Paul Goble
Baku, May 12 – It has long been an truism for Moscow journalists and Western analysts that ethnic clans are the primary source of corruption in the North Caucasus, but a new poll in the capital of Karachayevo-Cherkessia finds that residents there consider the representatives of Moscow agencies rather than local officials to be the main source of corruption.
And that finding is especially intriguing because the Cherkessk residents have a somewhat more positive view of Moscow’s policies in general than do the residents of other North Caucasus republics, possibly as a result of the Kremlin’s recent decision to replace the republic’s leadership.
Between April 27 and May 5, representatives of the Caucasus Times news agency queries 400 residents of the capital city of Karachayevo-Cherkessia about their experiences with corruption. More than nine out of ten of the Cherkessk residents – 91 percent – said they had encountered it (www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=20051).
That percentage, the news agency pointed out, was slightly higher than in the capitals of two other North Caucasus republics. In Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia, 79 percent of the residents said they had had experiences with corruption; and in Makhachkala, Daghestan, 86 percent had told Caucasus Times they did.
As in the other two republic capitals, the residents of Cherkessk identified as the most corrupt structures, health (49 percent), law enforcement (43 percent) and education (31 percent), a finding typical of surveys about corruption in the Russian Federation and one that reflects both the low pay of people working in these area and the frequent contact the citizenry has with them.
But the most intriguing finding of the Cherkessk poll is that n contrast to Vladikavkaz, where 81 percent said that local officials were the chief source of corruption, 54 percent of Cherkessk residents said federal officials bear primary responsibility, with only 46 percent saying that local officials do.
Such conclusions do not reflect two other findings of this poll. On the one hand, Cherkessk residents report roughly the same pattern of experience with corruption as do the people in other North Caucasus capitals – largely with local institutions – and on the other, they say their local law enforcement organs are more corrupt than those in neighboring republics.
Another difference between Cherkessk and the others concerns the trend in the amount of corruption. While a larger share of those sampled there than elsewhere believe that corruption is getting worse, it is also the case that a larger portion of the sample in the Karachayevo-Cherkessia capital than in the others found it difficult to answer than question.
This pattern might lead some to conclude that it reflected a negative view of Moscow among the Cherkessk population, but in fact, according to the Caucasus Times agency, the attitudes toward the Russian government were much more favorable than those found in other North Caucasus capitals.
“More than half of the respondents in Cherkessk (58 percent) said they had a generally positive attitude toward the policy of the federal center in the Caucasus, a sharp contrast to the situation in Vladikavkaz where only 28 percent had a similar attitude and where 58 percent had a negative assessment of Moscow’s approach.
According to the Caucasus Times analysts, the reason for this more favorable attitude toward the center among Cherkessk residents was Moscow’s recent decision to replace an unpopular republic leader whose son in law had been found guilty of killing seven people there and the honeymoon his replacement still enjoys.
` But if that is the explanation, Moscow should not assume that Karachayevo-Cherkessia will continue to have a positive attitude toward the Russian government for long. According to this poll, the residents of its capital city point to the same unresolved problems those in other North Caucasus republics do – unemployment, corruption, and the lack of social services.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Russia is ‘a Sociopathic Land,’ Orthodox Priest Says
Paul Goble
Baku, May 12 – The May 9th Victory Day celebration, a Russian Orthodox priest says, shows that Russia over the course of the last century and thanks to the imposition of Soviet values which continue to define the thinking and behavior of people there a sociopathic country, a state which “cannot live with others” because it is “indifferent to their rights.”
In a disturbing essay posted on the Grani.ru portal, Father Yakov Krotov says that “Russia was not always a sociopath.” While it was far from the most attractive of European countries in the 19th century, “it was a normal underdeveloped country, “capable of “concluding alliances” and “remaining true to them (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.150809.html).
While tsarist Russia was known as “the gendarme of Europe,” it was never called “the militiaman” of the continent because “unlike the militiaman, a gendarme all the same is a social phenomenon,” an individual responsible for enforcing laws that protect society rather than acting without regard for those laws and only for his own benefit.
Militiamen are hardly unique in this, Krotov continues, and he points to the attitudes and behavior of the oligaqrchs. “An oligarch who says that things are better in Russia than in England because in Russia he does not have to obey laws is a sociopath. He does not understand that while he can hid from the courts, he can’t protect his own child” from various social ills.
Krotov cites a psychoanalytic handbook to the effect that “anti=social psychopaths are not constrained by the norms of morality. They lie completely shamelessly … In most cases, they are moved by consideration of their own benefit but only in the short term: the longer-term consequences of their actions do not affect them much.”
“Is the acquisition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia profitable for Russia?” Krotov asks. “Is it profitable to establish such a protectorate over Georgia through which Central Asia will not be able to sell its gas to Europe so that we can remain monopolists? It is profitable – but “only in the short term.”
“Is it profitable to take money from a neighbor for a car and then not give it to him? It is profitable – one has the car. But that this will mean that one will not have good relations with the neighbor is not important to a sociopath. Relations are the essence of ‘social,’ and the sociopath fears that as much as fire.”
The Russia that developed after 1917 is defined by the medical description of sociopathy, the Orthodox priest continues. “’About their own failings, sociopaths never regret and are not inclined to learn from.’” Instead, they blame others or put our superficially attractive explanations, “’which leads to conflict with society.’”
When a country becomes sociopathetic, he says, it “accuses the countries around it and enters into conflict with the international community,” seeking only a short-term gain and ignoring the way in which its actions will undermine the possibility for cooperation and development of ties.
But there are other aspects of the sociopathetic personality which become especially dangerous when they are raised to the level of an entire country: Typically, Krotov continues, again citing the psychological text, sociopaths “act impulsively and are not inclined to planning. They are not afraid of threats and future punishments and dangers.’”
