Paul Goble
Staunton, September 28 – A Russian-Kazakhstan working group will present a plan for the construction of building a canal between the Caspian and Azov seas, an enormously expensive “gigantist” project with roots in the Stalinist 1930s and one that, if realized, would have enormous geopolitical consequences.
“In today’s “Izvestiya,” journalist Konstantin Volkov says that what his Moscow paper has been able to learn so far this “new mega-project,” one that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has supported since at least 2007, “promises to become the most expensive in the entire history of contemporary Russia” (www.izvestia.ru/obshestvo/article3146612/)
In 2009, Volkov says, the European Development Bank provided 2.7 million US dollars to study two possible routes – a “Eurasian” canal just north of the North Caucasus mountain range and a second branch of the existing Volga-Don canal which would pass somewhat further north.
According to the newspaper, the results of the study of the two, although still classified “secret,” are in fact “ready” for a “final” decision by the leaders of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, the two countries most immediately affected but hardly the only ones given the other Caspian and Black Sea littoral state and their neighbors.
But as Volkov puts it, “the question immediately arises: why in fact is it necessary to spend billions of dollars for a new link between the Caspian and the Azov?” The existing Volga-Don canal works more or less well for almost all purposes, including those that the backers of the new canal say it would fulfill.
However, as Putin put it, “the appearance of a new canal “would not simply give the Caspian littoral states a way out to the Black and Mediterranean, that is to the world ocean, but also qualitatively change their geopolitical position and allow them to become sea powers” as a result of this link.
Eurasianist Aleksandr Dugin told the paper that “the question here is geopolitical: In exchange for the establishment of the Eurasia canal, Russia will increase its influence in Kazakhstan. And if to these two countries joint also Azerbaijan and Iran, who are also on the Caspian littoral, this will create a new oil cartel that won’t be overawed by OPEC.”
If this canal is built, Russia will gain some immediate economic benefits from transit fees, given that between six and ten percent of the world’s oil is in the Caspian basin. But more important, it will be able to challenge those promoting other pipeline routes such as Baku-Jehan because ships will be able to carry the oil further and less expensively.
Moreover, Volkov continues, “if alongside will be established a transcontinental route connecting the industrial regions of China with the Caspian, then the new artery will become a channel for shipping Chinese goods” and that path could become a competitor to the sea route through the Suez canal.
The projected cost of each of the possible roots is roughly 500 billion rubles (16 billion US dollars), although as Volkov points out, those projections do not include many of the ancillary construction projects that will be needed or take into consideration the possible social costs or likely overruns.
According to the “Izvestiya” journalist, Moscow hopes to get the countries of the region who will be the direct beneficiaries, including not only Kazakhstan, but Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan, as well as China to help pay for the construction of this canal, a plan that means such a canal will trigger geopolitical tensions even before it goes into operation.
But the possibility this project is already generating controversy inside the Russian Federation, with ecologists questioning its impact and others the opportunity costs of spending money on such a canal at a time when Russia needs to invest in other infrastructure projects, including roads and public health facilities. See, among others the discussions at www.stoletie.ru/lenta/azov_s_kaspijem_sojedinat_2010-09-28.htm and http://www.fondsk.ru/news/2010/09/28/kaspij-soedinjat-s-azovskim-morem.html.)
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Luzhkov’s Ouster Said a Defeat for Moscow Patriarchate, Setback for Russia’s Imperial Nationalists
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 28 – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s ouster of longtime Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov is a stinging defeat for the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church which enjoyed close ties to the mayor and actively supported him even when the Kremlin sent clear signals that he was on his way out, according to one analyst.
And at the same time, Luzhkov’s departure removes from the scene one of the most consistent advocates of a neo-imperial policy for the Russian Federation, as another Moscow commentator points out, as well as forcing from office the author of the notorious October 1993 decree expelling from the Russian capital “persons of Caucasus nationality.”
While neither religion nor nationality issues probably played a major role in Luzhkov’s fall from grace, both are certainly going to be affected given Luzhkov’s prominence and the likelihood that any successor will adopt a different or at least lower profile role on such issues especially beyond the ring road.
Commenting on Luzhkov’s ouster today for the Portal-Credo.ru site, Aleksandr Soldatov, the editor of Agentura.ru, argues that as a result, the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has lost a champion and a friend whom the senior hierarchs did everything they could to lobby for right up to the end (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1787).
Among the Orthodox hierarchs, Soldatov notes, Luzhkov was known as the man who arranged for rebuilding Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior, currently de facto the main church of the Russian Orthodox Church and a place where Patriarch Kirill routinely conducts services.
The Moscow Patriarch, long part of “the Putin command,” behaved “much more actively” in support of Luzhkov “than the National Leader” when the Moscow mayor was being attacked. Last week, for example, Patriarch Kirill sent birthday greetings to Luzhkov in which he praised his services to the Church and to the country.
“If the lines of this letter” are compared with the Kremlin attacks, Soldatov continues, they might have appeared as “direct compromat” on the Patriarch. But the Church “did not limit itself” to this letter. It even offered “a special prayer” for Luzhkov on his birthday and succeeded in having that reported by Kremlin-controlled news agencies on September 21.
In Soldatov’s view, “the Moscow Patriarchate really owes a great deal to [Luzhkov],” not only for his support in building the cathedral in which Kirill is so pleased, unlike his predecessor Aleksii II who found it somehow not that “comfortable” but also for his support of the Church’s extensive economic and construction activities.
Many Orthodox Christians have been furious at Luzhkov for his destruction of the historic face of Moscow, Soldatov continues. “But the Church [as an organization] is … not a society of amateur architects or aesthetes.” Instead, it is “a completely pragmatic organization,” always looking after its own interests.
In short, the Moscow Patriarchate, if not the Russian Orthodox Church as a body of believers was “completely happy with Luzhkov. They understood the values and principles of each other,” even though Luzhkov himself was not that religious: The now ex-mayor was baptized only when the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was built.
That concord was reflected in Luzhkov’s farewell gift to the Church, a promise to build over the next year 200 new Orthodox churches, bringing the total number of Orthodox facilities in the Russian capital to more than 800. But now there is a question over this construction project, all the more so given the Muslim push for opening a fifth mosque there.
“It is obvious,” Soldatov concludes, “that in struggling for his position, Yuri Luzhkov attempted to make use of the Church as a resource. And he got it. Perhaps not so clearly ad demonstrably as he might have liked but completely clearly and unambiguously. And it is not Luzhkov’s fault that under present conditions this resource proved too small to save him.”
Meanwhile, in another commentary, Aleksandr Baunov discusses the role that Luzhkov played in promoting a particular neo-imperial policy by the Russian government in large measure because he ensured that Moscow had “its own foreign policy,” one sometimes at odds with that of the foreign ministry (slon.ru/blogs/baunov/post/466312/).
