Paul Goble
Vienna, May 1 – A bill under consideration in the Duma designed to counter “the rehabilitation in the new independent states of Nazism,” likely to be passed and signed into law in the coming weeks, makes no sense in legal terms, is historically “stupid,” and opens the door to a dangerous form of “political theater,” according to a leading Moscow commentator.
In an article in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Yevgeny Ikhlov writes that while neither he nor anyone else is against standing up against any recrudescence of totalitarianism, this particular piece of legislation is hardly the way to go about doing that. Instead, it has the capacity to make its authors and supporters look ridiculous (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=9034).
First of all, he points out, the draft bill is “a legal nonsense” because, by imposing penalties on those who express a different view on the history of World War II, it directly contradicts an 11-year-old ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, whose decisions Moscow is committed by treaty to respect and implement.
In September 1998, the Strasbourg court held in the case of Lehideux and Isorni v. France that “the presentation of a point of view on historical events which does not correspond to an officially adopted one does not represent a misuse of freedom of speech,” and consequently, anyone charged under the terms of the new bill would certainly invoke that in his defense.
Second, Ikhlov continues, the draft legislation is “a historical stupidity. “ Instead of focusing attention on Nazism, the bill has the effect of focusing attention on the Soviet past and especially on the Stalinist period.
The bill defines “Nazism (national socialism) [as] a totalitarian ideology and the practice of its application by Hitlerite Germany, its allies, and its accomplices” that involved “totalitarian terrorist methods of power … the propaganda of the supremacy of some nations over others, the committing of military crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.”
“Doesn’t this remind you of something?” Ikhlov asks his readers, and he cites the following decision of the Russian Constitutional Court from November 30, 1992, which defined the nature of the Soviet system.
“In the country,” the Russian court held, “over the course of a lengthy period of time ruled a regime of unlimited power of a small group of communist functionaries … who used force. … the leading structures of the CPSU were the initiators and their local structures carried out repressions against millions of Soviet people, including those peoples who were deported.”
“We see,” Ikhlov continues, “that in correspondence with Russian law, in the course of a lengthy period of time … on the territory of the USSR operated a totalitarian terrorist regime. But making a hero out of it is in no way prohibited.” Instead, President Dmitry Medvedev has again made November 7th, when the Soviet state was founded, a national holiday.
Can it be, Ikhlov asks, that “the entire difference is that Nazism ranked nations and not classes?” But that too is nonsensical from the point of view of history. “Hitlerism never drew up a precise hierarchy of ethnoses, [because] it never entered into the heads [of the Nazis] to consider Jews and non-Aryans nations.”
“The sad truth of history,” the Moscow writer suggests, “is that on the territory of the USSR, France, Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece, the Second World War was accompanied by [a series of] domestic civil wars,” conflicts that broke out because the German military gave rightist opponentts of leftist governments a chance to fight the latter.
“The hundreds and hundreds of thousands of armed collaborationists were not a form of betrayal; they were a front in a civil war,” Ikhlov says. It is thus “stupid and shameful” to fix “by law the correctness of one of the versions of this civil war, where various peoples were tragically caught “between two, let us use the words of the laws, totalitarian terrorist regimes.”
In this civil war, the Moscow commentator continues, “some ‘defended’ Auschwitz and Baby Yar; others Kolyma and the Butovo polygon.” And the draft bill’s constant but quite often incorrect reference to the decisions of the Nurnberg tribunal at the end of World War II ultimately cannot obscure that reality.
“The tragic truth of history is that all participants in World War II committed crimes of war. But the crimes of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition were called that only by historians and publicists; they were never assessed” by a duly constituted international court, and the proposed Russian legislation would not do that either.
And third, Ikhlov continues, the bill is a piece of “political theater,” intended to make propaganda points rather than become part of the rule of law, and one that appears set to serve as “a false pretext for dimwitted censorship and idiotic conflicts with the neighbors” of the Russian Federation.
