Paul Goble
Vienna, May 8 – The percentage of marriages between people of different nationalities has risen in Moscow since the end of Soviet times, but the share of such marriages has fallen in the North Caucasus, a pattern that appears to be extinguishing “the fire under ‘the melting pot’” many expected to produce a single integrated people.
When the Soviet government began to talk about the creation of a “new Soviet people” in the 1970s, Aleksandr Vladimirov writes in today’s “Vestnik Kavkaza,” government ideologists and academic experts viewed inter-ethnic marriages as both a contributing factor to and an indication of progress toward that goal (www.vestikavkaza.ru/node/256).
In Soviet times, the Rostov-na-Donu expert notes, Russian women in Moscow and other major cities “most often married Ukrainians, Jews, Belarusians, Armenians and Tatars,” but now as a result of migration, such women are marrying “Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Daghestanis, Chechens and Ingush.”
If the percentage of inter-ethnic marriages in the Russian capital has increased from 22 to 25 percent over the last decade or so, Vladimirov observes, the share of such marriages in Russian regions adjoining the North Caucasus is falling every year and in non-Russian regions there has declined almost to zero.
This difference in the pattern of inter-ethnic marriages between Moscow and the Russian south, he continues, leads him to have “mixed feelings,” not only because Muscovite women are increasingly marrying men culturally dissimilar from themselves but also because the situation in the south points to a hardening of distinct identities among Russians and non-Russians there.
Until 1992, Vladimirov says, ethnically mixed marriages were relatively common in Rostov, with roughly two of them taking place each week between Russian women and Georgian, Azerbaijani, Chechen and other Caucasian men, but now there are far fewer, perhaps no more than 10 such marriages annually out of a total of 1200.
One group where the shift has been particularly noticeable has been among the Cossacks, traditionally a group in which mixed marriages were relatively common. Vladimir Voronin, the chief ideologist of the Don Cossacks, for example said that his community was always “a melting pot” for people of different nationalities.
But now the situation has dramatically changed. Cossacks are increasingly xenophobic in large measure, Vladimirov insists, because of clashes in the eastern portions of Rostov oblast between members of that community and non-Russians from Chechnya and Daghestan who have moved into the area because of troubles in their homelands.
The Meskhetian Turks, some 18,000 of whom have moved into Rostov oblast in recent years, present a particular problem, Vladimirov and the Cossacks say. The number of marriages between them and local Russians “can be counted on one’s fingers,” and many Cossacks fear that eventually that will lead to a Kosovo-type situation there.
Indeed, many people in Rostov point to the rise of “mini-enclaves” of non-Russians inside Rostov oblast who live apart in what are effectively “societies closed” to outsiders like the Russians, most of whom are now moving out of such districts into areas where there is a Russian plurality or majority. That too is pushing down the number of inter-ethnic marriages.
Over the same period, the number of inter-ethnic marriages in the non-Russian republics of the North Caucasus has declined sharply. Such marriages have become “unpopular” and where they do take place they are among people of different Muslim nationalities rather than between representatives of these communities and ethnic Russians.
One reason that the decline in the number of inter-ethnic marriages in Rostov has attracted some attention is that there have been some much-publicized unions between ethnic Russian women and Muslim men from Turkey, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria and Morocco, even if there are almost none between Russian women and local Muslims.
Rostov Mufti Jafar Bikmayev points out that he often officiates at such marriages, which are indeed “inter-ethnic” but not in the way most Russians have traditionally defined them. But because many of the men in such marriages insist on their wives converting – even though Islam does not require that – these unions are likely to affect the ethnic balance as well.
According to Vladimir Alekseyev, a Rostov psychologist, “it is a difficult matter to decide whether inter-ethnic marriages are a good thing or not.” Such unions, he says, have both “positive and negative sides.” On the positive side, they lead to bilingualism, but on the negative, people in them sometimes fail to remember which nation they are members of.
At the conclusion of his article, Vladimirov provides a selection of comments on the Internet about such marriages. They provide a window on shifts in attitudes on these unions that may be even more important to the future evolution of ethnic identity than any of the other details the Rostov expert offers.
According to one, “only in marriages within one’s own nation is it possible to preserve its customs, religion and the like, After all, ‘between a bird in the sky and a fish in the sea, there cannot be a union.’” But while some other agreed with that view, one took a diametrically opposite position.
That individual posted a comment saying that “many peoples whose representatives now reject inter-ethnic marriages [forget that] at one time they arose thanks to the mixing of other peoples” through intermarriage,” a more open sentiment but one that it appears ever fewer people in the Russian Federation appear to share.
Friday, May 8, 2009
Thursday, May 7, 2009
Window on Eurasia: ‘Circassian Government in Exile’ – Provocation or Clever Geopolitical Move?
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 6 – The Circassian diaspora, which numbers more than five million people in Turkey, Syria, Israel and other countries, reportedly intends to set up a government in exile to press Moscow for greater autonomy, a unified republic in the North Caucasus and ultimately independence, according to an Israeli journalist who cites unnamed backers of this move.
But because the Circassians have never taken such a step before, because governments in exile have such a poor track record, and because those behind this idea have chosen so far to remain anonymous, this report has raised questions as to whether it is a provocation of one kind or another or a real political move in the increasingly fluid North Caucasus.
On the one hand, such a report could easily be used by the Russian government to justify a broader crackdown on the various Soviet-engineered nations in that region or at the very least to demand that these nations do not take any further steps toward expanding cooperation and thus challenging the territorial arrangements Stalin imposed and Moscow maintains there.
But on the other, some members of the Circassian diaspora are clearly eager to play a more active role in the North Caucasus after Moscow’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia, whose titular nationality they see as closely related to their own, and in advance of the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014, an event they oppose because it was the site of a genocide.
Two weeks ago, Avraam Shmulyevich, a Russian-language journalist living in Israel, posted on an Israeli news site an interview with unnamed “Circassian activists” who said that they plan to form a government in exile by the end of 2009 to advance the cause of Circassians in the North Caucasus (www.7kanal.com/article.php3?id=261705&view=print).
Because Shmulyevich quoted them as saying that those behind this move believe that “if Russia does not make concessions, it will lose not only Circassia but the entire Caucasus,” this article naturally attracted attention of Moscow outlets (www.apn.ru/opinions/article21563.htm) and specialists on the region (www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=20050).
The Israeli journalist prefaces his interview by noting that he had predicted last fall that the Circassian question would be acquiring “ever greater sharpness.” And he argues that the plans of the Circassian activists, whose names he does not give, to create in the near future “a Government of Circassia in Exile” have the effect of raising that issue to “a new level.”
