Paul Goble
Baku, May 14 – The authors of draft Russian legislation intended to prevent “the rehabilitation of Nazism” on the territory of the former republics of the USSR and most of those who have commented on it have focused on the ways such a law could be used by Moscow against the governments of some of these countries.
But Irina Pavlova, one of the most thoughtful Moscow commentators on public life there, argues that the real and far more negative impact of this legislation is likely to be on the Russian Federation itself, where, she suggests, this legislation sets the stage for the re-imposition of a Soviet-style official version of the Russian past (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.151005.html).
In an essay she entitled “An Afterward to Victory Day,” Pavlova argues that “far from everyone understands the genuine meaning of this legislative initiative.” And she seeks to provide it by noting that “what is important is Russia is not so much the laws themselves as the subtexts and instructions about what society as a whole may not suspect” until too late.
Consequently, in order to understand what this legislation may ultimately mean, it is important to look beyond the text itself which is clearly directed against non-Russian nations, some of whose members cooperated with the Nazis, and consider those at the top of the Russian political system who send “signals” as to how they want this act to be applied more generally.
On his video blog, she points out, President Dmitry Medvedev noted that “we have begun to encounter what are called historical falsifications” and these “are becoming ever more severe, evil and aggressive.” Consequently, he said, there is a need, in Pavlova’s words, “to be objective as the powers that be understand” whatever issue is at hand.
That sent a clear “signal” to those who wanted to hear. General Makhmut Gareyev, president of the Academy of Military Science and an officer long associated with official views on World War II, responded to Medvedev’s words with a reassertion of the need for “an objective treatment of the military history of Russia.”
He told an Ekho Moskvy interviewer that “no historians will give an answer” like that. “It is necessary,” the general continued, “that government organs participate in the creation of a new work. For example, only the General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the KGB and the FSB today can explain what really happened in 1941.”
Another person who heard this signal from Medvedev was Yury Zhukov, a researcher at the Institute of Russian History who has played “a definite role in the contemporary glamorization of Stalin,” told “Komsomolskaya Pravda” that “Russian citizens who intentionally distort the facts of history must be subject to criminal punishment.”
“All deviations from the official truth about the war,” Pavlova suggests, “from his point of view are “a clear expression of a pro-American and anti-Russian view about that which we by rights call the Great Fatherland War.” To prevent the situation from deteriorating further, Zhukov said, “it is necessary to create a single state history textbook.”
In this way, Sergei Shoigu’s initiative is being transformed into a weapon not so much against people in other countries who may have different views about World War II than Russians do than against “independent historians” who are not prepared to follow the line laid down by “veteran-preservers and historians who serve the present day powers that be.”
“The very threat of the use of the law in this way will lead to still greater difficulties in the search for truth about the Second World War,” Pavlova writes on the basis of her own experience as a historian, “although even now because of the inaccessibility of still classified documents, this search is extremely difficult.”
And “in such an atmosphere, inevitably will take place the further degradation of domestic research on Soviet and post-Soviet history [more generally], not to speak about the instruction” of the next generation of historians and of ordinary citizens of the Russian Federation.
In 2002, Pavlova writes, she attempted to do research on Stalin and the war and found her access to the archives contested by veterans groups who felt she was denigrating the Soviet leader. Her “opponents” at that time “could only dream about such a law” as the present one, at least in the interpretation of it that people like Gareyev and Zhukov are suggesting.
Given her own experience, the Moscow commentator says, she is confident that the chief victims of the new legislation will not be the leaders of Estonia or Ukraine but rather “those who permit themselves to doubt” the generally received “truth about the war” and are willing to look the facts of the case in the face, even if the current regime thinks no one should know.
Pavlova clearly recognizes that if this legislation passes and if it is then used by the Gareyevs and Zhukovs who are confident they have heard “a signal” from President Medvedev, the officialization of history will not be limited to World War II. It will spread, and those who care about truth will again have to fight on many fronts.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Conflict between ‘Official’ and ‘Unofficial’ Islam Arose after 1991, Russian Orientalist Says
Paul Goble
Baku, May 14 – The conflict between “official” Islam – which includes those institutions supported and sometimes controlled by Moscow – and “unofficial” or underground Islam – which opposes those institutions in the name of the true faith -- did not begin in Soviet times but rather after the collapse of the USSR, according to a leading Russian orientalist.
In part, this is a game of definitions – what people mean or have meant by these two categories has changed over time – but in another, Vladimir Bobrovnikov’s point, made in comments to the Regnum news agency, strikes at a fundamental set of assumptions long made by Western and Russian researchers (www.regnum.ru/news/1162403.html).
Perhaps more important, Bobrovnikov, an expert on Islam in the North Caucasus at the Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies, is a member of the Russian justice ministry’s Expert Council on State Religious Expertise. And consequently, his views merit particular attention because they may inform Moscow’s policies toward Islam.
There are several possible approaches to Islamic structures that Bobrovnikov’s comments suggest. On the one hand, much of his argument implies that he would favor a sharp reduction in the number of MSDs and even of mosques so that there would be a clear “power vertical” within Islam in the North Caucasus.
But on the other, his words indicate that he favors either providing even more support for the MSDs in order to ensure that they are in a better position to control the situation or, more speculatively, eliminating state support for them lest they be tarred by association with a secular state.
These two strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, it is entirely possible that in his new position, Bobrovnikov may argue for the adoption of a regionally variegated one. But regardless of what he supports and Moscow does, his remarks suggest that the official-unofficial divide is going to get deeper before it might be resolved.
The antagonism between “official” Muslim spiritual administrations (MSDs) in the North Caucasus and “official” (or “parallel”) Islam did not exist in Soviet times in the North Caucasus but rather arose after 1991 when the number of MSDs multiplied, their independence from the state increased, and Muslims returning from abroad challenged them.