On the one hand, the law contains a large number of assertions about the legal standing of the Russian Federation which are simply untrue, including the remarkable and absurd suggestion that “the Russian Federation is the continuer [rather than legal successor] of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”
And on the other, this bill could lead to absurd cases in which leaders of neighboring states – Ikhlov cites the president of Ukraine and the prime minister of Estonia – are charged with violating the law, convicted by a Moscow court – since that is where their embassies are – and where the sentence is enforced by Gazprom cutting off the gas to their countries.
Despite these problems, Ikhlov says, the bill is likely to be passed by the Duma and signed by President Medvedev because no one in the Moscow political establishment will want to say anything that their opponents could and would construe as a defense of the totalitarianism of another state. Defending such a system at home, of course, is another matter entirely.
Friday, May 1, 2009
Thursday, April 30, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Moscow has ‘Cast Aside’ Siberia, Threatening Russia’s Future, Scholar Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 30 – For the first time in more than a century, a Moscow-based politician and scholar from the Altai says, Russia’s central government has “cast aside” Siberia, a region that is not only rich in natural resources but whose unique spirit is critical for reform, thus putting the future of Russia as a whole at risk.
In an interview in “Baikalskiye vesti” yesterday, Vladimir Ryzhkov, currently a professor at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, says that “Siberia, which for the course of a century was celebrated not only for its natural but its human wealth has been converted into an ever poorer kray, forgotten by God and Moscow” (www.politirkutsk.ru/view.php/276/1.php).
The region’s population is not only declining, he says, but its level of education and culture is falling as well, trends that mean “if the political elite does not recognize fully the seriousness of the situation, it will soon become too late to engage in any talk about ‘the fates of Siberia.’”
Ryzhkov says that he is talking about Siberia as “a geographic term,” the two federal districts that extend from the Urals to the Pacific that constitutes 80 percent of Russia’s territory, 22 percent of the country’s population, and is responsible for 30 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.
But the population is declining. Since 1990, five million of its residents have died or left. As a result, the population of Chukotka has fallen by more than half, of Magadan by 40 percent, Kamchatka by 18 percent, and so on. And this is happening despite the wealth of the region and security considerations with regard to China with its enormous population next door.
What is surprising, Ryzhkov says, is that this trend reverses the one that the Russian government had promoted in the past. “From the beginning of the conquest of Siberia,” he notes, “that is the region to which came the strongest, most progressive, and most freedom-loving people.”
Until the 1980s, the average income of Siberians was higher than in Central Russia, the share of those with higher education was greater, and the fraction who subscribed to newspapers was also larger. “In a word,” he says, Siberians were “a highly educated, cultural, dynamic and urbanized” people.
Ryzhkov acknowledges that some of the current problems of the region reflect the fallout from Soviet economic development strategies, strategies that promoted the company towns whose basic industries are failing without their managers or workers having any other economic options in the same place.
But now the collapse of these cities has been accelerated by Moscow policies which mean that it is cheaper to fly from Moscow to Western Europe than it is to fly from the Russian capital to Vladivostok. As a result, Ryzhkov points out, “six of the ten poorest regions of the Russian Federation are Siberian.”
Asked whether there is any “way out” from this situation, Ryzhkov says that there is but that the political elite in Moscow, which he notes includes “few Siberians” besides Sergey Shoygu, must begin to focus on the region and recognize that Moscow must “leave a greater part of the taxes collected there” to Siberia.
In addition, he argues, Moscow must come up with a special program to transform company towns, something that does not exist at the federal level, so that the people who live in them will not flee but redirect their energies to new purposes for their benefit and the benefit of the country as a whole.
Moreover, he says, Moscow should intervene to make sure that no private company has a monopoly on air travel so that Siberians don’t have to pay such high prices for tickets. And he suggests that the Russian Federation should “restore the Soviet system” of quotas for students at higher educational systems so that those from areas far from Moscow will get a chance.
But Ryzhkov’s most important comments concern what he called “the special qualities” of Siberians. Unlike Russians in the European portion of the country, “in whose blood is the memory of serfdom,” Siberians never knew landowners, and consequently, they are “more brave and direct in politics and in life.”
