Paul Goble
Staunton, September 25 – Moscow has failed to stabilize the North Caucasus or even reduce the threats to Russian sovereignty and control there, a “Segodnya” commentator says, because it has failed to stem the flight of ethnic Russians from the region, the very people who he argues provide the glue that holds the country together.
Instead, Petr Ivanchenko argues in yesterday’s paper, the central powers that be have sought to buy friends from within the local elites, either through massive spending which quickly disappears into corrupt pockets or through the offer of more or less unrestricted autonomy in exchange for declarations of loyalty. Neither tactic has worked.
And consequently, he suggests, Moscow should again rely, as the tsarist and to a lesser extent the Soviet authorities did, on ethnic Russian and Cossack communities there, protecting those that remain and encouraging others to return in order to ensure that the center will in fact control the North Caucasus (www.segodnia.ru/index.php?pgid=2&partid=10&newsid=12565).
But while Ivanchenko acknowledges in his essay that many non-Russians blame all their problems on “the Russians,” largely because of what he calls “Wahhabi propaganda,” he fails to consider whether a Moscow policy which relied on the ethnic Russians might provoke even more resistance from non-Russians in that unstable region.
Although the Russian leadership has not been shy about using force – in fact, it appears to have launched major operations in Daghestan and Chechnya this weekend – Moscow currently is placing its bets on providing more jobs for people there, self-confidently believing that “unemployment is the root of all evils” in the North Caucasus.
That is the thrust of the new Strategy of Development of the North Caucasus Federal District Up to 2025 that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Presidential Plenipotentiary Aleksandr Khloponin have been pushing, Ivanchenko continues, but there is no reason to think that such an approach will work any better than the ones Moscow has tried before.
Not only is it “unclear how such programs can be achieved under conditions of terror and general fear” – Ivanchenko notes that as far as tourism is concerned, “militants in Kabardino-Balkaria have already begun the intentional murder of vacationers” – but the enormous sums of money Moscow plans to spend will simply disappear.
(What is truly perverse, he notes, is that in the preamble to the Strategy, its authors acknowledge that the money Moscow has spent up to now has not had a positive effect.” But then, “as we see, the new strategic concept proposes practically the same thing … to be carried out by “the very same people” who up to now have not used the money as intended.)
What should be obvious to everyone, the “Segodnya” commentator says, is that the ground has not been prepared in the North Caucasus for such projects. Instead, Moscow will spend money, officials in the North Caucasus will pocket it, and the Russian Federation will still face threats to its sovereign control of that region.
Ivanchenko notes that the Americans are beginning to learn that in Afghanistan. They thought they had been able to “purchase the loyalty” of their opponents. But that hasn’t worked, just as it did not work for the Russian Federation after the Khasavyurt peace accord with Chechnya signed by then Security Council deputy head Boris Berezovsky.
“Money from the Russian budget will find its way into the pockets of the local political elite which does not have any influence on the terrorists and cannot improve the situation,” Ivanchenko says. And thus it will do nothing to dissuade “many Caucasians” from blaming Moscow and the ethnic Russians for their problems.
The continuing thievery and corruption of regional leaders whom Stalin would have called at best “’our sons of bitches’” had been pushing ever more people in Moscow to accept the idea that the only way out is to allow local leaders to do whatever they want as long as they keep the peace and constantly declare their loyalty to Moscow.
That is what Moscow has done in Chechnya, but while the declarations of loyalty continue, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov has not been able to maintain order even in his home village. Moreover, the militants can attack his capital at any time, and Chechen criminals can operate far beyond “the borders of this ‘reservation.’”
Given that reality, Ivanchenko continues, it is time to look for another solution to the problem, and he offers his: increasing reliance on and the reinforcement of the ethnic Russian community still in the North Caucasus in the ways that both the tsarist regime and the Soviet authorities did in the past.
Ethnic Russians and Cossacks, he suggests, are precisely the people who can cope with the situation in the North Caucasus if they are supported. And he quotes with approval Soviet Marshal Ivan Bagramyan’s observation that “if in a military unit, there are fewer than 50 percent ethnic Russians, then it should be reformed because it would not be militarily capable.”
That “formulation,” Ivanchenko suggests, “must be applied not only in the military sphere.”
What is instructive, he continues, is that “even the authors” of the North Caucasus strategy document point out that “one of the causes of the existing problems is the outflow of the Christian population from the Caucasus,” a view that has its roots in Putin’s 1999 declarations about “the genocide of Russians” in Chechnya.
His remarks gave some Russians hope a decade ago, but then “the Kremlin decided to promote ‘the Chechenization’ of the conflict, and about the genocide none of the leaders of the country spoke anymore.” But it is time, the Russian commentator says, to remember precisely this, instead of throwing good money after bad and relying on purchased “friends.”
Saturday, September 25, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Daghestanis Outraged by Moscow’s Decision to Shift Border with Azerbaijan
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 25 – Daghestanis, who as one commentator noted angrily this week “in 1999 stood up in defense of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation” when they opposed a Chechen invasion have now been forced to watch “the violation of this [very same] territorial integrity by the government itself.”
In an article published yesterday, Ruslan Kurbanov, a scholar who serves on the working group of the Social Chamber for the Caucasus, said he was specifically referring to the agreement between Moscow and Baku over the flow of the Samur River which forms the border of the two countries (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/4821/109/).
That accord, which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made the centerpiece of his visit to Baku, shifted the line from the Azerbaijani shore of the river as it had been in Soviet times to the middle of the river, thus “allowing control of the Samur hydro-system to remain in the hands of the Azerbaijani side.”
Since the signing of that accord earlier this month, Kurbanov says, Daghestani journalists and bloggers have advanced numerous arguments as to “why for the peoples of Daghestan this agreement is a misfortune and why Russia’s inability to defend the interests of its own population, even of Caucasus nationality, is a humiliation.”
What makes their arguments particularly compelling, the Makhachkala writer says, is that “this is not a unique case.” Russia has been yielding territory for some time. And this process has involved “small units” of territory “now in the South and now in the East,” inevitably raising the question as to when this might stop.
