discussions of the “reincarnation” of the IMU and its growing activity in the northeastern provinces of Afghanistan and renewal of activity in the countries of Central Asia from which its members had earlier been pushed out.
This activity, the two stressed, is linked to the flow of drugs and the links of these radical Islamist groups to organized crime in many countries, factors that, along with their experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan, also prompt the members of the IMU and the UIJ to look beyond their national communities and think in radical jihadist terms of the Al-Qaeda type.
Staunton, September 30 – Many in the West have watched with alarm on the growth of Islamist violence in post-Soviet Central Asia, but most of them have concluded that its horrors are far away. Now, however, three experts are warning that this violence now poses a growing threat not only to the region but to Europe as well.
The three -- Tomasz Otłowski of Poland, Aleksandr Knyazev of the Russian Federation, and Marlene Laruelle of France – approach this issue from different perspectives but reach the same disturbing conclusion: Europe and the West more generally need to view Islamist radicalism in Central Asia as a problem that can reach Europe in the near future.
In an essay posted on "Wirtualna Polska,” Otłowski, who works as an analyst at the Bureau of National Security of Poland, argues that “Islamic radicalism in Central Asia is a growing problem” and that it is directly connected with the situation in Afghanistan and a threat to European countries (www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1285821060).
The activity of the Islamists is especially great in Tajikistan, “the poorest and weakest state” of Central Asia, Otłowski says. The other Central Asian states have been more effective in combating this ideological group, but that is beginning to change not only because the ethnic groups are so intermixed in the Fergana valley but also because of high unemployment.
Many unemployed young men are completely “frustrated” with their chances for the future, the Polish analyst argues, and consequently, they find an explanation for their problems and a guide to future action in “the radical variant of Islam which” Al-Qaeda and its representatives offer them.
As a result, he continues, “nowhere in Central Asia does the idea of jihad have as many supporters as in the Ferghana valley,” a place that has been a focus of attention by Al-Qaeda operatives since the end of the 1990s. And it was out of them that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) arose.
The IMU recruited its members in the Ferghana and “dispatched them for preparation in the Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan or in the Pakistani tribal territories.” The Uzbek government’s harsh campaign drove the IMU out of much of that country, but many IMU activists resettled in Pakistan’s Northern Waziristan, “a bastion today of Uzbek Islamists.”
There, along with other Islamist groups, the IMU has “not only more or less formally declared its subordination to Al-Qaeda (in both the ideological and organizational-cadres sense) but also begun to declare its interests in the globalization of its goals and activities,” a hallmark of Al-Qaeda throughout its history.
The IMU and other groups have used their “close ties with Al-Qaeda” to increase their operational possibilities and to broaden “the geography of their activity,” a development that is “useful to Al-Qaeda itself since the grouping provides additional forces and means for planning and conducting broad-scale operations” around the world.
“One of the first organizations” from Central Asia which adopted Al-Qaeda’s worldwide jihadist line was the Union of Islamic Jihad (UIJ), which consists of many activists who were part of the IMU. And the UIJ is now playing a major role for Al-Qaeda not only in Central Asia but in Europe and even the United States.
For Al-Qaeda, Otłowski writes, this focus on Central Asia is entirely understandable. Central Asia for that group, he says, is “a litmus test” of what may be possible. “Countries lying in the heart of the Asian continent with a predominant Muslim population and domestic problems are the ideal starting bases for further operations especially against Russia and China.”
But the UIJ is interested in attacking Europe as well, the Polish analyst says. It has already developed a network in Turkey and in Germany, both among local Muslims, recent Muslim converts, and especially those who have had experience in the fighting in Afghanistan or elsewhere.
“Without a doubt,” Otłowski argues, “it is only a question of time when the UIJ structures will focus on Europe” and launch attacks there. Germany and Turkey are particularly at risk, and UIJ is actively recruiting people who have little interest in what is taking place in Central Asia but a great desire to attack the West in the name of jihad.
Meanwhile, in Almaaty earlier this week, Aleksandr Knyazev of Moscow and Marlene Laruelle of Paris and Washington discussed what they call “the new arc of instability” from Afghanistan through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and the ways in which Islamist radicals in each of those countries are linked with one another (www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=6745).