In Soviet times, Bobrovnikov points out, “official Muslim structures in essence had no rights, but on the other hand,” in his view, they were never opposed by any Muslims outside these structures as many Muslims now stand in opposition to the MSDs during the last decade or so.
The basic preconditions for the split, the Moscow orientalist argues, “arose in the first half of the 1990s when it became possible to create an unlimited number of Muslim structures which bean to compete with one another” and who found themselves sometimes allied with and sometimes opposed by young Muslims who had received their Islamic training abroad.
“Among part of the young” who studied abroad, “the view arose that ‘the old men’ were teaching Islam incorrectly.” This was especially marked in the Northwestern Caucasus where, unlike in Daghestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia, there was no institution of sheikhs” whose authority was based on spiritual descent” rather than on expertise, often not high.
The post-Soviet conflict between official and unofficial Islam, Bobrovnikov says, “was exacerbated by yet another circumstance: Over the last 150 years, internal migration has been taking place at various levels of intensity.” Many areas, he says, are thus “mixed,” and “often there is not a single juma mosque,” but rather several, something that helps divide Muslims.
“The decisive stimulus” for the appearance of the conflict between “official” and “unofficial” Islam, Bobrovnikov argues, “became the events of 1999-2002 when the authorities returned de facto to the spiritual administrations the status of official Islamic structures which receive state support, including the backing of the siloviki.”
Many in Moscow saw this as a way of establishing tighter control over the Muslim communities, but in many parts of the North Caucasus, Bobrovnikov suggests, this re-officialization of the MSDs had the effect of triggering a dispute, with some of the MSDs compromised and marginalized as a result.
That opened the way for the young, often trained abroad or affected by literature from or contacts with militants in Daghestan and Chechnya to step up their campaign for alternatives to the official structures. Indeed, the Moscow orientalist strongly implies, the support Moscow gave to the MSDs at that time was just enough to make this split almost inevitable.
,
Baku, May 14 – The conflict between “official” Islam – which includes those institutions supported and sometimes controlled by Moscow – and “unofficial” or underground Islam – which opposes those institutions in the name of the true faith -- did not begin in Soviet times but rather after the collapse of the USSR, according to a leading Russian orientalist.
In part, this is a game of definitions – what people mean or have meant by these two categories has changed over time – but in another, Vladimir Bobrovnikov’s point, made in comments to the Regnum news agency, strikes at a fundamental set of assumptions long made by Western and Russian researchers (www.regnum.ru/news/1162403.html).
Perhaps more important, Bobrovnikov, an expert on Islam in the North Caucasus at the Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies, is a member of the Russian justice ministry’s Expert Council on State Religious Expertise. And consequently, his views merit particular attention because they may inform Moscow’s policies toward Islam.
There are several possible approaches to Islamic structures that Bobrovnikov’s comments suggest. On the one hand, much of his argument implies that he would favor a sharp reduction in the number of MSDs and even of mosques so that there would be a clear “power vertical” within Islam in the North Caucasus.
But on the other, his words indicate that he favors either providing even more support for the MSDs in order to ensure that they are in a better position to control the situation or, more speculatively, eliminating state support for them lest they be tarred by association with a secular state.
These two strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, it is entirely possible that in his new position, Bobrovnikov may argue for the adoption of a regionally variegated one. But regardless of what he supports and Moscow does, his remarks suggest that the official-unofficial divide is going to get deeper before it might be resolved.
The antagonism between “official” Muslim spiritual administrations (MSDs) in the North Caucasus and “official” (or “parallel”) Islam did not exist in Soviet times in the North Caucasus but rather arose after 1991 when the number of MSDs multiplied, their independence from the state increased, and Muslims returning from abroad challenged them.
In Soviet times, Bobrovnikov points out, “official Muslim structures in essence had no rights, but on the other hand,” in his view, they were never opposed by any Muslims outside these structures as many Muslims now stand in opposition to the MSDs during the last decade or so.
The basic preconditions for the split, the Moscow orientalist argues, “arose in the first half of the 1990s when it became possible to create an unlimited number of Muslim structures which bean to compete with one another” and who found themselves sometimes allied with and sometimes opposed by young Muslims who had received their Islamic training abroad.
“Among part of the young” who studied abroad, “the view arose that ‘the old men’ were teaching Islam incorrectly.” This was especially marked in the Northwestern Caucasus where, unlike in Daghestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia, there was no institution of sheikhs” whose authority was based on spiritual descent” rather than on expertise, often not high.
The post-Soviet conflict between official and unofficial Islam, Bobrovnikov says, “was exacerbated by yet another circumstance: Over the last 150 years, internal migration has been taking place at various levels of intensity.” Many areas, he says, are thus “mixed,” and “often there is not a single juma mosque,” but rather several, something that helps divide Muslims.
“The decisive stimulus” for the appearance of the conflict between “official” and “unofficial” Islam, Bobrovnikov argues, “became the events of 1999-2002 when the authorities returned de facto to the spiritual administrations the status of official Islamic structures which receive state support, including the backing of the siloviki.”
Many in Moscow saw this as a way of establishing tighter control over the Muslim communities, but in many parts of the North Caucasus, Bobrovnikov suggests, this re-officialization of the MSDs had the effect of triggering a dispute, with some of the MSDs compromised and marginalized as a result.
That opened the way for the young, often trained abroad or affected by literature from or contacts with militants in Daghestan and Chechnya to step up their campaign for alternatives to the official structures. Indeed, the Moscow orientalist strongly implies, the support Moscow gave to the MSDs at that time was just enough to make this split almost inevitable.