Indeed, and as paradoxical and counter-intuitive as it may seem, “their own security and that of others does not worry them very much.” Krotov continues by observing that a sociopath, either an individual or a state, “does not understand what social security is because he [it] does not understand what a society is.”
“Sociopathology is a victory over society. In the West people complain that society is individualistic, atomized, broken apart? Let them come to Russia: here there is no atomization or individualism!” That is because “here there is no society: 100 million sociopaths do not form a society just as … 100 zeks [or 100 of their jailors0 do not form a parliament.”
“When did sociopathy triumph in Russia?” Krotov asks, and he suggests that the answer is provided by the chief holidays the country celebrates: the anniversary of the October 1917 revolution, army day, and Victory Day on May 9th,” the last being perhaps the most indicative of the country’s descent into sociopathy relative to the rest of the world.
“In the final analysis,” he concludes, “the revolution and the reddening of the army are deeply internal phenomena, but May 9th is a commemoration of the separation of Russia from [its] allies in the anti-Hitler coalition,” a world in which most countries, including former enemies, mark “not victory or defeat but forgiveness and rapprochement.”
Baku, May 12 – The May 9th Victory Day celebration, a Russian Orthodox priest says, shows that Russia over the course of the last century and thanks to the imposition of Soviet values which continue to define the thinking and behavior of people there a sociopathic country, a state which “cannot live with others” because it is “indifferent to their rights.”
In a disturbing essay posted on the Grani.ru portal, Father Yakov Krotov says that “Russia was not always a sociopath.” While it was far from the most attractive of European countries in the 19th century, “it was a normal underdeveloped country, “capable of “concluding alliances” and “remaining true to them (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.150809.html).
While tsarist Russia was known as “the gendarme of Europe,” it was never called “the militiaman” of the continent because “unlike the militiaman, a gendarme all the same is a social phenomenon,” an individual responsible for enforcing laws that protect society rather than acting without regard for those laws and only for his own benefit.
Militiamen are hardly unique in this, Krotov continues, and he points to the attitudes and behavior of the oligaqrchs. “An oligarch who says that things are better in Russia than in England because in Russia he does not have to obey laws is a sociopath. He does not understand that while he can hid from the courts, he can’t protect his own child” from various social ills.
Krotov cites a psychoanalytic handbook to the effect that “anti=social psychopaths are not constrained by the norms of morality. They lie completely shamelessly … In most cases, they are moved by consideration of their own benefit but only in the short term: the longer-term consequences of their actions do not affect them much.”
“Is the acquisition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia profitable for Russia?” Krotov asks. “Is it profitable to establish such a protectorate over Georgia through which Central Asia will not be able to sell its gas to Europe so that we can remain monopolists? It is profitable – but “only in the short term.”
“Is it profitable to take money from a neighbor for a car and then not give it to him? It is profitable – one has the car. But that this will mean that one will not have good relations with the neighbor is not important to a sociopath. Relations are the essence of ‘social,’ and the sociopath fears that as much as fire.”
The Russia that developed after 1917 is defined by the medical description of sociopathy, the Orthodox priest continues. “’About their own failings, sociopaths never regret and are not inclined to learn from.’” Instead, they blame others or put our superficially attractive explanations, “’which leads to conflict with society.’”
When a country becomes sociopathetic, he says, it “accuses the countries around it and enters into conflict with the international community,” seeking only a short-term gain and ignoring the way in which its actions will undermine the possibility for cooperation and development of ties.
But there are other aspects of the sociopathetic personality which become especially dangerous when they are raised to the level of an entire country: Typically, Krotov continues, again citing the psychological text, sociopaths “act impulsively and are not inclined to planning. They are not afraid of threats and future punishments and dangers.’”
Indeed, and as paradoxical and counter-intuitive as it may seem, “their own security and that of others does not worry them very much.” Krotov continues by observing that a sociopath, either an individual or a state, “does not understand what social security is because he [it] does not understand what a society is.”
“Sociopathology is a victory over society. In the West people complain that society is individualistic, atomized, broken apart? Let them come to Russia: here there is no atomization or individualism!” That is because “here there is no society: 100 million sociopaths do not form a society just as … 100 zeks [or 100 of their jailors0 do not form a parliament.”
“When did sociopathy triumph in Russia?” Krotov asks, and he suggests that the answer is provided by the chief holidays the country celebrates: the anniversary of the October 1917 revolution, army day, and Victory Day on May 9th,” the last being perhaps the most indicative of the country’s descent into sociopathy relative to the rest of the world.
“In the final analysis,” he concludes, “the revolution and the reddening of the army are deeply internal phenomena, but May 9th is a commemoration of the separation of Russia from [its] allies in the anti-Hitler coalition,” a world in which most countries, including former enemies, mark “not victory or defeat but forgiveness and rapprochement.”
Sunday, May 10, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Putin’s New Energy Price Policy for the FSU Could Transform Russia’s Ties with Region
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 10 – Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said today that Moscow does not intend to continue to “subsidize the former republics of the Soviet Union” by selling them energy supplies at concessionary prices, a shift that is likely to transform the relationship between Russia and its neighbors but not necessarily in the way many might expect.
On the one hand, this shift will put additional pressure on some of these states to make deals with Moscow in order to keep these energy supplies coming, possibly offering the Russian government even larger stakes in their energy transportation infrastructure in order to pay for what they could not otherwise afford.
But on the other, Putin’s decision to demand market prices could have two very different sets of consequences for others, one of which he almost certainly does not expect and another which may open the door to even more invasive forms of Russian pressure on the countries around Russia’s periphery.
On the one hand, some of these countries may decide, as Estonia did in 1992, that if they have to pay world prices to Russia for energy supplies, they would be far better off making arrangements to purchase them from other countries less interested in using oil and gas as political weapons.