The Israeli journalist begins with the most sensitive issue of all: the possibility that the diaspora maintains contacts with “armed groups” or “jamaats” in the North Caucasus and that the proposed Government in Exile might call for an armed uprising if Moscow refuses to make concessions to it.
“We are not asserting,” the unnamed Circassians said, “that we have ties with all jamaats or that we can control them. But with certain of them, we do.” And they added that even if Moscow does not agree to the demands of the exile government, that does not mean that that government will declare “a general mobilization” or seek to destabilize the situation.
A decision to make war, Shmulyevich’s interlocutors said, “will be decided by the people. We are not saying that we will immediately call for general mobilization but permanent bases of resistance will be broadened,” something that they suggested Moscow should recognize when it is presented with Circassian demands.
Moreover, they continued, “we possess sufficient resources for pressure on Russia in all respects – diplomatic, military and otherwise. And if Russia does not make concessions, it will lose not only Circassia but the entire Caucasus. But we would not like to obtain independence through chaos,” but rather through non-violent ways.
Those with whom Shmulyevich spokes said that they had “not yet turned to the governments of Western countries,” although they added that if they do so, they “will receive support. In any case, we are certain that we will find many allies, including in the countries of the former USSR: in the Baltics, let us say and in the countries of the former socialist bloc.”
The interviewees said that they have not yet decided where the government will be based or exactly who will be part of it, but they indicated that they will oppose the Sochi Olympics, seek the reunification of the Circassian republics in the North Caucasus, the repatriation of Circassians to that region, and press ultimately for independence from the Russian Federation.
According to these unnamed people, the government in exile will “operate on the basis of the Declaration of the Independence of Circassia of the times of the Caucasus War (1835) and on the recognition of the independence of Circassia which the General Assembly of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) adopted in 1996.”
In a commentary about this interview on the Caucasus Times portal, Murat Kardnov suggested that the idea of a government in exile may be the latest example of Circassians abroad “to draw the North Caucasus Circassians into a conflict with Russia” and to overstate the ties of the Adygeys, Cherkess, Kabards, and other groups the Soviets split the Circassians into.
That the Shmulyevich interview is likely to have the effect of “drawing” the Circassians in the North Caucasus into conflict with the Russian government is beyond doubt. What remains an open question is who is behind this idea and who will benefit most from its circulation: the diaspora, the Circassians in the North Caucasus or Moscow.
But what is also an open question is whether recent developments in the North Caucasus, including greater activism among young people who did not grow up in an environment defined by the Soviet regime, are not only uniting the Circassians of that region but also expanding the ties of that community ties to the vastly larger Circassian nation abroad
To the extent these things are happening – and close observers of the region like Fatima Tlisova provide convincing evidence that it is – they seem certain to constitute a serious challenge to Moscow’s control of the entire region, whether a Circassian government in exile is actually formed or not.
Vienna, May 6 – The Circassian diaspora, which numbers more than five million people in Turkey, Syria, Israel and other countries, reportedly intends to set up a government in exile to press Moscow for greater autonomy, a unified republic in the North Caucasus and ultimately independence, according to an Israeli journalist who cites unnamed backers of this move.
But because the Circassians have never taken such a step before, because governments in exile have such a poor track record, and because those behind this idea have chosen so far to remain anonymous, this report has raised questions as to whether it is a provocation of one kind or another or a real political move in the increasingly fluid North Caucasus.
On the one hand, such a report could easily be used by the Russian government to justify a broader crackdown on the various Soviet-engineered nations in that region or at the very least to demand that these nations do not take any further steps toward expanding cooperation and thus challenging the territorial arrangements Stalin imposed and Moscow maintains there.
But on the other, some members of the Circassian diaspora are clearly eager to play a more active role in the North Caucasus after Moscow’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia, whose titular nationality they see as closely related to their own, and in advance of the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014, an event they oppose because it was the site of a genocide.
Two weeks ago, Avraam Shmulyevich, a Russian-language journalist living in Israel, posted on an Israeli news site an interview with unnamed “Circassian activists” who said that they plan to form a government in exile by the end of 2009 to advance the cause of Circassians in the North Caucasus (www.7kanal.com/article.php3?id=261705&view=print).
Because Shmulyevich quoted them as saying that those behind this move believe that “if Russia does not make concessions, it will lose not only Circassia but the entire Caucasus,” this article naturally attracted attention of Moscow outlets (www.apn.ru/opinions/article21563.htm) and specialists on the region (www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=20050).
The Israeli journalist prefaces his interview by noting that he had predicted last fall that the Circassian question would be acquiring “ever greater sharpness.” And he argues that the plans of the Circassian activists, whose names he does not give, to create in the near future “a Government of Circassia in Exile” have the effect of raising that issue to “a new level.”
The Israeli journalist begins with the most sensitive issue of all: the possibility that the diaspora maintains contacts with “armed groups” or “jamaats” in the North Caucasus and that the proposed Government in Exile might call for an armed uprising if Moscow refuses to make concessions to it.
“We are not asserting,” the unnamed Circassians said, “that we have ties with all jamaats or that we can control them. But with certain of them, we do.” And they added that even if Moscow does not agree to the demands of the exile government, that does not mean that that government will declare “a general mobilization” or seek to destabilize the situation.
A decision to make war, Shmulyevich’s interlocutors said, “will be decided by the people. We are not saying that we will immediately call for general mobilization but permanent bases of resistance will be broadened,” something that they suggested Moscow should recognize when it is presented with Circassian demands.
Moreover, they continued, “we possess sufficient resources for pressure on Russia in all respects – diplomatic, military and otherwise. And if Russia does not make concessions, it will lose not only Circassia but the entire Caucasus. But we would not like to obtain independence through chaos,” but rather through non-violent ways.
Those with whom Shmulyevich spokes said that they had “not yet turned to the governments of Western countries,” although they added that if they do so, they “will receive support. In any case, we are certain that we will find many allies, including in the countries of the former USSR: in the Baltics, let us say and in the countries of the former socialist bloc.”
The interviewees said that they have not yet decided where the government will be based or exactly who will be part of it, but they indicated that they will oppose the Sochi Olympics, seek the reunification of the Circassian republics in the North Caucasus, the repatriation of Circassians to that region, and press ultimately for independence from the Russian Federation.
According to these unnamed people, the government in exile will “operate on the basis of the Declaration of the Independence of Circassia of the times of the Caucasus War (1835) and on the recognition of the independence of Circassia which the General Assembly of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) adopted in 1996.”