As Baunov says, Luzhkov routinely maintained official and unofficial ties with people across the former Soviet space, and he advocated positions which the commentator who clearly approves them said showed that he “thought with the scope of a Winston Churchill, a Metternich or a Prince Gorchakov.”
Luzhkov was perhaps best known for his consistent support of the idea that Crimea should belong not to Ukraine but to the Russian Federation and his active promotion of the idea of the construction of a bridge from Krasnodar kray to Kerch in order to link those two territories closer together.
But that was far from the only example of Luzhkov’s line in this area. As early as 2006, he said that Moscow “would construct its relations with Abkhazia as with an independent state” and as early as 2004, he supported Adjaria and its leader Aslan Abashidze against Tbilisi’s blockade.
The now ex-mayor also maintained close relations with Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka even when the Minsk leader was on the outs with the Russian Federation, and Luzhkov backed the idea of diverting Siberian rivers to the south in order to “economically and politically attach to Russia its former Central Asian colonies.”
Baunov provides other examples of Luzhkov’s personal policies, often dismissed as populist but in fact having an impact on Russia’s approach, including in Central Asia and the Caucasus, opposition to the World Trade Organization, and support for ethnic Russian communities outside of the Russian Federation.
When Luzhkov dealt with officials in Western countries, Baunov says, he was treated as the mayor of a capital city. “But in the former union republics and satellites, Luzhkov conducted a relatively independent post-imperial and neo-colonial policy,” something that gained him support from many in these places, even as it generated criticism closer to home.
Staunton, September 28 – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s ouster of longtime Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov is a stinging defeat for the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church which enjoyed close ties to the mayor and actively supported him even when the Kremlin sent clear signals that he was on his way out, according to one analyst.
And at the same time, Luzhkov’s departure removes from the scene one of the most consistent advocates of a neo-imperial policy for the Russian Federation, as another Moscow commentator points out, as well as forcing from office the author of the notorious October 1993 decree expelling from the Russian capital “persons of Caucasus nationality.”
While neither religion nor nationality issues probably played a major role in Luzhkov’s fall from grace, both are certainly going to be affected given Luzhkov’s prominence and the likelihood that any successor will adopt a different or at least lower profile role on such issues especially beyond the ring road.
Commenting on Luzhkov’s ouster today for the Portal-Credo.ru site, Aleksandr Soldatov, the editor of Agentura.ru, argues that as a result, the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has lost a champion and a friend whom the senior hierarchs did everything they could to lobby for right up to the end (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1787).
Among the Orthodox hierarchs, Soldatov notes, Luzhkov was known as the man who arranged for rebuilding Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior, currently de facto the main church of the Russian Orthodox Church and a place where Patriarch Kirill routinely conducts services.
The Moscow Patriarch, long part of “the Putin command,” behaved “much more actively” in support of Luzhkov “than the National Leader” when the Moscow mayor was being attacked. Last week, for example, Patriarch Kirill sent birthday greetings to Luzhkov in which he praised his services to the Church and to the country.
“If the lines of this letter” are compared with the Kremlin attacks, Soldatov continues, they might have appeared as “direct compromat” on the Patriarch. But the Church “did not limit itself” to this letter. It even offered “a special prayer” for Luzhkov on his birthday and succeeded in having that reported by Kremlin-controlled news agencies on September 21.
In Soldatov’s view, “the Moscow Patriarchate really owes a great deal to [Luzhkov],” not only for his support in building the cathedral in which Kirill is so pleased, unlike his predecessor Aleksii II who found it somehow not that “comfortable” but also for his support of the Church’s extensive economic and construction activities.
Many Orthodox Christians have been furious at Luzhkov for his destruction of the historic face of Moscow, Soldatov continues. “But the Church [as an organization] is … not a society of amateur architects or aesthetes.” Instead, it is “a completely pragmatic organization,” always looking after its own interests.
In short, the Moscow Patriarchate, if not the Russian Orthodox Church as a body of believers was “completely happy with Luzhkov. They understood the values and principles of each other,” even though Luzhkov himself was not that religious: The now ex-mayor was baptized only when the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was built.
That concord was reflected in Luzhkov’s farewell gift to the Church, a promise to build over the next year 200 new Orthodox churches, bringing the total number of Orthodox facilities in the Russian capital to more than 800. But now there is a question over this construction project, all the more so given the Muslim push for opening a fifth mosque there.
“It is obvious,” Soldatov concludes, “that in struggling for his position, Yuri Luzhkov attempted to make use of the Church as a resource. And he got it. Perhaps not so clearly ad demonstrably as he might have liked but completely clearly and unambiguously. And it is not Luzhkov’s fault that under present conditions this resource proved too small to save him.”
Meanwhile, in another commentary, Aleksandr Baunov discusses the role that Luzhkov played in promoting a particular neo-imperial policy by the Russian government in large measure because he ensured that Moscow had “its own foreign policy,” one sometimes at odds with that of the foreign ministry (slon.ru/blogs/baunov/post/466312/).
As Baunov says, Luzhkov routinely maintained official and unofficial ties with people across the former Soviet space, and he advocated positions which the commentator who clearly approves them said showed that he “thought with the scope of a Winston Churchill, a Metternich or a Prince Gorchakov.”
Luzhkov was perhaps best known for his consistent support of the idea that Crimea should belong not to Ukraine but to the Russian Federation and his active promotion of the idea of the construction of a bridge from Krasnodar kray to Kerch in order to link those two territories closer together.
But that was far from the only example of Luzhkov’s line in this area. As early as 2006, he said that Moscow “would construct its relations with Abkhazia as with an independent state” and as early as 2004, he supported Adjaria and its leader Aslan Abashidze against Tbilisi’s blockade.
The now ex-mayor also maintained close relations with Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka even when the Minsk leader was on the outs with the Russian Federation, and Luzhkov backed the idea of diverting Siberian rivers to the south in order to “economically and politically attach to Russia its former Central Asian colonies.”
Baunov provides other examples of Luzhkov’s personal policies, often dismissed as populist but in fact having an impact on Russia’s approach, including in Central Asia and the Caucasus, opposition to the World Trade Organization, and support for ethnic Russian communities outside of the Russian Federation.
When Luzhkov dealt with officials in Western countries, Baunov says, he was treated as the mayor of a capital city. “But in the former union republics and satellites, Luzhkov conducted a relatively independent post-imperial and neo-colonial policy,” something that gained him support from many in these places, even as it generated criticism closer to home.
Window on Eurasia: Luzhkov’s Ouster Said a Defeat for Moscow Patriarchate, Setback for Russia’s Imperial Nationalists
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 28 – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s ouster of longtime Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov is a stinging defeat for the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church which enjoyed close ties to the mayor and actively supported him even when the Kremlin sent clear signals that he was on his way out, according to one analyst.
And at the same time, Luzhkov’s departure removes from the scene one of the most consistent advocates of a neo-imperial policy for the Russian Federation, as another Moscow commentator points out, as well as forcing from office the author of the notorious October 1993 decree expelling from the Russian capital “persons of Caucasus nationality.”