Among other comments, they provided support for Otłowski’s argument with their discussions of the “reincarnation” of the IMU and its growing activity in the northeastern provinces of Afghanistan and renewal of activity in the countries of Central Asia from which its members had earlier been pushed out.
This activity, the two stressed, is linked to the flow of drugs and the links of these radical Islamist groups to organized crime in many countries, factors that, along with their experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan, also prompt the members of the IMU and the UIJ to look beyond their national communities and think in radical jihadist terms of the Al-Qaeda type.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Underfunds Budget for Compatriots Program by More than 75 Percent
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 30 – Moscow spent less than a quarter of the amount it had budgeted to attract compatriots living abroad to come back to Russia, some 1.8 billion rubles (60 million US dollars) instead of eight billion rubles (260 million US dollars), a cutback that reflects Russia’s economic problems but reduces the chance that Moscow will attract many to return.
That has two major consequences. On the one hand, it means that an increasing share of the growing influx of migrant workers to the Russian Federation this year and in the future will consist of non-Russians culturally dissimilar from the titular nationality, a trend certain to exacerbate inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions there.
And on the other, this cutback means that Moscow will likely be playing a smaller role in the lives of the ethnic Russian communities of the former Soviet republics and Baltic states, despite the claims of ethnic Russian activists in those countries and the desire of some Russian nationalists to use ethnic Russian communities there to promote closer ties.
In reporting this development, Aleksandr Raskin, the deputy chief editor of “Expert Online,” argues that these cutbacks put the entire program at risk, even though officials like Federal Migration Service chief Konstantin Poltoranin insist that this reduction “does not mean the liquidation of the program” (www.expert.ru/articles/2010/09/29/krizisn_sootechestvenniki/).
According to FMS officials, Raskin continues, their institution asked for the reductions because its analysts concluded that no more than 20,000 people would move to the Russian Federation, far fewer than many Moscow officials and politicians had been projecting only a few years ago.
When the program was designed for the period 2007 to 2012, officials projected that 132,400 people would return – others suggested that as many as 300,000 would do so, Raskin notes -- but in fact only 8800 have done so thus far despite budgetary allocations totally 18.3 billion rubles (600 million US dollars).
Over the last several years, Russian officials have sought to promote in-migration of compatriots to economically weak regions rather than to Moscow or other major cities by offering more money to those prepared to move to the former and much less to those who want to go to the latter.
While FMS officials continue to be upbeat, many other parts of the bureaucracy are not. Igor Lyakin-Frolov, the deputy director of the Foreign Ministry’s information department, for example, told Raskin that “the program is really ineffective.” He added that various ministries, including his own, are discussing how to transform it.
FMS officials acknowledge that there are problems, including their inability to guarantee those who return that they will have appropriate housing. Doing that depends on the regions, and some of them are not very helpful. Moscow’s role is limited, they say, to ensuring that those who return obtain Russian Federation citizenship on an expedited basis.
Independent analysts, Raskin continues, are very skeptical about the program, with some arguing that Moscow hasn’t supported it adequately and others saying it is poorly designed. Dmitry Oreshkin, a political scientist, says that Moscow should have addressed this issue 15 or more years ago when many more ethnic Russians were interested in moving.
During the early 1990s, he points out, Russia absorbed up to a million compatriots each year because “people were fleeing from real threats” in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russia did not treat these people especially well with regards to housing and employment, but at the same time, it did not ignore them either.
The situation changed in the mid-1990s. Local and regional officials were less interested in taking in the large number of professionals for whom there were no obvious jobs. And many in Moscow “began to think that a return to the USSR was possible” and that the continued presence of ethnic Russians in the former republics would help promote that.
Guram Sanikidze, former deputy director of the Russian bureau of the International Migration Organization, is more skeptical than most of the Russian analysts. He suggests that people are not going to move to Russia -- “they do not have money for that” – and that as a result, “the program is condemned to failure.”
The amount of money, now reduced still further, is not enough to meet the nearly one million rubles (33,000 US dollars) a family needs to make the move, Sanikidze says. The amount Moscow is offering is thus “a drop in the bucket” and won’t convince all but the most frightened to move.