And on the other, by having deprived itself of what has been one of its most effective means of keeping the former Soviet republics wrapped in its embrace, the Russian government may now, as was the case in Georgia last summer, be even more inclined to use other means, including force, to project power.
That could open a new period of tensions between Russia and its neighbors, tensions which could force other countries to choose between conceding dominance of this region to Russia or challenging Moscow by more actively supporting these countries by providing energy assistance or military aid.
At the very least, Putin’s announcement, which came during the course of an interview with Japanese media in advance of his visit to Tokyo, opens a new era in the post-Soviet space, one that will be defined not only by what Moscow now does but equally by how the former Soviet republics and their Western partners react.
Today, Russian news agencies reported that Putin had told a group of Japanese journalists that “over the course of a lengthy period of time – 15 years – Russia reached out to its partners, the former republics of the Soviet Union – and provided them energy supplies at prices significantly below world prices” (rian.ru/economy/20090510/170603684.html).
“Over the course of that time,” the Russian prime minister said, “we have subsidized the economies of these countries to the extent of tens of billions of dollars.” Now, he continued, “we consider that this period has ended. It is necessary to go over to market relations” – and consequently world prices for gas, oil, and other forms of energy.
Putin rejected suggestions that Russia had used its energy supplied to put pressure on these or other countries. And he said that the events at the end of last year and the beginning of next when Moscow and Kyiv were unable to agree on the price and transit for gas were “sad and difficult.”
Obviously, he continued, the shift to market prices will create hardships for some of Russia’s neighbors, but Moscow is ready to work with them “to study the possibility of providing them support in the search for financial resources” they will need to pay Russia in the future.
Putin’s comments are disingenuous in at least three ways. First, Moscow has kept prices for its neighbors below world levels not to subsidize them but rather to reward and punish these states depending on Russia’s attitudes toward them and their willingness or unwillingness to cooperate with Moscow.
Second, the Russian prime minister’s remarks suggest that he and his government plan to continue what has been Moscow’s policy and use energy as a weapon by demanding that Russia’s neighbors offer Moscow ownership of their energy infrastructure as a way of paying their energy debts to Russia.
And third, Putin’s remarks come at a time when Moscow is increasingly angry about the eastward expansion in the influence of the European Union through its common neighborhood policies and of NATO via military cooperation with and exercises in countries, like Georgia, that are not yet members.
By once again invoking “market relations,” Putin clearly hopes to win plaudits from some in the West by obscuring the way in which Moscow has been using and will continue to use markets for political purposes against Russia’s neighbors -- rather than representing an affirmation that he and his government believe in markets in the same way others do.
Vienna, May 10 – Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said today that Moscow does not intend to continue to “subsidize the former republics of the Soviet Union” by selling them energy supplies at concessionary prices, a shift that is likely to transform the relationship between Russia and its neighbors but not necessarily in the way many might expect.
On the one hand, this shift will put additional pressure on some of these states to make deals with Moscow in order to keep these energy supplies coming, possibly offering the Russian government even larger stakes in their energy transportation infrastructure in order to pay for what they could not otherwise afford.
But on the other, Putin’s decision to demand market prices could have two very different sets of consequences for others, one of which he almost certainly does not expect and another which may open the door to even more invasive forms of Russian pressure on the countries around Russia’s periphery.
On the one hand, some of these countries may decide, as Estonia did in 1992, that if they have to pay world prices to Russia for energy supplies, they would be far better off making arrangements to purchase them from other countries less interested in using oil and gas as political weapons.
And on the other, by having deprived itself of what has been one of its most effective means of keeping the former Soviet republics wrapped in its embrace, the Russian government may now, as was the case in Georgia last summer, be even more inclined to use other means, including force, to project power.
That could open a new period of tensions between Russia and its neighbors, tensions which could force other countries to choose between conceding dominance of this region to Russia or challenging Moscow by more actively supporting these countries by providing energy assistance or military aid.
At the very least, Putin’s announcement, which came during the course of an interview with Japanese media in advance of his visit to Tokyo, opens a new era in the post-Soviet space, one that will be defined not only by what Moscow now does but equally by how the former Soviet republics and their Western partners react.
Today, Russian news agencies reported that Putin had told a group of Japanese journalists that “over the course of a lengthy period of time – 15 years – Russia reached out to its partners, the former republics of the Soviet Union – and provided them energy supplies at prices significantly below world prices” (rian.ru/economy/20090510/170603684.html).
“Over the course of that time,” the Russian prime minister said, “we have subsidized the economies of these countries to the extent of tens of billions of dollars.” Now, he continued, “we consider that this period has ended. It is necessary to go over to market relations” – and consequently world prices for gas, oil, and other forms of energy.
Putin rejected suggestions that Russia had used its energy supplied to put pressure on these or other countries. And he said that the events at the end of last year and the beginning of next when Moscow and Kyiv were unable to agree on the price and transit for gas were “sad and difficult.”
Obviously, he continued, the shift to market prices will create hardships for some of Russia’s neighbors, but Moscow is ready to work with them “to study the possibility of providing them support in the search for financial resources” they will need to pay Russia in the future.
Putin’s comments are disingenuous in at least three ways. First, Moscow has kept prices for its neighbors below world levels not to subsidize them but rather to reward and punish these states depending on Russia’s attitudes toward them and their willingness or unwillingness to cooperate with Moscow.
Second, the Russian prime minister’s remarks suggest that he and his government plan to continue what has been Moscow’s policy and use energy as a weapon by demanding that Russia’s neighbors offer Moscow ownership of their energy infrastructure as a way of paying their energy debts to Russia.