In 2005, Kurbanov continues, Moscow and Beijing reached agreement on the partial demarcation of the Sino-Russian border. As a result of this accord, Russia handed over a total of 337 square kilometers to China, something that sparked “hot discussions” in Moscow and the Russian Far East about whether this had been the right thing to do.
At that time, he recalls, “opponents of that transfer of territory pointed out that these were strategically important lands for Russia because they were rich in natural resources. But defenders of this decision of the government asserted that the loss in land was not very big for Russia and that the improvement of strategic relations with China was much more important.”
But only three years later, however, Moscow agreed to hand over still more territory to China so that it could “solemnly claim” that territorial issues between the countries, “negotiations about which had lasted more than 40 years,” had all been resolved, something many Russians had assumed had already taken place in 2005.
That is worrisome, Kurbanov says, because “if in this way Moscow will resolve all territorial problems, then nothing will remain from the Great Russia [of today] in the very near future. “ What guarantees does anyone have that Moscow won’t resolve the Kuriles dispute with Japan in Tokyo’s favor to “improve relations” with Tokyo?
Or what about Kaliningrad oblast, Kurbanov asks rhetorically, “which before World War II was [Germany’s] East Prussia and whose capital Kaliningrad was Konigsberg? Or how can one “not recall about Azerbaijani pretensions not only to the Samur but also to the [southern Daghestani] city of Derbent and the land adjoining it?
And all these things raise the larger and potentially far more fateful question, Kurbanov suggests: “Does the current Russian elite have any point at which it is prepared to stop making territorial concessions to its neighbors if the interests of simple people do not agitate anyone [among that elite]?”
The anger Daghestanis now feel is important for two reasons. On the one hand, it suggests that many of them now view Moscow as incapable of defending existing borders, a conclusion that is especially dangerous in a region where any appearance of weakness can lead people to conclude that it is time to shift allegiances.
And on the other, and more immediately, Moscow’s failure to recall the time when Daghestanis stood up and defended the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation only 11 years ago almost certainly means that fewer of them will be prepared to do so again and that more will be prepared to accept border changes that Moscow won’t like at all.
UPDATE on September 27. The anger of Daghestanis about Moscow's concessions to Azerbaijan on the border river is now being echoed by some Russian commentators in Moscow. See, for example, www.apn.ru/publications/article23198.htm
Staunton, September 25 – Daghestanis, who as one commentator noted angrily this week “in 1999 stood up in defense of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation” when they opposed a Chechen invasion have now been forced to watch “the violation of this [very same] territorial integrity by the government itself.”
In an article published yesterday, Ruslan Kurbanov, a scholar who serves on the working group of the Social Chamber for the Caucasus, said he was specifically referring to the agreement between Moscow and Baku over the flow of the Samur River which forms the border of the two countries (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/4821/109/).
That accord, which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made the centerpiece of his visit to Baku, shifted the line from the Azerbaijani shore of the river as it had been in Soviet times to the middle of the river, thus “allowing control of the Samur hydro-system to remain in the hands of the Azerbaijani side.”
Since the signing of that accord earlier this month, Kurbanov says, Daghestani journalists and bloggers have advanced numerous arguments as to “why for the peoples of Daghestan this agreement is a misfortune and why Russia’s inability to defend the interests of its own population, even of Caucasus nationality, is a humiliation.”
What makes their arguments particularly compelling, the Makhachkala writer says, is that “this is not a unique case.” Russia has been yielding territory for some time. And this process has involved “small units” of territory “now in the South and now in the East,” inevitably raising the question as to when this might stop.
In 2005, Kurbanov continues, Moscow and Beijing reached agreement on the partial demarcation of the Sino-Russian border. As a result of this accord, Russia handed over a total of 337 square kilometers to China, something that sparked “hot discussions” in Moscow and the Russian Far East about whether this had been the right thing to do.
At that time, he recalls, “opponents of that transfer of territory pointed out that these were strategically important lands for Russia because they were rich in natural resources. But defenders of this decision of the government asserted that the loss in land was not very big for Russia and that the improvement of strategic relations with China was much more important.”
But only three years later, however, Moscow agreed to hand over still more territory to China so that it could “solemnly claim” that territorial issues between the countries, “negotiations about which had lasted more than 40 years,” had all been resolved, something many Russians had assumed had already taken place in 2005.
That is worrisome, Kurbanov says, because “if in this way Moscow will resolve all territorial problems, then nothing will remain from the Great Russia [of today] in the very near future. “ What guarantees does anyone have that Moscow won’t resolve the Kuriles dispute with Japan in Tokyo’s favor to “improve relations” with Tokyo?
Or what about Kaliningrad oblast, Kurbanov asks rhetorically, “which before World War II was [Germany’s] East Prussia and whose capital Kaliningrad was Konigsberg? Or how can one “not recall about Azerbaijani pretensions not only to the Samur but also to the [southern Daghestani] city of Derbent and the land adjoining it?
And all these things raise the larger and potentially far more fateful question, Kurbanov suggests: “Does the current Russian elite have any point at which it is prepared to stop making territorial concessions to its neighbors if the interests of simple people do not agitate anyone [among that elite]?”
The anger Daghestanis now feel is important for two reasons. On the one hand, it suggests that many of them now view Moscow as incapable of defending existing borders, a conclusion that is especially dangerous in a region where any appearance of weakness can lead people to conclude that it is time to shift allegiances.
And on the other, and more immediately, Moscow’s failure to recall the time when Daghestanis stood up and defended the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation only 11 years ago almost certainly means that fewer of them will be prepared to do so again and that more will be prepared to accept border changes that Moscow won’t like at all.
UPDATE on September 27. The anger of Daghestanis about Moscow's concessions to Azerbaijan on the border river is now being echoed by some Russian commentators in Moscow. See, for example, www.apn.ru/publications/article23198.htm
Window on Eurasia: A Tajik Muslim, Trained by Turks, Arabs and Malaysians, Now Teaches Koran Recitation to Kazan Tatars
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 25 – The complex ways in which Muslims from various former Soviet republics have interacted with the Islamic world outside is reflected in the career of Ibrahim Sabirov, a Tajik trained by Turks, Yemenis and Saudis, who now heads training center for the recitation of the Koran Recitation in Tatarstan.