In a commentary about this interview on the Caucasus Times portal, Murat Kardnov suggested that the idea of a government in exile may be the latest example of Circassians abroad “to draw the North Caucasus Circassians into a conflict with Russia” and to overstate the ties of the Adygeys, Cherkess, Kabards, and other groups the Soviets split the Circassians into.
That the Shmulyevich interview is likely to have the effect of “drawing” the Circassians in the North Caucasus into conflict with the Russian government is beyond doubt. What remains an open question is who is behind this idea and who will benefit most from its circulation: the diaspora, the Circassians in the North Caucasus or Moscow.
But what is also an open question is whether recent developments in the North Caucasus, including greater activism among young people who did not grow up in an environment defined by the Soviet regime, are not only uniting the Circassians of that region but also expanding the ties of that community ties to the vastly larger Circassian nation abroad
To the extent these things are happening – and close observers of the region like Fatima Tlisova provide convincing evidence that it is – they seem certain to constitute a serious challenge to Moscow’s control of the entire region, whether a Circassian government in exile is actually formed or not.
Window on Eurasia: Officials in Tajik Region Tell Ethnic Uzbeks to Become Citizens of Tajikistan or Leave
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 7 – Officials in a district in Tajikistan along the Uzbek border, have told residents there who are Uzbekistan nationals that they can become citizens of Tajikistan or go to Uzbekistan, the latest indication of rising tensions in that border region and something that could trigger more serious clashes between the two countries.
In an article posted on Ferghana.ru yesterday, journalist Taliv Rasul-zade said that Penjikent officials had told him that people were completely free to choose under the terms of Tajikistan’s citizenship law. And according to the reporter, 40 households in one village have expressed their desire to take Tajik citizenship (www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=6158).
Many people in border regions in Central Asia have taken advantage of the sometimes ambiguous status of the citizen of one country living in another toavoid avoid paying taxes or serving in the military even though not having local citizenship has restricted their access to educational institutions and the franchise.
But now the governments of the region are seeking to regularize the situation by setting up commissions like the one in Tajikistan and insisting on everyone defining their status, most often by becoming a citizen of their country of residence. Tajik officials told Ferghana.ru that they had hoped that Uzbek officials would work with them in this, but that has not happened.
Another reason citizenship has remained undefined until now is that there are many border disputes and unusual administrative arrangements. The village of Plotina, for example, is claimed as an inalienable part of its territory by Tajikistan, but administratively, it remains subordinate to the Jami mahallah of the city of Bekabad of Tashkent oblast in Uzbekistan.
According to Noziyat Akhromova, the president of the Jami mahallah, Plotina is “conditionally divided” into two parts – those who live “this side of the city club” are citizens of Uzbekistan, she said, while those who live “on the other side of the club” are Tajikistanis – an indication of the fact that citizenship as such has not meant a lot to many residents.
But that is changing: Individuals increasingly need to have their diplomas recognized, they need to gain access to social servics, and they require travel documents of one kind or another. And the central governments of these countries are increasingly concerned about tax collection and effective control of border regions.
One Tajik official, Zokirjon Mahmudov, head of border village in Spitamensk district, said that resolving the citizenship issue will require the intervention of the presidents of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Lower level officials simply lack the authority to take the necessary steps, and he said that he hopes to dispatch a letter to the two leaders proposing a meeting.
But other officials are prepared to act without waiting for such a bilateral accord: They want to tell residents on the territories of their villages and regions that they must “become citizens” of the country where they live of “leave,” either on their own or with the assistance of their homeland.
Such actions on “passport questions” could help to ignite clashes along the border of these two countries, especially following the Russian government’s invocation of the defense of citizenship as a justification for its military intervention in Georgia, a justification that many countries around the world were willing to accept or at least not challenge.
The governments in both Dushanbe and Tashkent are certainly aware of that precedent, and the fights of citizenship in several border regions could thus easily become broader military engagements, especially given the disputes these two governments have over water, drug trafficking, and other issues as well.
Vienna, May 7 – Officials in a district in Tajikistan along the Uzbek border, have told residents there who are Uzbekistan nationals that they can become citizens of Tajikistan or go to Uzbekistan, the latest indication of rising tensions in that border region and something that could trigger more serious clashes between the two countries.
In an article posted on Ferghana.ru yesterday, journalist Taliv Rasul-zade said that Penjikent officials had told him that people were completely free to choose under the terms of Tajikistan’s citizenship law. And according to the reporter, 40 households in one village have expressed their desire to take Tajik citizenship (www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=6158).
Many people in border regions in Central Asia have taken advantage of the sometimes ambiguous status of the citizen of one country living in another toavoid avoid paying taxes or serving in the military even though not having local citizenship has restricted their access to educational institutions and the franchise.
But now the governments of the region are seeking to regularize the situation by setting up commissions like the one in Tajikistan and insisting on everyone defining their status, most often by becoming a citizen of their country of residence. Tajik officials told Ferghana.ru that they had hoped that Uzbek officials would work with them in this, but that has not happened.
Another reason citizenship has remained undefined until now is that there are many border disputes and unusual administrative arrangements. The village of Plotina, for example, is claimed as an inalienable part of its territory by Tajikistan, but administratively, it remains subordinate to the Jami mahallah of the city of Bekabad of Tashkent oblast in Uzbekistan.
According to Noziyat Akhromova, the president of the Jami mahallah, Plotina is “conditionally divided” into two parts – those who live “this side of the city club” are citizens of Uzbekistan, she said, while those who live “on the other side of the club” are Tajikistanis – an indication of the fact that citizenship as such has not meant a lot to many residents.
But that is changing: Individuals increasingly need to have their diplomas recognized, they need to gain access to social servics, and they require travel documents of one kind or another. And the central governments of these countries are increasingly concerned about tax collection and effective control of border regions.
One Tajik official, Zokirjon Mahmudov, head of border village in Spitamensk district, said that resolving the citizenship issue will require the intervention of the presidents of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Lower level officials simply lack the authority to take the necessary steps, and he said that he hopes to dispatch a letter to the two leaders proposing a meeting.
But other officials are prepared to act without waiting for such a bilateral accord: They want to tell residents on the territories of their villages and regions that they must “become citizens” of the country where they live of “leave,” either on their own or with the assistance of their homeland.
Such actions on “passport questions” could help to ignite clashes along the border of these two countries, especially following the Russian government’s invocation of the defense of citizenship as a justification for its military intervention in Georgia, a justification that many countries around the world were willing to accept or at least not challenge.