,
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Out-Migration from Russian North Increasingly Hurting Economy There
Paul Goble
Baku, May 13 – The departure of workers and their families from northern regions of the Russian Federation like Murmansk oblast is not only reducing the number of people available for employment there but also cutting the number of people in prime child-bearing age groups, trends that are slowing economic activity there.
And while there has been a slight decline in the number of people leaving over the last several years – most who wanted and could leave have already done so – and a slight uptick in childbirths given the larger pool of women born circa 1990, demographers say this is only “the calm before the storm” of further declines (www.mbnews.ru/content/view/17761/99/).
In an article on MBNews.ru this week entitled “We are Losing an Entire Murmansk,” Elena Malyshkina says that the population of Murmansk oblast fell by 340,000 over the last 18 years, approximately 30 percent of its peak figure of 1,191,500 in 1990. The “lion’s share” of this decline – “from 70 to 90 percent in various years – consisted of those who left the region.
That outmigration is equivalent, she notes, to the entire population of the city of Murmansk.
Over the last several years, the decline in the population has slowed compared to the 1990s, but that trend may not last. Indeed, there are some reasons to think it could even be reversed: “In 2008, losses from migration increased 48.5 percent in comparison to losses in 2007.”
Officials in the region have been pleased by the recent increase in the number of births there, and some of them predict that if that trend continues, then soon, the number of births each year will be equal to the number of deaths, a situation in which the population losses Murmansk has suffered on that account “could become equal to zero.”
But Malyshkina says, “most likely, this is simply the calm before the storm” because specialists are predicting that in the immediate future there will be an essential reduction in the number of births as the number of women entering prime child-bearing ages will fall across the country.
The numbers of potential new mothers in the Russian north are likely to decline even more precipitously, because they are members of an age group that is the most likely to leave. And consequently, the percentage decline in the population in Murmansk and neighboring regions is likely to be far higher than elsewhere.
According to the projections of Russian demographers, the journalist reports, by 2026, the population of Murmansk oblast will fall from its current 842,000 to 688,000, of which outmigration will account for 131,000 of the 154,000 overall decline. And those figures may prove to be overly optimistic.
Malyshkina suggests that “the first indications” of this new decline have appeared already this year: In January-February 2009, compared to the first two months of 2008, the natural decline [deaths over births] increased by three percent, [while] the migration loss rose by 29 percent.”
The continuing departure of workers, she says, “could become for the economy of the oblast a powerful brake,” possibly bringing many enterprises to a complete halt because most of their workers there know that they can make as much or more elsewhere and not have to suffer the climatic and other problems of the north.
If the situation is to be improved, she says, there must be a sharp increase in the pay and benefits for people working there, the introduction of significant number of Gastarbeiters from Central Asia and the Caucasus, and/or a change in the way the firms and companies there do business, including the possibility of shifting to more innovative forms of development.
But as “Novaya gazeta” pointed out this week, United Nations studies show that “it is significantly easier to die in Russia than to be born,” in large measure because “there is no state policy not only to preserve the nation but even to prevent its degeneration” (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/048/19.html).
Baku, May 13 – The departure of workers and their families from northern regions of the Russian Federation like Murmansk oblast is not only reducing the number of people available for employment there but also cutting the number of people in prime child-bearing age groups, trends that are slowing economic activity there.
And while there has been a slight decline in the number of people leaving over the last several years – most who wanted and could leave have already done so – and a slight uptick in childbirths given the larger pool of women born circa 1990, demographers say this is only “the calm before the storm” of further declines (www.mbnews.ru/content/view/17761/99/).
In an article on MBNews.ru this week entitled “We are Losing an Entire Murmansk,” Elena Malyshkina says that the population of Murmansk oblast fell by 340,000 over the last 18 years, approximately 30 percent of its peak figure of 1,191,500 in 1990. The “lion’s share” of this decline – “from 70 to 90 percent in various years – consisted of those who left the region.
That outmigration is equivalent, she notes, to the entire population of the city of Murmansk.
Over the last several years, the decline in the population has slowed compared to the 1990s, but that trend may not last. Indeed, there are some reasons to think it could even be reversed: “In 2008, losses from migration increased 48.5 percent in comparison to losses in 2007.”
Officials in the region have been pleased by the recent increase in the number of births there, and some of them predict that if that trend continues, then soon, the number of births each year will be equal to the number of deaths, a situation in which the population losses Murmansk has suffered on that account “could become equal to zero.”
But Malyshkina says, “most likely, this is simply the calm before the storm” because specialists are predicting that in the immediate future there will be an essential reduction in the number of births as the number of women entering prime child-bearing ages will fall across the country.
The numbers of potential new mothers in the Russian north are likely to decline even more precipitously, because they are members of an age group that is the most likely to leave. And consequently, the percentage decline in the population in Murmansk and neighboring regions is likely to be far higher than elsewhere.
According to the projections of Russian demographers, the journalist reports, by 2026, the population of Murmansk oblast will fall from its current 842,000 to 688,000, of which outmigration will account for 131,000 of the 154,000 overall decline. And those figures may prove to be overly optimistic.
Malyshkina suggests that “the first indications” of this new decline have appeared already this year: In January-February 2009, compared to the first two months of 2008, the natural decline [deaths over births] increased by three percent, [while] the migration loss rose by 29 percent.”
The continuing departure of workers, she says, “could become for the economy of the oblast a powerful brake,” possibly bringing many enterprises to a complete halt because most of their workers there know that they can make as much or more elsewhere and not have to suffer the climatic and other problems of the north.
If the situation is to be improved, she says, there must be a sharp increase in the pay and benefits for people working there, the introduction of significant number of Gastarbeiters from Central Asia and the Caucasus, and/or a change in the way the firms and companies there do business, including the possibility of shifting to more innovative forms of development.
