Paul Goble
Vienna, May 9 – Draft legislation introduced in the Duma this week intended to prevent “the rehabilitation in the new independent states on the territory of the former USSR of Nazism, Nazi crimes and their accomplices” embodies “the totalitarian terrorist method of rule” that the bill specifically denounces, according to a Moscow commentator.
In an article posted on the Kasparov.ru portal yesterday, Aleksandr Kramov says that the measure, which is almost certain to pass given United Russia’s support, represents the latest effort by the powers that be “to restore the Soviet empire under the cover of the struggle with ‘those who are rehabilitating Nazism’” (www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=4A040F67237CF).
The measure sets fines of up to 500,000 rubles (14,000 US dollars) and imprisonment of up to five years for “actions directed at revising the results of the International Military Tribunal at Nurenburg and also any actions or inactions directed at … the restoration of the reputations of Nazi criminals, the accomplices of Nazism, and their organizations.”
No one is talking about revisiting the Nuremberg trials, Kramov says. Instead, the measure is clearly directed at those who, from the Kremlin’s point of view, are engaged in “the rehabilitation of the accomplices of Nazism, including the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine and “its own citizens (for example historians and researchers).”
The bill defines “accomplices of Nazism” as including those “who cooperated with the occupation administration on the territory of the USSR,” whether this cooperation was voluntarily or involuntary and regardless of whether those who cooperated did so “not out of a desire to fight for Hitler and Nazism but [because of] hatred to Stalin and Soviet totalitarianism.”
Soviet propagandists, Kramov continues, “loved to talk” about “those who betrayed ‘the Soviet motherland’ out of a desire to save their own skins. But for millions of people, no ‘Soviet motherland’ existed.” Instead, there was only “a prison house of peoples from which they wanted to escape by any means.” The German occupation gave them “a convenient chance.”
And it is those feelings rather than any desire to support the Nazis that explain “the completely unheard of extent of collaborationism of the population of the USSR during the war years,” the Moscow commentator writes, as many historians have pointed out and as any careful and unbiased investigation of the facts will show.
As an example of the opposition to Stalin rather than support for Hitler, Kramov points to what happened in Estonia in 1944 when “Estonian soldiers, seeing that the German units were evacuating and leaving them to their Soviet ‘soldier-liberator,’ engaged in a battle with the Germans in order to get weapons and ammunition in order to resist the Red Army on their own.”
Such people, seeking to defend the independence of their country which Stalin had earlier occupied as a result of a deal with Hitler, can hardly be called “accomplices of Nazism,” although that is exactly what the new Russian measure would identify them and many others who found themselves in an equally tragic predicament.
“Stalin and his marshals without pity sacrificed millions of their soldiers’ lives not to unselfishly ‘liberate people from the fascist yoke.’” Instead, “having liberated territories from German occupation, the Soviet forces brought a Soviet occupation.” That Soviet empire died “20 years ago, but its ghost continues to float above Russia.”
Kramov argues that “the Kremlin no longer can intimidate its independent neighbors with armed interference” – although the case of Georgia would appear to raise doubts on that score – but it can and does use its control of gas and its ability to selectively employ memories of World War II in order to try to regain some of the influence it has lost.
Consequently, the commentator continues, Moscow’s current and much ballyhooed struggle AGAINST “the rehabilitation of Nazism” as exemplified in this latest piece of legislation must be seen for what it is: the current Russian regime’s struggle FOR “the rehabilitation of the Soviet and [in particular the] Stalinist past.”
“The Kremlin wants to ban respect for the memory of those who struggled with arms in their hands against the Soviet empire because up to now it has not given up the idea of reestablishing it in one form or another on the post-Soviet space,” he writes. And thus what the backers of the new bill want to defend is not the Nurenburg court “but Stalin.”
And to that end, the supporters of this effort are prepared to hand over “the interpretation of history” not to historians but rather to “prosecutors,” an approach to Russia’s own history that is “one of the signs of ‘the totalitarian terrorist method of power’ which is how the [pro-Kremlin] deputies define Nazism.”
Saturday, May 9, 2009
Friday, May 8, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Policies Pushing Russia’s Muslims toward a United ‘Front,’ Tatar Activist Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 8 – Moscow’s plan to cut the regional component in most school programs this fall is likely to lead Muslim nations within the borders of the Russian Federation to come together in a united “front” to press for the reversal of that policy through international courts and via other means, according to a leading Kazan Tatar activist.
In an interview posted online yesterday, Damir Iskhakov, a leading theoretician of the Tatar national movement, warned that the Russian government’s “harsh” insistence on taking this step will thus have “negative consequences for the state interests of Russia” and present the center with a challenge it will find hard to counter (www.apn.ru/publications/article21587.htm).
“I would prefer a more democratic path in which all national groups would be given greater opportunities for development, but at present, I do not see such a possibility in Russia.” And he urged the central authorities to rethink their “harsh” position before it unintentionally generates an equally “harsh” response.
Already, Iskhakov said, “there are proposals to create a federal party which would have a clearly expressed national, regional and religious component. Yes, this is banned by existing laws, but there are many ways of getting around such prohibitions,” including establishing a “Eurasian” party whose goal would be to promote the interests of national groups.
One must adopt a patient approach to the consideration of the internal situation of Russia, Iskhakov said, noting that “it isn’t too glorious and at present is obviously getting worse.” Consequently, “the activization of the most varied political forces with which the Tatars might form a bloc is possible.”
Indeed, Iskhakov argued, “the appearance of a so-called parliament and government of Tatarstan in exile is a signal which means that abroad there are sufficiently powerful forces interested in the establishment of such groups. [And] Moscow circles need to think how they will defend their state interests” in this new environment.
Given his willingness to form a “front” on a Muslim basis, Iskhakov was asked what future political Islam has in Tatarstan. He noted that “Islam is part of [Tatar] national consciousness, closely connected with identity. Many [Tatars] who consider themselves Muslim by birth are trying to give this word content,” something that he said is no quick or easy task.
But over time, he suggested, Tatars become Muslims “qualitatively different from the present-day one, and there will emerge a real Islamic umma which will recognize its own interests and rally around them. But [at the same time], the ethnic factor will not disappear. For Tatars, it exists in close relation to a religious foundation.”