While neither religion nor nationality issues probably played a major role in Luzhkov’s fall from grace, both are certainly going to be affected given Luzhkov’s prominence and the likelihood that any successor will adopt a different or at least lower profile role on such issues especially beyond the ring road.
Commenting on Luzhkov’s ouster today for the Portal-Credo.ru site, Aleksandr Soldatov, the editor of Agentura.ru, argues that as a result, the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has lost a champion and a friend whom the senior hierarchs did everything they could to lobby for right up to the end (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1787).
Among the Orthodox hierarchs, Soldatov notes, Luzhkov was known as the man who arranged for rebuilding Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior, currently de facto the main church of the Russian Orthodox Church and a place where Patriarch Kirill routinely conducts services.
The Moscow Patriarch, long part of “the Putin command,” behaved “much more actively” in support of Luzhkov “than the National Leader” when the Moscow mayor was being attacked. Last week, for example, Patriarch Kirill sent birthday greetings to Luzhkov in which he praised his services to the Church and to the country.
“If the lines of this letter” are compared with the Kremlin attacks, Soldatov continues, they might have appeared as “direct compromat” on the Patriarch. But the Church “did not limit itself” to this letter. It even offered “a special prayer” for Luzhkov on his birthday and succeeded in having that reported by Kremlin-controlled news agencies on September 21.
In Soldatov’s view, “the Moscow Patriarchate really owes a great deal to [Luzhkov],” not only for his support in building the cathedral in which Kirill is so pleased, unlike his predecessor Aleksii II who found it somehow not that “comfortable” but also for his support of the Church’s extensive economic and construction activities.
Many Orthodox Christians have been furious at Luzhkov for his destruction of the historic face of Moscow, Soldatov continues. “But the Church [as an organization] is … not a society of amateur architects or aesthetes.” Instead, it is “a completely pragmatic organization,” always looking after its own interests.
In short, the Moscow Patriarchate, if not the Russian Orthodox Church as a body of believers was “completely happy with Luzhkov. They understood the values and principles of each other,” even though Luzhkov himself was not that religious: The now ex-mayor was baptized only when the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was built.
That concord was reflected in Luzhkov’s farewell gift to the Church, a promise to build over the next year 200 new Orthodox churches, bringing the total number of Orthodox facilities in the Russian capital to more than 800. But now there is a question over this construction project, all the more so given the Muslim push for opening a fifth mosque there.
“It is obvious,” Soldatov concludes, “that in struggling for his position, Yuri Luzhkov attempted to make use of the Church as a resource. And he got it. Perhaps not so clearly ad demonstrably as he might have liked but completely clearly and unambiguously. And it is not Luzhkov’s fault that under present conditions this resource proved too small to save him.”
Meanwhile, in another commentary, Aleksandr Baunov discusses the role that Luzhkov played in promoting a particular neo-imperial policy by the Russian government in large measure because he ensured that Moscow had “its own foreign policy,” one sometimes at odds with that of the foreign ministry (slon.ru/blogs/baunov/post/466312/).
As Baunov says, Luzhkov routinely maintained official and unofficial ties with people across the former Soviet space, and he advocated positions which the commentator who clearly approves them said showed that he “thought with the scope of a Winston Churchill, a Metternich or a Prince Gorchakov.”
Luzhkov was perhaps best known for his consistent support of the idea that Crimea should belong not to Ukraine but to the Russian Federation and his active promotion of the idea of the construction of a bridge from Krasnodar kray to Kerch in order to link those two territories closer together.
But that was far from the only example of Luzhkov’s line in this area. As early as 2006, he said that Moscow “would construct its relations with Abkhazia as with an independent state” and as early as 2004, he supported Adjaria and its leader Aslan Abashidze against Tbilisi’s blockade.
The now ex-mayor also maintained close relations with Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka even when the Minsk leader was on the outs with the Russian Federation, and Luzhkov backed the idea of diverting Siberian rivers to the south in order to “economically and politically attach to Russia its former Central Asian colonies.”
Baunov provides other examples of Luzhkov’s personal policies, often dismissed as populist but in fact having an impact on Russia’s approach, including in Central Asia and the Caucasus, opposition to the World Trade Organization, and support for ethnic Russian communities outside of the Russian Federation.
When Luzhkov dealt with officials in Western countries, Baunov says, he was treated as the mayor of a capital city. “But in the former union republics and satellites, Luzhkov conducted a relatively independent post-imperial and neo-colonial policy,” something that gained him support from many in these places, even as it generated criticism closer to home.
Staunton, September 28 – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s ouster of longtime Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov is a stinging defeat for the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church which enjoyed close ties to the mayor and actively supported him even when the Kremlin sent clear signals that he was on his way out, according to one analyst.
And at the same time, Luzhkov’s departure removes from the scene one of the most consistent advocates of a neo-imperial policy for the Russian Federation, as another Moscow commentator points out, as well as forcing from office the author of the notorious October 1993 decree expelling from the Russian capital “persons of Caucasus nationality.”
While neither religion nor nationality issues probably played a major role in Luzhkov’s fall from grace, both are certainly going to be affected given Luzhkov’s prominence and the likelihood that any successor will adopt a different or at least lower profile role on such issues especially beyond the ring road.
Commenting on Luzhkov’s ouster today for the Portal-Credo.ru site, Aleksandr Soldatov, the editor of Agentura.ru, argues that as a result, the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has lost a champion and a friend whom the senior hierarchs did everything they could to lobby for right up to the end (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1787).
Among the Orthodox hierarchs, Soldatov notes, Luzhkov was known as the man who arranged for rebuilding Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior, currently de facto the main church of the Russian Orthodox Church and a place where Patriarch Kirill routinely conducts services.
The Moscow Patriarch, long part of “the Putin command,” behaved “much more actively” in support of Luzhkov “than the National Leader” when the Moscow mayor was being attacked. Last week, for example, Patriarch Kirill sent birthday greetings to Luzhkov in which he praised his services to the Church and to the country.
“If the lines of this letter” are compared with the Kremlin attacks, Soldatov continues, they might have appeared as “direct compromat” on the Patriarch. But the Church “did not limit itself” to this letter. It even offered “a special prayer” for Luzhkov on his birthday and succeeded in having that reported by Kremlin-controlled news agencies on September 21.
In Soldatov’s view, “the Moscow Patriarchate really owes a great deal to [Luzhkov],” not only for his support in building the cathedral in which Kirill is so pleased, unlike his predecessor Aleksii II who found it somehow not that “comfortable” but also for his support of the Church’s extensive economic and construction activities.
Many Orthodox Christians have been furious at Luzhkov for his destruction of the historic face of Moscow, Soldatov continues. “But the Church [as an organization] is … not a society of amateur architects or aesthetes.” Instead, it is “a completely pragmatic organization,” always looking after its own interests.