The governments in both Dushanbe and Tashkent are certainly aware of that precedent, and the fights of citizenship in several border regions could thus easily become broader military engagements, especially given the disputes these two governments have over water, drug trafficking, and other issues as well.
Window on Eurasia: Every Sixth Russian in Southern Urals Ready to Use of Violence against Regional Officials, Poll Shows
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 7 – One in every six resident of the Southern Urals is now prepared to use violence against local government officials and their offices, a poll finding that the regional news agency reporting it says should give the Russian authorities pause about the rapid shift in popular attitudes against them.
According to the results of a poll conducted by the Urals Analytic Center in Chelyabinsk, every fifth resident is ready to participate in demonstrations against the government and only slightly fewer are prepared to use “forceful methods” to seize administrative buildings or oppose officials (www.ura.ru/content/chel/06-05-2009/articles/1036253591.html).
And while the poll did not explore whether these increasingly negative popular attitudes toward officials at the city and regional level extended to the Russian government as such, it is likely that many of those polled do not differentiate among the “vlasti” of various levels and that negative views toward local officials might quickly spread to Moscow ones.
The Urals region has a long history of radicalism and is the location of many company towns which scholars like Yevgeny Gontmakher warn have suffered far more than many other places, but the Chelyabinsk figures are striking, especially because as Ura.ru said yesterday, they represent a radical shift against the authorities in the course of “literally a couple of months.”
The Chelyabinsk center conducted the poll as part of its monitoring of the situation there before October 2009 and March 2010 municipal elections, and it found that “half of the residents of Chelyabinsk oblast are dissatisfied with the regional and municipal authorities,” a finding that “stunned” those who conducted the survey.
Given these findings, Ura.ru journalist Sergey Leonov says, it is entirely reasonable to ask “how representative was the sample and how correct the results.” He notes that the survey involved more than 1500 residents from more than 20 municipalities ranging from the city of Chelyabinsk to villages. The probability of error is thus plus or minus two to four percent.
According to the survey, 46.7 percent of people in Chelyabinsk and 68.3 percent of those in the company town of Magnitogorsk are increasingly inclined to protest. Overall, every fourth resident of the oblast says he or she could take part in protest actions, slightly less than the share of every third one in the two largest cities.
The most interesting finding of the poll, however, was elsewhere, Leonov suggests. The respondents were offered a list of 20means of influencing the government, “including court suits, letters and appeals,” and so on. In Chelyabinsk, 22.7 percent said they would consider using force to seize government buildings; in Magnitogorsk, 18.33 percent said they might.
“If one takes these data as a basis [for projections],” the journalist says, “then in the 3.5 million-person oblast, where everything on the surface appears quiet, any incautious action or even word of a bureaucrat could lead to an explosion, especially if that bureaucrat is a local one.” He reports majorities there still trust the Russian president and the Russian government.
Yury Chanov, a local political scientist, told the news agency that “the region is at the doorstep of a municipal catastrophe,” equivalent to the one that swept through it at the time of monetarization of benefits and likely to lead to the electoral defeat of local officials. In 2005, only ten of 32 municipality heads there were kept by the voters, he pointed out.
Because the economic crisis hit the Urals relatively recently, Chanov continued, the share of people angry at the authorities is likely to grow. But the analyst said, “this is not the worst thing.” Far more worrying, he said, is the expressed willingness of residents “to go into the streets and not simply to stand quietly in a picket line but to resort to force.”
Whether the region or the country as a whole will be able “to avoid popular uprisings in the future,” the political analyst concluded, remains as the results of this Chelyabinsk survey show very much “an open question. Everything depends on the actions of the powers that be alone.”
Vienna, May 7 – One in every six resident of the Southern Urals is now prepared to use violence against local government officials and their offices, a poll finding that the regional news agency reporting it says should give the Russian authorities pause about the rapid shift in popular attitudes against them.
According to the results of a poll conducted by the Urals Analytic Center in Chelyabinsk, every fifth resident is ready to participate in demonstrations against the government and only slightly fewer are prepared to use “forceful methods” to seize administrative buildings or oppose officials (www.ura.ru/content/chel/06-05-2009/articles/1036253591.html).
And while the poll did not explore whether these increasingly negative popular attitudes toward officials at the city and regional level extended to the Russian government as such, it is likely that many of those polled do not differentiate among the “vlasti” of various levels and that negative views toward local officials might quickly spread to Moscow ones.
The Urals region has a long history of radicalism and is the location of many company towns which scholars like Yevgeny Gontmakher warn have suffered far more than many other places, but the Chelyabinsk figures are striking, especially because as Ura.ru said yesterday, they represent a radical shift against the authorities in the course of “literally a couple of months.”
The Chelyabinsk center conducted the poll as part of its monitoring of the situation there before October 2009 and March 2010 municipal elections, and it found that “half of the residents of Chelyabinsk oblast are dissatisfied with the regional and municipal authorities,” a finding that “stunned” those who conducted the survey.
Given these findings, Ura.ru journalist Sergey Leonov says, it is entirely reasonable to ask “how representative was the sample and how correct the results.” He notes that the survey involved more than 1500 residents from more than 20 municipalities ranging from the city of Chelyabinsk to villages. The probability of error is thus plus or minus two to four percent.
According to the survey, 46.7 percent of people in Chelyabinsk and 68.3 percent of those in the company town of Magnitogorsk are increasingly inclined to protest. Overall, every fourth resident of the oblast says he or she could take part in protest actions, slightly less than the share of every third one in the two largest cities.
The most interesting finding of the poll, however, was elsewhere, Leonov suggests. The respondents were offered a list of 20means of influencing the government, “including court suits, letters and appeals,” and so on. In Chelyabinsk, 22.7 percent said they would consider using force to seize government buildings; in Magnitogorsk, 18.33 percent said they might.
“If one takes these data as a basis [for projections],” the journalist says, “then in the 3.5 million-person oblast, where everything on the surface appears quiet, any incautious action or even word of a bureaucrat could lead to an explosion, especially if that bureaucrat is a local one.” He reports majorities there still trust the Russian president and the Russian government.
Yury Chanov, a local political scientist, told the news agency that “the region is at the doorstep of a municipal catastrophe,” equivalent to the one that swept through it at the time of monetarization of benefits and likely to lead to the electoral defeat of local officials. In 2005, only ten of 32 municipality heads there were kept by the voters, he pointed out.
Because the economic crisis hit the Urals relatively recently, Chanov continued, the share of people angry at the authorities is likely to grow. But the analyst said, “this is not the worst thing.” Far more worrying, he said, is the expressed willingness of residents “to go into the streets and not simply to stand quietly in a picket line but to resort to force.”