Iskhakov continued by observing that as a result, “the religious foundation will acquire ever greater importance.” That will not necessarily lead to “confrontations with non-Muslims, but almost certainly it will mean that “the number of mixed marriages will be less,” because a Muslim parent will insist that children be raised in the faith.
Iskhakov’s warning is interesting for three reasons. First, it highlights just how angry many non-Russians are about the central government’s decision to reduce many of the hours devoted to local culture, history, and language in the regional school programs. Many people have complained; this is the first time someone prominent has made such a serious threat.
Second, Iskhakov’s comments suggest that the Kazan Tatars are already in close touch with other non-Russian groups, the neighboring Bashkirs and other peoples of the Middle Volga in the first instance but also with Muslim nationalities in the North Caucasus, with whom they have not had the same kind of relationship in the past.
And third, although the Kazan Tatars have long dominated Islamic institutions in what is now the Russian Federation, they have generally been extremely careful about playing any Islamic card since the 1920s when one of their co-ethnics, Sultan Galiyev, was denounced for attempting to organize what Stalin denounced as “Muslim national communism.”
Iskhakov’s argument clearly show not only that ever more Kazan Tatars are becoming more Islamic but also that they are once again prepared to use Islam as the basis for the formation of a broader political alliance, something few would have predicted as recently as a decade ago but a development that Moscow’s own heavy-handedness has helped to bring about.
Vienna, May 8 – Moscow’s plan to cut the regional component in most school programs this fall is likely to lead Muslim nations within the borders of the Russian Federation to come together in a united “front” to press for the reversal of that policy through international courts and via other means, according to a leading Kazan Tatar activist.
In an interview posted online yesterday, Damir Iskhakov, a leading theoretician of the Tatar national movement, warned that the Russian government’s “harsh” insistence on taking this step will thus have “negative consequences for the state interests of Russia” and present the center with a challenge it will find hard to counter (www.apn.ru/publications/article21587.htm).
“I would prefer a more democratic path in which all national groups would be given greater opportunities for development, but at present, I do not see such a possibility in Russia.” And he urged the central authorities to rethink their “harsh” position before it unintentionally generates an equally “harsh” response.
Already, Iskhakov said, “there are proposals to create a federal party which would have a clearly expressed national, regional and religious component. Yes, this is banned by existing laws, but there are many ways of getting around such prohibitions,” including establishing a “Eurasian” party whose goal would be to promote the interests of national groups.
One must adopt a patient approach to the consideration of the internal situation of Russia, Iskhakov said, noting that “it isn’t too glorious and at present is obviously getting worse.” Consequently, “the activization of the most varied political forces with which the Tatars might form a bloc is possible.”
Indeed, Iskhakov argued, “the appearance of a so-called parliament and government of Tatarstan in exile is a signal which means that abroad there are sufficiently powerful forces interested in the establishment of such groups. [And] Moscow circles need to think how they will defend their state interests” in this new environment.
Given his willingness to form a “front” on a Muslim basis, Iskhakov was asked what future political Islam has in Tatarstan. He noted that “Islam is part of [Tatar] national consciousness, closely connected with identity. Many [Tatars] who consider themselves Muslim by birth are trying to give this word content,” something that he said is no quick or easy task.
But over time, he suggested, Tatars become Muslims “qualitatively different from the present-day one, and there will emerge a real Islamic umma which will recognize its own interests and rally around them. But [at the same time], the ethnic factor will not disappear. For Tatars, it exists in close relation to a religious foundation.”
Iskhakov continued by observing that as a result, “the religious foundation will acquire ever greater importance.” That will not necessarily lead to “confrontations with non-Muslims, but almost certainly it will mean that “the number of mixed marriages will be less,” because a Muslim parent will insist that children be raised in the faith.
Iskhakov’s warning is interesting for three reasons. First, it highlights just how angry many non-Russians are about the central government’s decision to reduce many of the hours devoted to local culture, history, and language in the regional school programs. Many people have complained; this is the first time someone prominent has made such a serious threat.
Second, Iskhakov’s comments suggest that the Kazan Tatars are already in close touch with other non-Russian groups, the neighboring Bashkirs and other peoples of the Middle Volga in the first instance but also with Muslim nationalities in the North Caucasus, with whom they have not had the same kind of relationship in the past.
And third, although the Kazan Tatars have long dominated Islamic institutions in what is now the Russian Federation, they have generally been extremely careful about playing any Islamic card since the 1920s when one of their co-ethnics, Sultan Galiyev, was denounced for attempting to organize what Stalin denounced as “Muslim national communism.”
Iskhakov’s argument clearly show not only that ever more Kazan Tatars are becoming more Islamic but also that they are once again prepared to use Islam as the basis for the formation of a broader political alliance, something few would have predicted as recently as a decade ago but a development that Moscow’s own heavy-handedness has helped to bring about.
Window on Eurasia: Guns Illegally in Private Hands in Russia Now Sufficient for ‘a Small Civil War,’ Moscow Paper Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 8 – While the number of guns illegally in private hands in the Russian Federation is miniscule in comparison to weapons having that status in the United States, Russians today have far more such guns than ever before and now have enough to “conduct a small civil war,” according to an investigation by a Moscow journalist.
In an article in today’s “Novaya gazeta,” Sergey Kanyev, who writes frequently on crime in the Russian capital, says that there are approximately 170,000 pistols and automatic weapons in the hands of those who are “not the best part of the population” and who obtained, retain and can be expected to use them illegally (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/047/00.html).
The Moscow journalist began looking into the matter when, after a militia officer shot up a supermarket there, “some sources asserted” that the officer had stolen his weapon from a fellow soldier in the Chechen campaign while others “wrote that the pistol has disappeared from the stocks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.”
The latter suggestion, Kanyev said, raises the question of how many guns may be missing from official stocks and how often they are being tracked down and returned to safe keeping. The statistics, he continues, make “an impression,” but “a still greater” one is produced by the lack of correspondence between the number “lost” and the number “returned.”