In short, the Moscow Patriarchate, if not the Russian Orthodox Church as a body of believers was “completely happy with Luzhkov. They understood the values and principles of each other,” even though Luzhkov himself was not that religious: The now ex-mayor was baptized only when the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was built.
That concord was reflected in Luzhkov’s farewell gift to the Church, a promise to build over the next year 200 new Orthodox churches, bringing the total number of Orthodox facilities in the Russian capital to more than 800. But now there is a question over this construction project, all the more so given the Muslim push for opening a fifth mosque there.
“It is obvious,” Soldatov concludes, “that in struggling for his position, Yuri Luzhkov attempted to make use of the Church as a resource. And he got it. Perhaps not so clearly ad demonstrably as he might have liked but completely clearly and unambiguously. And it is not Luzhkov’s fault that under present conditions this resource proved too small to save him.”
Meanwhile, in another commentary, Aleksandr Baunov discusses the role that Luzhkov played in promoting a particular neo-imperial policy by the Russian government in large measure because he ensured that Moscow had “its own foreign policy,” one sometimes at odds with that of the foreign ministry (slon.ru/blogs/baunov/post/466312/).
As Baunov says, Luzhkov routinely maintained official and unofficial ties with people across the former Soviet space, and he advocated positions which the commentator who clearly approves them said showed that he “thought with the scope of a Winston Churchill, a Metternich or a Prince Gorchakov.”
Luzhkov was perhaps best known for his consistent support of the idea that Crimea should belong not to Ukraine but to the Russian Federation and his active promotion of the idea of the construction of a bridge from Krasnodar kray to Kerch in order to link those two territories closer together.
But that was far from the only example of Luzhkov’s line in this area. As early as 2006, he said that Moscow “would construct its relations with Abkhazia as with an independent state” and as early as 2004, he supported Adjaria and its leader Aslan Abashidze against Tbilisi’s blockade.
The now ex-mayor also maintained close relations with Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka even when the Minsk leader was on the outs with the Russian Federation, and Luzhkov backed the idea of diverting Siberian rivers to the south in order to “economically and politically attach to Russia its former Central Asian colonies.”
Baunov provides other examples of Luzhkov’s personal policies, often dismissed as populist but in fact having an impact on Russia’s approach, including in Central Asia and the Caucasus, opposition to the World Trade Organization, and support for ethnic Russian communities outside of the Russian Federation.
When Luzhkov dealt with officials in Western countries, Baunov says, he was treated as the mayor of a capital city. “But in the former union republics and satellites, Luzhkov conducted a relatively independent post-imperial and neo-colonial policy,” something that gained him support from many in these places, even as it generated criticism closer to home.
Monday, September 27, 2010
Window on Eurasia: North Caucasian Militants Want Russia to Want Independence of North Caucasus, Mamsurov Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 27 – Militants in the North Caucasus republics want to create a situation in which residents there will decide that they would be better off outside of the Russian Federation, but even more, the head of the Republic of North Ossetia says, they seek by their actions to get Russians to want precisely that.
To that end, Taymuraz Mamsurov says in an interview published in today’s “Kommersant,” the militants try to do everything so that Russians will view North Caucasians as “wild men whom it is impossible to education but only possible to destroy” so that eventually Russians will say enough (kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1511641&NodesID=6).
And in pursuit of that goal, he continues, they are prepared to engage in the most horrific act of terrorism like the September 9th explosion in Vladikavkaz and to fight on for perhaps as many as ten years more, something they hope to be able to achieve by keeping the population of the region in a condition of constant fear.
To defeat them, Mamsurov argues, “we must learn to live in conditions of war. Now, we must quickly learn from our mistakes. In blood, unfortunately. But the most terrible thing is if our people will live in horror and fear.” People cannot and must not live that way. “Therefore one must learn how to counter these threats and wait until all this will end.”
After the Vladikavkaz attack, Mamsurov acknowledges that many Ossetians and especially the young were inclined to blame the Ingush, not only because an entire generation has grown up among the Ossetians blaming the Ingush and vice versa but because young people tend to be especially emotional on such subjects. If they were otherwise, it would be “strange.”
The North Ossetian leader said that Ingush President Yevkurov had called him immediately after the events to express his sympathies but that it was very difficult for him to say anything publically, given the passions in both republics. That is something, Mamsurov says he fully understands.
In other comments, Mamsurov says that he made contacts with the Israelis after the Beslan terrorist act because “one must teach people” not only that “each day is a gift but also to be able to live with the threat of terrorism, and not become immobilized by fear of that possibility even as one minimizes the threat. That is something the Israelis have done.
The North Ossetian leader also says that his relations with the law enforcement organs in his republic are good, even though “by federal law, [he] does not have the right to appoint or remove them and they have the right not to tell me all that I want to know.” But he suggests that he gets information “about everything.”
Mamsurov argues that Islam is not to blame for all the problems in the North Caucasus as many seem to think – even those responsible for Beslan were from other faiths. And he adds that despite his own ethnic heritage, he had “never in [his] life” gone to a mosque, and believed that “faith without knowledge is fanaticism.
But Mamsurov’s most important comments concern how he would conduct the struggle against the militants. On the one hand, he stresses that it is an ideological fight, one in which current leaders like himself must make sure that another generation does not grow up hating people of other groups and blaming them for all their own problems.
And on the other, he calls for draconian punishments. Those who engage in the killing of innocents must be killed. There is no other “medicine” for them. Moreover, the families of the militants and those who stand behind the one and the other must bear full responsibility for what the terrorists do.
Mamsurov dismisses as impossible the idea suicide bombers do not care about their lives. Such an individual is simply specially prepared, just like some dogs are in the military. Such an individual “does not sacrifice himself. He is not alive. [Instead,] this is an individual who does not know religion or the value of life or the mother who bore and nursed him.”
In fact, such an individual is simply “a thing in human form that is chosen because of his psychological problems.” No ideas are behind his action, Mamsurov continues, and certainly no religion supports this kind of behavior. That is a hard lesson to learn, but it is a necessary one if such phenomena are to be defeated.
What the peoples of the North Caucasus are involved in is “a war. This is not some kind of petty banditism. And when one is involved in a war one must act accordingly. If I take you prisoner, I read out law. If I am required to keep you in prison and feed you and so on, I must do that. If I am required in military time to shoot you, then I must do so.”
More to the point, “you must know about this. When you leave your home, you must know what you are getting involved in. And if you go along this path, then you must know that even if you die, this is what will happen with your family and close friends. This is not some kind of Caucasian wildness; it must be based on law and on the decision of a court.”
If the peoples of the North Caucasus are to defeat the militants, Mamsurov concludes, everyone must understand that, both the militants and those they seek to destroy or enslave.
Staunton, September 27 – Militants in the North Caucasus republics want to create a situation in which residents there will decide that they would be better off outside of the Russian Federation, but even more, the head of the Republic of North Ossetia says, they seek by their actions to get Russians to want precisely that.