On Thursday, the new Islamsng.com portal published an interview with him conducted by Dzhannat Sergey Markus, an ethnic Russian convert to Islam who is active in both the print and electronic media as a commentator on developments in the Muslim community in the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics (islamsng.com/tjk/tradition/171).
And while Sabirov’s career is certainly not typical, it is instructive both in highlighting the role Central Asian and especially foreign Muslims have played in the restoration of Islam in Russia and in showing the way very conservative forms of Islam, such as memorization of the Koran (“hafiz”), are gaining ground even in Kazan, a center of Jadidist reforms.
In 2003, Sabirov founded the Center for the Preparation of Hafizes of the Koran at the Russian Islamic University in the Tatarstan capital. Asked why such a center was set up only then and not immediately after “freedom of conscience became a reality in Russia with the start of perestroika” in the late 1980s, Sabirov blamed it on “the tragic history of our country.”
“More precisely,” he said, it happened because of those repressive acts which seriously undermined Islamic traditions in the Russian Empire and especially in the Middle Volga region and then almost completely destroyed them during the period of the Soviet regime” with its anti-religious program.
Given that, he continued, “restoring such a precise art as the reading of the Koran and in particular the experience of the hafiz, who know the Koranic text by heart and are masters of repeating it is extraordinarily difficult because in this case what is especially important are living people” who have that skill and can pass it on directly to their pupils.
Such people represent a chain extending back to Mohammed who learned the Koran by heart from the Archangel Gabriel and then passed it on to others. Consequently, “when listening to the Koran today from a real reader, we approach this chain.” And that is why the oppressors of Islam always try not only to destroy mosques and burn books but to break this chain.”
Markus said that helped to explain why a Tajik would have to come to Tatarstan from Central Asia where there are many more such schools to restore this tie. Sabirov agreed, noting that “being further from the imperial and soviet centers, our traditions were preserved in a more vital way. Now,” he said, “we are called to help other brothers.”
As for himself, Sabirov said, he began to learn the Koran at home in Tajikistan but only fully mastered it and became a hafiz when he “received the tradition from Aduljalil Kasim from Yemen,” a scholar who now also works at his center. Others acquired that skill abroad or from those who had been abroad.
When Islam was reborn in Russia in the 1990s, Sabirov continued, it happened when “the first hafizes appeared from abroad, and certain young people studied the Koran in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The first Tatarstan hafizes were students of Karaers Muqerrem from Turkey.” Sabirov said he was among their number but noted that he also studied in Malaysia.
Like other traditional Muslims, Sabirov argued that “every letter of the Koran, read in the Arabic languages at times even without an understanding of its meaning, enriches the spirit of an individual and is counted for him as a good deed,” a view that many Jadid modernists have challenged, arguing instead that gaining knowledge rather than rote learning is key.
But if he is a traditionalist in some respects, Sabirov has proved a modernizer in others, albeit explaining his innovation, the training of young women as hafizes as a restoration of “a most ancient tradition.” And he has taken the lead in training young people in camps and in using the Internet for distance learning with Muslim experts in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
. Moreover, Sabirov said that he ensures that the students at his Center not only memorize the Koran but also gain knowledge in the Arabic language, calligraphy, Islamic law and traditions, and even physical fitness.
When asked about the impact of Tatar language and culture on what he is doing, Sabirov pointed out that “the culture of Islam presupposes diversity and does not reject national uniqueness,” adding that “Tatar musicality (and this literally is in the sub-consciousness even of babes) is based on the five tone scale.”
“The child begins to think (including musically) in the spirit of his ancestors,” Sabirov said. “Our task is to develop his abilities in general, then to teach him to teach in Arabic (that is, according to the Koran) in order that he will then return to his roots,” ones deeper than the nationality that he may already have come to know.
Staunton, September 25 – The complex ways in which Muslims from various former Soviet republics have interacted with the Islamic world outside is reflected in the career of Ibrahim Sabirov, a Tajik trained by Turks, Yemenis and Saudis, who now heads training center for the recitation of the Koran Recitation in Tatarstan.
On Thursday, the new Islamsng.com portal published an interview with him conducted by Dzhannat Sergey Markus, an ethnic Russian convert to Islam who is active in both the print and electronic media as a commentator on developments in the Muslim community in the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics (islamsng.com/tjk/tradition/171).
And while Sabirov’s career is certainly not typical, it is instructive both in highlighting the role Central Asian and especially foreign Muslims have played in the restoration of Islam in Russia and in showing the way very conservative forms of Islam, such as memorization of the Koran (“hafiz”), are gaining ground even in Kazan, a center of Jadidist reforms.
In 2003, Sabirov founded the Center for the Preparation of Hafizes of the Koran at the Russian Islamic University in the Tatarstan capital. Asked why such a center was set up only then and not immediately after “freedom of conscience became a reality in Russia with the start of perestroika” in the late 1980s, Sabirov blamed it on “the tragic history of our country.”
“More precisely,” he said, it happened because of those repressive acts which seriously undermined Islamic traditions in the Russian Empire and especially in the Middle Volga region and then almost completely destroyed them during the period of the Soviet regime” with its anti-religious program.
Given that, he continued, “restoring such a precise art as the reading of the Koran and in particular the experience of the hafiz, who know the Koranic text by heart and are masters of repeating it is extraordinarily difficult because in this case what is especially important are living people” who have that skill and can pass it on directly to their pupils.
Such people represent a chain extending back to Mohammed who learned the Koran by heart from the Archangel Gabriel and then passed it on to others. Consequently, “when listening to the Koran today from a real reader, we approach this chain.” And that is why the oppressors of Islam always try not only to destroy mosques and burn books but to break this chain.”
Markus said that helped to explain why a Tajik would have to come to Tatarstan from Central Asia where there are many more such schools to restore this tie. Sabirov agreed, noting that “being further from the imperial and soviet centers, our traditions were preserved in a more vital way. Now,” he said, “we are called to help other brothers.”
As for himself, Sabirov said, he began to learn the Koran at home in Tajikistan but only fully mastered it and became a hafiz when he “received the tradition from Aduljalil Kasim from Yemen,” a scholar who now also works at his center. Others acquired that skill abroad or from those who had been abroad.