Whether the region or the country as a whole will be able “to avoid popular uprisings in the future,” the political analyst concluded, remains as the results of this Chelyabinsk survey show very much “an open question. Everything depends on the actions of the powers that be alone.”
Wednesday, May 6, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Russian Justice Ministry Maintains Quotas for Closing NGOs
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 6 – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s decision in May 2008 to transfer responsibility for the registration of non-governmental organizations from the Federal Registration Service (FRS) to the Ministry of Justice has not led to the kind of progress toward a law-based state that many activists had hoped.
According to a new analysis of the legal situation in which Russian NGOs find themselves, in many regions exactly the same officials are overseeing the registration process as were before this change was made, and the justice ministry has set quotas for the number of NGOs to be shut down each year (www.polit.ru/analytics/2009/05/04/nko.html).
And what is still worse, Olga Gnezdilova, the legal affairs advisor to the Voronezh Inter-Regional Legal Defense Group who prepared this analysis, says, there is growing evidence that the Russian government plans to target for inspection NGOs conducting educational work, thus putting nearly half of all such organizations at risk of losing their right to operate.
Last month marked the third anniversary of the introduction of amendments to the law on the registration of NGOs that then-President Vladimir Putin said were necessary to combat terrorism, block espionage by foreign governments, and prevent the rise of “orange” revolutions in the Russian Federation.
But since then, Gnezdilova notes, despite highly invasive official supervision of NGOs, the Russian authorities have not exposed “a single terrorist or extremist NGO,” except for the case of a Tyumen gay group which was charged with threatening “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia” by contributing to “a reduction of its population.”
Despite that, she continues, “it became difficult for organizations to register; problems began with registration of changes of rules, addresses and their leaders; and cases of criminal persecution of leaders and searches in organizations increased.” In addition, many NGOs faced problems with the tax authorities, and the media continued to attack NGOs as “extremist.”
In May 2008, the Russian NGO community thought that their situation would improve when incoming President Dmitry Medvedev stripped the Federal Registration Service of its power over registration and put the justice ministry and its regional administrations in charge of this function.
But these “hopes have not been realized,” Gnezdilova says, because “real changes in the authority of the new controlling organization have not occurred” and because “in many regions, the very same officials [who had been involved at the FRS] are filling the same slots in the Ministry of Justice.”
Still more disturbing, she says, the ministry last year and again this year set a quota of 1400 organizations for the number of NGOs to which its officials were supposed to deny registration, thus leading regional officials to compete to find reasons to do so and thus to look good in the eyes of their Moscow superiors.
Moreover, over the last year, officials have frequently exercised their power under the amended legislation to refuse registration to groups if there has been a change in leader or address, shifts that often happen in the NGO community but ones that now put the existence of many such organizations at risk.
As of the start of 2009, Gnezdilova continues, 219,802 NGOs had ceased to exist since the amended law came into force. Of those, many simply ceased to exist, but “more than 44,000” were shut down by court order, generally for failing to meet one or another often burdensome government registration requirement.
More NGOs are likely to be closed by the courts in the future, Gnezdilova says, especially since the government is checking almost all NGOs which have any foreign funding and plans to focus on the 46 percent of them engaged in educational work, attention that “puts under threat the existence of every second organization.”
In addition, attacks on NGOs continue largely unabated. In March 2009, for example, a FRS official in Voronezh said that NGOs there were being financed illegally by “Western special services,” but when asked for details, she could not provide any and said that officials were focusing on the failure of NGOs to provide necessary registration documents.
And last month, FSB chief Nikolay Patrushev added that “particular foreign NGOs provide information support to terrorism,” a charge for which he provided no evidence but which the Russian media played up and which, according to Gnezdilova, undoubtedly “sent ‘a signal’ to bureaucrats working with NGOs.”
The legal affairs special concludes that “despite the hopes” many had last year, “it is now possible to say that without a fundamental change in the laws regulating the activities [of those working with NGOs] and without a change in the attitudes of leading political figures [on these groups], it is not possible to speak about the growth and development of the civic sector.”
“For the time being,” she says, “the main tasks” of the NGOs in this sector “will remain the struggle for survival.”
Vienna, May 6 – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s decision in May 2008 to transfer responsibility for the registration of non-governmental organizations from the Federal Registration Service (FRS) to the Ministry of Justice has not led to the kind of progress toward a law-based state that many activists had hoped.
According to a new analysis of the legal situation in which Russian NGOs find themselves, in many regions exactly the same officials are overseeing the registration process as were before this change was made, and the justice ministry has set quotas for the number of NGOs to be shut down each year (www.polit.ru/analytics/2009/05/04/nko.html).
And what is still worse, Olga Gnezdilova, the legal affairs advisor to the Voronezh Inter-Regional Legal Defense Group who prepared this analysis, says, there is growing evidence that the Russian government plans to target for inspection NGOs conducting educational work, thus putting nearly half of all such organizations at risk of losing their right to operate.
Last month marked the third anniversary of the introduction of amendments to the law on the registration of NGOs that then-President Vladimir Putin said were necessary to combat terrorism, block espionage by foreign governments, and prevent the rise of “orange” revolutions in the Russian Federation.
But since then, Gnezdilova notes, despite highly invasive official supervision of NGOs, the Russian authorities have not exposed “a single terrorist or extremist NGO,” except for the case of a Tyumen gay group which was charged with threatening “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia” by contributing to “a reduction of its population.”
Despite that, she continues, “it became difficult for organizations to register; problems began with registration of changes of rules, addresses and their leaders; and cases of criminal persecution of leaders and searches in organizations increased.” In addition, many NGOs faced problems with the tax authorities, and the media continued to attack NGOs as “extremist.”
In May 2008, the Russian NGO community thought that their situation would improve when incoming President Dmitry Medvedev stripped the Federal Registration Service of its power over registration and put the justice ministry and its regional administrations in charge of this function.
But these “hopes have not been realized,” Gnezdilova says, because “real changes in the authority of the new controlling organization have not occurred” and because “in many regions, the very same officials [who had been involved at the FRS] are filling the same slots in the Ministry of Justice.”
Still more disturbing, she says, the ministry last year and again this year set a quota of 1400 organizations for the number of NGOs to which its officials were supposed to deny registration, thus leading regional officials to compete to find reasons to do so and thus to look good in the eyes of their Moscow superiors.