“As a result of corruption and the sloppiness of the force structures,” he writes, “the population of Russia” is now in a position “to conduct a small civil war.” And while that may seem to be a journalistic exaggeration to people in countries with far more guns in private hands, for Russians, who in Soviet times had little access to guns, it may be shockingly appropriate.
Not surprisingly, officials at the FSB, MVD and Ministry of Defense are not willing to provide any details, the “Novaya gazeta” reporter says, but “it is sufficient” to talk to any traffic policeman, and he will allow you to copy a compact disk containing a data base on weapons that are missing or stolen and that the militia hopes to recover.
The traffic police use this list, Kanyev says, when they are checking cars they have stopped for moving violations. And while the list is almost certainly incomplete and not reflect many weapons that have been lost or recovered, the journalist says, it is “none the less” a very useful place to start.
According to this data source, from 1951 through 2008, on the territory of the USSR and then on that of the Russian Federation were stolen in one way or another 182,114 guns of various types. In addition, he says, “166,265 guns were seized by MVD and FSB officers from criminals and ordinary citizens.” But the actual difference between those lost and found is far larger.
The largest “source” of such weapons is the defense ministry, Kanyev says. While in Soviet times, the military was generally able to prevent the loss of weapons except during conflicts like Afghanistan, “beginning with the 1990s, the situation sharply changed [and] out of the army arsenals, arms flowed out in quantity.”
During the two Chechen wars, the journalist says, the military officially lost 4,456 weapons, although the actual number was certainly higher given seizures by the Chechens, guns improperly listed as lost or destroyed, and generally chaotic accounting methods. Moreover, FSB officers serving in the combat zone lost weapons and ammunition as well.
Interior ministry officials and the militia have often “lost” weapons, he continues. In 80 percent of the cases in Soviet times, the officers involved were drunk. Unfortunately, those guns continue to go off “up to now.” Indeed, he suggests that many actions that Moscow has branded as terrorist may have been conducted by people with stolen weaponry.
Moreover, he continues, it is an open secret that militiamen sometimes trade in arms, something they can easily do given that “according to unofficial data of operational officers, 70 percent of the arms taken from criminals are not recorded in the militia files.” As a result, today there are “approximately 170,000 pistols and automatic weapons” now in private hands illegally.
Other officials, including prosecutors, have also “lost” or “sold” weapons, and it is entirely possible that that pattern may explain recent reports that the defense minister has issued an order banning officers from carrying weapons without explicit permission, something that has infuriated many officers but may help prevent more guns from falling into the wrong hands.
Vienna, May 8 – While the number of guns illegally in private hands in the Russian Federation is miniscule in comparison to weapons having that status in the United States, Russians today have far more such guns than ever before and now have enough to “conduct a small civil war,” according to an investigation by a Moscow journalist.
In an article in today’s “Novaya gazeta,” Sergey Kanyev, who writes frequently on crime in the Russian capital, says that there are approximately 170,000 pistols and automatic weapons in the hands of those who are “not the best part of the population” and who obtained, retain and can be expected to use them illegally (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/047/00.html).
The Moscow journalist began looking into the matter when, after a militia officer shot up a supermarket there, “some sources asserted” that the officer had stolen his weapon from a fellow soldier in the Chechen campaign while others “wrote that the pistol has disappeared from the stocks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.”
The latter suggestion, Kanyev said, raises the question of how many guns may be missing from official stocks and how often they are being tracked down and returned to safe keeping. The statistics, he continues, make “an impression,” but “a still greater” one is produced by the lack of correspondence between the number “lost” and the number “returned.”
“As a result of corruption and the sloppiness of the force structures,” he writes, “the population of Russia” is now in a position “to conduct a small civil war.” And while that may seem to be a journalistic exaggeration to people in countries with far more guns in private hands, for Russians, who in Soviet times had little access to guns, it may be shockingly appropriate.
Not surprisingly, officials at the FSB, MVD and Ministry of Defense are not willing to provide any details, the “Novaya gazeta” reporter says, but “it is sufficient” to talk to any traffic policeman, and he will allow you to copy a compact disk containing a data base on weapons that are missing or stolen and that the militia hopes to recover.
The traffic police use this list, Kanyev says, when they are checking cars they have stopped for moving violations. And while the list is almost certainly incomplete and not reflect many weapons that have been lost or recovered, the journalist says, it is “none the less” a very useful place to start.
According to this data source, from 1951 through 2008, on the territory of the USSR and then on that of the Russian Federation were stolen in one way or another 182,114 guns of various types. In addition, he says, “166,265 guns were seized by MVD and FSB officers from criminals and ordinary citizens.” But the actual difference between those lost and found is far larger.
The largest “source” of such weapons is the defense ministry, Kanyev says. While in Soviet times, the military was generally able to prevent the loss of weapons except during conflicts like Afghanistan, “beginning with the 1990s, the situation sharply changed [and] out of the army arsenals, arms flowed out in quantity.”
During the two Chechen wars, the journalist says, the military officially lost 4,456 weapons, although the actual number was certainly higher given seizures by the Chechens, guns improperly listed as lost or destroyed, and generally chaotic accounting methods. Moreover, FSB officers serving in the combat zone lost weapons and ammunition as well.
Interior ministry officials and the militia have often “lost” weapons, he continues. In 80 percent of the cases in Soviet times, the officers involved were drunk. Unfortunately, those guns continue to go off “up to now.” Indeed, he suggests that many actions that Moscow has branded as terrorist may have been conducted by people with stolen weaponry.
Moreover, he continues, it is an open secret that militiamen sometimes trade in arms, something they can easily do given that “according to unofficial data of operational officers, 70 percent of the arms taken from criminals are not recorded in the militia files.” As a result, today there are “approximately 170,000 pistols and automatic weapons” now in private hands illegally.
Other officials, including prosecutors, have also “lost” or “sold” weapons, and it is entirely possible that that pattern may explain recent reports that the defense minister has issued an order banning officers from carrying weapons without explicit permission, something that has infuriated many officers but may help prevent more guns from falling into the wrong hands.
Window on Eurasia: Inter-Ethnic Marriages Increase in Moscow, Fall in North Caucasus
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 8 – The percentage of marriages between people of different nationalities has risen in Moscow since the end of Soviet times, but the share of such marriages has fallen in the North Caucasus, a pattern that appears to be extinguishing “the fire under ‘the melting pot’” many expected to produce a single integrated people.
