Paul Goble
Staunton, September 24 – Most Russian commentators compare how Russia deals with its Muslim community to the ways in which European countries treat theirs, but a leading Muslim editor in Moscow says that a far more suggestive comparison at least for the present is between the situation in Russia and that in Asian countries with significant Muslim minorities.
In an essay posted on Islam.ru, Abdulla Rinat Mukhametov, that site’s deputy chief editor, notes that many Russian specialists on Muslims, including Ruslan Kurbanov, have focused almost exclusively on the European experience when discussing the status of Muslims in the Russian Federation (www.islam.ru/pressclub/tema/lutaziar/).
But in his view, Mukhametov writes, “one should compare Russia as far as its relations with its domestic Muslim community is concerned not with Europe but with Asia or more precisely with those Asian countries in which a significant Muslim minority lives” and in that way avoid the mistake of assuming that Russia’s situation is “in principle unique.”
“The experience of European and more generally Western Muslim minorities, despite its brief history, today has turned out to be much more studied that the analogous processes in Asia,” the Islam.ru editor says, a reflection of the fact that their appearance “at the center of the world concerns experts far more than the rest.”
“But for us living in Russia,” Mukhametov continues, “it is extremely important to know how Islam has existed and exists in such countries as China, India, Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and even Burma and Vietnam to a certain degree” and even “with certain qualifications,” in the Balkans, Ukraine, Poland, Belarus and Lithuania.”
That is because historically Russia “has much in common with these countries as far as its dealings with Islam. First of all, as in them, “Islam is a traditional, historically rooted religion.” In Russia as in the others, Muslims are “indigenous residents on the land where they live and not migrants or their descendents as in Europe.”
Second, again in these countries and in Russia, “the Muslim minority has problems with the government of one or another level of intensity.” Third, in all of them and in Russia, “Islam and Muslims have played in the history of their countries a much more important and positive role than that which the governments are prepared to acknowledge.”
Fourth, “in all these countries,” Muslims are split between the loyal and the integrated, on the one hand, and those in open and often armed conflict with the central government, on the other. In Russia, Mukhametov points out, this divide runs between “the community of Muslims of the Volga-Urals region” and the Muslims of “the destabilized North Caucasus.”
Moreover, he notes, in all these countries as in Russia itself, these problems are not always strictly religious. They also reflect “the political-territorial separatism of some Muslims and disagreement with this position by another part of the faithful,” a divide with roots extending far back into history and not always based in the first instance on Islam.
And finally, in all these countries as again as in Russia, “Muslims are a kind of ‘younger brothers,’ who de facto do not have equal status with the majority,” even if de jure they do. That lower status typically reflects the reality that “at one time, their ancestors suffered an historical defeat and have remained in a subordinate position.”
Viewed from this “Asian” perspective, he continues, “the Russian Federation is crudely speaking the best government of an ‘Asiatic’ type of interrelationships with [its] Muslim minorities.” But unfortunately, the situation is changing, and Russia may soon acquire “the most problematic” aspects of the ‘European’ relationship while losing the best of the ‘Asiatic.’
Because of the enormous flows of immigration from Central Asia and other “former colonies of the Russian Empire … Islam in the Russian Federation increasingly recalls the ‘European’ type where the overwhelming majority of followers of Islam are immigrants or their descendents of the second or in the best case third generation.”
And as a result, Mukhametov says, “the centuries-old ‘Asian’ identity of Islam in Russia is rapidly changing before our eyes,” a shift that represents “the main challenge, above all for the indigenous Muslims” of Russia but also for Russian society and the Russian powers that be who must respond.
Until the end of the Soviet period, most Russians had good reason to associate Muslims with “the Tatar neighbor” who may have lived next door for decades. But after that time, with the violence in the North Caucasus, that image of the Muslim of Russia was replaced for many by that of “the Caucasus militant” or of “the illiterate and scruffy gastarbeiter.”
The influx of Muslims from Central Asia and the Caucasus means, he continues, that “after 20 to 30 years, the indigenous Muslim population of Russia, the communities of the Volga-Urals and North Caucasus regions will become minorities in relation to the Central Asian majority—a long-term trend which it is impossible to change whether one likes it or not.”
It is already the case in some Russian cities where there are more Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz than indigenous Russian Muslims in the parishes of the mosques, and anger about that both among ethnic Russians and indigenous Muslims is helping to transform the Muslim community of Russia into something “it never was before.”
Mukhametov says that he believes that “in the 21st century, the Russian Federation will be not that country of ‘the Asian-Muslim’ type as it was,” but rather “will become ‘Europeans,’” in that “the problem of Islam and migration [will be viewed as] one and the same thing. With one distinction, [Russia’s] situation will be an order of magnitude worse.”
The reason for that, he suggests, is that “Russia is not prepared for such a turn of events and what is still worse, it does not want to get prepared.” Instead, people continue to act “as if nothing is happening or as if someone else is responsible for our problems and that someone consequently must resolve them.” Unfortunately, there is no reason to expect anyone will.
Friday, September 24, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Military Pensioners in 12 Russian Cities Call for Putin’s Ouster
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 24 – Last weekend, Russian military retirees and their families took part in demonstrations in 12 cities of the Volga-Ural military district both to call attention to their plight and to advance political demands, including calls for internal troops not to obey orders to use force against the people and for the dismissal of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
As organizers pointed out, “the official media” in Moscow “modestly kept quiet” about these protests, and details about them are only now coming to light in the blogosphere, on some regional sites, and on opposition portals in the Russian capital (news.babr.ru/?IDE=88558, www.pbrus.org/main/557-sobytiya-v-ulyanovske-voennosluzhashhie.html, and www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=4C9C8E1C6E824).