But as “Novaya gazeta” pointed out this week, United Nations studies show that “it is significantly easier to die in Russia than to be born,” in large measure because “there is no state policy not only to preserve the nation but even to prevent its degeneration” (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/048/19.html).
Window on Eurasia: Russia is an Example of Wittfogel’s ‘Oriental Despotism,’ Moscow Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Baku, May 13 – Karl Wittfogel’s 1957 volume “Oriental Despotism” provide a key to understanding not only why the current Russian government cannot elaborate a new ideological justification for itself but also why, despite the expectations of many, its authoritarian regime shows few signs of changing or being challenged, according to a Moscow commentator.
In an article in yesterday’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Mark Feygin says that Russians who want to understand their country’s current situation need to pay attention to Wittfogel’s writings, and he bemoans the fact that although the German scholar’s book has been translated into many languages, it has never been translated into Russian (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=9060).
Feygin provides a brief introduction to Wittfogel’s argument before turning to the ways in which the latter’s ideas help to explain the Russia of Medvedev and Putin. According to Wittfogel, Karl Marx “concealed from his followers” the existence of what Marx called “the Asiatic mode of production.”
In such societies, the bureaucracy which controls key resources is “the ruling class,” a situation which means that “in the pre-colonial East (above all in China), there exists a ‘distinct’ society, not bourgeois, not feudal, and not slave holding.” Instead, it is defined by “the existence of a despotic state operating on a bureaucratic class.”
Unlike in the West, where economic and hence social and political change resulted from the rise of different classes who controlled property, Wittfogel suggested, “in the East, there arose a bureaucratic system … the basis of which was the absence of private ownership of the means of production.”
The existence of this class and its control over the means of production meant that societies of this “Eastern” type “were not capable of independently making the transition to capitalism,” a Marxist economic determinist view but one that Wittfogel insisted also reflected some of the ideas of Max Weber.
Thus, Feygin argues, following Wittfogel’s schema, “the paths of the West and the East are different in principle, and what is the most important thing for [Russians is that] Russia is historically part of the Asiatic mode of production,” a place where the bureaucracy controls resources and seeks to prevent any other “class” from gaining access to them.
At the end of the tsarist period, there were the beginnings of a trend away from this, but, according to Wittfogel and Feygin, “nine months after the fall of tsarism in 1917, the Bolshevik revolution cleared the way for the totalitarian apparat state in the USSR,” a state thaqt represented “a return after a short period of freedom to ‘hydraulic orders’ of the traditional type.”
In Wittfogel’s writings, Feygin notes, Russia was classed as a “sub-marginal” form of this hydraulic state, whereas China was considered as a classical “hydrologic society” and Byzantium as a “marginal” one. But in all three, “classes as a social-economic category” were absent, and real power resided in “the bureaucratic strata.”
Again, Feygin reminds, “Eastern society was based not on property relations but on the existence of a despotic state,” with society being divided in only “two classes, the administrating and the administrated.” As a result, “state power bears an absolutist character,” however much its occupants deny it.
“The goals of the state [in these systems] is not to allow property owners to develop into an independent political force,” lest they became a challenge to the state. And the authoritarianism this involved remains widespread because its structures, including family ties are “natural, simple and therefore long-lived.”
That is one of the ways in which authoritarianism is distinguished from democracy and totalitarianism, Feygin suggests, both of which are extremely complicated and therefore difficult to set up and likely to decay. And once one recognizes that, he continues, it becomes obvious what has happened in Russia.
The post-Soviet leadership failed to make the transition from totalitarianism to democracy and consequently they fell back on “customary and natural authoritarianism with ‘hydrologic’ arrangements [in this case based on oil and gas rather than water] of an Asiatic type.”
For members of the bureaucracy, this trend was entirely natural. “And all attempts to justify its activity are directed at one goal – to as convincingly as possible separate themselves from the communist heritage but not from the bureaucratic, authoritarian model” which is “historical and traditional.”
But this model may explain still more about the direction the Russian Federation is moving in, Feygin concludes. It means that the followers of Russia’s own Oriental despotism are likely to see the East as “a lesser evil” than the West and put themselves in league not with the Euro-Atlantic community but with China.
If that happens, the Moscow commentator suggests, the consequences for the country could be fateful: Russians now living “could become witnesses of the territorial loss of Siberia and the Far East as a result of the civilizational choice the current powers that be” have made, as Wittfogel might have predicted.
Baku, May 13 – Karl Wittfogel’s 1957 volume “Oriental Despotism” provide a key to understanding not only why the current Russian government cannot elaborate a new ideological justification for itself but also why, despite the expectations of many, its authoritarian regime shows few signs of changing or being challenged, according to a Moscow commentator.
In an article in yesterday’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Mark Feygin says that Russians who want to understand their country’s current situation need to pay attention to Wittfogel’s writings, and he bemoans the fact that although the German scholar’s book has been translated into many languages, it has never been translated into Russian (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=9060).
Feygin provides a brief introduction to Wittfogel’s argument before turning to the ways in which the latter’s ideas help to explain the Russia of Medvedev and Putin. According to Wittfogel, Karl Marx “concealed from his followers” the existence of what Marx called “the Asiatic mode of production.”
In such societies, the bureaucracy which controls key resources is “the ruling class,” a situation which means that “in the pre-colonial East (above all in China), there exists a ‘distinct’ society, not bourgeois, not feudal, and not slave holding.” Instead, it is defined by “the existence of a despotic state operating on a bureaucratic class.”
Unlike in the West, where economic and hence social and political change resulted from the rise of different classes who controlled property, Wittfogel suggested, “in the East, there arose a bureaucratic system … the basis of which was the absence of private ownership of the means of production.”