When Islam was reborn in Russia in the 1990s, Sabirov continued, it happened when “the first hafizes appeared from abroad, and certain young people studied the Koran in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The first Tatarstan hafizes were students of Karaers Muqerrem from Turkey.” Sabirov said he was among their number but noted that he also studied in Malaysia.
Like other traditional Muslims, Sabirov argued that “every letter of the Koran, read in the Arabic languages at times even without an understanding of its meaning, enriches the spirit of an individual and is counted for him as a good deed,” a view that many Jadid modernists have challenged, arguing instead that gaining knowledge rather than rote learning is key.
But if he is a traditionalist in some respects, Sabirov has proved a modernizer in others, albeit explaining his innovation, the training of young women as hafizes as a restoration of “a most ancient tradition.” And he has taken the lead in training young people in camps and in using the Internet for distance learning with Muslim experts in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
. Moreover, Sabirov said that he ensures that the students at his Center not only memorize the Koran but also gain knowledge in the Arabic language, calligraphy, Islamic law and traditions, and even physical fitness.
When asked about the impact of Tatar language and culture on what he is doing, Sabirov pointed out that “the culture of Islam presupposes diversity and does not reject national uniqueness,” adding that “Tatar musicality (and this literally is in the sub-consciousness even of babes) is based on the five tone scale.”
“The child begins to think (including musically) in the spirit of his ancestors,” Sabirov said. “Our task is to develop his abilities in general, then to teach him to teach in Arabic (that is, according to the Koran) in order that he will then return to his roots,” ones deeper than the nationality that he may already have come to know.
Friday, September 24, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Russia Caught between ‘Asiatic’ and ‘European’ Models of Relations between a Secular State and a Muslim Minority, Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 24 – Most Russian commentators compare how Russia deals with its Muslim community to the ways in which European countries treat theirs, but a leading Muslim editor in Moscow says that a far more suggestive comparison at least for the present is between the situation in Russia and that in Asian countries with significant Muslim minorities.
In an essay posted on Islam.ru, Abdulla Rinat Mukhametov, that site’s deputy chief editor, notes that many Russian specialists on Muslims, including Ruslan Kurbanov, have focused almost exclusively on the European experience when discussing the status of Muslims in the Russian Federation (www.islam.ru/pressclub/tema/lutaziar/).
But in his view, Mukhametov writes, “one should compare Russia as far as its relations with its domestic Muslim community is concerned not with Europe but with Asia or more precisely with those Asian countries in which a significant Muslim minority lives” and in that way avoid the mistake of assuming that Russia’s situation is “in principle unique.”
“The experience of European and more generally Western Muslim minorities, despite its brief history, today has turned out to be much more studied that the analogous processes in Asia,” the Islam.ru editor says, a reflection of the fact that their appearance “at the center of the world concerns experts far more than the rest.”
“But for us living in Russia,” Mukhametov continues, “it is extremely important to know how Islam has existed and exists in such countries as China, India, Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and even Burma and Vietnam to a certain degree” and even “with certain qualifications,” in the Balkans, Ukraine, Poland, Belarus and Lithuania.”
That is because historically Russia “has much in common with these countries as far as its dealings with Islam. First of all, as in them, “Islam is a traditional, historically rooted religion.” In Russia as in the others, Muslims are “indigenous residents on the land where they live and not migrants or their descendents as in Europe.”
Second, again in these countries and in Russia, “the Muslim minority has problems with the government of one or another level of intensity.” Third, in all of them and in Russia, “Islam and Muslims have played in the history of their countries a much more important and positive role than that which the governments are prepared to acknowledge.”
Fourth, “in all these countries,” Muslims are split between the loyal and the integrated, on the one hand, and those in open and often armed conflict with the central government, on the other. In Russia, Mukhametov points out, this divide runs between “the community of Muslims of the Volga-Urals region” and the Muslims of “the destabilized North Caucasus.”
Moreover, he notes, in all these countries as in Russia itself, these problems are not always strictly religious. They also reflect “the political-territorial separatism of some Muslims and disagreement with this position by another part of the faithful,” a divide with roots extending far back into history and not always based in the first instance on Islam.
And finally, in all these countries as again as in Russia, “Muslims are a kind of ‘younger brothers,’ who de facto do not have equal status with the majority,” even if de jure they do. That lower status typically reflects the reality that “at one time, their ancestors suffered an historical defeat and have remained in a subordinate position.”
Viewed from this “Asian” perspective, he continues, “the Russian Federation is crudely speaking the best government of an ‘Asiatic’ type of interrelationships with [its] Muslim minorities.” But unfortunately, the situation is changing, and Russia may soon acquire “the most problematic” aspects of the ‘European’ relationship while losing the best of the ‘Asiatic.’
Because of the enormous flows of immigration from Central Asia and other “former colonies of the Russian Empire … Islam in the Russian Federation increasingly recalls the ‘European’ type where the overwhelming majority of followers of Islam are immigrants or their descendents of the second or in the best case third generation.”
And as a result, Mukhametov says, “the centuries-old ‘Asian’ identity of Islam in Russia is rapidly changing before our eyes,” a shift that represents “the main challenge, above all for the indigenous Muslims” of Russia but also for Russian society and the Russian powers that be who must respond.
Until the end of the Soviet period, most Russians had good reason to associate Muslims with “the Tatar neighbor” who may have lived next door for decades. But after that time, with the violence in the North Caucasus, that image of the Muslim of Russia was replaced for many by that of “the Caucasus militant” or of “the illiterate and scruffy gastarbeiter.”
The influx of Muslims from Central Asia and the Caucasus means, he continues, that “after 20 to 30 years, the indigenous Muslim population of Russia, the communities of the Volga-Urals and North Caucasus regions will become minorities in relation to the Central Asian majority—a long-term trend which it is impossible to change whether one likes it or not.”
It is already the case in some Russian cities where there are more Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz than indigenous Russian Muslims in the parishes of the mosques, and anger about that both among ethnic Russians and indigenous Muslims is helping to transform the Muslim community of Russia into something “it never was before.”