Instead, he concludes, “this is a propaganda program, used by the administration of Vladimir Putin as one of the aspects of the pre-election presidential race which is beginning now in Russia.” It may make for good public relations, but it is not something likely to have the consequences Moscow says it hopes for on the ground.
Staunton, September 30 – Moscow spent less than a quarter of the amount it had budgeted to attract compatriots living abroad to come back to Russia, some 1.8 billion rubles (60 million US dollars) instead of eight billion rubles (260 million US dollars), a cutback that reflects Russia’s economic problems but reduces the chance that Moscow will attract many to return.
That has two major consequences. On the one hand, it means that an increasing share of the growing influx of migrant workers to the Russian Federation this year and in the future will consist of non-Russians culturally dissimilar from the titular nationality, a trend certain to exacerbate inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions there.
And on the other, this cutback means that Moscow will likely be playing a smaller role in the lives of the ethnic Russian communities of the former Soviet republics and Baltic states, despite the claims of ethnic Russian activists in those countries and the desire of some Russian nationalists to use ethnic Russian communities there to promote closer ties.
In reporting this development, Aleksandr Raskin, the deputy chief editor of “Expert Online,” argues that these cutbacks put the entire program at risk, even though officials like Federal Migration Service chief Konstantin Poltoranin insist that this reduction “does not mean the liquidation of the program” (www.expert.ru/articles/2010/09/29/krizisn_sootechestvenniki/).
According to FMS officials, Raskin continues, their institution asked for the reductions because its analysts concluded that no more than 20,000 people would move to the Russian Federation, far fewer than many Moscow officials and politicians had been projecting only a few years ago.
When the program was designed for the period 2007 to 2012, officials projected that 132,400 people would return – others suggested that as many as 300,000 would do so, Raskin notes -- but in fact only 8800 have done so thus far despite budgetary allocations totally 18.3 billion rubles (600 million US dollars).
Over the last several years, Russian officials have sought to promote in-migration of compatriots to economically weak regions rather than to Moscow or other major cities by offering more money to those prepared to move to the former and much less to those who want to go to the latter.
While FMS officials continue to be upbeat, many other parts of the bureaucracy are not. Igor Lyakin-Frolov, the deputy director of the Foreign Ministry’s information department, for example, told Raskin that “the program is really ineffective.” He added that various ministries, including his own, are discussing how to transform it.
FMS officials acknowledge that there are problems, including their inability to guarantee those who return that they will have appropriate housing. Doing that depends on the regions, and some of them are not very helpful. Moscow’s role is limited, they say, to ensuring that those who return obtain Russian Federation citizenship on an expedited basis.
Independent analysts, Raskin continues, are very skeptical about the program, with some arguing that Moscow hasn’t supported it adequately and others saying it is poorly designed. Dmitry Oreshkin, a political scientist, says that Moscow should have addressed this issue 15 or more years ago when many more ethnic Russians were interested in moving.
During the early 1990s, he points out, Russia absorbed up to a million compatriots each year because “people were fleeing from real threats” in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russia did not treat these people especially well with regards to housing and employment, but at the same time, it did not ignore them either.
The situation changed in the mid-1990s. Local and regional officials were less interested in taking in the large number of professionals for whom there were no obvious jobs. And many in Moscow “began to think that a return to the USSR was possible” and that the continued presence of ethnic Russians in the former republics would help promote that.
Guram Sanikidze, former deputy director of the Russian bureau of the International Migration Organization, is more skeptical than most of the Russian analysts. He suggests that people are not going to move to Russia -- “they do not have money for that” – and that as a result, “the program is condemned to failure.”
The amount of money, now reduced still further, is not enough to meet the nearly one million rubles (33,000 US dollars) a family needs to make the move, Sanikidze says. The amount Moscow is offering is thus “a drop in the bucket” and won’t convince all but the most frightened to move.
Instead, he concludes, “this is a propaganda program, used by the administration of Vladimir Putin as one of the aspects of the pre-election presidential race which is beginning now in Russia.” It may make for good public relations, but it is not something likely to have the consequences Moscow says it hopes for on the ground.
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