The existence of this class and its control over the means of production meant that societies of this “Eastern” type “were not capable of independently making the transition to capitalism,” a Marxist economic determinist view but one that Wittfogel insisted also reflected some of the ideas of Max Weber.
Thus, Feygin argues, following Wittfogel’s schema, “the paths of the West and the East are different in principle, and what is the most important thing for [Russians is that] Russia is historically part of the Asiatic mode of production,” a place where the bureaucracy controls resources and seeks to prevent any other “class” from gaining access to them.
At the end of the tsarist period, there were the beginnings of a trend away from this, but, according to Wittfogel and Feygin, “nine months after the fall of tsarism in 1917, the Bolshevik revolution cleared the way for the totalitarian apparat state in the USSR,” a state thaqt represented “a return after a short period of freedom to ‘hydraulic orders’ of the traditional type.”
In Wittfogel’s writings, Feygin notes, Russia was classed as a “sub-marginal” form of this hydraulic state, whereas China was considered as a classical “hydrologic society” and Byzantium as a “marginal” one. But in all three, “classes as a social-economic category” were absent, and real power resided in “the bureaucratic strata.”
Again, Feygin reminds, “Eastern society was based not on property relations but on the existence of a despotic state,” with society being divided in only “two classes, the administrating and the administrated.” As a result, “state power bears an absolutist character,” however much its occupants deny it.
“The goals of the state [in these systems] is not to allow property owners to develop into an independent political force,” lest they became a challenge to the state. And the authoritarianism this involved remains widespread because its structures, including family ties are “natural, simple and therefore long-lived.”
That is one of the ways in which authoritarianism is distinguished from democracy and totalitarianism, Feygin suggests, both of which are extremely complicated and therefore difficult to set up and likely to decay. And once one recognizes that, he continues, it becomes obvious what has happened in Russia.
The post-Soviet leadership failed to make the transition from totalitarianism to democracy and consequently they fell back on “customary and natural authoritarianism with ‘hydrologic’ arrangements [in this case based on oil and gas rather than water] of an Asiatic type.”
For members of the bureaucracy, this trend was entirely natural. “And all attempts to justify its activity are directed at one goal – to as convincingly as possible separate themselves from the communist heritage but not from the bureaucratic, authoritarian model” which is “historical and traditional.”
But this model may explain still more about the direction the Russian Federation is moving in, Feygin concludes. It means that the followers of Russia’s own Oriental despotism are likely to see the East as “a lesser evil” than the West and put themselves in league not with the Euro-Atlantic community but with China.
If that happens, the Moscow commentator suggests, the consequences for the country could be fateful: Russians now living “could become witnesses of the territorial loss of Siberia and the Far East as a result of the civilizational choice the current powers that be” have made, as Wittfogel might have predicted.
Window on Eurasia: New Moscow Climate Doctrine Focuses on Reacting to Rather than Preventing Change, Environmentalists Say
Paul Goble
Baku, May 13 – Russian and European environmentalists are concerned that a new Russian climate change doctrine developed without comment and now awaiting promulgation by President Dmitry Medvedev focuses more on how Moscow should react to the impact of climate change rather than on taking steps to prevent it.
Greenpeace Russia welcomed the preparation of the doctrine, and Kristin Jorgensen of Norway’s Bellona Group, greeted Russia’s new focus on climate change. “Until recently,” she said, Moscow “officially denied that the entire problem exists.” Now, Russia is again a participant “in the world debate” (www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2009/climate_doctrine).
But like her Russian counterparts, the Norwegian environmentalist said that the new doctrine “was hardly geared toward preventing climate change” but as rather “a call to take cover” from the consequences more and more people can see coming and that an increasing number of countries around the world want to take steps to prevent.
The new Russian doctrine which was approved at the ministerial level last month argues that “it is possible to reduce the dangers of natural phenomena, cut down on the experiences of liquidating emergency situations, and increase the durability of various economic sectors such as agriculture, transport and energy” which are likely to be affected by climate change.
Because of its size and location – with much of its territory in the far north where permafrost is melting and at low levels that could be flooded by rising ocean levels – Russia is by nearly universal consent the country likely to be the most hard hit by climate change over the next century.
Some of the impact of climate change is already in evidence, the Bellona Group points out. A century ago, Russia suffered 150 to 200 “dangerous natural phenomena” such as flooding every year. Now the number of such events has risen to 300 to 400 annually, and even greater numbers are predicted for the future.
Eighteen months ago, the Russian emergency situations ministry issued dire warnings about the Russian north, noting that global warming could turn them into bogs, with many areas becoming flooded or inaccessible. This rise in the water table could also affect natural oil reservoirs, possibly leading to massive contamination of water and land.
One Russian official behind the new doctrine is Yury Truntyev, Russia’s minister for natural resources. He notes that if the world’s oceans continue to rise, by the middle or end of this century, large portions of St. Petersburg and the Yamal peninsula could be flooded, with portions of Arkhangelsk and Murmansk at risk as well.
Greenpeace Russia says that the doctrine, while a start, is “too little” by itself to achieve the goals of dealing with the problem. And the organization complained that the elaboration of the doctrine “if not under conditions of secrecy then in a complete lack of information for the public” is extremely unfortunate.
Once Medvedev promulgates it, the organization said, there would be “public discussion” about what to do next, including a consideration of creating a new state organization to oversee Russian efforts in this area, something that Truntyev also favors, and setting standards for cutting back emissions.
Nina Lesikina, a Bellona activist in Murmansk, said that she and her members were very disappointed in the document’s content. “While the rest of the world is developing and implementing greenhouse gas emissions reduction programs … Russia is selfishly busying itself only with adapting to climate change.”