When the Soviet government began to talk about the creation of a “new Soviet people” in the 1970s, Aleksandr Vladimirov writes in today’s “Vestnik Kavkaza,” government ideologists and academic experts viewed inter-ethnic marriages as both a contributing factor to and an indication of progress toward that goal (www.vestikavkaza.ru/node/256).
In Soviet times, the Rostov-na-Donu expert notes, Russian women in Moscow and other major cities “most often married Ukrainians, Jews, Belarusians, Armenians and Tatars,” but now as a result of migration, such women are marrying “Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Daghestanis, Chechens and Ingush.”
If the percentage of inter-ethnic marriages in the Russian capital has increased from 22 to 25 percent over the last decade or so, Vladimirov observes, the share of such marriages in Russian regions adjoining the North Caucasus is falling every year and in non-Russian regions there has declined almost to zero.
This difference in the pattern of inter-ethnic marriages between Moscow and the Russian south, he continues, leads him to have “mixed feelings,” not only because Muscovite women are increasingly marrying men culturally dissimilar from themselves but also because the situation in the south points to a hardening of distinct identities among Russians and non-Russians there.
Until 1992, Vladimirov says, ethnically mixed marriages were relatively common in Rostov, with roughly two of them taking place each week between Russian women and Georgian, Azerbaijani, Chechen and other Caucasian men, but now there are far fewer, perhaps no more than 10 such marriages annually out of a total of 1200.
One group where the shift has been particularly noticeable has been among the Cossacks, traditionally a group in which mixed marriages were relatively common. Vladimir Voronin, the chief ideologist of the Don Cossacks, for example said that his community was always “a melting pot” for people of different nationalities.
But now the situation has dramatically changed. Cossacks are increasingly xenophobic in large measure, Vladimirov insists, because of clashes in the eastern portions of Rostov oblast between members of that community and non-Russians from Chechnya and Daghestan who have moved into the area because of troubles in their homelands.
The Meskhetian Turks, some 18,000 of whom have moved into Rostov oblast in recent years, present a particular problem, Vladimirov and the Cossacks say. The number of marriages between them and local Russians “can be counted on one’s fingers,” and many Cossacks fear that eventually that will lead to a Kosovo-type situation there.
Indeed, many people in Rostov point to the rise of “mini-enclaves” of non-Russians inside Rostov oblast who live apart in what are effectively “societies closed” to outsiders like the Russians, most of whom are now moving out of such districts into areas where there is a Russian plurality or majority. That too is pushing down the number of inter-ethnic marriages.
Over the same period, the number of inter-ethnic marriages in the non-Russian republics of the North Caucasus has declined sharply. Such marriages have become “unpopular” and where they do take place they are among people of different Muslim nationalities rather than between representatives of these communities and ethnic Russians.
One reason that the decline in the number of inter-ethnic marriages in Rostov has attracted some attention is that there have been some much-publicized unions between ethnic Russian women and Muslim men from Turkey, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria and Morocco, even if there are almost none between Russian women and local Muslims.
Rostov Mufti Jafar Bikmayev points out that he often officiates at such marriages, which are indeed “inter-ethnic” but not in the way most Russians have traditionally defined them. But because many of the men in such marriages insist on their wives converting – even though Islam does not require that – these unions are likely to affect the ethnic balance as well.
According to Vladimir Alekseyev, a Rostov psychologist, “it is a difficult matter to decide whether inter-ethnic marriages are a good thing or not.” Such unions, he says, have both “positive and negative sides.” On the positive side, they lead to bilingualism, but on the negative, people in them sometimes fail to remember which nation they are members of.
At the conclusion of his article, Vladimirov provides a selection of comments on the Internet about such marriages. They provide a window on shifts in attitudes on these unions that may be even more important to the future evolution of ethnic identity than any of the other details the Rostov expert offers.
According to one, “only in marriages within one’s own nation is it possible to preserve its customs, religion and the like, After all, ‘between a bird in the sky and a fish in the sea, there cannot be a union.’” But while some other agreed with that view, one took a diametrically opposite position.
That individual posted a comment saying that “many peoples whose representatives now reject inter-ethnic marriages [forget that] at one time they arose thanks to the mixing of other peoples” through intermarriage,” a more open sentiment but one that it appears ever fewer people in the Russian Federation appear to share.
Vienna, May 8 – The percentage of marriages between people of different nationalities has risen in Moscow since the end of Soviet times, but the share of such marriages has fallen in the North Caucasus, a pattern that appears to be extinguishing “the fire under ‘the melting pot’” many expected to produce a single integrated people.
When the Soviet government began to talk about the creation of a “new Soviet people” in the 1970s, Aleksandr Vladimirov writes in today’s “Vestnik Kavkaza,” government ideologists and academic experts viewed inter-ethnic marriages as both a contributing factor to and an indication of progress toward that goal (www.vestikavkaza.ru/node/256).
In Soviet times, the Rostov-na-Donu expert notes, Russian women in Moscow and other major cities “most often married Ukrainians, Jews, Belarusians, Armenians and Tatars,” but now as a result of migration, such women are marrying “Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Daghestanis, Chechens and Ingush.”
If the percentage of inter-ethnic marriages in the Russian capital has increased from 22 to 25 percent over the last decade or so, Vladimirov observes, the share of such marriages in Russian regions adjoining the North Caucasus is falling every year and in non-Russian regions there has declined almost to zero.
This difference in the pattern of inter-ethnic marriages between Moscow and the Russian south, he continues, leads him to have “mixed feelings,” not only because Muscovite women are increasingly marrying men culturally dissimilar from themselves but also because the situation in the south points to a hardening of distinct identities among Russians and non-Russians there.
Until 1992, Vladimirov says, ethnically mixed marriages were relatively common in Rostov, with roughly two of them taking place each week between Russian women and Georgian, Azerbaijani, Chechen and other Caucasian men, but now there are far fewer, perhaps no more than 10 such marriages annually out of a total of 1200.