To that end, Taymuraz Mamsurov says in an interview published in today’s “Kommersant,” the militants try to do everything so that Russians will view North Caucasians as “wild men whom it is impossible to education but only possible to destroy” so that eventually Russians will say enough (kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1511641&NodesID=6).
And in pursuit of that goal, he continues, they are prepared to engage in the most horrific act of terrorism like the September 9th explosion in Vladikavkaz and to fight on for perhaps as many as ten years more, something they hope to be able to achieve by keeping the population of the region in a condition of constant fear.
To defeat them, Mamsurov argues, “we must learn to live in conditions of war. Now, we must quickly learn from our mistakes. In blood, unfortunately. But the most terrible thing is if our people will live in horror and fear.” People cannot and must not live that way. “Therefore one must learn how to counter these threats and wait until all this will end.”
After the Vladikavkaz attack, Mamsurov acknowledges that many Ossetians and especially the young were inclined to blame the Ingush, not only because an entire generation has grown up among the Ossetians blaming the Ingush and vice versa but because young people tend to be especially emotional on such subjects. If they were otherwise, it would be “strange.”
The North Ossetian leader said that Ingush President Yevkurov had called him immediately after the events to express his sympathies but that it was very difficult for him to say anything publically, given the passions in both republics. That is something, Mamsurov says he fully understands.
In other comments, Mamsurov says that he made contacts with the Israelis after the Beslan terrorist act because “one must teach people” not only that “each day is a gift but also to be able to live with the threat of terrorism, and not become immobilized by fear of that possibility even as one minimizes the threat. That is something the Israelis have done.
The North Ossetian leader also says that his relations with the law enforcement organs in his republic are good, even though “by federal law, [he] does not have the right to appoint or remove them and they have the right not to tell me all that I want to know.” But he suggests that he gets information “about everything.”
Mamsurov argues that Islam is not to blame for all the problems in the North Caucasus as many seem to think – even those responsible for Beslan were from other faiths. And he adds that despite his own ethnic heritage, he had “never in [his] life” gone to a mosque, and believed that “faith without knowledge is fanaticism.
But Mamsurov’s most important comments concern how he would conduct the struggle against the militants. On the one hand, he stresses that it is an ideological fight, one in which current leaders like himself must make sure that another generation does not grow up hating people of other groups and blaming them for all their own problems.
And on the other, he calls for draconian punishments. Those who engage in the killing of innocents must be killed. There is no other “medicine” for them. Moreover, the families of the militants and those who stand behind the one and the other must bear full responsibility for what the terrorists do.
Mamsurov dismisses as impossible the idea suicide bombers do not care about their lives. Such an individual is simply specially prepared, just like some dogs are in the military. Such an individual “does not sacrifice himself. He is not alive. [Instead,] this is an individual who does not know religion or the value of life or the mother who bore and nursed him.”
In fact, such an individual is simply “a thing in human form that is chosen because of his psychological problems.” No ideas are behind his action, Mamsurov continues, and certainly no religion supports this kind of behavior. That is a hard lesson to learn, but it is a necessary one if such phenomena are to be defeated.
What the peoples of the North Caucasus are involved in is “a war. This is not some kind of petty banditism. And when one is involved in a war one must act accordingly. If I take you prisoner, I read out law. If I am required to keep you in prison and feed you and so on, I must do that. If I am required in military time to shoot you, then I must do so.”
More to the point, “you must know about this. When you leave your home, you must know what you are getting involved in. And if you go along this path, then you must know that even if you die, this is what will happen with your family and close friends. This is not some kind of Caucasian wildness; it must be based on law and on the decision of a court.”
If the peoples of the North Caucasus are to defeat the militants, Mamsurov concludes, everyone must understand that, both the militants and those they seek to destroy or enslave.
Window on Eurasia: Kamchatka Draftees Can’t Show Up for Military Service Because of Costly Air Fares
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 27 – For four years, a Kamchatka journalist says, draftees from Koryak district have not been able to show up for military service because there has been no money from the government to pay for the air fares needed to bring them to central dispatch places, one measure of the difficulties involved in connecting parts of Russia not linked by roads.
But as Vyacheslav Skalatsky shows, the combination of cutbacks in air service to distant locations within the Russian Federation and rapidly increasing prices for air fares has broader consequences, both preventing young men from getting better jobs that military experience can open for them and meaning that people who are ill cannot get medical attention.
When he first reported this, the Kamchatka journalist says, he and his colleagues “understood that the bureaucrats might have not been able to deal with this problem just as with others. But we were not prepared to plumb the depths of their unprofessionalism. Now that has happened (www.raipon.info/index.php/component/content/article/1-novosti/1196-im-ne-doehat),
Skalatsky notes that “the task of bringing draftees to the kray center is only part of a large social problem of the entire Koryak district. Young people [from there] cannot be called to military service as is guaranteed by the Constitution. And then they cannot find more or less attractive work because of the lack of such service.”
But instead of addressing this problem, regional officials have sought to shift responsibility for and place blame on anyone but themselves. And when Koryak residents have complained, the bureaucrats have often routed their letters to the wrong officials who in turn have either ignored them or answered with “empty” promises.
One appeal, he said, complained that the situation had deteriorated since the Koryak district was amalgamated into the Kamchatka kray as part of then-President Vladimir Putin’s push to reduce the number of federal subjects by combining in the first instance, small, so-called “matryoshka” non-Russian districts with larger and predominantly Russian ones.
And another letter that Skalatsky read out on television pointed out to officials that many young men can’t find jobs because of this situation. Those “without a military ticket,” she pointed out, “are not hired on a permanent basis,” something that leaves them with few prospects and little hope for the future.
One official told her that the military commissar of Kamchatka kray says that the kray government cannot pay for the flights because Moscow has not provided the necessary funds “to the full extent.” He promised to see what could be done, but since that time, the people and draftees of Koryakia have not received any help.
What they and others have received are proud and entirely “empty” boasts by kray officials. Oskana Gerasimova, the kray development minister, told a session of the Russian-American Pacific Ocean Partnership Group that Kamchatka has all that it needs to be a leader in the development of trade ties between Russia and Pacific Rim and European countries.
Skalatsky says that it would be “interesting” to learn how Gerasimova squares this claim with the situation of “those draftees who FOR YEARS have not been able to reach the draft assembly point because of the absence of money and air communications” and feels comfortable in asserting that Kamchatka is able to respond “adequately to ‘the challenges of the times.’”
Some might be tempted to view this situation as exceptional, but another report today, this time in “Nezavisimaya gazeta,” suggests that similar problems are intensifying in the roughly one-third of the Russian Federation that lies in the north and whose residents are not linked to the rest of the country by any roads, let alone good ones.
According to the Moscow paper’s Krasnoyarsk correspondent, Aleksandr Chernyavsky, 11 days ago, officials closed the civilian airport in Dixon, the northernmost such facility in the Russian Federation, ending regular air service between that location and the south and stranding some 60 passengers waiting on the tarmac(www.ng.ru/regions/2010-09-27/100_dixon.html).