And third, Putin’s remarks come at a time when Moscow is increasingly angry about the eastward expansion in the influence of the European Union through its common neighborhood policies and of NATO via military cooperation with and exercises in countries, like Georgia, that are not yet members.
By once again invoking “market relations,” Putin clearly hopes to win plaudits from some in the West by obscuring the way in which Moscow has been using and will continue to use markets for political purposes against Russia’s neighbors -- rather than representing an affirmation that he and his government believe in markets in the same way others do.
Window on Eurasia: “Koenigsberg is a Russian City,” Kaliningrad Mayor Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 10 – Kaliningrad is not a trophy won by Moscow as the result of the Soviet victory in World War II but rather “a Russian city” that became part of the Russian Empire two centuries earlier, according to that city’s mayor. For that reason, he says, it is his personal view that it would not be a problem to restore Koenigsberg as its name.
Indeed, Feliks Lapin said in a wide-ranging interview on Echo Moskvy radio yesterday, Russians should be proud of the fact that Koenigsberg is a Russian city, although he admitted that many people would have problems with this or with calling the entire oblast, created in 1945, Eastern Prussia (www.echo.msk.ru/programs/town/589217-echo/).
Not surprisingly, that comment has attracted the most attention, given the sensitivities of Russia, Poland, Lithuania, and Germany about a region all of whom have a stake in, but Lapin also provided an intriguing perspective about the difficulties Kaliningrad faces as a Russian exclave and about the impact of its propinquity to EU and NATO member countries.
On the one hand, Lapin said, the economic crisis had hit his city harder than many other Russian areas not only because of the downsizing of the military there – he said that Kaliningrad was no longer a military “city” but a military “town” – and the impact of other post-Soviet changes but also because of its being cut off from the Russian Federation proper.
But on the other, he argued that despite the problems he and the residents of his city face, its location and the influence of its neighbors on Kaliningrad have had some positive consequences, making it one of the safest Russian cities at the present time and promoting a more cosmopolitan set of attitudes among residents.
Residents of his city, Lapin said, have been steadfast in the face of the current economic crisis because “all of them understand how complicated things are, because [they] are people who have passed through a crisis much more difficult than was the case” in the remainder of the Russian Federation.
They know that the downsizing of the Russian military which provided much of the life blood of the city earlier has left them with challenges others do not face, Lapin continued, and they understand, especially now, that the completion of some projects, including the building of new housing stocks and highways, will have to be put off.
One of the reasons for their understanding, he said, is that Moscow, “over the last three years,” has lifted many restrictions on the region and allowed it to develop as a special economic zone with ties to Europe. And another is that the situation with regarding crime is much less negative than in other Russian cities.
“Many people say,” his interviewer remarked, “that Kaliningrad is a port city with prostitution, narcotics, HIV/AIDS” and wonder how the people there are coping. To which Lapin responded that “everything [there] is like in a normal big city,” including all the problems his interviewer mentioned.
But he added, there is one dimension on which Kaliningrad is distinguished “from other [Russian] cities in a positive way: [there] city can walk about at night without fear.” And he acknowledged that this was “certainly” the result of what his Echo Moskvy interviewer described as “the influence of the neighbors.”
Those include both the Poles and the Balts, all of whose countries are members of the two key Western institutions, the European Union and NATO. But those memberships do not prevent the Russian residents of Kaliningrad from having regular and positive interaction with members of those nations.
“You know,” Lapin said, “when people talk to one another, no one typically asks whether you are a NATO member or not a NATO member.” Instead, they focus on common issues, including on shared works of art and culture which lay the foundation for “a communion of people and a closeness of people.”
Because that is the case, the mayor continued, how one calls the city he heads matters. Calling it Kaliningrad as now focuses on the events of 1945 while restoring its earlier name of Koenigsberg would serve to underscore the way in which that city has long been part of Russia and of Europe.
Russians have every reason to be “proud that Koenigsberg is a Russian city,” although he noted that many would object and even more would have problems with calling the oblast “Prussia.” It might be better to keep its current name, Kaliningrad oblast, “or call it something else,” such as “Western Russia” (www.rian.ru/society/20090509/170568924.html).
Vienna, May 10 – Kaliningrad is not a trophy won by Moscow as the result of the Soviet victory in World War II but rather “a Russian city” that became part of the Russian Empire two centuries earlier, according to that city’s mayor. For that reason, he says, it is his personal view that it would not be a problem to restore Koenigsberg as its name.
Indeed, Feliks Lapin said in a wide-ranging interview on Echo Moskvy radio yesterday, Russians should be proud of the fact that Koenigsberg is a Russian city, although he admitted that many people would have problems with this or with calling the entire oblast, created in 1945, Eastern Prussia (www.echo.msk.ru/programs/town/589217-echo/).
Not surprisingly, that comment has attracted the most attention, given the sensitivities of Russia, Poland, Lithuania, and Germany about a region all of whom have a stake in, but Lapin also provided an intriguing perspective about the difficulties Kaliningrad faces as a Russian exclave and about the impact of its propinquity to EU and NATO member countries.
On the one hand, Lapin said, the economic crisis had hit his city harder than many other Russian areas not only because of the downsizing of the military there – he said that Kaliningrad was no longer a military “city” but a military “town” – and the impact of other post-Soviet changes but also because of its being cut off from the Russian Federation proper.
But on the other, he argued that despite the problems he and the residents of his city face, its location and the influence of its neighbors on Kaliningrad have had some positive consequences, making it one of the safest Russian cities at the present time and promoting a more cosmopolitan set of attitudes among residents.
Residents of his city, Lapin said, have been steadfast in the face of the current economic crisis because “all of them understand how complicated things are, because [they] are people who have passed through a crisis much more difficult than was the case” in the remainder of the Russian Federation.