Organizers of the meetings, which attracted 400 people in Ulyanovsk and smaller numbers in the other cities, pointed out that “military personnel are a special part of the civilian population of the country … people who have consciously chosen their fate to defend their country and their people from aggressors.”
“And having chosen service to the Fatherland,” the organizers said, “the country and government guarantee them social security and defense after they take their pensions as a special category of citizens.” But in recent years, they continued, that contract has broken down: military people have served the state but the state has not served them.
The continuing reform of the army and fleet have “shameless” thrown many officers and their families “into the streets,” leaving them without the most basic requirements. And these people include “not only elderly soldiers but also young officers aged 30” and wives who while following their husbands did not have a chance to work.
Faced with this situation, the organizers continued, Russian military retirees have written senior officers and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin but “they have not received a single answer.” And consequently, “beginning on May 19, 2010, the military personnel of Ulyanovsk have begun on a monthly basis to picket and advance social demands.”
(The 19th of the month was chosen because it refers to the number of the article in the Russian Constitution about military service. In this respect, this latest movement among military retirees is an echo of efforts by human rights activists to protest violations of basic rights every 31st of the month.)
“Recognizing perfectly well that the defense of social rights is a matter of politics, the military people have been supported by social-political organizations like the Unified Civic Front, Solidarity, RNDS, the Other Russia, the KPRF, LDPR and also the population of the city of Ulyanovsk.” And now these demonstrations are spreading and becoming more political.
“At the present time,” the organizers say, “the people have come down with ‘an immune deficit of faith,’ an analogue to HIV/AIDS only for society as a whole.” Indeed, “a vicious circle” has developed: The powers that be ignore the people, even those who have “defended and protected the state.” Consequently, military retirees must protest.
One participant, Boris Smekhnov, a lieutenant colonel retired from the tank forces and head of the Unified Regional Staff for the Defense of the Social Rights of Military People and Their Families, told the Ulyanovsk protest that “we understand perfectly well that no less than 80 percent of the population is dissatisfied with the policies being implemented by the powers.”
“Even those who serve and receive good pay today are dissatisfied with it because they understand very well that they do not have a future,” Smekhnov continued. That is because, he said, “the people no longer have any power in the country, and the defense capability of the country is at a low level.”
More pointedly, he said he was concerned by “the establishment in Russia of a large number of internal forces. In the Oath,” he pointed out, “there are no words about fighting with one’s own people. This is something which officers of the internal forces must remember” and it is something which the powers that be appear to have forgotten.
The Ulyanovsk meeting adopted appeals to serving officers and soldiers and to President Dmitry Medvedev. In them, the protesters asserted that “Our Motherland is in Danger… not from external enemies but from the pathetic policy of the power of the property owners who conceal themselves behind a distorted image about the state.”
They then identify the following eight problems in Russia today: First, “power is concentrated in the hands of a single party ‘United Russia.’” Second, the country’s social-economic and political crisis is deepening. Third, the armed forces are being destroyed. Fourth, industry and agriculture are collapsing.
Fifth, national projects have failed. Sixth, the gap between rich and poor is increasing at a fantastic rate. Seventh, life in Ulyanovsk oblast is far below the all-Russia average. And eighth, the powers that be are “shamelessly using the administrative resource” to ensure their survival in office while “completely violating the constitutional rights of the voters.”
Consequently, they made the following demands; the dismissal of Putin and his government, the dismissal of the regional and city authorities, an end to state financing of “pocket media,” a cut in the size of the bureaucracy, and an end to billing the population for communal services.
In addition, these appeals called for the adoption of “decisive measures” to end the decay of the military, an increase in pensions for all citizens “except highly paid bureaucrats,” and “the return of the state rest homes to the oblast and city council of veterans. If their demands are ignored, the participants said, they will stage hunger strikes in the future.
Staunton, September 24 – Last weekend, Russian military retirees and their families took part in demonstrations in 12 cities of the Volga-Ural military district both to call attention to their plight and to advance political demands, including calls for internal troops not to obey orders to use force against the people and for the dismissal of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
As organizers pointed out, “the official media” in Moscow “modestly kept quiet” about these protests, and details about them are only now coming to light in the blogosphere, on some regional sites, and on opposition portals in the Russian capital (news.babr.ru/?IDE=88558, www.pbrus.org/main/557-sobytiya-v-ulyanovske-voennosluzhashhie.html, and www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=4C9C8E1C6E824).
Organizers of the meetings, which attracted 400 people in Ulyanovsk and smaller numbers in the other cities, pointed out that “military personnel are a special part of the civilian population of the country … people who have consciously chosen their fate to defend their country and their people from aggressors.”
“And having chosen service to the Fatherland,” the organizers said, “the country and government guarantee them social security and defense after they take their pensions as a special category of citizens.” But in recent years, they continued, that contract has broken down: military people have served the state but the state has not served them.
The continuing reform of the army and fleet have “shameless” thrown many officers and their families “into the streets,” leaving them without the most basic requirements. And these people include “not only elderly soldiers but also young officers aged 30” and wives who while following their husbands did not have a chance to work.
Faced with this situation, the organizers continued, Russian military retirees have written senior officers and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin but “they have not received a single answer.” And consequently, “beginning on May 19, 2010, the military personnel of Ulyanovsk have begun on a monthly basis to picket and advance social demands.”
(The 19th of the month was chosen because it refers to the number of the article in the Russian Constitution about military service. In this respect, this latest movement among military retirees is an echo of efforts by human rights activists to protest violations of basic rights every 31st of the month.)
“Recognizing perfectly well that the defense of social rights is a matter of politics, the military people have been supported by social-political organizations like the Unified Civic Front, Solidarity, RNDS, the Other Russia, the KPRF, LDPR and also the population of the city of Ulyanovsk.” And now these demonstrations are spreading and becoming more political.