“The air bridge for residents of Dixon” – more than 600 people – “is vitally necessary, Chernyavsky continues. By plane are delivered not only the residents of the local settlement but also doctors, mail, and fresh products like milk and vegetables.” Official promises to establish “helicopter communication” do not appear likely to make up for the loss of plane service.
Vasily Nechayev, the head of the education commission of the regional legislature, says that this failure of the industry and energy ministry and the Taymyr district authorities is generating “serious concerns among the kray parliamentarians. But the local executive responds that that the closure was not his fault but that of aviation safety officials.
To bring the airport up to Russian safety standards will require 250 million rubles (8 million US dollars), an amount local legislatures promise to try to find in next year’s budget. In the meantime, residents of that northern settlement will have to make do without fresh milk and vegetables and perhaps, like the Koryaks, won’t be able to send their sons south to the army.
Staunton, September 27 – For four years, a Kamchatka journalist says, draftees from Koryak district have not been able to show up for military service because there has been no money from the government to pay for the air fares needed to bring them to central dispatch places, one measure of the difficulties involved in connecting parts of Russia not linked by roads.
But as Vyacheslav Skalatsky shows, the combination of cutbacks in air service to distant locations within the Russian Federation and rapidly increasing prices for air fares has broader consequences, both preventing young men from getting better jobs that military experience can open for them and meaning that people who are ill cannot get medical attention.
When he first reported this, the Kamchatka journalist says, he and his colleagues “understood that the bureaucrats might have not been able to deal with this problem just as with others. But we were not prepared to plumb the depths of their unprofessionalism. Now that has happened (www.raipon.info/index.php/component/content/article/1-novosti/1196-im-ne-doehat),
Skalatsky notes that “the task of bringing draftees to the kray center is only part of a large social problem of the entire Koryak district. Young people [from there] cannot be called to military service as is guaranteed by the Constitution. And then they cannot find more or less attractive work because of the lack of such service.”
But instead of addressing this problem, regional officials have sought to shift responsibility for and place blame on anyone but themselves. And when Koryak residents have complained, the bureaucrats have often routed their letters to the wrong officials who in turn have either ignored them or answered with “empty” promises.
One appeal, he said, complained that the situation had deteriorated since the Koryak district was amalgamated into the Kamchatka kray as part of then-President Vladimir Putin’s push to reduce the number of federal subjects by combining in the first instance, small, so-called “matryoshka” non-Russian districts with larger and predominantly Russian ones.
And another letter that Skalatsky read out on television pointed out to officials that many young men can’t find jobs because of this situation. Those “without a military ticket,” she pointed out, “are not hired on a permanent basis,” something that leaves them with few prospects and little hope for the future.
One official told her that the military commissar of Kamchatka kray says that the kray government cannot pay for the flights because Moscow has not provided the necessary funds “to the full extent.” He promised to see what could be done, but since that time, the people and draftees of Koryakia have not received any help.
What they and others have received are proud and entirely “empty” boasts by kray officials. Oskana Gerasimova, the kray development minister, told a session of the Russian-American Pacific Ocean Partnership Group that Kamchatka has all that it needs to be a leader in the development of trade ties between Russia and Pacific Rim and European countries.
Skalatsky says that it would be “interesting” to learn how Gerasimova squares this claim with the situation of “those draftees who FOR YEARS have not been able to reach the draft assembly point because of the absence of money and air communications” and feels comfortable in asserting that Kamchatka is able to respond “adequately to ‘the challenges of the times.’”
Some might be tempted to view this situation as exceptional, but another report today, this time in “Nezavisimaya gazeta,” suggests that similar problems are intensifying in the roughly one-third of the Russian Federation that lies in the north and whose residents are not linked to the rest of the country by any roads, let alone good ones.
According to the Moscow paper’s Krasnoyarsk correspondent, Aleksandr Chernyavsky, 11 days ago, officials closed the civilian airport in Dixon, the northernmost such facility in the Russian Federation, ending regular air service between that location and the south and stranding some 60 passengers waiting on the tarmac(www.ng.ru/regions/2010-09-27/100_dixon.html).
“The air bridge for residents of Dixon” – more than 600 people – “is vitally necessary, Chernyavsky continues. By plane are delivered not only the residents of the local settlement but also doctors, mail, and fresh products like milk and vegetables.” Official promises to establish “helicopter communication” do not appear likely to make up for the loss of plane service.
Vasily Nechayev, the head of the education commission of the regional legislature, says that this failure of the industry and energy ministry and the Taymyr district authorities is generating “serious concerns among the kray parliamentarians. But the local executive responds that that the closure was not his fault but that of aviation safety officials.
To bring the airport up to Russian safety standards will require 250 million rubles (8 million US dollars), an amount local legislatures promise to try to find in next year’s budget. In the meantime, residents of that northern settlement will have to make do without fresh milk and vegetables and perhaps, like the Koryaks, won’t be able to send their sons south to the army.
Sunday, September 26, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Patriarchate Backs Novel by Widow of Martyred Orthodox Missionary about Islamist Extremists
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 26 – The widow of Father Daniel Sysoyev, a young Russian Orthodox pastor missionary who in the view of the Moscow Patriarchate, was “martyred” in November 2009 by Islamist extremists, has written a novel about a young woman who out of her love for her husband finds herself in a camp where Islamists prepare suicide bombers.
The subject is explosive enough in today’s Russia, but the impact of this novel is certain to be far greater than would otherwise be the case because the book is to be published with the imprimatur of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church and thus will be seen by many as a statement of its views (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=37507).
At the very least, the appearance of this book by Yulia Sysoyeva will again focus attention not only on her late husband’s murder and the fate of the many suspected of killing him but also and far more importantly on his push for missionary work by the Russian Orthodox Church not only about the non-traditional faiths but also and especially among Muslims.
Sysoyev, born in 1974, was at the time of his death the pastor of Moscow’s Church of the Apostle Thomas. But more important, he had attracted attention both for his active missionary work among Muslims and Protestants and his willingness to debate the leaders of these faiths and the opponents among the Orthodox of such missionary activity.
(Most Orthodox hierarchs have no objection to missionary work among those they call the non-traditional faiths in that country, but these leaders generally follow the line laid down a decade ago by the churchman who is now patriarch that the Orthodox should not proselytize among the other “traditional” faiths – Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism.)
Sysoyev argued that the Orthodox faith requires its adherents to spread the Good News of
Christianity to others. And during the last decade of his life, he gained the reputation of being an active missionary among the rapidly growing Muslim community of the Russian capital, a reputation that may have cost him his life.
On November 19, 2009, he was shot in his own church. Officials moved quickly and arrested a Kyrgyz national on suspicion. That individual, however, died while in detention, an outcome that led some to believe there was a cover up and others, including radical Islamists in the North Caucasus, to declare that they rather than the man arrested had killed Sysoyev.