They know that the downsizing of the Russian military which provided much of the life blood of the city earlier has left them with challenges others do not face, Lapin continued, and they understand, especially now, that the completion of some projects, including the building of new housing stocks and highways, will have to be put off.
One of the reasons for their understanding, he said, is that Moscow, “over the last three years,” has lifted many restrictions on the region and allowed it to develop as a special economic zone with ties to Europe. And another is that the situation with regarding crime is much less negative than in other Russian cities.
“Many people say,” his interviewer remarked, “that Kaliningrad is a port city with prostitution, narcotics, HIV/AIDS” and wonder how the people there are coping. To which Lapin responded that “everything [there] is like in a normal big city,” including all the problems his interviewer mentioned.
But he added, there is one dimension on which Kaliningrad is distinguished “from other [Russian] cities in a positive way: [there] city can walk about at night without fear.” And he acknowledged that this was “certainly” the result of what his Echo Moskvy interviewer described as “the influence of the neighbors.”
Those include both the Poles and the Balts, all of whose countries are members of the two key Western institutions, the European Union and NATO. But those memberships do not prevent the Russian residents of Kaliningrad from having regular and positive interaction with members of those nations.
“You know,” Lapin said, “when people talk to one another, no one typically asks whether you are a NATO member or not a NATO member.” Instead, they focus on common issues, including on shared works of art and culture which lay the foundation for “a communion of people and a closeness of people.”
Because that is the case, the mayor continued, how one calls the city he heads matters. Calling it Kaliningrad as now focuses on the events of 1945 while restoring its earlier name of Koenigsberg would serve to underscore the way in which that city has long been part of Russia and of Europe.
Russians have every reason to be “proud that Koenigsberg is a Russian city,” although he noted that many would object and even more would have problems with calling the oblast “Prussia.” It might be better to keep its current name, Kaliningrad oblast, “or call it something else,” such as “Western Russia” (www.rian.ru/society/20090509/170568924.html).
Saturday, May 9, 2009
Window on Eurasia: RusHydro Charges Evenk Dam Opponents with ‘Extremism’
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 9 – RusHydro, which builds and operates hydroelectric stations for the Russian government, has accused a group opposing a dam it wants to build in Krasnoyarsk kray of extremism, a charge that prompted interior ministry officers there to call in representatives of the website of the opposition yesterday for “an explanation.”
But the charge and the expansive definition of “extremism” interior ministry officials have accepted has prompted the Russian section of the World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace, and other environmental protection groups to denounce the company for engaging in such “black PR” against its opponents(www.plotina.net/rusgidro-obvinyaet-nas-v-ekstremizme/#more-627).
This battle goes back several years. If RusHydro goes ahead with its plans, some one million hectares of land will be flooded, destroying not only a unique natural habitat but also putting at risk the survival of a small ethnic community, the Evenks, who have lived there and depended on that environment from time immemorial.
Earlier this year, the ecological and ethnic objections to this project came together when more than 9,000 Evenks and their supporters wrote an open letter to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in which they reminded him that the UN Council on Human Rights had explicitly called on Moscow to end its support for the construction of this dam.
Despite that, however, RusHydro has pressed ahead, largely because it enjoys the support of Moscow officials who expect to profit from the sale of the electric power to Mongolia and China that such a dam will generate and who feel confident they can ignore an ethnic group few Russians have ever heard about.
Indeed, the acting head of the company, Vasily Zubakin, took the view that RusHydro had nothing to learn from or talk over with its opponents. “We are perfectly justified” in what we are doing, he said. The company’s opponents are simply engaged in “a political game” and thus do not merit attention.
“I am not a supporter of witch hunts and cannot see the hand of [foreign] special services everywhere, but when one observes the increase in the activity of ecological organizations, it is obvious that they are seeking to identify the latest enemy,” pointedly adding that Russians could guess “in what country of the world the site Plotina.net is registered.”
But having gained the support of the environmentalist movement, the Evenks and their local supporters have become increasingly radical in their expressions of outrage about the project. And the expression of this anger reached a new high when a Siberian journalist urged Moscow and RusHydro to back off lest they “force the Evenks to shoot.”
In an April 11th article that was featured on many Runet portals, he recalled that the Evenks are well armed, have a long tradition as sharpshooters – an Evenk was one of the best and most renowned Soviet snipers during World War II – and could be expected to use violence if their views continue to be ignored.
That was too much for RusHydro, and three days after the article appeared, its officers sent a letter to the officials within the Krasnoyarsk internal affairs department responsible for countering terrorism, denouncing the article as a clear call for violence and demanding that the authorities move against plotina.net (www.plotina.net/pdf/RusHydro_PlotinaNet.pdf).
RusHydro apparently singled out Plotina.net because it has regularly featured articles critical of the company. Indeed, in its complaint about the April 11th article, the company appended a six page list of articles it had produced on its own or carried from other sites such as Kasparov.ru, Babr.ru and Radio Liberty.
Yesterday, in advance of Victory Day and perhaps expecting that few would notice this latest example of official misuse of Russia’s counter-extremism laws, the Krasnoyarsk militia called in Plotina.net. But the quick reaction of environmental groups shows that in the age of the Internet, those who think they can hide such actions for long are almost certainly wrong.
Vienna, May 9 – RusHydro, which builds and operates hydroelectric stations for the Russian government, has accused a group opposing a dam it wants to build in Krasnoyarsk kray of extremism, a charge that prompted interior ministry officers there to call in representatives of the website of the opposition yesterday for “an explanation.”
But the charge and the expansive definition of “extremism” interior ministry officials have accepted has prompted the Russian section of the World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace, and other environmental protection groups to denounce the company for engaging in such “black PR” against its opponents(www.plotina.net/rusgidro-obvinyaet-nas-v-ekstremizme/#more-627).