Moreover, over the last year, officials have frequently exercised their power under the amended legislation to refuse registration to groups if there has been a change in leader or address, shifts that often happen in the NGO community but ones that now put the existence of many such organizations at risk.
As of the start of 2009, Gnezdilova continues, 219,802 NGOs had ceased to exist since the amended law came into force. Of those, many simply ceased to exist, but “more than 44,000” were shut down by court order, generally for failing to meet one or another often burdensome government registration requirement.
More NGOs are likely to be closed by the courts in the future, Gnezdilova says, especially since the government is checking almost all NGOs which have any foreign funding and plans to focus on the 46 percent of them engaged in educational work, attention that “puts under threat the existence of every second organization.”
In addition, attacks on NGOs continue largely unabated. In March 2009, for example, a FRS official in Voronezh said that NGOs there were being financed illegally by “Western special services,” but when asked for details, she could not provide any and said that officials were focusing on the failure of NGOs to provide necessary registration documents.
And last month, FSB chief Nikolay Patrushev added that “particular foreign NGOs provide information support to terrorism,” a charge for which he provided no evidence but which the Russian media played up and which, according to Gnezdilova, undoubtedly “sent ‘a signal’ to bureaucrats working with NGOs.”
The legal affairs special concludes that “despite the hopes” many had last year, “it is now possible to say that without a fundamental change in the laws regulating the activities [of those working with NGOs] and without a change in the attitudes of leading political figures [on these groups], it is not possible to speak about the growth and development of the civic sector.”
“For the time being,” she says, “the main tasks” of the NGOs in this sector “will remain the struggle for survival.”
Window on Eurasia: Putin’s Own Words Show Russia Does Not Have a State, Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 6 – Many people are now accustomed to hearing that Russia was a failed state until Boris Yeltsin, and few are startled anymore to hear suggestions that it is a criminal state. But according to one analyst, a recent remark by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin raises the question as to whether there is any state as such in the Russian Federation.
“How can there not be a state in Russia if the building of the state is our chief and general pride?” Yury Magarshak asks in an article in today’s “Vremya.” “How can there not be a state in Russia if state-thinking people form a large fraction of the citizens of the country? [And] how can there not be a state if many Russians remain convinced that the Motherland is a state?”
“Until very recently,” the New York-based Russian specialist on high technology and a frequent writer on Russia’s social and political problems, continues, he “also thought that a state existed in Russia.” But there are reasons to suppose that unfortunately a state does not exist” there (www.vremya.ru/2009/77/4/228487.html).
Of course, Magarshak writes, “Russia is a state in the sense that it occupies a large part of the globe and is a member of the United Nations. But it seems” – and according to Magarshak, Putin has unintentionally acknowledged as much – “that there is no state in Russia which fulfills the basic functions which a state is obligated to carry out.”
During his recent meeting with the Duma, Putin was asked whether it was time to end the flat tax on incomes in order to be in a better position to finance state programs. The prime minister responded by saying that such a step must not be taken because if it were, employers would pay people off the books, “in envelopes,” so as to escape taxation
“Judging by the news programs,” Magarshak says, “this answer satisfied the parliamentarians. But it does not satisfy me.” Indeed, the specialist, who was trained at Leningrad State University says, “it shocked” him because of what it said about the government of the country in which he was born and about which he cares so much.
Throughout human history, he writes, “one of the basic functions of a state alongside providing justice and security for its citizens has been the collection of taxes.” Indeed, for a functioning state, tax collection is “one of the easiest obligations” of central institutions. And if Russia today can’t do what other states have always done, “is it in fact a state at all?”
“But the situation is still worse,” Magarshak says. What Putin said means that “if Moscow were to end the current formal equality of citizens on income taxes, money would circulate in society via the shadow economy, that is criminally and illegally,” and thus be beyond the reach of the authorities.
“In other words,” the “Vremya” commentator says, “the prime minister was not only acknowledging to the entire world that the state cannot collect taxes … but also that it is not even capable of providing for the legal circulation of money in the country,” a situation other officials have conceded by noting that corruption in Russia is comparable in size to the national budget.
In making that remark, Magarshak says, Putin was certainly being “sincere. More than that, it is clear to every thoughtful Russian that in essence [the prime minister] is right: at the present time, the powers that be [in the Russian Federation] are powerless before the criminal world,” a situation that means that “there is in general no ‘vlast.’”
To the extent that is true, how is Russia going to get out of the current crisis? The situation is not encouraging, Magarshak says. Russians did well under Putin only because of high oil and gas prices, a situation that is unlikely to return anytime soon. And the country “does not produce any products which are competitive on the world market.”
Unfortunately, Magarshak notes, “there is no tradition of technology firms of a competitive level that are sending their goods to that market, and there are no corresponding specialists.” Moreover, even if they should “by a miracle” appear, “the presence of the shadow economy” seriously reduces the chance that they will be able to compete with foreign firms.
Magarshak ends his article by acknowledging that “no one in the world for a long time has been surprised by books about Russia with titles like ‘The Creation of a Criminal State.’ And no one is surprised in Russia. But a report that Russia does not have a state at all whether it be criminal, bandit, or thieving – nonetheless is unexpected and sad.”
But he says one “would like to think” that there is a cure for the “disease” Russia suffers from. Unfortunately, given the “seriousness” of the diagnosis, the course of treatment is likely going to require radical steps, including quite possibly the wholesale replacement of elites, even though that too may prove “insufficient.”
What is clear, however, is that both this situation and possible cures “must be discussed, especially during the crisis as the highest priority at all levels from television to the Duma.” That is because, Magarshak concludes, while Russia may not have a state just now, no one, including its citizens, has another Russia to turn to.
Vienna, May 6 – Many people are now accustomed to hearing that Russia was a failed state until Boris Yeltsin, and few are startled anymore to hear suggestions that it is a criminal state. But according to one analyst, a recent remark by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin raises the question as to whether there is any state as such in the Russian Federation.
“How can there not be a state in Russia if the building of the state is our chief and general pride?” Yury Magarshak asks in an article in today’s “Vremya.” “How can there not be a state in Russia if state-thinking people form a large fraction of the citizens of the country? [And] how can there not be a state if many Russians remain convinced that the Motherland is a state?”
“Until very recently,” the New York-based Russian specialist on high technology and a frequent writer on Russia’s social and political problems, continues, he “also thought that a state existed in Russia.” But there are reasons to suppose that unfortunately a state does not exist” there (www.vremya.ru/2009/77/4/228487.html).