At the time of his death, Patriarch Kirill called Father Daniel Sysoyev “a martyr” for the cause of missionary work, and many Orthodox priests and hierarchs have routinely invoked his name and his ideas since then, arguing that the Church must not be afraid, as Sysoyev was not afraid, of seeking to convert Muslims now living in Moscow and other Russian cities.
By giving its support to the novel Sysoyev’s widow has written, one that judging by the brief Interfax account will portray Muslims in a negative way by suggesting they want to recruit Russians as suicide bombers, the Moscow Patriarchate is encouraging anti-Muslim attitudes among the Orthodox, thus exacerbating inter-religious and inter-ethnic tensions in Russia.
Staunton, September 26 – The widow of Father Daniel Sysoyev, a young Russian Orthodox pastor missionary who in the view of the Moscow Patriarchate, was “martyred” in November 2009 by Islamist extremists, has written a novel about a young woman who out of her love for her husband finds herself in a camp where Islamists prepare suicide bombers.
The subject is explosive enough in today’s Russia, but the impact of this novel is certain to be far greater than would otherwise be the case because the book is to be published with the imprimatur of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church and thus will be seen by many as a statement of its views (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=37507).
At the very least, the appearance of this book by Yulia Sysoyeva will again focus attention not only on her late husband’s murder and the fate of the many suspected of killing him but also and far more importantly on his push for missionary work by the Russian Orthodox Church not only about the non-traditional faiths but also and especially among Muslims.
Sysoyev, born in 1974, was at the time of his death the pastor of Moscow’s Church of the Apostle Thomas. But more important, he had attracted attention both for his active missionary work among Muslims and Protestants and his willingness to debate the leaders of these faiths and the opponents among the Orthodox of such missionary activity.
(Most Orthodox hierarchs have no objection to missionary work among those they call the non-traditional faiths in that country, but these leaders generally follow the line laid down a decade ago by the churchman who is now patriarch that the Orthodox should not proselytize among the other “traditional” faiths – Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism.)
Sysoyev argued that the Orthodox faith requires its adherents to spread the Good News of
Christianity to others. And during the last decade of his life, he gained the reputation of being an active missionary among the rapidly growing Muslim community of the Russian capital, a reputation that may have cost him his life.
On November 19, 2009, he was shot in his own church. Officials moved quickly and arrested a Kyrgyz national on suspicion. That individual, however, died while in detention, an outcome that led some to believe there was a cover up and others, including radical Islamists in the North Caucasus, to declare that they rather than the man arrested had killed Sysoyev.
At the time of his death, Patriarch Kirill called Father Daniel Sysoyev “a martyr” for the cause of missionary work, and many Orthodox priests and hierarchs have routinely invoked his name and his ideas since then, arguing that the Church must not be afraid, as Sysoyev was not afraid, of seeking to convert Muslims now living in Moscow and other Russian cities.
By giving its support to the novel Sysoyev’s widow has written, one that judging by the brief Interfax account will portray Muslims in a negative way by suggesting they want to recruit Russians as suicide bombers, the Moscow Patriarchate is encouraging anti-Muslim attitudes among the Orthodox, thus exacerbating inter-religious and inter-ethnic tensions in Russia.
Window on Eurasia: To Cut Costs, Irkutsk Governor Wants to Move All 6500 Residents of One District Out of Their Homes
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 26 – Irkutsk Governor Dmitry Mezentsev has directed officials there to come up with plans to resettle the 6500 residents of his region’s Mamsko-Chuisk district because it costs so much to heat their homes in the winter, a step that he says would save the region’s budget 130 million rubles (4 million US dollars) a year.
Mezentsev says that “if this sum were divided among the residents, each would receive 21,000 rubles (700 US dollars) a piece,” an amount that means “it is impossible to speak about the effective expenditure of budgetary funds.” Moreover, he said, once these people moved, they would have better housing and a better way of life (www.nts-tv.ru/?q=node/28942).
But it is unlikely that many of those whom Irkutsk would like to shift will believe him or that the money saved from not providing heating in the winter to this district would actually go to the people involved. Indeed, if the past is any guide, many of those the powers that be want to move are likely to refuse.
However, this effort not only highlights the extraordinary difficulties that both officials and the population face in areas of Russia beyond the Urals, difficulties rooted in the enormous distances and absence of key infrastructure, but it appears likely to attract even more attention to a disturbing portrait of life in Siberia and the Russian Far East circulating on the blogosphere.
In contrast to the up-beat and prettified picture of life in the region that accompanied Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s recent road trip there, journalist Yuri Pankov provides a Muscovite’s view of what he describes as a dying society in a 6000-word diary entitled “The Brotherhood of the End” (news.babr.ru/?IDE=88485 and news.babr.ru/?IDE=88486).
Like most diaries – and Pankov spent several weeks in various cities and villages of Siberia this summer – this one features more specific facts than generalizations. But the journalist is more interested than many in moving from the one to the other, and that is perhaps why so many Siberians have paid attention, despite their anger at his words (www.news.babr.ru/?IDE=88569).
According to Pankov, his visit this time – he was last there in the 1980s when conditions were better or at least people were more optimistic – forced him to conclude that “THE COUNTRY HAD DIED. [Emphasis in the original.] Without exaggeration. But no one has taken note of this. They have simply forgotten it for a long, long time.”
In many ways, Siberian cities like Bratsk recall the situation that existed in Moscow “at the beginning of the 1990s.” An “unbelievable” number of drunks, “no churches in principle” because the Soviets had closed them, and “the improbable popularity of taxis” which “simple people use even to go for bread because they are so fearful of thieves and murderers.”
Moreover, Pankov continues, “Siberia and the Far East are lost already. Everyone [there] curses the Chinese but they understand that without them nothing good can be expected. It is better if one’s husband is a Chinese, there is work in Chinese companies, there are Chinese fruits, Chinese restaurants, and vacations in China.”
Environmental degradation is extreme. In Bratsk, people often hear sirens from the factories, just as in Soviet times, to announce that the firms are putting wastes into the air or water. And the water in the lakes and rivers is so polluted that doctors say no one should eat the fish from them, although local people in their poverty do so anyway.
In many Siberian villages and even cities, there are three times as many women as men, a situation that often leads to irregular living arrangements. Women are afraid to get abortions lest they be left unable to have more children, and in some places, they have to give birth in emergency service vehicles because hospitals are so far away.
In some villages, he writes, the number of people actually living is much smaller than the number officials think are there. Local people conceal the deaths and departures in order to continue to receive the pensions of the departed, the only way such residents have to survive given low incomes and the high cost of food from other parts of Russia.
Moreover, Pankov says, his visit proved to him that Siberia has not been “electrified” as many believe. That is a myth. Many places do not have any electricity at all, and even in tourist centers on Lake Baikal, there is power from local diesel generators only for “three or four hours in the evening and one hour in the morning.”
Conditions are now so bad, he continues, that many young people, even though they fear what may happen to them, view service in the military as “salvation,” a way out of their difficulties and one that resembles what many Soviet citizens felt as a result of collectivization in the 1920s and 1930s.