Mukhametov says that he believes that “in the 21st century, the Russian Federation will be not that country of ‘the Asian-Muslim’ type as it was,” but rather “will become ‘Europeans,’” in that “the problem of Islam and migration [will be viewed as] one and the same thing. With one distinction, [Russia’s] situation will be an order of magnitude worse.”
The reason for that, he suggests, is that “Russia is not prepared for such a turn of events and what is still worse, it does not want to get prepared.” Instead, people continue to act “as if nothing is happening or as if someone else is responsible for our problems and that someone consequently must resolve them.” Unfortunately, there is no reason to expect anyone will.
Staunton, September 24 – Most Russian commentators compare how Russia deals with its Muslim community to the ways in which European countries treat theirs, but a leading Muslim editor in Moscow says that a far more suggestive comparison at least for the present is between the situation in Russia and that in Asian countries with significant Muslim minorities.
In an essay posted on Islam.ru, Abdulla Rinat Mukhametov, that site’s deputy chief editor, notes that many Russian specialists on Muslims, including Ruslan Kurbanov, have focused almost exclusively on the European experience when discussing the status of Muslims in the Russian Federation (www.islam.ru/pressclub/tema/lutaziar/).
But in his view, Mukhametov writes, “one should compare Russia as far as its relations with its domestic Muslim community is concerned not with Europe but with Asia or more precisely with those Asian countries in which a significant Muslim minority lives” and in that way avoid the mistake of assuming that Russia’s situation is “in principle unique.”
“The experience of European and more generally Western Muslim minorities, despite its brief history, today has turned out to be much more studied that the analogous processes in Asia,” the Islam.ru editor says, a reflection of the fact that their appearance “at the center of the world concerns experts far more than the rest.”
“But for us living in Russia,” Mukhametov continues, “it is extremely important to know how Islam has existed and exists in such countries as China, India, Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and even Burma and Vietnam to a certain degree” and even “with certain qualifications,” in the Balkans, Ukraine, Poland, Belarus and Lithuania.”
That is because historically Russia “has much in common with these countries as far as its dealings with Islam. First of all, as in them, “Islam is a traditional, historically rooted religion.” In Russia as in the others, Muslims are “indigenous residents on the land where they live and not migrants or their descendents as in Europe.”
Second, again in these countries and in Russia, “the Muslim minority has problems with the government of one or another level of intensity.” Third, in all of them and in Russia, “Islam and Muslims have played in the history of their countries a much more important and positive role than that which the governments are prepared to acknowledge.”
Fourth, “in all these countries,” Muslims are split between the loyal and the integrated, on the one hand, and those in open and often armed conflict with the central government, on the other. In Russia, Mukhametov points out, this divide runs between “the community of Muslims of the Volga-Urals region” and the Muslims of “the destabilized North Caucasus.”
Moreover, he notes, in all these countries as in Russia itself, these problems are not always strictly religious. They also reflect “the political-territorial separatism of some Muslims and disagreement with this position by another part of the faithful,” a divide with roots extending far back into history and not always based in the first instance on Islam.
And finally, in all these countries as again as in Russia, “Muslims are a kind of ‘younger brothers,’ who de facto do not have equal status with the majority,” even if de jure they do. That lower status typically reflects the reality that “at one time, their ancestors suffered an historical defeat and have remained in a subordinate position.”
Viewed from this “Asian” perspective, he continues, “the Russian Federation is crudely speaking the best government of an ‘Asiatic’ type of interrelationships with [its] Muslim minorities.” But unfortunately, the situation is changing, and Russia may soon acquire “the most problematic” aspects of the ‘European’ relationship while losing the best of the ‘Asiatic.’
Because of the enormous flows of immigration from Central Asia and other “former colonies of the Russian Empire … Islam in the Russian Federation increasingly recalls the ‘European’ type where the overwhelming majority of followers of Islam are immigrants or their descendents of the second or in the best case third generation.”
And as a result, Mukhametov says, “the centuries-old ‘Asian’ identity of Islam in Russia is rapidly changing before our eyes,” a shift that represents “the main challenge, above all for the indigenous Muslims” of Russia but also for Russian society and the Russian powers that be who must respond.
Until the end of the Soviet period, most Russians had good reason to associate Muslims with “the Tatar neighbor” who may have lived next door for decades. But after that time, with the violence in the North Caucasus, that image of the Muslim of Russia was replaced for many by that of “the Caucasus militant” or of “the illiterate and scruffy gastarbeiter.”
The influx of Muslims from Central Asia and the Caucasus means, he continues, that “after 20 to 30 years, the indigenous Muslim population of Russia, the communities of the Volga-Urals and North Caucasus regions will become minorities in relation to the Central Asian majority—a long-term trend which it is impossible to change whether one likes it or not.”
It is already the case in some Russian cities where there are more Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz than indigenous Russian Muslims in the parishes of the mosques, and anger about that both among ethnic Russians and indigenous Muslims is helping to transform the Muslim community of Russia into something “it never was before.”
Mukhametov says that he believes that “in the 21st century, the Russian Federation will be not that country of ‘the Asian-Muslim’ type as it was,” but rather “will become ‘Europeans,’” in that “the problem of Islam and migration [will be viewed as] one and the same thing. With one distinction, [Russia’s] situation will be an order of magnitude worse.”
The reason for that, he suggests, is that “Russia is not prepared for such a turn of events and what is still worse, it does not want to get prepared.” Instead, people continue to act “as if nothing is happening or as if someone else is responsible for our problems and that someone consequently must resolve them.” Unfortunately, there is no reason to expect anyone will.
Window on Eurasia: Military Pensioners in 12 Russian Cities Call for Putin’s Ouster
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 24 – Last weekend, Russian military retirees and their families took part in demonstrations in 12 cities of the Volga-Ural military district both to call attention to their plight and to advance political demands, including calls for internal troops not to obey orders to use force against the people and for the dismissal of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
As organizers pointed out, “the official media” in Moscow “modestly kept quiet” about these protests, and details about them are only now coming to light in the blogosphere, on some regional sites, and on opposition portals in the Russian capital (news.babr.ru/?IDE=88558, www.pbrus.org/main/557-sobytiya-v-ulyanovske-voennosluzhashhie.html, and www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=4C9C8E1C6E824).