Of course, Magarshak writes, “Russia is a state in the sense that it occupies a large part of the globe and is a member of the United Nations. But it seems” – and according to Magarshak, Putin has unintentionally acknowledged as much – “that there is no state in Russia which fulfills the basic functions which a state is obligated to carry out.”
During his recent meeting with the Duma, Putin was asked whether it was time to end the flat tax on incomes in order to be in a better position to finance state programs. The prime minister responded by saying that such a step must not be taken because if it were, employers would pay people off the books, “in envelopes,” so as to escape taxation
“Judging by the news programs,” Magarshak says, “this answer satisfied the parliamentarians. But it does not satisfy me.” Indeed, the specialist, who was trained at Leningrad State University says, “it shocked” him because of what it said about the government of the country in which he was born and about which he cares so much.
Throughout human history, he writes, “one of the basic functions of a state alongside providing justice and security for its citizens has been the collection of taxes.” Indeed, for a functioning state, tax collection is “one of the easiest obligations” of central institutions. And if Russia today can’t do what other states have always done, “is it in fact a state at all?”
“But the situation is still worse,” Magarshak says. What Putin said means that “if Moscow were to end the current formal equality of citizens on income taxes, money would circulate in society via the shadow economy, that is criminally and illegally,” and thus be beyond the reach of the authorities.
“In other words,” the “Vremya” commentator says, “the prime minister was not only acknowledging to the entire world that the state cannot collect taxes … but also that it is not even capable of providing for the legal circulation of money in the country,” a situation other officials have conceded by noting that corruption in Russia is comparable in size to the national budget.
In making that remark, Magarshak says, Putin was certainly being “sincere. More than that, it is clear to every thoughtful Russian that in essence [the prime minister] is right: at the present time, the powers that be [in the Russian Federation] are powerless before the criminal world,” a situation that means that “there is in general no ‘vlast.’”
To the extent that is true, how is Russia going to get out of the current crisis? The situation is not encouraging, Magarshak says. Russians did well under Putin only because of high oil and gas prices, a situation that is unlikely to return anytime soon. And the country “does not produce any products which are competitive on the world market.”
Unfortunately, Magarshak notes, “there is no tradition of technology firms of a competitive level that are sending their goods to that market, and there are no corresponding specialists.” Moreover, even if they should “by a miracle” appear, “the presence of the shadow economy” seriously reduces the chance that they will be able to compete with foreign firms.
Magarshak ends his article by acknowledging that “no one in the world for a long time has been surprised by books about Russia with titles like ‘The Creation of a Criminal State.’ And no one is surprised in Russia. But a report that Russia does not have a state at all whether it be criminal, bandit, or thieving – nonetheless is unexpected and sad.”
But he says one “would like to think” that there is a cure for the “disease” Russia suffers from. Unfortunately, given the “seriousness” of the diagnosis, the course of treatment is likely going to require radical steps, including quite possibly the wholesale replacement of elites, even though that too may prove “insufficient.”
What is clear, however, is that both this situation and possible cures “must be discussed, especially during the crisis as the highest priority at all levels from television to the Duma.” That is because, Magarshak concludes, while Russia may not have a state just now, no one, including its citizens, has another Russia to turn to.
Window on Eurasia: Might the US Recognize Abkhazia and Turn Moscow’s Victory into Defeat?
Paul Goble
Vienna, May 6 – The United States and even more likely Turkey might change course, recognize the independence of Abkhazia, move to include both Abkhazia and Georgia into Western institutions like NATO and thus transform Moscow’s victory on the ground in August 2008 into a major geopolitical defeat, according to a Moscow analyst.
In what he acknowledges is a highly speculative article, Andrey Serenko, a political analyst at the Moscow Foundation for the Development of Information, argues that however improbable it may seem at present, the US and Turkey might recognize Abkhazia as part of a broader strategy of ousting Russia from the Caucasus (www.vestikavkaza.ru/node/2438).
And while the Moscow writer may be wrong both overall and in detail, his argument is worth exploring not only because it reflects a habit of mind quite frequently found in the Russian capital at the present time but also because it highlights the fluidity and openness of a situation in the Caucasus that most analysts are inclined to see as far more fixed than in fact is the case.
Despite the fact that much of the fighting between Russia and Georgia took place in South Ossetia rather than in Abkhazia – in fact, there was no fighting there during the recent war -- “the main goal”of both Moscow and Tbilisi was the latter because control of that breakaway republic was seen as controlling so much.
“If Tbilisi had been able to return Abkhazia to its control,” Serenko suggests, “the fate of the Russian Black Sea Fleet would have been fixed” and against Russia, whereas if, as happened, Abkhazia gained its independence as a result of Moscow’s actions, Russia’s ability to project power in the region would remain great.
Given the geopolitical importance of Abkhazia, the Moscow analyst says, it is implausible that the West will simply continue to repeat its declarations of support for the territorial integrity of the Republic Georgia and do nothing to counter the consequences of Russia’s victory there last summer.
One possible scenario, Serenko continues, would involve the following steps: “The United States could conduct shuttle talks between the Georgian and Abkhaz leaderships and on the basis of their outcome declare that Washington, following Moscow, will recognize the independence of Abkhazia.”
Today, “no one expects this from the Americans but precisely such a move could change the situation in the Southern Caucasus in in favor of the US, because following such recognition, American investments, major Western companies and NGOs would flood into Sukhumi,” leading at least some Abkhaz to lobby “for friendship with the US.”
Russia is certainly not prepared for such an American move, nor are the upper reaches of the Abkhazian leadership. President Sergey Bagapsh and his colleagues are “sincerely grateful” to Moscow for its assistance in their republic’s gaining independence and for its recognition of that status. And they believe that they can resist any blandishments from the West.
But Serenko says, “serious politicians inMoscow cannot be such optimists. Besides that, there are in Abkhazia, besides Bagapsh, politicians, bureaucrats, and petty businessmen who are striving to become major players and ‘win out’ some personal profit from independence achieved at long last. … Independence in order not to depend on or to take from all …”
“In the event of a successful American entrance into Abkhazia, Sukhumi could be offered the variant which the US and NATO have already proposed to Serbia and Kosovo – why argue and fight over borders? Both Serbia and Kosovo will be admitted to the European Union in which there are no internal borders and then into NATO.”
That formula will eventually work in the Balkans. Why not try it in the Caucasus? “Why should Georgia and Abkhazia fight and argue among themselves? They both an be admitted … [after a decent interval] … into the European Union and into NATO. And then the problem of borders and independence disappears on its own.”
“Is this a fantastic scenario?” Serenko asks rhetorically. “Nomore fantastic than the disintegration of the USSR, the disintegration of Serbia or the recognition of the independence of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” events many said would never happened before they did and were proclaimed inevitable.