One group where the shift has been particularly noticeable has been among the Cossacks, traditionally a group in which mixed marriages were relatively common. Vladimir Voronin, the chief ideologist of the Don Cossacks, for example said that his community was always “a melting pot” for people of different nationalities.
But now the situation has dramatically changed. Cossacks are increasingly xenophobic in large measure, Vladimirov insists, because of clashes in the eastern portions of Rostov oblast between members of that community and non-Russians from Chechnya and Daghestan who have moved into the area because of troubles in their homelands.
The Meskhetian Turks, some 18,000 of whom have moved into Rostov oblast in recent years, present a particular problem, Vladimirov and the Cossacks say. The number of marriages between them and local Russians “can be counted on one’s fingers,” and many Cossacks fear that eventually that will lead to a Kosovo-type situation there.
Indeed, many people in Rostov point to the rise of “mini-enclaves” of non-Russians inside Rostov oblast who live apart in what are effectively “societies closed” to outsiders like the Russians, most of whom are now moving out of such districts into areas where there is a Russian plurality or majority. That too is pushing down the number of inter-ethnic marriages.
Over the same period, the number of inter-ethnic marriages in the non-Russian republics of the North Caucasus has declined sharply. Such marriages have become “unpopular” and where they do take place they are among people of different Muslim nationalities rather than between representatives of these communities and ethnic Russians.
One reason that the decline in the number of inter-ethnic marriages in Rostov has attracted some attention is that there have been some much-publicized unions between ethnic Russian women and Muslim men from Turkey, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria and Morocco, even if there are almost none between Russian women and local Muslims.
Rostov Mufti Jafar Bikmayev points out that he often officiates at such marriages, which are indeed “inter-ethnic” but not in the way most Russians have traditionally defined them. But because many of the men in such marriages insist on their wives converting – even though Islam does not require that – these unions are likely to affect the ethnic balance as well.
According to Vladimir Alekseyev, a Rostov psychologist, “it is a difficult matter to decide whether inter-ethnic marriages are a good thing or not.” Such unions, he says, have both “positive and negative sides.” On the positive side, they lead to bilingualism, but on the negative, people in them sometimes fail to remember which nation they are members of.
At the conclusion of his article, Vladimirov provides a selection of comments on the Internet about such marriages. They provide a window on shifts in attitudes on these unions that may be even more important to the future evolution of ethnic identity than any of the other details the Rostov expert offers.
According to one, “only in marriages within one’s own nation is it possible to preserve its customs, religion and the like, After all, ‘between a bird in the sky and a fish in the sea, there cannot be a union.’” But while some other agreed with that view, one took a diametrically opposite position.
That individual posted a comment saying that “many peoples whose representatives now reject inter-ethnic marriages [forget that] at one time they arose thanks to the mixing of other peoples” through intermarriage,” a more open sentiment but one that it appears ever fewer people in the Russian Federation appear to share.
Thursday, May 7, 2009
Window on Eurasia: ‘Circassian Government in Exile’ – Provocation or Clever Geopolitical Move?
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 6 – The Circassian diaspora, which numbers more than five million people in Turkey, Syria, Israel and other countries, reportedly intends to set up a government in exile to press Moscow for greater autonomy, a unified republic in the North Caucasus and ultimately independence, according to an Israeli journalist who cites unnamed backers of this move.
But because the Circassians have never taken such a step before, because governments in exile have such a poor track record, and because those behind this idea have chosen so far to remain anonymous, this report has raised questions as to whether it is a provocation of one kind or another or a real political move in the increasingly fluid North Caucasus.
On the one hand, such a report could easily be used by the Russian government to justify a broader crackdown on the various Soviet-engineered nations in that region or at the very least to demand that these nations do not take any further steps toward expanding cooperation and thus challenging the territorial arrangements Stalin imposed and Moscow maintains there.
But on the other, some members of the Circassian diaspora are clearly eager to play a more active role in the North Caucasus after Moscow’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia, whose titular nationality they see as closely related to their own, and in advance of the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014, an event they oppose because it was the site of a genocide.
Two weeks ago, Avraam Shmulyevich, a Russian-language journalist living in Israel, posted on an Israeli news site an interview with unnamed “Circassian activists” who said that they plan to form a government in exile by the end of 2009 to advance the cause of Circassians in the North Caucasus (www.7kanal.com/article.php3?id=261705&view=print).
Because Shmulyevich quoted them as saying that those behind this move believe that “if Russia does not make concessions, it will lose not only Circassia but the entire Caucasus,” this article naturally attracted attention of Moscow outlets (www.apn.ru/opinions/article21563.htm) and specialists on the region (www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=20050).
The Israeli journalist prefaces his interview by noting that he had predicted last fall that the Circassian question would be acquiring “ever greater sharpness.” And he argues that the plans of the Circassian activists, whose names he does not give, to create in the near future “a Government of Circassia in Exile” have the effect of raising that issue to “a new level.”
The Israeli journalist begins with the most sensitive issue of all: the possibility that the diaspora maintains contacts with “armed groups” or “jamaats” in the North Caucasus and that the proposed Government in Exile might call for an armed uprising if Moscow refuses to make concessions to it.
“We are not asserting,” the unnamed Circassians said, “that we have ties with all jamaats or that we can control them. But with certain of them, we do.” And they added that even if Moscow does not agree to the demands of the exile government, that does not mean that that government will declare “a general mobilization” or seek to destabilize the situation.
A decision to make war, Shmulyevich’s interlocutors said, “will be decided by the people. We are not saying that we will immediately call for general mobilization but permanent bases of resistance will be broadened,” something that they suggested Moscow should recognize when it is presented with Circassian demands.
Moreover, they continued, “we possess sufficient resources for pressure on Russia in all respects – diplomatic, military and otherwise. And if Russia does not make concessions, it will lose not only Circassia but the entire Caucasus. But we would not like to obtain independence through chaos,” but rather through non-violent ways.
Those with whom Shmulyevich spokes said that they had “not yet turned to the governments of Western countries,” although they added that if they do so, they “will receive support. In any case, we are certain that we will find many allies, including in the countries of the former USSR: in the Baltics, let us say and in the countries of the former socialist bloc.”