Organizers of the meetings, which attracted 400 people in Ulyanovsk and smaller numbers in the other cities, pointed out that “military personnel are a special part of the civilian population of the country … people who have consciously chosen their fate to defend their country and their people from aggressors.”
“And having chosen service to the Fatherland,” the organizers said, “the country and government guarantee them social security and defense after they take their pensions as a special category of citizens.” But in recent years, they continued, that contract has broken down: military people have served the state but the state has not served them.
The continuing reform of the army and fleet have “shameless” thrown many officers and their families “into the streets,” leaving them without the most basic requirements. And these people include “not only elderly soldiers but also young officers aged 30” and wives who while following their husbands did not have a chance to work.
Faced with this situation, the organizers continued, Russian military retirees have written senior officers and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin but “they have not received a single answer.” And consequently, “beginning on May 19, 2010, the military personnel of Ulyanovsk have begun on a monthly basis to picket and advance social demands.”
(The 19th of the month was chosen because it refers to the number of the article in the Russian Constitution about military service. In this respect, this latest movement among military retirees is an echo of efforts by human rights activists to protest violations of basic rights every 31st of the month.)
“Recognizing perfectly well that the defense of social rights is a matter of politics, the military people have been supported by social-political organizations like the Unified Civic Front, Solidarity, RNDS, the Other Russia, the KPRF, LDPR and also the population of the city of Ulyanovsk.” And now these demonstrations are spreading and becoming more political.
“At the present time,” the organizers say, “the people have come down with ‘an immune deficit of faith,’ an analogue to HIV/AIDS only for society as a whole.” Indeed, “a vicious circle” has developed: The powers that be ignore the people, even those who have “defended and protected the state.” Consequently, military retirees must protest.
One participant, Boris Smekhnov, a lieutenant colonel retired from the tank forces and head of the Unified Regional Staff for the Defense of the Social Rights of Military People and Their Families, told the Ulyanovsk protest that “we understand perfectly well that no less than 80 percent of the population is dissatisfied with the policies being implemented by the powers.”
“Even those who serve and receive good pay today are dissatisfied with it because they understand very well that they do not have a future,” Smekhnov continued. That is because, he said, “the people no longer have any power in the country, and the defense capability of the country is at a low level.”
More pointedly, he said he was concerned by “the establishment in Russia of a large number of internal forces. In the Oath,” he pointed out, “there are no words about fighting with one’s own people. This is something which officers of the internal forces must remember” and it is something which the powers that be appear to have forgotten.
The Ulyanovsk meeting adopted appeals to serving officers and soldiers and to President Dmitry Medvedev. In them, the protesters asserted that “Our Motherland is in Danger… not from external enemies but from the pathetic policy of the power of the property owners who conceal themselves behind a distorted image about the state.”
They then identify the following eight problems in Russia today: First, “power is concentrated in the hands of a single party ‘United Russia.’” Second, the country’s social-economic and political crisis is deepening. Third, the armed forces are being destroyed. Fourth, industry and agriculture are collapsing.
Fifth, national projects have failed. Sixth, the gap between rich and poor is increasing at a fantastic rate. Seventh, life in Ulyanovsk oblast is far below the all-Russia average. And eighth, the powers that be are “shamelessly using the administrative resource” to ensure their survival in office while “completely violating the constitutional rights of the voters.”
Consequently, they made the following demands; the dismissal of Putin and his government, the dismissal of the regional and city authorities, an end to state financing of “pocket media,” a cut in the size of the bureaucracy, and an end to billing the population for communal services.
In addition, these appeals called for the adoption of “decisive measures” to end the decay of the military, an increase in pensions for all citizens “except highly paid bureaucrats,” and “the return of the state rest homes to the oblast and city council of veterans. If their demands are ignored, the participants said, they will stage hunger strikes in the future.
Staunton, September 24 – Last weekend, Russian military retirees and their families took part in demonstrations in 12 cities of the Volga-Ural military district both to call attention to their plight and to advance political demands, including calls for internal troops not to obey orders to use force against the people and for the dismissal of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
As organizers pointed out, “the official media” in Moscow “modestly kept quiet” about these protests, and details about them are only now coming to light in the blogosphere, on some regional sites, and on opposition portals in the Russian capital (news.babr.ru/?IDE=88558, www.pbrus.org/main/557-sobytiya-v-ulyanovske-voennosluzhashhie.html, and www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=4C9C8E1C6E824).
Organizers of the meetings, which attracted 400 people in Ulyanovsk and smaller numbers in the other cities, pointed out that “military personnel are a special part of the civilian population of the country … people who have consciously chosen their fate to defend their country and their people from aggressors.”
“And having chosen service to the Fatherland,” the organizers said, “the country and government guarantee them social security and defense after they take their pensions as a special category of citizens.” But in recent years, they continued, that contract has broken down: military people have served the state but the state has not served them.
The continuing reform of the army and fleet have “shameless” thrown many officers and their families “into the streets,” leaving them without the most basic requirements. And these people include “not only elderly soldiers but also young officers aged 30” and wives who while following their husbands did not have a chance to work.
Faced with this situation, the organizers continued, Russian military retirees have written senior officers and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin but “they have not received a single answer.” And consequently, “beginning on May 19, 2010, the military personnel of Ulyanovsk have begun on a monthly basis to picket and advance social demands.”
(The 19th of the month was chosen because it refers to the number of the article in the Russian Constitution about military service. In this respect, this latest movement among military retirees is an echo of efforts by human rights activists to protest violations of basic rights every 31st of the month.)
“Recognizing perfectly well that the defense of social rights is a matter of politics, the military people have been supported by social-political organizations like the Unified Civic Front, Solidarity, RNDS, the Other Russia, the KPRF, LDPR and also the population of the city of Ulyanovsk.” And now these demonstrations are spreading and becoming more political.
“At the present time,” the organizers say, “the people have come down with ‘an immune deficit of faith,’ an analogue to HIV/AIDS only for society as a whole.” Indeed, “a vicious circle” has developed: The powers that be ignore the people, even those who have “defended and protected the state.” Consequently, military retirees must protest.