That is what Siberian villages and towns are like now, he says. “All Siberia is one big de-kulakized village.”
Siberians, he writes, view political parties as “commercial enterprises” rather than expressions of the views of one or another part of the population. They see elections are completely fraudulent, and because television exposes them to the better life that Russians elsewhere have, many of them are increasingly angry at Moscow.
For the people he met, “a national leader in Russia would be only someone who builds roads. Nothing more than that is necessary. That is, in general, no rights, no elections, land, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, or conscience – here in one settlement of 1400 residents there are no believers at all.”
The only ones who have even been baptized are those who came to Siberia to earn money in the 1960s or who are the descendents of exiled kulaks. Indeed, Pankov says, people in the villages, “live like animals. They throw trash directly out the door.” Even the youngest curse rather than speak. “The people here are degenerating.”
Only roads will save the situation, he continues, but he provides the interesting detail that as in Soviet times, there are no local maps. He asked various officials to provide him one and even after more than a week, no one could find even a single map of the district. Given that people had nowhere to go, that ultimately was no surprise.
“One of the leading intellectuals of Bratsk,” Pankov said, is a veterinarian who is able to speak freely because he is subordinate not to local officials but to people in Irkutsk. He was the one who said no one should eat fish from the local reservoir, lest the poisons in the water make people ill.
And the veterinarian summed up his feelings about the situation in his Siberian city with words that Pankov might have been able to agree with, at least in part. “A fish rots from the head,” as the saying goes, the vet said, but at the present time, “the country is rotting from Moscow.”
Staunton, September 26 – Irkutsk Governor Dmitry Mezentsev has directed officials there to come up with plans to resettle the 6500 residents of his region’s Mamsko-Chuisk district because it costs so much to heat their homes in the winter, a step that he says would save the region’s budget 130 million rubles (4 million US dollars) a year.
Mezentsev says that “if this sum were divided among the residents, each would receive 21,000 rubles (700 US dollars) a piece,” an amount that means “it is impossible to speak about the effective expenditure of budgetary funds.” Moreover, he said, once these people moved, they would have better housing and a better way of life (www.nts-tv.ru/?q=node/28942).
But it is unlikely that many of those whom Irkutsk would like to shift will believe him or that the money saved from not providing heating in the winter to this district would actually go to the people involved. Indeed, if the past is any guide, many of those the powers that be want to move are likely to refuse.
However, this effort not only highlights the extraordinary difficulties that both officials and the population face in areas of Russia beyond the Urals, difficulties rooted in the enormous distances and absence of key infrastructure, but it appears likely to attract even more attention to a disturbing portrait of life in Siberia and the Russian Far East circulating on the blogosphere.
In contrast to the up-beat and prettified picture of life in the region that accompanied Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s recent road trip there, journalist Yuri Pankov provides a Muscovite’s view of what he describes as a dying society in a 6000-word diary entitled “The Brotherhood of the End” (news.babr.ru/?IDE=88485 and news.babr.ru/?IDE=88486).
Like most diaries – and Pankov spent several weeks in various cities and villages of Siberia this summer – this one features more specific facts than generalizations. But the journalist is more interested than many in moving from the one to the other, and that is perhaps why so many Siberians have paid attention, despite their anger at his words (www.news.babr.ru/?IDE=88569).
According to Pankov, his visit this time – he was last there in the 1980s when conditions were better or at least people were more optimistic – forced him to conclude that “THE COUNTRY HAD DIED. [Emphasis in the original.] Without exaggeration. But no one has taken note of this. They have simply forgotten it for a long, long time.”
In many ways, Siberian cities like Bratsk recall the situation that existed in Moscow “at the beginning of the 1990s.” An “unbelievable” number of drunks, “no churches in principle” because the Soviets had closed them, and “the improbable popularity of taxis” which “simple people use even to go for bread because they are so fearful of thieves and murderers.”
Moreover, Pankov continues, “Siberia and the Far East are lost already. Everyone [there] curses the Chinese but they understand that without them nothing good can be expected. It is better if one’s husband is a Chinese, there is work in Chinese companies, there are Chinese fruits, Chinese restaurants, and vacations in China.”
Environmental degradation is extreme. In Bratsk, people often hear sirens from the factories, just as in Soviet times, to announce that the firms are putting wastes into the air or water. And the water in the lakes and rivers is so polluted that doctors say no one should eat the fish from them, although local people in their poverty do so anyway.
In many Siberian villages and even cities, there are three times as many women as men, a situation that often leads to irregular living arrangements. Women are afraid to get abortions lest they be left unable to have more children, and in some places, they have to give birth in emergency service vehicles because hospitals are so far away.
In some villages, he writes, the number of people actually living is much smaller than the number officials think are there. Local people conceal the deaths and departures in order to continue to receive the pensions of the departed, the only way such residents have to survive given low incomes and the high cost of food from other parts of Russia.
Moreover, Pankov says, his visit proved to him that Siberia has not been “electrified” as many believe. That is a myth. Many places do not have any electricity at all, and even in tourist centers on Lake Baikal, there is power from local diesel generators only for “three or four hours in the evening and one hour in the morning.”
Conditions are now so bad, he continues, that many young people, even though they fear what may happen to them, view service in the military as “salvation,” a way out of their difficulties and one that resembles what many Soviet citizens felt as a result of collectivization in the 1920s and 1930s.
That is what Siberian villages and towns are like now, he says. “All Siberia is one big de-kulakized village.”
Siberians, he writes, view political parties as “commercial enterprises” rather than expressions of the views of one or another part of the population. They see elections are completely fraudulent, and because television exposes them to the better life that Russians elsewhere have, many of them are increasingly angry at Moscow.
For the people he met, “a national leader in Russia would be only someone who builds roads. Nothing more than that is necessary. That is, in general, no rights, no elections, land, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, or conscience – here in one settlement of 1400 residents there are no believers at all.”
The only ones who have even been baptized are those who came to Siberia to earn money in the 1960s or who are the descendents of exiled kulaks. Indeed, Pankov says, people in the villages, “live like animals. They throw trash directly out the door.” Even the youngest curse rather than speak. “The people here are degenerating.”
Only roads will save the situation, he continues, but he provides the interesting detail that as in Soviet times, there are no local maps. He asked various officials to provide him one and even after more than a week, no one could find even a single map of the district. Given that people had nowhere to go, that ultimately was no surprise.
“One of the leading intellectuals of Bratsk,” Pankov said, is a veterinarian who is able to speak freely because he is subordinate not to local officials but to people in Irkutsk. He was the one who said no one should eat fish from the local reservoir, lest the poisons in the water make people ill.
And the veterinarian summed up his feelings about the situation in his Siberian city with words that Pankov might have been able to agree with, at least in part. “A fish rots from the head,” as the saying goes, the vet said, but at the present time, “the country is rotting from Moscow.”
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