One of the reasons that Moscow should be concerned about an American rapprochement with Abkhazia is that if it occurred, “the political successes of Russia [in Georgia in particular and in the Caucasus regionmore generally] would instantly be transformed into a political defeat.”
First of all, the Moscow political commentator insists, “having recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia [last summer], Moscow deprived itself of the right to talk about the principle of the inviolability of the territorial integrity of states and weakened its position in European political projects.”
Second, Russia opened itself to more separatist challenges within, if not today “when in Moscow the powers that be are strong and the threats of separatism do not exist,” but in the future because “no one knows [what the situation will be either in Moscow or on Russia’s periphery] several years from now.
And third, “the independence of Abkhazia achieved by Russia can open the way for a new political project which Moscow would hardly like. The Abkhaz, the Cherkess, the Kabardins, the Adyge, and also their co-ethnics living in Turkey, Syria, and Jordan form one super-ethnos,” collectively and by themselves known as the Circassians, Serenko says.
Their existence could lead to greater activism by Turkey in this area even if the US doesn’t move. Many have noted that Ankara did not follow its Western partners in condemning Russia’s military and political moves in Georgia, and “it must not be excluded that Ankara could recognize Abkhazia” as part of its ongoing effort to project power in the Caucasus.
In that event, Serenko concludes ominously, if not entirely convincingly given the restrained language he used in presenting his scenario, “into the orbit of this game could be included three of the North Caucasus republics” – Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachayevo-Cherkessia – which are included in Russia.”
Vienna, May 6 – The United States and even more likely Turkey might change course, recognize the independence of Abkhazia, move to include both Abkhazia and Georgia into Western institutions like NATO and thus transform Moscow’s victory on the ground in August 2008 into a major geopolitical defeat, according to a Moscow analyst.
In what he acknowledges is a highly speculative article, Andrey Serenko, a political analyst at the Moscow Foundation for the Development of Information, argues that however improbable it may seem at present, the US and Turkey might recognize Abkhazia as part of a broader strategy of ousting Russia from the Caucasus (www.vestikavkaza.ru/node/2438).
And while the Moscow writer may be wrong both overall and in detail, his argument is worth exploring not only because it reflects a habit of mind quite frequently found in the Russian capital at the present time but also because it highlights the fluidity and openness of a situation in the Caucasus that most analysts are inclined to see as far more fixed than in fact is the case.
Despite the fact that much of the fighting between Russia and Georgia took place in South Ossetia rather than in Abkhazia – in fact, there was no fighting there during the recent war -- “the main goal”of both Moscow and Tbilisi was the latter because control of that breakaway republic was seen as controlling so much.
“If Tbilisi had been able to return Abkhazia to its control,” Serenko suggests, “the fate of the Russian Black Sea Fleet would have been fixed” and against Russia, whereas if, as happened, Abkhazia gained its independence as a result of Moscow’s actions, Russia’s ability to project power in the region would remain great.
Given the geopolitical importance of Abkhazia, the Moscow analyst says, it is implausible that the West will simply continue to repeat its declarations of support for the territorial integrity of the Republic Georgia and do nothing to counter the consequences of Russia’s victory there last summer.
One possible scenario, Serenko continues, would involve the following steps: “The United States could conduct shuttle talks between the Georgian and Abkhaz leaderships and on the basis of their outcome declare that Washington, following Moscow, will recognize the independence of Abkhazia.”
Today, “no one expects this from the Americans but precisely such a move could change the situation in the Southern Caucasus in in favor of the US, because following such recognition, American investments, major Western companies and NGOs would flood into Sukhumi,” leading at least some Abkhaz to lobby “for friendship with the US.”
Russia is certainly not prepared for such an American move, nor are the upper reaches of the Abkhazian leadership. President Sergey Bagapsh and his colleagues are “sincerely grateful” to Moscow for its assistance in their republic’s gaining independence and for its recognition of that status. And they believe that they can resist any blandishments from the West.
But Serenko says, “serious politicians inMoscow cannot be such optimists. Besides that, there are in Abkhazia, besides Bagapsh, politicians, bureaucrats, and petty businessmen who are striving to become major players and ‘win out’ some personal profit from independence achieved at long last. … Independence in order not to depend on or to take from all …”
“In the event of a successful American entrance into Abkhazia, Sukhumi could be offered the variant which the US and NATO have already proposed to Serbia and Kosovo – why argue and fight over borders? Both Serbia and Kosovo will be admitted to the European Union in which there are no internal borders and then into NATO.”
That formula will eventually work in the Balkans. Why not try it in the Caucasus? “Why should Georgia and Abkhazia fight and argue among themselves? They both an be admitted … [after a decent interval] … into the European Union and into NATO. And then the problem of borders and independence disappears on its own.”
“Is this a fantastic scenario?” Serenko asks rhetorically. “Nomore fantastic than the disintegration of the USSR, the disintegration of Serbia or the recognition of the independence of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” events many said would never happened before they did and were proclaimed inevitable.
One of the reasons that Moscow should be concerned about an American rapprochement with Abkhazia is that if it occurred, “the political successes of Russia [in Georgia in particular and in the Caucasus regionmore generally] would instantly be transformed into a political defeat.”
First of all, the Moscow political commentator insists, “having recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia [last summer], Moscow deprived itself of the right to talk about the principle of the inviolability of the territorial integrity of states and weakened its position in European political projects.”
Second, Russia opened itself to more separatist challenges within, if not today “when in Moscow the powers that be are strong and the threats of separatism do not exist,” but in the future because “no one knows [what the situation will be either in Moscow or on Russia’s periphery] several years from now.
And third, “the independence of Abkhazia achieved by Russia can open the way for a new political project which Moscow would hardly like. The Abkhaz, the Cherkess, the Kabardins, the Adyge, and also their co-ethnics living in Turkey, Syria, and Jordan form one super-ethnos,” collectively and by themselves known as the Circassians, Serenko says.
Their existence could lead to greater activism by Turkey in this area even if the US doesn’t move. Many have noted that Ankara did not follow its Western partners in condemning Russia’s military and political moves in Georgia, and “it must not be excluded that Ankara could recognize Abkhazia” as part of its ongoing effort to project power in the Caucasus.
In that event, Serenko concludes ominously, if not entirely convincingly given the restrained language he used in presenting his scenario, “into the orbit of this game could be included three of the North Caucasus republics” – Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachayevo-Cherkessia – which are included in Russia.”
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