“At the present time,” the organizers say, “the people have come down with ‘an immune deficit of faith,’ an analogue to HIV/AIDS only for society as a whole.” Indeed, “a vicious circle” has developed: The powers that be ignore the people, even those who have “defended and protected the state.” Consequently, military retirees must protest.
One participant, Boris Smekhnov, a lieutenant colonel retired from the tank forces and head of the Unified Regional Staff for the Defense of the Social Rights of Military People and Their Families, told the Ulyanovsk protest that “we understand perfectly well that no less than 80 percent of the population is dissatisfied with the policies being implemented by the powers.”
“Even those who serve and receive good pay today are dissatisfied with it because they understand very well that they do not have a future,” Smekhnov continued. That is because, he said, “the people no longer have any power in the country, and the defense capability of the country is at a low level.”
More pointedly, he said he was concerned by “the establishment in Russia of a large number of internal forces. In the Oath,” he pointed out, “there are no words about fighting with one’s own people. This is something which officers of the internal forces must remember” and it is something which the powers that be appear to have forgotten.
The Ulyanovsk meeting adopted appeals to serving officers and soldiers and to President Dmitry Medvedev. In them, the protesters asserted that “Our Motherland is in Danger… not from external enemies but from the pathetic policy of the power of the property owners who conceal themselves behind a distorted image about the state.”
They then identify the following eight problems in Russia today: First, “power is concentrated in the hands of a single party ‘United Russia.’” Second, the country’s social-economic and political crisis is deepening. Third, the armed forces are being destroyed. Fourth, industry and agriculture are collapsing.
Fifth, national projects have failed. Sixth, the gap between rich and poor is increasing at a fantastic rate. Seventh, life in Ulyanovsk oblast is far below the all-Russia average. And eighth, the powers that be are “shamelessly using the administrative resource” to ensure their survival in office while “completely violating the constitutional rights of the voters.”
Consequently, they made the following demands; the dismissal of Putin and his government, the dismissal of the regional and city authorities, an end to state financing of “pocket media,” a cut in the size of the bureaucracy, and an end to billing the population for communal services.
In addition, these appeals called for the adoption of “decisive measures” to end the decay of the military, an increase in pensions for all citizens “except highly paid bureaucrats,” and “the return of the state rest homes to the oblast and city council of veterans. If their demands are ignored, the participants said, they will stage hunger strikes in the future.
Window on Eurasia: Based on Demand, Moscow Should Have ‘No Fewer’ than 150 Mosques, Tyumen Religious Leaders Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 24 – Based on the number of practicing Muslims in the Russian capital, Moscow should have “no fewer than 150 mosques,” according to the kazi of Tyumen, the latest comment on the dispute over whether that city will even allow the construction of one additional mosque to the four it currently has.
But in an even more important development, a Christian leader there not only has supported this call but has argued that religious groups, including the Moscow Patriarchate, must be allowed to construct churches only where they can show demand for such services rather than to “mark” a territory as belonging to one or another faith, as some Orthodox leaders argue.
At a meeting this week of the Congress of Religious Organization of Tyumen Oblast (KROTO), Fatykh Garifullin, the chief of the kaziyat of the Tyumen Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD), said that the demand for Muslim prayer houses far exceeds the supply in Moscow (www.islamnews.ru/news-26811.html).
The Muslim judge noted that “55,000 people came to one cathedral mosque [in Moscow] for the holiday prayers” earlier this week, that “military units” blocked their way, and that most were forced to say their prayers while kneeling in the streets, thereby creating the impression that “Muslims are the citizens of Russia with the fewest rights.”
That situation could be corrected, he continued, by the construction in the Russian capital of “150 small mosques” designed for “400 to 500 believers” each. “Otherwise,” he warned, “with each Muslim holiday, the number of believers outside the mosques will increase and this will generate ever more hostility from non-Muslim Muscovites.”
Garifullin added that there was no need to build numerous “large pompous” mosques in Moscow. “One major cathedral mosque is sufficient; the remaining 150 to 200 mosques should be modest” in size and appearance. And another Muslim participant in the meeting proposed using “modular” buildings, just as the Moscow Patriarchate has suggested for new churches.
The kazi’s proposal was supported by Yevgeny Shestakov, the KROTO chairman, who pointedly noted that “the religious facilities of any confession must be build on the basis of demand for them and not in order to designate ‘their territory.’” Additional construction based on any other principle will only make the current situation worse.
KROTO, an organization which unites Muslims, Jews, some Protestants and non-Orthodox Christians in Tyumen, this year marks its fifth anniversary, and participants said they would like to have the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. But so far, the latter have “ignored” all invitations to take part either fully or as an observer.
(KROTO over the course of its history has also repeatedly invited representatives of the Old Believers, the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, which has a regional center in Ishim, Tyumen Catholics, and the newly-established Lutheran organization in Tyumen to become members.)
Staunton, September 24 – Based on the number of practicing Muslims in the Russian capital, Moscow should have “no fewer than 150 mosques,” according to the kazi of Tyumen, the latest comment on the dispute over whether that city will even allow the construction of one additional mosque to the four it currently has.
But in an even more important development, a Christian leader there not only has supported this call but has argued that religious groups, including the Moscow Patriarchate, must be allowed to construct churches only where they can show demand for such services rather than to “mark” a territory as belonging to one or another faith, as some Orthodox leaders argue.
At a meeting this week of the Congress of Religious Organization of Tyumen Oblast (KROTO), Fatykh Garifullin, the chief of the kaziyat of the Tyumen Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD), said that the demand for Muslim prayer houses far exceeds the supply in Moscow (www.islamnews.ru/news-26811.html).
The Muslim judge noted that “55,000 people came to one cathedral mosque [in Moscow] for the holiday prayers” earlier this week, that “military units” blocked their way, and that most were forced to say their prayers while kneeling in the streets, thereby creating the impression that “Muslims are the citizens of Russia with the fewest rights.”