The interviewees said that they have not yet decided where the government will be based or exactly who will be part of it, but they indicated that they will oppose the Sochi Olympics, seek the reunification of the Circassian republics in the North Caucasus, the repatriation of Circassians to that region, and press ultimately for independence from the Russian Federation.
According to these unnamed people, the government in exile will “operate on the basis of the Declaration of the Independence of Circassia of the times of the Caucasus War (1835) and on the recognition of the independence of Circassia which the General Assembly of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) adopted in 1996.”
In a commentary about this interview on the Caucasus Times portal, Murat Kardnov suggested that the idea of a government in exile may be the latest example of Circassians abroad “to draw the North Caucasus Circassians into a conflict with Russia” and to overstate the ties of the Adygeys, Cherkess, Kabards, and other groups the Soviets split the Circassians into.
That the Shmulyevich interview is likely to have the effect of “drawing” the Circassians in the North Caucasus into conflict with the Russian government is beyond doubt. What remains an open question is who is behind this idea and who will benefit most from its circulation: the diaspora, the Circassians in the North Caucasus or Moscow.
But what is also an open question is whether recent developments in the North Caucasus, including greater activism among young people who did not grow up in an environment defined by the Soviet regime, are not only uniting the Circassians of that region but also expanding the ties of that community ties to the vastly larger Circassian nation abroad
To the extent these things are happening – and close observers of the region like Fatima Tlisova provide convincing evidence that it is – they seem certain to constitute a serious challenge to Moscow’s control of the entire region, whether a Circassian government in exile is actually formed or not.
Vienna, May 6 – The Circassian diaspora, which numbers more than five million people in Turkey, Syria, Israel and other countries, reportedly intends to set up a government in exile to press Moscow for greater autonomy, a unified republic in the North Caucasus and ultimately independence, according to an Israeli journalist who cites unnamed backers of this move.
But because the Circassians have never taken such a step before, because governments in exile have such a poor track record, and because those behind this idea have chosen so far to remain anonymous, this report has raised questions as to whether it is a provocation of one kind or another or a real political move in the increasingly fluid North Caucasus.
On the one hand, such a report could easily be used by the Russian government to justify a broader crackdown on the various Soviet-engineered nations in that region or at the very least to demand that these nations do not take any further steps toward expanding cooperation and thus challenging the territorial arrangements Stalin imposed and Moscow maintains there.
But on the other, some members of the Circassian diaspora are clearly eager to play a more active role in the North Caucasus after Moscow’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia, whose titular nationality they see as closely related to their own, and in advance of the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014, an event they oppose because it was the site of a genocide.
Two weeks ago, Avraam Shmulyevich, a Russian-language journalist living in Israel, posted on an Israeli news site an interview with unnamed “Circassian activists” who said that they plan to form a government in exile by the end of 2009 to advance the cause of Circassians in the North Caucasus (www.7kanal.com/article.php3?id=261705&view=print).
Because Shmulyevich quoted them as saying that those behind this move believe that “if Russia does not make concessions, it will lose not only Circassia but the entire Caucasus,” this article naturally attracted attention of Moscow outlets (www.apn.ru/opinions/article21563.htm) and specialists on the region (www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=20050).
The Israeli journalist prefaces his interview by noting that he had predicted last fall that the Circassian question would be acquiring “ever greater sharpness.” And he argues that the plans of the Circassian activists, whose names he does not give, to create in the near future “a Government of Circassia in Exile” have the effect of raising that issue to “a new level.”
The Israeli journalist begins with the most sensitive issue of all: the possibility that the diaspora maintains contacts with “armed groups” or “jamaats” in the North Caucasus and that the proposed Government in Exile might call for an armed uprising if Moscow refuses to make concessions to it.
“We are not asserting,” the unnamed Circassians said, “that we have ties with all jamaats or that we can control them. But with certain of them, we do.” And they added that even if Moscow does not agree to the demands of the exile government, that does not mean that that government will declare “a general mobilization” or seek to destabilize the situation.
A decision to make war, Shmulyevich’s interlocutors said, “will be decided by the people. We are not saying that we will immediately call for general mobilization but permanent bases of resistance will be broadened,” something that they suggested Moscow should recognize when it is presented with Circassian demands.
Moreover, they continued, “we possess sufficient resources for pressure on Russia in all respects – diplomatic, military and otherwise. And if Russia does not make concessions, it will lose not only Circassia but the entire Caucasus. But we would not like to obtain independence through chaos,” but rather through non-violent ways.
Those with whom Shmulyevich spokes said that they had “not yet turned to the governments of Western countries,” although they added that if they do so, they “will receive support. In any case, we are certain that we will find many allies, including in the countries of the former USSR: in the Baltics, let us say and in the countries of the former socialist bloc.”
The interviewees said that they have not yet decided where the government will be based or exactly who will be part of it, but they indicated that they will oppose the Sochi Olympics, seek the reunification of the Circassian republics in the North Caucasus, the repatriation of Circassians to that region, and press ultimately for independence from the Russian Federation.
According to these unnamed people, the government in exile will “operate on the basis of the Declaration of the Independence of Circassia of the times of the Caucasus War (1835) and on the recognition of the independence of Circassia which the General Assembly of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) adopted in 1996.”
In a commentary about this interview on the Caucasus Times portal, Murat Kardnov suggested that the idea of a government in exile may be the latest example of Circassians abroad “to draw the North Caucasus Circassians into a conflict with Russia” and to overstate the ties of the Adygeys, Cherkess, Kabards, and other groups the Soviets split the Circassians into.
That the Shmulyevich interview is likely to have the effect of “drawing” the Circassians in the North Caucasus into conflict with the Russian government is beyond doubt. What remains an open question is who is behind this idea and who will benefit most from its circulation: the diaspora, the Circassians in the North Caucasus or Moscow.
But what is also an open question is whether recent developments in the North Caucasus, including greater activism among young people who did not grow up in an environment defined by the Soviet regime, are not only uniting the Circassians of that region but also expanding the ties of that community ties to the vastly larger Circassian nation abroad
To the extent these things are happening – and close observers of the region like Fatima Tlisova provide convincing evidence that it is – they seem certain to constitute a serious challenge to Moscow’s control of the entire region, whether a Circassian government in exile is actually formed or not.