“Stabilizing the climate requires the reduction of global emissions of carbon dioxide by 50 to 80 percent by 2050,” she added, saying that achieving that goal would only be possible if all countries including the Russian Federation made “a concerted effort” rather than sought as Moscow appears to be doing to do only what is immediately profitable for themselves.
Baku, May 13 – Russian and European environmentalists are concerned that a new Russian climate change doctrine developed without comment and now awaiting promulgation by President Dmitry Medvedev focuses more on how Moscow should react to the impact of climate change rather than on taking steps to prevent it.
Greenpeace Russia welcomed the preparation of the doctrine, and Kristin Jorgensen of Norway’s Bellona Group, greeted Russia’s new focus on climate change. “Until recently,” she said, Moscow “officially denied that the entire problem exists.” Now, Russia is again a participant “in the world debate” (www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2009/climate_doctrine).
But like her Russian counterparts, the Norwegian environmentalist said that the new doctrine “was hardly geared toward preventing climate change” but as rather “a call to take cover” from the consequences more and more people can see coming and that an increasing number of countries around the world want to take steps to prevent.
The new Russian doctrine which was approved at the ministerial level last month argues that “it is possible to reduce the dangers of natural phenomena, cut down on the experiences of liquidating emergency situations, and increase the durability of various economic sectors such as agriculture, transport and energy” which are likely to be affected by climate change.
Because of its size and location – with much of its territory in the far north where permafrost is melting and at low levels that could be flooded by rising ocean levels – Russia is by nearly universal consent the country likely to be the most hard hit by climate change over the next century.
Some of the impact of climate change is already in evidence, the Bellona Group points out. A century ago, Russia suffered 150 to 200 “dangerous natural phenomena” such as flooding every year. Now the number of such events has risen to 300 to 400 annually, and even greater numbers are predicted for the future.
Eighteen months ago, the Russian emergency situations ministry issued dire warnings about the Russian north, noting that global warming could turn them into bogs, with many areas becoming flooded or inaccessible. This rise in the water table could also affect natural oil reservoirs, possibly leading to massive contamination of water and land.
One Russian official behind the new doctrine is Yury Truntyev, Russia’s minister for natural resources. He notes that if the world’s oceans continue to rise, by the middle or end of this century, large portions of St. Petersburg and the Yamal peninsula could be flooded, with portions of Arkhangelsk and Murmansk at risk as well.
Greenpeace Russia says that the doctrine, while a start, is “too little” by itself to achieve the goals of dealing with the problem. And the organization complained that the elaboration of the doctrine “if not under conditions of secrecy then in a complete lack of information for the public” is extremely unfortunate.
Once Medvedev promulgates it, the organization said, there would be “public discussion” about what to do next, including a consideration of creating a new state organization to oversee Russian efforts in this area, something that Truntyev also favors, and setting standards for cutting back emissions.
Nina Lesikina, a Bellona activist in Murmansk, said that she and her members were very disappointed in the document’s content. “While the rest of the world is developing and implementing greenhouse gas emissions reduction programs … Russia is selfishly busying itself only with adapting to climate change.”
“Stabilizing the climate requires the reduction of global emissions of carbon dioxide by 50 to 80 percent by 2050,” she added, saying that achieving that goal would only be possible if all countries including the Russian Federation made “a concerted effort” rather than sought as Moscow appears to be doing to do only what is immediately profitable for themselves.
Window on Eurasia: Some North Caucasians Say Moscow Representatives, Not Local Elites Chief Source of Corruption
Paul Goble
Baku, May 12 – It has long been an truism for Moscow journalists and Western analysts that ethnic clans are the primary source of corruption in the North Caucasus, but a new poll in the capital of Karachayevo-Cherkessia finds that residents there consider the representatives of Moscow agencies rather than local officials to be the main source of corruption.
And that finding is especially intriguing because the Cherkessk residents have a somewhat more positive view of Moscow’s policies in general than do the residents of other North Caucasus republics, possibly as a result of the Kremlin’s recent decision to replace the republic’s leadership.
Between April 27 and May 5, representatives of the Caucasus Times news agency queries 400 residents of the capital city of Karachayevo-Cherkessia about their experiences with corruption. More than nine out of ten of the Cherkessk residents – 91 percent – said they had encountered it (www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=20051).
That percentage, the news agency pointed out, was slightly higher than in the capitals of two other North Caucasus republics. In Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia, 79 percent of the residents said they had had experiences with corruption; and in Makhachkala, Daghestan, 86 percent had told Caucasus Times they did.
As in the other two republic capitals, the residents of Cherkessk identified as the most corrupt structures, health (49 percent), law enforcement (43 percent) and education (31 percent), a finding typical of surveys about corruption in the Russian Federation and one that reflects both the low pay of people working in these area and the frequent contact the citizenry has with them.
But the most intriguing finding of the Cherkessk poll is that n contrast to Vladikavkaz, where 81 percent said that local officials were the chief source of corruption, 54 percent of Cherkessk residents said federal officials bear primary responsibility, with only 46 percent saying that local officials do.
Such conclusions do not reflect two other findings of this poll. On the one hand, Cherkessk residents report roughly the same pattern of experience with corruption as do the people in other North Caucasus capitals – largely with local institutions – and on the other, they say their local law enforcement organs are more corrupt than those in neighboring republics.
Another difference between Cherkessk and the others concerns the trend in the amount of corruption. While a larger share of those sampled there than elsewhere believe that corruption is getting worse, it is also the case that a larger portion of the sample in the Karachayevo-Cherkessia capital than in the others found it difficult to answer than question.
This pattern might lead some to conclude that it reflected a negative view of Moscow among the Cherkessk population, but in fact, according to the Caucasus Times agency, the attitudes toward the Russian government were much more favorable than those found in other North Caucasus capitals.