One participant, Boris Smekhnov, a lieutenant colonel retired from the tank forces and head of the Unified Regional Staff for the Defense of the Social Rights of Military People and Their Families, told the Ulyanovsk protest that “we understand perfectly well that no less than 80 percent of the population is dissatisfied with the policies being implemented by the powers.”
“Even those who serve and receive good pay today are dissatisfied with it because they understand very well that they do not have a future,” Smekhnov continued. That is because, he said, “the people no longer have any power in the country, and the defense capability of the country is at a low level.”
More pointedly, he said he was concerned by “the establishment in Russia of a large number of internal forces. In the Oath,” he pointed out, “there are no words about fighting with one’s own people. This is something which officers of the internal forces must remember” and it is something which the powers that be appear to have forgotten.
The Ulyanovsk meeting adopted appeals to serving officers and soldiers and to President Dmitry Medvedev. In them, the protesters asserted that “Our Motherland is in Danger… not from external enemies but from the pathetic policy of the power of the property owners who conceal themselves behind a distorted image about the state.”
They then identify the following eight problems in Russia today: First, “power is concentrated in the hands of a single party ‘United Russia.’” Second, the country’s social-economic and political crisis is deepening. Third, the armed forces are being destroyed. Fourth, industry and agriculture are collapsing.
Fifth, national projects have failed. Sixth, the gap between rich and poor is increasing at a fantastic rate. Seventh, life in Ulyanovsk oblast is far below the all-Russia average. And eighth, the powers that be are “shamelessly using the administrative resource” to ensure their survival in office while “completely violating the constitutional rights of the voters.”
Consequently, they made the following demands; the dismissal of Putin and his government, the dismissal of the regional and city authorities, an end to state financing of “pocket media,” a cut in the size of the bureaucracy, and an end to billing the population for communal services.
In addition, these appeals called for the adoption of “decisive measures” to end the decay of the military, an increase in pensions for all citizens “except highly paid bureaucrats,” and “the return of the state rest homes to the oblast and city council of veterans. If their demands are ignored, the participants said, they will stage hunger strikes in the future.
Window on Eurasia: Based on Demand, Moscow Should Have ‘No Fewer’ than 150 Mosques, Tyumen Religious Leaders Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 24 – Based on the number of practicing Muslims in the Russian capital, Moscow should have “no fewer than 150 mosques,” according to the kazi of Tyumen, the latest comment on the dispute over whether that city will even allow the construction of one additional mosque to the four it currently has.
But in an even more important development, a Christian leader there not only has supported this call but has argued that religious groups, including the Moscow Patriarchate, must be allowed to construct churches only where they can show demand for such services rather than to “mark” a territory as belonging to one or another faith, as some Orthodox leaders argue.
At a meeting this week of the Congress of Religious Organization of Tyumen Oblast (KROTO), Fatykh Garifullin, the chief of the kaziyat of the Tyumen Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD), said that the demand for Muslim prayer houses far exceeds the supply in Moscow (www.islamnews.ru/news-26811.html).
The Muslim judge noted that “55,000 people came to one cathedral mosque [in Moscow] for the holiday prayers” earlier this week, that “military units” blocked their way, and that most were forced to say their prayers while kneeling in the streets, thereby creating the impression that “Muslims are the citizens of Russia with the fewest rights.”
That situation could be corrected, he continued, by the construction in the Russian capital of “150 small mosques” designed for “400 to 500 believers” each. “Otherwise,” he warned, “with each Muslim holiday, the number of believers outside the mosques will increase and this will generate ever more hostility from non-Muslim Muscovites.”
Garifullin added that there was no need to build numerous “large pompous” mosques in Moscow. “One major cathedral mosque is sufficient; the remaining 150 to 200 mosques should be modest” in size and appearance. And another Muslim participant in the meeting proposed using “modular” buildings, just as the Moscow Patriarchate has suggested for new churches.
The kazi’s proposal was supported by Yevgeny Shestakov, the KROTO chairman, who pointedly noted that “the religious facilities of any confession must be build on the basis of demand for them and not in order to designate ‘their territory.’” Additional construction based on any other principle will only make the current situation worse.
KROTO, an organization which unites Muslims, Jews, some Protestants and non-Orthodox Christians in Tyumen, this year marks its fifth anniversary, and participants said they would like to have the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. But so far, the latter have “ignored” all invitations to take part either fully or as an observer.
(KROTO over the course of its history has also repeatedly invited representatives of the Old Believers, the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, which has a regional center in Ishim, Tyumen Catholics, and the newly-established Lutheran organization in Tyumen to become members.)
Staunton, September 24 – Based on the number of practicing Muslims in the Russian capital, Moscow should have “no fewer than 150 mosques,” according to the kazi of Tyumen, the latest comment on the dispute over whether that city will even allow the construction of one additional mosque to the four it currently has.
But in an even more important development, a Christian leader there not only has supported this call but has argued that religious groups, including the Moscow Patriarchate, must be allowed to construct churches only where they can show demand for such services rather than to “mark” a territory as belonging to one or another faith, as some Orthodox leaders argue.
At a meeting this week of the Congress of Religious Organization of Tyumen Oblast (KROTO), Fatykh Garifullin, the chief of the kaziyat of the Tyumen Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD), said that the demand for Muslim prayer houses far exceeds the supply in Moscow (www.islamnews.ru/news-26811.html).
The Muslim judge noted that “55,000 people came to one cathedral mosque [in Moscow] for the holiday prayers” earlier this week, that “military units” blocked their way, and that most were forced to say their prayers while kneeling in the streets, thereby creating the impression that “Muslims are the citizens of Russia with the fewest rights.”
That situation could be corrected, he continued, by the construction in the Russian capital of “150 small mosques” designed for “400 to 500 believers” each. “Otherwise,” he warned, “with each Muslim holiday, the number of believers outside the mosques will increase and this will generate ever more hostility from non-Muslim Muscovites.”
Garifullin added that there was no need to build numerous “large pompous” mosques in Moscow. “One major cathedral mosque is sufficient; the remaining 150 to 200 mosques should be modest” in size and appearance. And another Muslim participant in the meeting proposed using “modular” buildings, just as the Moscow Patriarchate has suggested for new churches.