This battle goes back several years. If RusHydro goes ahead with its plans, some one million hectares of land will be flooded, destroying not only a unique natural habitat but also putting at risk the survival of a small ethnic community, the Evenks, who have lived there and depended on that environment from time immemorial.
Earlier this year, the ecological and ethnic objections to this project came together when more than 9,000 Evenks and their supporters wrote an open letter to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in which they reminded him that the UN Council on Human Rights had explicitly called on Moscow to end its support for the construction of this dam.
Despite that, however, RusHydro has pressed ahead, largely because it enjoys the support of Moscow officials who expect to profit from the sale of the electric power to Mongolia and China that such a dam will generate and who feel confident they can ignore an ethnic group few Russians have ever heard about.
Indeed, the acting head of the company, Vasily Zubakin, took the view that RusHydro had nothing to learn from or talk over with its opponents. “We are perfectly justified” in what we are doing, he said. The company’s opponents are simply engaged in “a political game” and thus do not merit attention.
“I am not a supporter of witch hunts and cannot see the hand of [foreign] special services everywhere, but when one observes the increase in the activity of ecological organizations, it is obvious that they are seeking to identify the latest enemy,” pointedly adding that Russians could guess “in what country of the world the site Plotina.net is registered.”
But having gained the support of the environmentalist movement, the Evenks and their local supporters have become increasingly radical in their expressions of outrage about the project. And the expression of this anger reached a new high when a Siberian journalist urged Moscow and RusHydro to back off lest they “force the Evenks to shoot.”
In an April 11th article that was featured on many Runet portals, he recalled that the Evenks are well armed, have a long tradition as sharpshooters – an Evenk was one of the best and most renowned Soviet snipers during World War II – and could be expected to use violence if their views continue to be ignored.
That was too much for RusHydro, and three days after the article appeared, its officers sent a letter to the officials within the Krasnoyarsk internal affairs department responsible for countering terrorism, denouncing the article as a clear call for violence and demanding that the authorities move against plotina.net (www.plotina.net/pdf/RusHydro_PlotinaNet.pdf).
RusHydro apparently singled out Plotina.net because it has regularly featured articles critical of the company. Indeed, in its complaint about the April 11th article, the company appended a six page list of articles it had produced on its own or carried from other sites such as Kasparov.ru, Babr.ru and Radio Liberty.
Yesterday, in advance of Victory Day and perhaps expecting that few would notice this latest example of official misuse of Russia’s counter-extremism laws, the Krasnoyarsk militia called in Plotina.net. But the quick reaction of environmental groups shows that in the age of the Internet, those who think they can hide such actions for long are almost certainly wrong.
Window on Eurasia: ‘Russia is on the Brink of Sectarian War,’ Moscow Lawyer Warns
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 9 – Even though rights activists almost unanimously have denounced his appointment, Aleksandr Dvorkin, the new head of the religious expertise council, retains the support of the justice ministry and some international groups, a situation that leaves Russia “on the brink of a sectarian war,” according to a Moscow attorney.
In an article on portal of the Slavic Centre for Law and Justice this week, Inna Zagrebina, a legal affairs expert at the Moscow Institute of Religion and Law, argues that the backing the self-described “anti-Sectarian” is receiving “not only undermines inter-confessional accord in the regions and leads to discrimination, but crudely violates national and international legal norms.”
Since his appointment last month to head the justice ministry’s council on religious expertise, Dvorkin has been attacked by religious and human rights activists not only because he tends to distinguish among all non-Orthodox faiths but rather frequently appears to call for an undifferentiated form of struggle against them (www.sclj.ru/news/detail.php?ID=2369).
Such criticism, however, much of it from extremely distinguished experts in the field, has not dissuaded him or his backers. And now, the Russian justice ministry and the European Federation of Investigative and Information Centers about Sectarianism (FECRIS) are holding a conference this coming Friday and Saturday in St. Petersburg in support of Dvorkin’s approach.
Not only will the Russian justice minister speak but Dvorkin himself is slated to deliver the keynote address – and FECRIS, which does not enjoy a good reputation among rights groups, will provide both with the kind of international cover for their ideas about attacking people of religious denominations the Russian state does not like.
The titles of the presentations suggest the direction the meeting will take. Dvorkin’s will speak on “Destructive Cults and Human Rights;” Ryazan Mayor Oleg Shishov on “The Violations of Human Rights by Cults in Ryazan Oblast;” and Saratov anti-sectarian Aleksandr Kuzmin on “Threats to Russian State Security from the Cult of the Neo-Pentecostals.”
And earlier meetings Dvorkin has conducted around Russia indicate how this one is likely to be used. After these meetings have taken place, he and his followers have published pamphlets and given interviews with “in a tendentious fashion” suggesting that Russians must be on guard against all groups. The St. Petersburg meeting is likely to produce the same.
The upcoming conference, however, is different in two important respects. On the hand, it will send the clearest message yet that Dvorkin and his followers enjoy the backing of the Russian justice ministry and consequently that their statements have an official imprimatur even if the earlier claims of the “sektoveds” have routinely been shown to be false.
And on the other, the involvement of a group of European anti-Sectarian activists – FECRIS is based in Paris – will not only further legitimize in the eyes of many Russians what Dvorkin and his backers want to do but also tend to limit foreign criticism of him and foreign support for his Russian critics.
All this, Zagrebina concludes, makes it clear why senior officials included not only Dvorkin but other “like-minded people” in the ministry’s experts council: This is “an attempt to make Dvorkin’s approach to sects, one that she argues inevitably exacerbates inter-religious hostility, the religious policy of the state.”