That situation could be corrected, he continued, by the construction in the Russian capital of “150 small mosques” designed for “400 to 500 believers” each. “Otherwise,” he warned, “with each Muslim holiday, the number of believers outside the mosques will increase and this will generate ever more hostility from non-Muslim Muscovites.”
Garifullin added that there was no need to build numerous “large pompous” mosques in Moscow. “One major cathedral mosque is sufficient; the remaining 150 to 200 mosques should be modest” in size and appearance. And another Muslim participant in the meeting proposed using “modular” buildings, just as the Moscow Patriarchate has suggested for new churches.
The kazi’s proposal was supported by Yevgeny Shestakov, the KROTO chairman, who pointedly noted that “the religious facilities of any confession must be build on the basis of demand for them and not in order to designate ‘their territory.’” Additional construction based on any other principle will only make the current situation worse.
KROTO, an organization which unites Muslims, Jews, some Protestants and non-Orthodox Christians in Tyumen, this year marks its fifth anniversary, and participants said they would like to have the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. But so far, the latter have “ignored” all invitations to take part either fully or as an observer.
(KROTO over the course of its history has also repeatedly invited representatives of the Old Believers, the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, which has a regional center in Ishim, Tyumen Catholics, and the newly-established Lutheran organization in Tyumen to become members.)
Thursday, September 23, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Is Moscow Preparing a New Military Push in the North Caucasus?
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 23 – Moscow’s decision to send new draftees to Daghestan resembles the steps the Russian powers that be took before the August 2008 war in Georgia, the head of the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee in St. Petersburg says. And these moves suggest that Moscow may be preparing for some new military campaign in the North Caucasus.
Because the defense ministry has promised not to send draftees to hotspots, Ella Polyakova reports, military commanders are forcing draftees to sign contracts as professional soldiers prior to their being dispatched in secret to Daghestan, tactics that raise some serious questions (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/174595/).
Over the past few weeks, the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee in the northern capital has picked the offices of the staff of internal troops there, carrying placards which reflect these concerns. “What is Russia preparing for?” asked one, and “Why are they sending draftees to Daghestan?” posed another.
The Soldiers’ Mothers Committee has been told that the draftees are being sent there to beef up security in advance of the 2014 Sochi Olympics, but few members of that group say they believe that. And Polyakova says that many are especially concerned because commanders have prohibited the soldiers from carrying mobile phones, via which they could report their locations.
All this, she continues, “reminds” her and her colleagues of “the situation before the military conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008” and suggests that perhaps “a new war in the Caucasus awaits us.”
But an MVD spokesman has dismissed fears. The only “concrete task” these soldiers have, Colonel Vasily Panchenkov says, is “the preservation of public order” in Daghestan. And he insisted that “no one [in the military] had forced the draftees to sign contracts” as professional soldiers.”
Such agreements were “completely voluntary,” a reflection only of “certain material stimuli. Agitation among draftees of course is carried out but they are offered the right of choice.” And Panchenkov said that the parents of most draftees understand that. Those who have picketed are a tiny minority.
In reporting this exchange in St. Petersburg, the Kavkaz Uzel.ru portal asked commentator Konstantin Kazenin for his views on the situation. He replied that he “does not see any evident connection between the Russian-Georgian conflict and the dispatch of subunits of the internal forces from Leningrad oblast to Daghestan.”
“On the other hand,” he continued, “there is now in Daghestan now a quite complicated operational situation. There are a large number of local conflicts – criminal, religious, and political – especially before the elections.” And the powers that be want to bring them under control, something that does not necessarily point to war.
The portal also recalled that in the spring of 2009, Moscow dispatched “several major echelons with untrained draftees” to the Caucasus, groups who were also “deprived of any chance to maintain contact with their relatives and friends, according to Tatyana Kuznetsova of the Inter-Regional Movement of Soldiers’ Mothers. And at that time too, no war broke out.
But both the secrecy Moscow is throwing over all these activities within the force structures, secrecy that may be intensified if the Duma gives final approval to a new law on coverage of the Russian counter-terrorist effort, and the large number of possible targets of a military campaign in the Caucasus, are exacerbating Russian worries about the future.
Staunton, September 23 – Moscow’s decision to send new draftees to Daghestan resembles the steps the Russian powers that be took before the August 2008 war in Georgia, the head of the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee in St. Petersburg says. And these moves suggest that Moscow may be preparing for some new military campaign in the North Caucasus.
Because the defense ministry has promised not to send draftees to hotspots, Ella Polyakova reports, military commanders are forcing draftees to sign contracts as professional soldiers prior to their being dispatched in secret to Daghestan, tactics that raise some serious questions (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/174595/).
Over the past few weeks, the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee in the northern capital has picked the offices of the staff of internal troops there, carrying placards which reflect these concerns. “What is Russia preparing for?” asked one, and “Why are they sending draftees to Daghestan?” posed another.
The Soldiers’ Mothers Committee has been told that the draftees are being sent there to beef up security in advance of the 2014 Sochi Olympics, but few members of that group say they believe that. And Polyakova says that many are especially concerned because commanders have prohibited the soldiers from carrying mobile phones, via which they could report their locations.
All this, she continues, “reminds” her and her colleagues of “the situation before the military conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008” and suggests that perhaps “a new war in the Caucasus awaits us.”
But an MVD spokesman has dismissed fears. The only “concrete task” these soldiers have, Colonel Vasily Panchenkov says, is “the preservation of public order” in Daghestan. And he insisted that “no one [in the military] had forced the draftees to sign contracts” as professional soldiers.”