“More than half of the respondents in Cherkessk (58 percent) said they had a generally positive attitude toward the policy of the federal center in the Caucasus, a sharp contrast to the situation in Vladikavkaz where only 28 percent had a similar attitude and where 58 percent had a negative assessment of Moscow’s approach.
According to the Caucasus Times analysts, the reason for this more favorable attitude toward the center among Cherkessk residents was Moscow’s recent decision to replace an unpopular republic leader whose son in law had been found guilty of killing seven people there and the honeymoon his replacement still enjoys.
` But if that is the explanation, Moscow should not assume that Karachayevo-Cherkessia will continue to have a positive attitude toward the Russian government for long. According to this poll, the residents of its capital city point to the same unresolved problems those in other North Caucasus republics do – unemployment, corruption, and the lack of social services.
Baku, May 12 – It has long been an truism for Moscow journalists and Western analysts that ethnic clans are the primary source of corruption in the North Caucasus, but a new poll in the capital of Karachayevo-Cherkessia finds that residents there consider the representatives of Moscow agencies rather than local officials to be the main source of corruption.
And that finding is especially intriguing because the Cherkessk residents have a somewhat more positive view of Moscow’s policies in general than do the residents of other North Caucasus republics, possibly as a result of the Kremlin’s recent decision to replace the republic’s leadership.
Between April 27 and May 5, representatives of the Caucasus Times news agency queries 400 residents of the capital city of Karachayevo-Cherkessia about their experiences with corruption. More than nine out of ten of the Cherkessk residents – 91 percent – said they had encountered it (www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=20051).
That percentage, the news agency pointed out, was slightly higher than in the capitals of two other North Caucasus republics. In Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia, 79 percent of the residents said they had had experiences with corruption; and in Makhachkala, Daghestan, 86 percent had told Caucasus Times they did.
As in the other two republic capitals, the residents of Cherkessk identified as the most corrupt structures, health (49 percent), law enforcement (43 percent) and education (31 percent), a finding typical of surveys about corruption in the Russian Federation and one that reflects both the low pay of people working in these area and the frequent contact the citizenry has with them.
But the most intriguing finding of the Cherkessk poll is that n contrast to Vladikavkaz, where 81 percent said that local officials were the chief source of corruption, 54 percent of Cherkessk residents said federal officials bear primary responsibility, with only 46 percent saying that local officials do.
Such conclusions do not reflect two other findings of this poll. On the one hand, Cherkessk residents report roughly the same pattern of experience with corruption as do the people in other North Caucasus capitals – largely with local institutions – and on the other, they say their local law enforcement organs are more corrupt than those in neighboring republics.
Another difference between Cherkessk and the others concerns the trend in the amount of corruption. While a larger share of those sampled there than elsewhere believe that corruption is getting worse, it is also the case that a larger portion of the sample in the Karachayevo-Cherkessia capital than in the others found it difficult to answer than question.
This pattern might lead some to conclude that it reflected a negative view of Moscow among the Cherkessk population, but in fact, according to the Caucasus Times agency, the attitudes toward the Russian government were much more favorable than those found in other North Caucasus capitals.
“More than half of the respondents in Cherkessk (58 percent) said they had a generally positive attitude toward the policy of the federal center in the Caucasus, a sharp contrast to the situation in Vladikavkaz where only 28 percent had a similar attitude and where 58 percent had a negative assessment of Moscow’s approach.
According to the Caucasus Times analysts, the reason for this more favorable attitude toward the center among Cherkessk residents was Moscow’s recent decision to replace an unpopular republic leader whose son in law had been found guilty of killing seven people there and the honeymoon his replacement still enjoys.
` But if that is the explanation, Moscow should not assume that Karachayevo-Cherkessia will continue to have a positive attitude toward the Russian government for long. According to this poll, the residents of its capital city point to the same unresolved problems those in other North Caucasus republics do – unemployment, corruption, and the lack of social services.
Window on Eurasia: Russia is ‘a Sociopathic Land,’ Orthodox Priest Says
Paul Goble
Baku, May 12 – The May 9th Victory Day celebration, a Russian Orthodox priest says, shows that Russia over the course of the last century and thanks to the imposition of Soviet values which continue to define the thinking and behavior of people there a sociopathic country, a state which “cannot live with others” because it is “indifferent to their rights.”
In a disturbing essay posted on the Grani.ru portal, Father Yakov Krotov says that “Russia was not always a sociopath.” While it was far from the most attractive of European countries in the 19th century, “it was a normal underdeveloped country, “capable of “concluding alliances” and “remaining true to them (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.150809.html).
While tsarist Russia was known as “the gendarme of Europe,” it was never called “the militiaman” of the continent because “unlike the militiaman, a gendarme all the same is a social phenomenon,” an individual responsible for enforcing laws that protect society rather than acting without regard for those laws and only for his own benefit.
Militiamen are hardly unique in this, Krotov continues, and he points to the attitudes and behavior of the oligaqrchs. “An oligarch who says that things are better in Russia than in England because in Russia he does not have to obey laws is a sociopath. He does not understand that while he can hid from the courts, he can’t protect his own child” from various social ills.
Krotov cites a psychoanalytic handbook to the effect that “anti=social psychopaths are not constrained by the norms of morality. They lie completely shamelessly … In most cases, they are moved by consideration of their own benefit but only in the short term: the longer-term consequences of their actions do not affect them much.”
“Is the acquisition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia profitable for Russia?” Krotov asks. “Is it profitable to establish such a protectorate over Georgia through which Central Asia will not be able to sell its gas to Europe so that we can remain monopolists? It is profitable – but “only in the short term.”