Those who are doing that and those who fail to speak up against it need to reflect on what the policies of such “inquisitors” will have on a “multi-national and multi-confessional country like Russia. If Dvorkin isn’t stopped, the lawyer warns, Russia could soon be in the grip of “a sectarian war,” a conflict neither people like Dvorkin nor believers nor the country can survive.
Vienna, May 9 – Even though rights activists almost unanimously have denounced his appointment, Aleksandr Dvorkin, the new head of the religious expertise council, retains the support of the justice ministry and some international groups, a situation that leaves Russia “on the brink of a sectarian war,” according to a Moscow attorney.
In an article on portal of the Slavic Centre for Law and Justice this week, Inna Zagrebina, a legal affairs expert at the Moscow Institute of Religion and Law, argues that the backing the self-described “anti-Sectarian” is receiving “not only undermines inter-confessional accord in the regions and leads to discrimination, but crudely violates national and international legal norms.”
Since his appointment last month to head the justice ministry’s council on religious expertise, Dvorkin has been attacked by religious and human rights activists not only because he tends to distinguish among all non-Orthodox faiths but rather frequently appears to call for an undifferentiated form of struggle against them (www.sclj.ru/news/detail.php?ID=2369).
Such criticism, however, much of it from extremely distinguished experts in the field, has not dissuaded him or his backers. And now, the Russian justice ministry and the European Federation of Investigative and Information Centers about Sectarianism (FECRIS) are holding a conference this coming Friday and Saturday in St. Petersburg in support of Dvorkin’s approach.
Not only will the Russian justice minister speak but Dvorkin himself is slated to deliver the keynote address – and FECRIS, which does not enjoy a good reputation among rights groups, will provide both with the kind of international cover for their ideas about attacking people of religious denominations the Russian state does not like.
The titles of the presentations suggest the direction the meeting will take. Dvorkin’s will speak on “Destructive Cults and Human Rights;” Ryazan Mayor Oleg Shishov on “The Violations of Human Rights by Cults in Ryazan Oblast;” and Saratov anti-sectarian Aleksandr Kuzmin on “Threats to Russian State Security from the Cult of the Neo-Pentecostals.”
And earlier meetings Dvorkin has conducted around Russia indicate how this one is likely to be used. After these meetings have taken place, he and his followers have published pamphlets and given interviews with “in a tendentious fashion” suggesting that Russians must be on guard against all groups. The St. Petersburg meeting is likely to produce the same.
The upcoming conference, however, is different in two important respects. On the hand, it will send the clearest message yet that Dvorkin and his followers enjoy the backing of the Russian justice ministry and consequently that their statements have an official imprimatur even if the earlier claims of the “sektoveds” have routinely been shown to be false.
And on the other, the involvement of a group of European anti-Sectarian activists – FECRIS is based in Paris – will not only further legitimize in the eyes of many Russians what Dvorkin and his backers want to do but also tend to limit foreign criticism of him and foreign support for his Russian critics.
All this, Zagrebina concludes, makes it clear why senior officials included not only Dvorkin but other “like-minded people” in the ministry’s experts council: This is “an attempt to make Dvorkin’s approach to sects, one that she argues inevitably exacerbates inter-religious hostility, the religious policy of the state.”
Those who are doing that and those who fail to speak up against it need to reflect on what the policies of such “inquisitors” will have on a “multi-national and multi-confessional country like Russia. If Dvorkin isn’t stopped, the lawyer warns, Russia could soon be in the grip of “a sectarian war,” a conflict neither people like Dvorkin nor believers nor the country can survive.
Window on Eurasia: Draft Bill on ‘Rehabilitation of Nazism’ Embodies the Totalitarianism It Denounces, Moscow Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 9 – Draft legislation introduced in the Duma this week intended to prevent “the rehabilitation in the new independent states on the territory of the former USSR of Nazism, Nazi crimes and their accomplices” embodies “the totalitarian terrorist method of rule” that the bill specifically denounces, according to a Moscow commentator.
In an article posted on the Kasparov.ru portal yesterday, Aleksandr Kramov says that the measure, which is almost certain to pass given United Russia’s support, represents the latest effort by the powers that be “to restore the Soviet empire under the cover of the struggle with ‘those who are rehabilitating Nazism’” (www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=4A040F67237CF).
The measure sets fines of up to 500,000 rubles (14,000 US dollars) and imprisonment of up to five years for “actions directed at revising the results of the International Military Tribunal at Nurenburg and also any actions or inactions directed at … the restoration of the reputations of Nazi criminals, the accomplices of Nazism, and their organizations.”
No one is talking about revisiting the Nuremberg trials, Kramov says. Instead, the measure is clearly directed at those who, from the Kremlin’s point of view, are engaged in “the rehabilitation of the accomplices of Nazism, including the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine and “its own citizens (for example historians and researchers).”
The bill defines “accomplices of Nazism” as including those “who cooperated with the occupation administration on the territory of the USSR,” whether this cooperation was voluntarily or involuntary and regardless of whether those who cooperated did so “not out of a desire to fight for Hitler and Nazism but [because of] hatred to Stalin and Soviet totalitarianism.”
Soviet propagandists, Kramov continues, “loved to talk” about “those who betrayed ‘the Soviet motherland’ out of a desire to save their own skins. But for millions of people, no ‘Soviet motherland’ existed.” Instead, there was only “a prison house of peoples from which they wanted to escape by any means.” The German occupation gave them “a convenient chance.”
And it is those feelings rather than any desire to support the Nazis that explain “the completely unheard of extent of collaborationism of the population of the USSR during the war years,” the Moscow commentator writes, as many historians have pointed out and as any careful and unbiased investigation of the facts will show.
As an example of the opposition to Stalin rather than support for Hitler, Kramov points to what happened in Estonia in 1944 when “Estonian soldiers, seeing that the German units were evacuating and leaving them to their Soviet ‘soldier-liberator,’ engaged in a battle with the Germans in order to get weapons and ammunition in order to resist the Red Army on their own.”