Such agreements were “completely voluntary,” a reflection only of “certain material stimuli. Agitation among draftees of course is carried out but they are offered the right of choice.” And Panchenkov said that the parents of most draftees understand that. Those who have picketed are a tiny minority.
In reporting this exchange in St. Petersburg, the Kavkaz Uzel.ru portal asked commentator Konstantin Kazenin for his views on the situation. He replied that he “does not see any evident connection between the Russian-Georgian conflict and the dispatch of subunits of the internal forces from Leningrad oblast to Daghestan.”
“On the other hand,” he continued, “there is now in Daghestan now a quite complicated operational situation. There are a large number of local conflicts – criminal, religious, and political – especially before the elections.” And the powers that be want to bring them under control, something that does not necessarily point to war.
The portal also recalled that in the spring of 2009, Moscow dispatched “several major echelons with untrained draftees” to the Caucasus, groups who were also “deprived of any chance to maintain contact with their relatives and friends, according to Tatyana Kuznetsova of the Inter-Regional Movement of Soldiers’ Mothers. And at that time too, no war broke out.
But both the secrecy Moscow is throwing over all these activities within the force structures, secrecy that may be intensified if the Duma gives final approval to a new law on coverage of the Russian counter-terrorist effort, and the large number of possible targets of a military campaign in the Caucasus, are exacerbating Russian worries about the future.
Window on Eurasia: Russia Now at Risk of ‘Religious War’ Across the Country, Experts Warn
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 23 – Increasingly sharp disputes in many cities of the Russian Federation over whether Muslims should be allowed to build a mosque, disputes that have already spilled over into violence in Syktyvkar and Moscow this week, threaten to unleash “a religious war” across the country, experts say.
The number of people now directly involved in these disputes is small and “real tensions” at the societal level” are not intense, but Aleksey Levinson, a sociologist at Moscow’s Levada Center, argues that the situation could easily get out of control because of the way the media is playing up these disagreements (www.svpressa.ru/society/article/30919/).
Speaking to “Svobodnaya pressa” journalist Anton Razmakhnin, Levinson suggests that “those who have decided now to play the anti-Islamic card are taking a great risk.” In response to such “aggressive” opposition to mosques, Russia “can get not just a war in the Caucasus but something much worse a full-scale jihad in every city where there is a conflict of this kind.”
In both the Moscow and Syktyvkar cases, Razmakhnin notes by way of introduction, the number of people involved on both sides of the disputes has been small. Moreover, these disputes have been going on for some time without attracting much attention. But coverage of massive Muslim participation in the Uraza-Bayram celebrations triggered something
When Razmakhnin asks Levinson why he was so pessimistic about the future, the latter replies that was “because “fundamentalist Islam and precisely this trend is becoming more active … after the protests is a very strong organizing and cementing phenomenon,” one that has “all the signs of a young, active and militant religion” and that no one knows how to stop.
Levinson dismisses the idea that the increasing activism of the Russian Orthodox Church could block this. In his view, the sociologist said, “the mobilizing potential of Christianity [in general and not just the Russian Orthodox Church] now is much weaker than that of Islam,” something the followers of all confessions need to understand.
“To launch a new crusade now,” he argues, “would be insanity – under current circumstances of Christian civilization, such a response would be equal to a battle between crowds of peasants and old women with an organized army. No, contemporary Christianity should not play at such a war.”
Instead, Levinson says, the best outcome is likely to be achieved by “the tactic of the soft assimilation of Islam, its integration into a secular and ecumenical civilization. Such a course of events would allow [Russia and the world] to avoid the escalation of force and new religious wars. To stand above religion and to lift the Muslim up to this level is our chance.”
“Unfortunately,” Levinson continues, the world at present is skittering “toward confrontation. And Russia is no exception. I see that a clash is very probable but we will hardly win it. But with the help of ecumenism, we could achieve a good peace, but this variant of development of events still is not very probable.”
Razmakhnin then asked another expert for her views on the clashes over the construction of mosques. Valeriya Porokhova, a specialist on Islam who has translated the Koran into Russia, says that it is important to draw a distinction between the lumpen elements that are taking part in the clashes and the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate.
The Church’s upper echelons, she says, “are more friendly to Islam for these are two traditional religions which have common interests and face common challenges.” But “at the lower level, especially among lay Orthodox activists, hostility to Islam is strong: why are there so many of them? Why are they so well-organized?” And that “threatens” peace in Russia.
She suggests that one needs to look beyond the emotions of the moment because they reflect not just religious differences but the ways in which the powers that be conduct their relations with people of faith. Instead of holding public hearings and discussions, Porokhova says, officials do everything in secret, something that sparks anger in and of itself.
“In other words,” she suggests, “the problem which really threatens peace in Russia is not in the mosques as such but in the authoritarian way in which cities take decisions, including on the most sensitive issues.” Whatever decision is reached in this way will be “insufficiently legitimate” to those on the losing side who were not able to participate in reaching it.
That reality can be seen, the specialist says, if one compares the tensions over mosques in Russia with those in European countries. There, “if a case involves a decision about prohibiting or permitting the construction of a mosque in a particular region, this decision will be taken by democratically elected authorities, and the level of trust in this decision will be greater.”
Unfortunately, Porokhova concludes, this, “the main question,” is one that in Russia, “none of the key players has raised. Instead of democratization, practically all somewhat powerful forces are pushing Russia to a new civil but now already religious war,” when the application of democracy could prevent that.
Staunton, September 23 – Increasingly sharp disputes in many cities of the Russian Federation over whether Muslims should be allowed to build a mosque, disputes that have already spilled over into violence in Syktyvkar and Moscow this week, threaten to unleash “a religious war” across the country, experts say.
The number of people now directly involved in these disputes is small and “real tensions” at the societal level” are not intense, but Aleksey Levinson, a sociologist at Moscow’s Levada Center, argues that the situation could easily get out of control because of the way the media is playing up these disagreements (www.svpressa.ru/society/article/30919/).