Window on Eurasia: Officials in Tajik Region Tell Ethnic Uzbeks to Become Citizens of Tajikistan or Leave
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 7 – Officials in a district in Tajikistan along the Uzbek border, have told residents there who are Uzbekistan nationals that they can become citizens of Tajikistan or go to Uzbekistan, the latest indication of rising tensions in that border region and something that could trigger more serious clashes between the two countries.
In an article posted on Ferghana.ru yesterday, journalist Taliv Rasul-zade said that Penjikent officials had told him that people were completely free to choose under the terms of Tajikistan’s citizenship law. And according to the reporter, 40 households in one village have expressed their desire to take Tajik citizenship (www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=6158).
Many people in border regions in Central Asia have taken advantage of the sometimes ambiguous status of the citizen of one country living in another toavoid avoid paying taxes or serving in the military even though not having local citizenship has restricted their access to educational institutions and the franchise.
But now the governments of the region are seeking to regularize the situation by setting up commissions like the one in Tajikistan and insisting on everyone defining their status, most often by becoming a citizen of their country of residence. Tajik officials told Ferghana.ru that they had hoped that Uzbek officials would work with them in this, but that has not happened.
Another reason citizenship has remained undefined until now is that there are many border disputes and unusual administrative arrangements. The village of Plotina, for example, is claimed as an inalienable part of its territory by Tajikistan, but administratively, it remains subordinate to the Jami mahallah of the city of Bekabad of Tashkent oblast in Uzbekistan.
According to Noziyat Akhromova, the president of the Jami mahallah, Plotina is “conditionally divided” into two parts – those who live “this side of the city club” are citizens of Uzbekistan, she said, while those who live “on the other side of the club” are Tajikistanis – an indication of the fact that citizenship as such has not meant a lot to many residents.
But that is changing: Individuals increasingly need to have their diplomas recognized, they need to gain access to social servics, and they require travel documents of one kind or another. And the central governments of these countries are increasingly concerned about tax collection and effective control of border regions.
One Tajik official, Zokirjon Mahmudov, head of border village in Spitamensk district, said that resolving the citizenship issue will require the intervention of the presidents of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Lower level officials simply lack the authority to take the necessary steps, and he said that he hopes to dispatch a letter to the two leaders proposing a meeting.
But other officials are prepared to act without waiting for such a bilateral accord: They want to tell residents on the territories of their villages and regions that they must “become citizens” of the country where they live of “leave,” either on their own or with the assistance of their homeland.
Such actions on “passport questions” could help to ignite clashes along the border of these two countries, especially following the Russian government’s invocation of the defense of citizenship as a justification for its military intervention in Georgia, a justification that many countries around the world were willing to accept or at least not challenge.
The governments in both Dushanbe and Tashkent are certainly aware of that precedent, and the fights of citizenship in several border regions could thus easily become broader military engagements, especially given the disputes these two governments have over water, drug trafficking, and other issues as well.
Vienna, May 7 – Officials in a district in Tajikistan along the Uzbek border, have told residents there who are Uzbekistan nationals that they can become citizens of Tajikistan or go to Uzbekistan, the latest indication of rising tensions in that border region and something that could trigger more serious clashes between the two countries.
In an article posted on Ferghana.ru yesterday, journalist Taliv Rasul-zade said that Penjikent officials had told him that people were completely free to choose under the terms of Tajikistan’s citizenship law. And according to the reporter, 40 households in one village have expressed their desire to take Tajik citizenship (www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=6158).
Many people in border regions in Central Asia have taken advantage of the sometimes ambiguous status of the citizen of one country living in another toavoid avoid paying taxes or serving in the military even though not having local citizenship has restricted their access to educational institutions and the franchise.
But now the governments of the region are seeking to regularize the situation by setting up commissions like the one in Tajikistan and insisting on everyone defining their status, most often by becoming a citizen of their country of residence. Tajik officials told Ferghana.ru that they had hoped that Uzbek officials would work with them in this, but that has not happened.
Another reason citizenship has remained undefined until now is that there are many border disputes and unusual administrative arrangements. The village of Plotina, for example, is claimed as an inalienable part of its territory by Tajikistan, but administratively, it remains subordinate to the Jami mahallah of the city of Bekabad of Tashkent oblast in Uzbekistan.
According to Noziyat Akhromova, the president of the Jami mahallah, Plotina is “conditionally divided” into two parts – those who live “this side of the city club” are citizens of Uzbekistan, she said, while those who live “on the other side of the club” are Tajikistanis – an indication of the fact that citizenship as such has not meant a lot to many residents.
But that is changing: Individuals increasingly need to have their diplomas recognized, they need to gain access to social servics, and they require travel documents of one kind or another. And the central governments of these countries are increasingly concerned about tax collection and effective control of border regions.
One Tajik official, Zokirjon Mahmudov, head of border village in Spitamensk district, said that resolving the citizenship issue will require the intervention of the presidents of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Lower level officials simply lack the authority to take the necessary steps, and he said that he hopes to dispatch a letter to the two leaders proposing a meeting.
But other officials are prepared to act without waiting for such a bilateral accord: They want to tell residents on the territories of their villages and regions that they must “become citizens” of the country where they live of “leave,” either on their own or with the assistance of their homeland.
Such actions on “passport questions” could help to ignite clashes along the border of these two countries, especially following the Russian government’s invocation of the defense of citizenship as a justification for its military intervention in Georgia, a justification that many countries around the world were willing to accept or at least not challenge.
The governments in both Dushanbe and Tashkent are certainly aware of that precedent, and the fights of citizenship in several border regions could thus easily become broader military engagements, especially given the disputes these two governments have over water, drug trafficking, and other issues as well.
Window on Eurasia: Every Sixth Russian in Southern Urals Ready to Use of Violence against Regional Officials, Poll Shows
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 7 – One in every six resident of the Southern Urals is now prepared to use violence against local government officials and their offices, a poll finding that the regional news agency reporting it says should give the Russian authorities pause about the rapid shift in popular attitudes against them.
According to the results of a poll conducted by the Urals Analytic Center in Chelyabinsk, every fifth resident is ready to participate in demonstrations against the government and only slightly fewer are prepared to use “forceful methods” to seize administrative buildings or oppose officials (www.ura.ru/content/chel/06-05-2009/articles/1036253591.html).