Such people, seeking to defend the independence of their country which Stalin had earlier occupied as a result of a deal with Hitler, can hardly be called “accomplices of Nazism,” although that is exactly what the new Russian measure would identify them and many others who found themselves in an equally tragic predicament.
“Stalin and his marshals without pity sacrificed millions of their soldiers’ lives not to unselfishly ‘liberate people from the fascist yoke.’” Instead, “having liberated territories from German occupation, the Soviet forces brought a Soviet occupation.” That Soviet empire died “20 years ago, but its ghost continues to float above Russia.”
Kramov argues that “the Kremlin no longer can intimidate its independent neighbors with armed interference” – although the case of Georgia would appear to raise doubts on that score – but it can and does use its control of gas and its ability to selectively employ memories of World War II in order to try to regain some of the influence it has lost.
Consequently, the commentator continues, Moscow’s current and much ballyhooed struggle AGAINST “the rehabilitation of Nazism” as exemplified in this latest piece of legislation must be seen for what it is: the current Russian regime’s struggle FOR “the rehabilitation of the Soviet and [in particular the] Stalinist past.”
“The Kremlin wants to ban respect for the memory of those who struggled with arms in their hands against the Soviet empire because up to now it has not given up the idea of reestablishing it in one form or another on the post-Soviet space,” he writes. And thus what the backers of the new bill want to defend is not the Nurenburg court “but Stalin.”
And to that end, the supporters of this effort are prepared to hand over “the interpretation of history” not to historians but rather to “prosecutors,” an approach to Russia’s own history that is “one of the signs of ‘the totalitarian terrorist method of power’ which is how the [pro-Kremlin] deputies define Nazism.”
Vienna, May 9 – Draft legislation introduced in the Duma this week intended to prevent “the rehabilitation in the new independent states on the territory of the former USSR of Nazism, Nazi crimes and their accomplices” embodies “the totalitarian terrorist method of rule” that the bill specifically denounces, according to a Moscow commentator.
In an article posted on the Kasparov.ru portal yesterday, Aleksandr Kramov says that the measure, which is almost certain to pass given United Russia’s support, represents the latest effort by the powers that be “to restore the Soviet empire under the cover of the struggle with ‘those who are rehabilitating Nazism’” (www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=4A040F67237CF).
The measure sets fines of up to 500,000 rubles (14,000 US dollars) and imprisonment of up to five years for “actions directed at revising the results of the International Military Tribunal at Nurenburg and also any actions or inactions directed at … the restoration of the reputations of Nazi criminals, the accomplices of Nazism, and their organizations.”
No one is talking about revisiting the Nuremberg trials, Kramov says. Instead, the measure is clearly directed at those who, from the Kremlin’s point of view, are engaged in “the rehabilitation of the accomplices of Nazism, including the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine and “its own citizens (for example historians and researchers).”
The bill defines “accomplices of Nazism” as including those “who cooperated with the occupation administration on the territory of the USSR,” whether this cooperation was voluntarily or involuntary and regardless of whether those who cooperated did so “not out of a desire to fight for Hitler and Nazism but [because of] hatred to Stalin and Soviet totalitarianism.”
Soviet propagandists, Kramov continues, “loved to talk” about “those who betrayed ‘the Soviet motherland’ out of a desire to save their own skins. But for millions of people, no ‘Soviet motherland’ existed.” Instead, there was only “a prison house of peoples from which they wanted to escape by any means.” The German occupation gave them “a convenient chance.”
And it is those feelings rather than any desire to support the Nazis that explain “the completely unheard of extent of collaborationism of the population of the USSR during the war years,” the Moscow commentator writes, as many historians have pointed out and as any careful and unbiased investigation of the facts will show.
As an example of the opposition to Stalin rather than support for Hitler, Kramov points to what happened in Estonia in 1944 when “Estonian soldiers, seeing that the German units were evacuating and leaving them to their Soviet ‘soldier-liberator,’ engaged in a battle with the Germans in order to get weapons and ammunition in order to resist the Red Army on their own.”
Such people, seeking to defend the independence of their country which Stalin had earlier occupied as a result of a deal with Hitler, can hardly be called “accomplices of Nazism,” although that is exactly what the new Russian measure would identify them and many others who found themselves in an equally tragic predicament.
“Stalin and his marshals without pity sacrificed millions of their soldiers’ lives not to unselfishly ‘liberate people from the fascist yoke.’” Instead, “having liberated territories from German occupation, the Soviet forces brought a Soviet occupation.” That Soviet empire died “20 years ago, but its ghost continues to float above Russia.”
Kramov argues that “the Kremlin no longer can intimidate its independent neighbors with armed interference” – although the case of Georgia would appear to raise doubts on that score – but it can and does use its control of gas and its ability to selectively employ memories of World War II in order to try to regain some of the influence it has lost.
Consequently, the commentator continues, Moscow’s current and much ballyhooed struggle AGAINST “the rehabilitation of Nazism” as exemplified in this latest piece of legislation must be seen for what it is: the current Russian regime’s struggle FOR “the rehabilitation of the Soviet and [in particular the] Stalinist past.”
“The Kremlin wants to ban respect for the memory of those who struggled with arms in their hands against the Soviet empire because up to now it has not given up the idea of reestablishing it in one form or another on the post-Soviet space,” he writes. And thus what the backers of the new bill want to defend is not the Nurenburg court “but Stalin.”
And to that end, the supporters of this effort are prepared to hand over “the interpretation of history” not to historians but rather to “prosecutors,” an approach to Russia’s own history that is “one of the signs of ‘the totalitarian terrorist method of power’ which is how the [pro-Kremlin] deputies define Nazism.”
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