Speaking to “Svobodnaya pressa” journalist Anton Razmakhnin, Levinson suggests that “those who have decided now to play the anti-Islamic card are taking a great risk.” In response to such “aggressive” opposition to mosques, Russia “can get not just a war in the Caucasus but something much worse a full-scale jihad in every city where there is a conflict of this kind.”
In both the Moscow and Syktyvkar cases, Razmakhnin notes by way of introduction, the number of people involved on both sides of the disputes has been small. Moreover, these disputes have been going on for some time without attracting much attention. But coverage of massive Muslim participation in the Uraza-Bayram celebrations triggered something
When Razmakhnin asks Levinson why he was so pessimistic about the future, the latter replies that was “because “fundamentalist Islam and precisely this trend is becoming more active … after the protests is a very strong organizing and cementing phenomenon,” one that has “all the signs of a young, active and militant religion” and that no one knows how to stop.
Levinson dismisses the idea that the increasing activism of the Russian Orthodox Church could block this. In his view, the sociologist said, “the mobilizing potential of Christianity [in general and not just the Russian Orthodox Church] now is much weaker than that of Islam,” something the followers of all confessions need to understand.
“To launch a new crusade now,” he argues, “would be insanity – under current circumstances of Christian civilization, such a response would be equal to a battle between crowds of peasants and old women with an organized army. No, contemporary Christianity should not play at such a war.”
Instead, Levinson says, the best outcome is likely to be achieved by “the tactic of the soft assimilation of Islam, its integration into a secular and ecumenical civilization. Such a course of events would allow [Russia and the world] to avoid the escalation of force and new religious wars. To stand above religion and to lift the Muslim up to this level is our chance.”
“Unfortunately,” Levinson continues, the world at present is skittering “toward confrontation. And Russia is no exception. I see that a clash is very probable but we will hardly win it. But with the help of ecumenism, we could achieve a good peace, but this variant of development of events still is not very probable.”
Razmakhnin then asked another expert for her views on the clashes over the construction of mosques. Valeriya Porokhova, a specialist on Islam who has translated the Koran into Russia, says that it is important to draw a distinction between the lumpen elements that are taking part in the clashes and the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate.
The Church’s upper echelons, she says, “are more friendly to Islam for these are two traditional religions which have common interests and face common challenges.” But “at the lower level, especially among lay Orthodox activists, hostility to Islam is strong: why are there so many of them? Why are they so well-organized?” And that “threatens” peace in Russia.
She suggests that one needs to look beyond the emotions of the moment because they reflect not just religious differences but the ways in which the powers that be conduct their relations with people of faith. Instead of holding public hearings and discussions, Porokhova says, officials do everything in secret, something that sparks anger in and of itself.
“In other words,” she suggests, “the problem which really threatens peace in Russia is not in the mosques as such but in the authoritarian way in which cities take decisions, including on the most sensitive issues.” Whatever decision is reached in this way will be “insufficiently legitimate” to those on the losing side who were not able to participate in reaching it.
That reality can be seen, the specialist says, if one compares the tensions over mosques in Russia with those in European countries. There, “if a case involves a decision about prohibiting or permitting the construction of a mosque in a particular region, this decision will be taken by democratically elected authorities, and the level of trust in this decision will be greater.”
Unfortunately, Porokhova concludes, this, “the main question,” is one that in Russia, “none of the key players has raised. Instead of democratization, practically all somewhat powerful forces are pushing Russia to a new civil but now already religious war,” when the application of democracy could prevent that.
Window on Eurasia: Lavrov’s Rhetorical Shift Suggests New Approach to ‘Already Not So Newly Independent States,’ MGIMO Professor Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 23 – Earlier this month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is “a common historical resource of Russia and the other countries” in it, a formulation, a leading Moscow scholar says, that points to “a new conception of relations with the already not very newly independent states.”
In today’s “Nezavisimaya gazeta,” Aleksey Bogaturov, the pro-rector of the Foreign Ministry’s Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), argues that this rhetorical formula opens the way to a more realistic approach to developing relations among these states (www.ng.ru/politics/2010-09-23/3_kartblansh.html).
That is because, the MGIMO professor continues, “for the first time is established a logically explicable relationships between nostalgic emotions and rational calculations concerning the CIS,” one that does not ignore history but understands that the future will be build not only by using it but also by moving away from it.
As Bogaturov notes, “20 years ago, Russian political thought gave birth to the slogan, ‘civilized divorce,’” which long ago ceased to have much explanatory value. Meanwhile, “Western colleagues also have not distinguished themselves,” constantly referring to “’the neo-imperial ambitions’ of Moscow” without wanting or focusing on “innovations.”
Lavrov’s new formula, the MGIMO expert says, helps overcome these problems by drawing attention to the incontestable importance of “the lengthy and close co-existence of the former union republics” in the past, recognition of the combination of “positive and negative” phenomena in that past without any suggestion of “a common state future” for them.
That is important because it allows for integration without threatening the independence of the countries involved. Indeed, it makes the path to integration easier. As Bogaturov points out, “with the exception of the European Union, nowhere in the world does integration presuppose the establishment of [combined] single states.”
And “the understanding of the common historical resource also contains practically useful guidance on the genetic similarity of the economic and political processes on the space of the CIS” while calling for “a reasoned restraint” based on the recognition that “by their origins, the processes [in these countries] are similar, but the course of their development is not.”
Bogaturov suggests that Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan are proceeding along the path of the development of the market together with what he calls “a conservative consolidation” of political power, a path that combines “a super-powerful state with limited elements of liberal norms and formal democratic procedures.”