And while the poll did not explore whether these increasingly negative popular attitudes toward officials at the city and regional level extended to the Russian government as such, it is likely that many of those polled do not differentiate among the “vlasti” of various levels and that negative views toward local officials might quickly spread to Moscow ones.
The Urals region has a long history of radicalism and is the location of many company towns which scholars like Yevgeny Gontmakher warn have suffered far more than many other places, but the Chelyabinsk figures are striking, especially because as Ura.ru said yesterday, they represent a radical shift against the authorities in the course of “literally a couple of months.”
The Chelyabinsk center conducted the poll as part of its monitoring of the situation there before October 2009 and March 2010 municipal elections, and it found that “half of the residents of Chelyabinsk oblast are dissatisfied with the regional and municipal authorities,” a finding that “stunned” those who conducted the survey.
Given these findings, Ura.ru journalist Sergey Leonov says, it is entirely reasonable to ask “how representative was the sample and how correct the results.” He notes that the survey involved more than 1500 residents from more than 20 municipalities ranging from the city of Chelyabinsk to villages. The probability of error is thus plus or minus two to four percent.
According to the survey, 46.7 percent of people in Chelyabinsk and 68.3 percent of those in the company town of Magnitogorsk are increasingly inclined to protest. Overall, every fourth resident of the oblast says he or she could take part in protest actions, slightly less than the share of every third one in the two largest cities.
The most interesting finding of the poll, however, was elsewhere, Leonov suggests. The respondents were offered a list of 20means of influencing the government, “including court suits, letters and appeals,” and so on. In Chelyabinsk, 22.7 percent said they would consider using force to seize government buildings; in Magnitogorsk, 18.33 percent said they might.
“If one takes these data as a basis [for projections],” the journalist says, “then in the 3.5 million-person oblast, where everything on the surface appears quiet, any incautious action or even word of a bureaucrat could lead to an explosion, especially if that bureaucrat is a local one.” He reports majorities there still trust the Russian president and the Russian government.
Yury Chanov, a local political scientist, told the news agency that “the region is at the doorstep of a municipal catastrophe,” equivalent to the one that swept through it at the time of monetarization of benefits and likely to lead to the electoral defeat of local officials. In 2005, only ten of 32 municipality heads there were kept by the voters, he pointed out.
Because the economic crisis hit the Urals relatively recently, Chanov continued, the share of people angry at the authorities is likely to grow. But the analyst said, “this is not the worst thing.” Far more worrying, he said, is the expressed willingness of residents “to go into the streets and not simply to stand quietly in a picket line but to resort to force.”
Whether the region or the country as a whole will be able “to avoid popular uprisings in the future,” the political analyst concluded, remains as the results of this Chelyabinsk survey show very much “an open question. Everything depends on the actions of the powers that be alone.”
Vienna, May 7 – One in every six resident of the Southern Urals is now prepared to use violence against local government officials and their offices, a poll finding that the regional news agency reporting it says should give the Russian authorities pause about the rapid shift in popular attitudes against them.
According to the results of a poll conducted by the Urals Analytic Center in Chelyabinsk, every fifth resident is ready to participate in demonstrations against the government and only slightly fewer are prepared to use “forceful methods” to seize administrative buildings or oppose officials (www.ura.ru/content/chel/06-05-2009/articles/1036253591.html).
And while the poll did not explore whether these increasingly negative popular attitudes toward officials at the city and regional level extended to the Russian government as such, it is likely that many of those polled do not differentiate among the “vlasti” of various levels and that negative views toward local officials might quickly spread to Moscow ones.
The Urals region has a long history of radicalism and is the location of many company towns which scholars like Yevgeny Gontmakher warn have suffered far more than many other places, but the Chelyabinsk figures are striking, especially because as Ura.ru said yesterday, they represent a radical shift against the authorities in the course of “literally a couple of months.”
The Chelyabinsk center conducted the poll as part of its monitoring of the situation there before October 2009 and March 2010 municipal elections, and it found that “half of the residents of Chelyabinsk oblast are dissatisfied with the regional and municipal authorities,” a finding that “stunned” those who conducted the survey.
Given these findings, Ura.ru journalist Sergey Leonov says, it is entirely reasonable to ask “how representative was the sample and how correct the results.” He notes that the survey involved more than 1500 residents from more than 20 municipalities ranging from the city of Chelyabinsk to villages. The probability of error is thus plus or minus two to four percent.
According to the survey, 46.7 percent of people in Chelyabinsk and 68.3 percent of those in the company town of Magnitogorsk are increasingly inclined to protest. Overall, every fourth resident of the oblast says he or she could take part in protest actions, slightly less than the share of every third one in the two largest cities.
The most interesting finding of the poll, however, was elsewhere, Leonov suggests. The respondents were offered a list of 20means of influencing the government, “including court suits, letters and appeals,” and so on. In Chelyabinsk, 22.7 percent said they would consider using force to seize government buildings; in Magnitogorsk, 18.33 percent said they might.
“If one takes these data as a basis [for projections],” the journalist says, “then in the 3.5 million-person oblast, where everything on the surface appears quiet, any incautious action or even word of a bureaucrat could lead to an explosion, especially if that bureaucrat is a local one.” He reports majorities there still trust the Russian president and the Russian government.
Yury Chanov, a local political scientist, told the news agency that “the region is at the doorstep of a municipal catastrophe,” equivalent to the one that swept through it at the time of monetarization of benefits and likely to lead to the electoral defeat of local officials. In 2005, only ten of 32 municipality heads there were kept by the voters, he pointed out.
Because the economic crisis hit the Urals relatively recently, Chanov continued, the share of people angry at the authorities is likely to grow. But the analyst said, “this is not the worst thing.” Far more worrying, he said, is the expressed willingness of residents “to go into the streets and not simply to stand quietly in a picket line but to resort to force.”
Whether the region or the country as a whole will be able “to avoid popular uprisings in the future,” the political analyst concluded, remains as the results of this Chelyabinsk survey show very much “an open question. Everything depends on the actions of the powers that be alone.”
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