The kazi’s proposal was supported by Yevgeny Shestakov, the KROTO chairman, who pointedly noted that “the religious facilities of any confession must be build on the basis of demand for them and not in order to designate ‘their territory.’” Additional construction based on any other principle will only make the current situation worse.
KROTO, an organization which unites Muslims, Jews, some Protestants and non-Orthodox Christians in Tyumen, this year marks its fifth anniversary, and participants said they would like to have the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. But so far, the latter have “ignored” all invitations to take part either fully or as an observer.
(KROTO over the course of its history has also repeatedly invited representatives of the Old Believers, the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, which has a regional center in Ishim, Tyumen Catholics, and the newly-established Lutheran organization in Tyumen to become members.)
Thursday, September 23, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Is Moscow Preparing a New Military Push in the North Caucasus?
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 23 – Moscow’s decision to send new draftees to Daghestan resembles the steps the Russian powers that be took before the August 2008 war in Georgia, the head of the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee in St. Petersburg says. And these moves suggest that Moscow may be preparing for some new military campaign in the North Caucasus.
Because the defense ministry has promised not to send draftees to hotspots, Ella Polyakova reports, military commanders are forcing draftees to sign contracts as professional soldiers prior to their being dispatched in secret to Daghestan, tactics that raise some serious questions (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/174595/).
Over the past few weeks, the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee in the northern capital has picked the offices of the staff of internal troops there, carrying placards which reflect these concerns. “What is Russia preparing for?” asked one, and “Why are they sending draftees to Daghestan?” posed another.
The Soldiers’ Mothers Committee has been told that the draftees are being sent there to beef up security in advance of the 2014 Sochi Olympics, but few members of that group say they believe that. And Polyakova says that many are especially concerned because commanders have prohibited the soldiers from carrying mobile phones, via which they could report their locations.
All this, she continues, “reminds” her and her colleagues of “the situation before the military conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008” and suggests that perhaps “a new war in the Caucasus awaits us.”
But an MVD spokesman has dismissed fears. The only “concrete task” these soldiers have, Colonel Vasily Panchenkov says, is “the preservation of public order” in Daghestan. And he insisted that “no one [in the military] had forced the draftees to sign contracts” as professional soldiers.”
Such agreements were “completely voluntary,” a reflection only of “certain material stimuli. Agitation among draftees of course is carried out but they are offered the right of choice.” And Panchenkov said that the parents of most draftees understand that. Those who have picketed are a tiny minority.
In reporting this exchange in St. Petersburg, the Kavkaz Uzel.ru portal asked commentator Konstantin Kazenin for his views on the situation. He replied that he “does not see any evident connection between the Russian-Georgian conflict and the dispatch of subunits of the internal forces from Leningrad oblast to Daghestan.”
“On the other hand,” he continued, “there is now in Daghestan now a quite complicated operational situation. There are a large number of local conflicts – criminal, religious, and political – especially before the elections.” And the powers that be want to bring them under control, something that does not necessarily point to war.
The portal also recalled that in the spring of 2009, Moscow dispatched “several major echelons with untrained draftees” to the Caucasus, groups who were also “deprived of any chance to maintain contact with their relatives and friends, according to Tatyana Kuznetsova of the Inter-Regional Movement of Soldiers’ Mothers. And at that time too, no war broke out.
But both the secrecy Moscow is throwing over all these activities within the force structures, secrecy that may be intensified if the Duma gives final approval to a new law on coverage of the Russian counter-terrorist effort, and the large number of possible targets of a military campaign in the Caucasus, are exacerbating Russian worries about the future.
Staunton, September 23 – Moscow’s decision to send new draftees to Daghestan resembles the steps the Russian powers that be took before the August 2008 war in Georgia, the head of the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee in St. Petersburg says. And these moves suggest that Moscow may be preparing for some new military campaign in the North Caucasus.
Because the defense ministry has promised not to send draftees to hotspots, Ella Polyakova reports, military commanders are forcing draftees to sign contracts as professional soldiers prior to their being dispatched in secret to Daghestan, tactics that raise some serious questions (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/174595/).
Over the past few weeks, the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee in the northern capital has picked the offices of the staff of internal troops there, carrying placards which reflect these concerns. “What is Russia preparing for?” asked one, and “Why are they sending draftees to Daghestan?” posed another.
The Soldiers’ Mothers Committee has been told that the draftees are being sent there to beef up security in advance of the 2014 Sochi Olympics, but few members of that group say they believe that. And Polyakova says that many are especially concerned because commanders have prohibited the soldiers from carrying mobile phones, via which they could report their locations.
All this, she continues, “reminds” her and her colleagues of “the situation before the military conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008” and suggests that perhaps “a new war in the Caucasus awaits us.”
But an MVD spokesman has dismissed fears. The only “concrete task” these soldiers have, Colonel Vasily Panchenkov says, is “the preservation of public order” in Daghestan. And he insisted that “no one [in the military] had forced the draftees to sign contracts” as professional soldiers.”
Such agreements were “completely voluntary,” a reflection only of “certain material stimuli. Agitation among draftees of course is carried out but they are offered the right of choice.” And Panchenkov said that the parents of most draftees understand that. Those who have picketed are a tiny minority.
In reporting this exchange in St. Petersburg, the Kavkaz Uzel.ru portal asked commentator Konstantin Kazenin for his views on the situation. He replied that he “does not see any evident connection between the Russian-Georgian conflict and the dispatch of subunits of the internal forces from Leningrad oblast to Daghestan.”
“On the other hand,” he continued, “there is now in Daghestan now a quite complicated operational situation. There are a large number of local conflicts – criminal, religious, and political – especially before the elections.” And the powers that be want to bring them under control, something that does not necessarily point to war.
The portal also recalled that in the spring of 2009, Moscow dispatched “several major echelons with untrained draftees” to the Caucasus, groups who were also “deprived of any chance to maintain contact with their relatives and friends, according to Tatyana Kuznetsova of the Inter-Regional Movement of Soldiers’ Mothers. And at that time too, no war broke out.
But both the secrecy Moscow is throwing over all these activities within the force structures, secrecy that may be intensified if the Duma gives final approval to a new law on coverage of the Russian counter-terrorist effort, and the large number of possible targets of a military campaign in the Caucasus, are exacerbating Russian worries about the future.
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