Kyrgyzstan and Moldova in contrast “are living according to a special rhythm.” The first has been passing through “spasms of adaptation of a tradition system to democratic procedures; the second has faced difficulties because of deep divisions within its society, the Transdniestria problem, and the question of unification with Romania.
Georgia – which has withdrawn from the CIS – represents “a curious case,” Bogaturov continues. There, “the authoritarianism of Saakashvili which is supported by foreign budgets seeks economic liberalism.” And the situations in Ukraine and Armenia are equally diverse, reflecting both domestic problems and foreign ones.
“An important component of the conception of a common historical inheritance,” Bogaturov argues, “is its highlighting of the common pool of problems involving border security.” While some deny it, “the borders of the present and former countries of the CIS and also the borders of certain Baltic states have a common historical and instrumental origin.”
That is, he suggests, because “they were drawn [in Soviet times] arbitrarily and kept in place by force or threats.”
“From this point of view, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the states of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia and, let us say, Lithuania are genetically similar states.” Their borders were drawn by others: This is a historical legacy, but it is “not an imperative of future development.” Instead, “it is the basis for showing mutual tolerance.”
In addition, Bogaturov says, Lavrov’s formulation has a cultural component, one that rests on the common Russian-language space that the Soviet system established, a space across which information and ideas can move more easily than across the external borders of any of these countries in any other language.
And consequently, he concludes, the term “common historical resource” for these countries represents “a base of experience and precedent-setting comparisons for the improvement of the strategy of the consistent but careful, pragmatic, and selective coming together” of these countries in various sectors.
Staunton, September 23 – Earlier this month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is “a common historical resource of Russia and the other countries” in it, a formulation, a leading Moscow scholar says, that points to “a new conception of relations with the already not very newly independent states.”
In today’s “Nezavisimaya gazeta,” Aleksey Bogaturov, the pro-rector of the Foreign Ministry’s Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), argues that this rhetorical formula opens the way to a more realistic approach to developing relations among these states (www.ng.ru/politics/2010-09-23/3_kartblansh.html).
That is because, the MGIMO professor continues, “for the first time is established a logically explicable relationships between nostalgic emotions and rational calculations concerning the CIS,” one that does not ignore history but understands that the future will be build not only by using it but also by moving away from it.
As Bogaturov notes, “20 years ago, Russian political thought gave birth to the slogan, ‘civilized divorce,’” which long ago ceased to have much explanatory value. Meanwhile, “Western colleagues also have not distinguished themselves,” constantly referring to “’the neo-imperial ambitions’ of Moscow” without wanting or focusing on “innovations.”
Lavrov’s new formula, the MGIMO expert says, helps overcome these problems by drawing attention to the incontestable importance of “the lengthy and close co-existence of the former union republics” in the past, recognition of the combination of “positive and negative” phenomena in that past without any suggestion of “a common state future” for them.
That is important because it allows for integration without threatening the independence of the countries involved. Indeed, it makes the path to integration easier. As Bogaturov points out, “with the exception of the European Union, nowhere in the world does integration presuppose the establishment of [combined] single states.”
And “the understanding of the common historical resource also contains practically useful guidance on the genetic similarity of the economic and political processes on the space of the CIS” while calling for “a reasoned restraint” based on the recognition that “by their origins, the processes [in these countries] are similar, but the course of their development is not.”
Bogaturov suggests that Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan are proceeding along the path of the development of the market together with what he calls “a conservative consolidation” of political power, a path that combines “a super-powerful state with limited elements of liberal norms and formal democratic procedures.”
Kyrgyzstan and Moldova in contrast “are living according to a special rhythm.” The first has been passing through “spasms of adaptation of a tradition system to democratic procedures; the second has faced difficulties because of deep divisions within its society, the Transdniestria problem, and the question of unification with Romania.
Georgia – which has withdrawn from the CIS – represents “a curious case,” Bogaturov continues. There, “the authoritarianism of Saakashvili which is supported by foreign budgets seeks economic liberalism.” And the situations in Ukraine and Armenia are equally diverse, reflecting both domestic problems and foreign ones.
“An important component of the conception of a common historical inheritance,” Bogaturov argues, “is its highlighting of the common pool of problems involving border security.” While some deny it, “the borders of the present and former countries of the CIS and also the borders of certain Baltic states have a common historical and instrumental origin.”
That is, he suggests, because “they were drawn [in Soviet times] arbitrarily and kept in place by force or threats.”
“From this point of view, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the states of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia and, let us say, Lithuania are genetically similar states.” Their borders were drawn by others: This is a historical legacy, but it is “not an imperative of future development.” Instead, “it is the basis for showing mutual tolerance.”
In addition, Bogaturov says, Lavrov’s formulation has a cultural component, one that rests on the common Russian-language space that the Soviet system established, a space across which information and ideas can move more easily than across the external borders of any of these countries in any other language.
And consequently, he concludes, the term “common historical resource” for these countries represents “a base of experience and precedent-setting comparisons for the improvement of the strategy of the consistent but careful, pragmatic, and selective coming together” of these countries in various sectors.
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
Window on Eurasia: On South Ossetia, Yevkurov Caught between Moscow and His Own Nation
Paul Goble
Staunton, September 22 – Ingushetia President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov’s visit to South Ossetia and his pledge to sign a cooperation agreement with that republic are consistent with Russian policy and presumably please Moscow, but they are infuriating many Ingush and some Ossetians who have a less than positive relationship with the other ethnic group.
And this extraordinarily sensitive situation in which Yevkurov now finds himself is yet another unanticipated consequence for the North Caucasus and hence for the Russian Federation more generally of Moscow’s decision to extend diplomatic recognition to South Ossetia (and Abkhazia) after the August 2008 war with Georgia (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/174530/).