“Is it profitable to take money from a neighbor for a car and then not give it to him? It is profitable – one has the car. But that this will mean that one will not have good relations with the neighbor is not important to a sociopath. Relations are the essence of ‘social,’ and the sociopath fears that as much as fire.”
The Russia that developed after 1917 is defined by the medical description of sociopathy, the Orthodox priest continues. “’About their own failings, sociopaths never regret and are not inclined to learn from.’” Instead, they blame others or put our superficially attractive explanations, “’which leads to conflict with society.’”
When a country becomes sociopathetic, he says, it “accuses the countries around it and enters into conflict with the international community,” seeking only a short-term gain and ignoring the way in which its actions will undermine the possibility for cooperation and development of ties.
But there are other aspects of the sociopathetic personality which become especially dangerous when they are raised to the level of an entire country: Typically, Krotov continues, again citing the psychological text, sociopaths “act impulsively and are not inclined to planning. They are not afraid of threats and future punishments and dangers.’”
Indeed, and as paradoxical and counter-intuitive as it may seem, “their own security and that of others does not worry them very much.” Krotov continues by observing that a sociopath, either an individual or a state, “does not understand what social security is because he [it] does not understand what a society is.”
“Sociopathology is a victory over society. In the West people complain that society is individualistic, atomized, broken apart? Let them come to Russia: here there is no atomization or individualism!” That is because “here there is no society: 100 million sociopaths do not form a society just as … 100 zeks [or 100 of their jailors0 do not form a parliament.”
“When did sociopathy triumph in Russia?” Krotov asks, and he suggests that the answer is provided by the chief holidays the country celebrates: the anniversary of the October 1917 revolution, army day, and Victory Day on May 9th,” the last being perhaps the most indicative of the country’s descent into sociopathy relative to the rest of the world.
“In the final analysis,” he concludes, “the revolution and the reddening of the army are deeply internal phenomena, but May 9th is a commemoration of the separation of Russia from [its] allies in the anti-Hitler coalition,” a world in which most countries, including former enemies, mark “not victory or defeat but forgiveness and rapprochement.”
Baku, May 12 – The May 9th Victory Day celebration, a Russian Orthodox priest says, shows that Russia over the course of the last century and thanks to the imposition of Soviet values which continue to define the thinking and behavior of people there a sociopathic country, a state which “cannot live with others” because it is “indifferent to their rights.”
In a disturbing essay posted on the Grani.ru portal, Father Yakov Krotov says that “Russia was not always a sociopath.” While it was far from the most attractive of European countries in the 19th century, “it was a normal underdeveloped country, “capable of “concluding alliances” and “remaining true to them (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.150809.html).
While tsarist Russia was known as “the gendarme of Europe,” it was never called “the militiaman” of the continent because “unlike the militiaman, a gendarme all the same is a social phenomenon,” an individual responsible for enforcing laws that protect society rather than acting without regard for those laws and only for his own benefit.
Militiamen are hardly unique in this, Krotov continues, and he points to the attitudes and behavior of the oligaqrchs. “An oligarch who says that things are better in Russia than in England because in Russia he does not have to obey laws is a sociopath. He does not understand that while he can hid from the courts, he can’t protect his own child” from various social ills.
Krotov cites a psychoanalytic handbook to the effect that “anti=social psychopaths are not constrained by the norms of morality. They lie completely shamelessly … In most cases, they are moved by consideration of their own benefit but only in the short term: the longer-term consequences of their actions do not affect them much.”
“Is the acquisition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia profitable for Russia?” Krotov asks. “Is it profitable to establish such a protectorate over Georgia through which Central Asia will not be able to sell its gas to Europe so that we can remain monopolists? It is profitable – but “only in the short term.”
“Is it profitable to take money from a neighbor for a car and then not give it to him? It is profitable – one has the car. But that this will mean that one will not have good relations with the neighbor is not important to a sociopath. Relations are the essence of ‘social,’ and the sociopath fears that as much as fire.”
The Russia that developed after 1917 is defined by the medical description of sociopathy, the Orthodox priest continues. “’About their own failings, sociopaths never regret and are not inclined to learn from.’” Instead, they blame others or put our superficially attractive explanations, “’which leads to conflict with society.’”
When a country becomes sociopathetic, he says, it “accuses the countries around it and enters into conflict with the international community,” seeking only a short-term gain and ignoring the way in which its actions will undermine the possibility for cooperation and development of ties.
But there are other aspects of the sociopathetic personality which become especially dangerous when they are raised to the level of an entire country: Typically, Krotov continues, again citing the psychological text, sociopaths “act impulsively and are not inclined to planning. They are not afraid of threats and future punishments and dangers.’”
Indeed, and as paradoxical and counter-intuitive as it may seem, “their own security and that of others does not worry them very much.” Krotov continues by observing that a sociopath, either an individual or a state, “does not understand what social security is because he [it] does not understand what a society is.”
“Sociopathology is a victory over society. In the West people complain that society is individualistic, atomized, broken apart? Let them come to Russia: here there is no atomization or individualism!” That is because “here there is no society: 100 million sociopaths do not form a society just as … 100 zeks [or 100 of their jailors0 do not form a parliament.”
“When did sociopathy triumph in Russia?” Krotov asks, and he suggests that the answer is provided by the chief holidays the country celebrates: the anniversary of the October 1917 revolution, army day, and Victory Day on May 9th,” the last being perhaps the most indicative of the country’s descent into sociopathy relative to the rest of the world.
“In the final analysis,” he concludes, “the revolution and the reddening of the army are deeply internal phenomena, but May 9th is a commemoration of the separation of Russia from [its] allies in the anti-Hitler coalition,” a world in which most countries, including former enemies, mark “not victory or defeat but forgiveness and rapprochement.”
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