The Ingush president visited Tskhinval as part of the Russian Federation delegation taking part in the 20th anniversary of South Ossetia’s declaration of independence. While there, Yevkurov said that Ingushetia had long wanted to provide assistance to South Ossetia,” but he added that “it is one thing to propose” and quite another to provide or accept it.
Indeed, he said, he was now prepared to sign an agreement providing such assistance, but Yevkurov’s diplomatic language reflects hostility between the Ingush and the Ossetians especially in the wake of the Vladikavkaz terrorist action earlier this month that claimed 17 lives and nearly 200 wounded and that some say had links to problems between the two ethnic groups.
After that attack, Konstantin Pukhayev, the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration of the South Ossetia, noting that he is “a supporter of harsh measures in the struggle with terrorism,” called for “the complete closure of the administrative border” between North Ossetia and Ingushetia, hardly an expression of friendship.
As Kavkaz Uzel.ru notes, Pukhayev was forced to back down the following day when he issued a statement that he “did not have in mind the complete closure of the border but only its reinforcement.” Nonetheless, the damage was done, and many Ingush saw this as more evidence of the hostility of Ossetians, whether in the north or the south, to themselves.
A great problem for Yevkurov and hence for Moscow, however, may lie with the negative reaction of some in Ingushetia to their president’s visit to the south. Yevkurov’s own advisor for work with public organizations, Aslan Kodzoyev, denounced Pukhayev’s statement as undermining the possibilities for fraternal relations.
He suggested that Yevkurov should have reacted to the South Ossetians more forcefully than he did but noted that “alas, Yevkurov behaved as a soldier of Russia and not as a ruler of the Ingush,” a choice that has the effect of reducing still further his authority in Ingushetia and the chances for a better future.
Kodzoyev acknowledged that officials in his position don’t normally express themselves as he has or even have the right to do so. But he suggested that Yevkurov’s failure to stand up for the Ingush was serious mistake and that he, one of the president’s advisors, had no choice but to go public with a denunciation of it.
Perhaps no one should have been surprised by his action. After all, tensions between the Ingush and the Ossetians have been relatively high since 1992 when serious clashes in the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia between Ossetians and Ingush led to deaths and the flight of part of the population.
But this pattern of reactions in Ingushetia and South Ossetia are an indication of one of the ways Moscow’s recognition of the two breakaway republics is creating problems for the Russian Federation within its own borders, increasing rather than decreasing tensions, whatever officials may proclaim.
And while that is unlikely to cause Moscow to review its decision to recognize these republics, it may mean that Russian officials will be more careful than they have been up to now in promoting contacts between republics which Moscow recognizes as independent countries and other republics which it sees as its own federal subjects.
Staunton, September 22 – Ingushetia President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov’s visit to South Ossetia and his pledge to sign a cooperation agreement with that republic are consistent with Russian policy and presumably please Moscow, but they are infuriating many Ingush and some Ossetians who have a less than positive relationship with the other ethnic group.
And this extraordinarily sensitive situation in which Yevkurov now finds himself is yet another unanticipated consequence for the North Caucasus and hence for the Russian Federation more generally of Moscow’s decision to extend diplomatic recognition to South Ossetia (and Abkhazia) after the August 2008 war with Georgia (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/174530/).
The Ingush president visited Tskhinval as part of the Russian Federation delegation taking part in the 20th anniversary of South Ossetia’s declaration of independence. While there, Yevkurov said that Ingushetia had long wanted to provide assistance to South Ossetia,” but he added that “it is one thing to propose” and quite another to provide or accept it.
Indeed, he said, he was now prepared to sign an agreement providing such assistance, but Yevkurov’s diplomatic language reflects hostility between the Ingush and the Ossetians especially in the wake of the Vladikavkaz terrorist action earlier this month that claimed 17 lives and nearly 200 wounded and that some say had links to problems between the two ethnic groups.
After that attack, Konstantin Pukhayev, the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration of the South Ossetia, noting that he is “a supporter of harsh measures in the struggle with terrorism,” called for “the complete closure of the administrative border” between North Ossetia and Ingushetia, hardly an expression of friendship.
As Kavkaz Uzel.ru notes, Pukhayev was forced to back down the following day when he issued a statement that he “did not have in mind the complete closure of the border but only its reinforcement.” Nonetheless, the damage was done, and many Ingush saw this as more evidence of the hostility of Ossetians, whether in the north or the south, to themselves.
A great problem for Yevkurov and hence for Moscow, however, may lie with the negative reaction of some in Ingushetia to their president’s visit to the south. Yevkurov’s own advisor for work with public organizations, Aslan Kodzoyev, denounced Pukhayev’s statement as undermining the possibilities for fraternal relations.
He suggested that Yevkurov should have reacted to the South Ossetians more forcefully than he did but noted that “alas, Yevkurov behaved as a soldier of Russia and not as a ruler of the Ingush,” a choice that has the effect of reducing still further his authority in Ingushetia and the chances for a better future.
Kodzoyev acknowledged that officials in his position don’t normally express themselves as he has or even have the right to do so. But he suggested that Yevkurov’s failure to stand up for the Ingush was serious mistake and that he, one of the president’s advisors, had no choice but to go public with a denunciation of it.
Perhaps no one should have been surprised by his action. After all, tensions between the Ingush and the Ossetians have been relatively high since 1992 when serious clashes in the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia between Ossetians and Ingush led to deaths and the flight of part of the population.
But this pattern of reactions in Ingushetia and South Ossetia are an indication of one of the ways Moscow’s recognition of the two breakaway republics is creating problems for the Russian Federation within its own borders, increasing rather than decreasing tensions, whatever officials may proclaim.
And while that is unlikely to cause Moscow to review its decision to recognize these republics, it may mean that Russian officials will be more careful than they have been up to now in promoting contacts between republics which Moscow recognizes as independent countries and other republics which it sees as its own federal subjects.
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