Moreover, he says, “they are very entrepreneurial, show initiative, and are businesslike. It is no accident that an enormous number of businessmen [in Russia] are Siberians.” And Ryzhkov concludes, if everything else were equal, “the first who would run ahead [in that sector and presumably many others] would be the Siberians.”
Vienna, April 30 – For the first time in more than a century, a Moscow-based politician and scholar from the Altai says, Russia’s central government has “cast aside” Siberia, a region that is not only rich in natural resources but whose unique spirit is critical for reform, thus putting the future of Russia as a whole at risk.
In an interview in “Baikalskiye vesti” yesterday, Vladimir Ryzhkov, currently a professor at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, says that “Siberia, which for the course of a century was celebrated not only for its natural but its human wealth has been converted into an ever poorer kray, forgotten by God and Moscow” (www.politirkutsk.ru/view.php/276/1.php).
The region’s population is not only declining, he says, but its level of education and culture is falling as well, trends that mean “if the political elite does not recognize fully the seriousness of the situation, it will soon become too late to engage in any talk about ‘the fates of Siberia.’”
Ryzhkov says that he is talking about Siberia as “a geographic term,” the two federal districts that extend from the Urals to the Pacific that constitutes 80 percent of Russia’s territory, 22 percent of the country’s population, and is responsible for 30 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.
But the population is declining. Since 1990, five million of its residents have died or left. As a result, the population of Chukotka has fallen by more than half, of Magadan by 40 percent, Kamchatka by 18 percent, and so on. And this is happening despite the wealth of the region and security considerations with regard to China with its enormous population next door.
What is surprising, Ryzhkov says, is that this trend reverses the one that the Russian government had promoted in the past. “From the beginning of the conquest of Siberia,” he notes, “that is the region to which came the strongest, most progressive, and most freedom-loving people.”
Until the 1980s, the average income of Siberians was higher than in Central Russia, the share of those with higher education was greater, and the fraction who subscribed to newspapers was also larger. “In a word,” he says, Siberians were “a highly educated, cultural, dynamic and urbanized” people.
Ryzhkov acknowledges that some of the current problems of the region reflect the fallout from Soviet economic development strategies, strategies that promoted the company towns whose basic industries are failing without their managers or workers having any other economic options in the same place.
But now the collapse of these cities has been accelerated by Moscow policies which mean that it is cheaper to fly from Moscow to Western Europe than it is to fly from the Russian capital to Vladivostok. As a result, Ryzhkov points out, “six of the ten poorest regions of the Russian Federation are Siberian.”
Asked whether there is any “way out” from this situation, Ryzhkov says that there is but that the political elite in Moscow, which he notes includes “few Siberians” besides Sergey Shoygu, must begin to focus on the region and recognize that Moscow must “leave a greater part of the taxes collected there” to Siberia.
In addition, he argues, Moscow must come up with a special program to transform company towns, something that does not exist at the federal level, so that the people who live in them will not flee but redirect their energies to new purposes for their benefit and the benefit of the country as a whole.
Moreover, he says, Moscow should intervene to make sure that no private company has a monopoly on air travel so that Siberians don’t have to pay such high prices for tickets. And he suggests that the Russian Federation should “restore the Soviet system” of quotas for students at higher educational systems so that those from areas far from Moscow will get a chance.
But Ryzhkov’s most important comments concern what he called “the special qualities” of Siberians. Unlike Russians in the European portion of the country, “in whose blood is the memory of serfdom,” Siberians never knew landowners, and consequently, they are “more brave and direct in politics and in life.”
Moreover, he says, “they are very entrepreneurial, show initiative, and are businesslike. It is no accident that an enormous number of businessmen [in Russia] are Siberians.” And Ryzhkov concludes, if everything else were equal, “the first who would run ahead [in that sector and presumably many others] would be the Siberians.”
Window on Eurasia: New Russian Patriarch Enlists Regime’s Help to Suppress Independent Orthodox Believers
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 30 – A Russian appeals court has left in force a decision of a lower court to allow allowing the state to seize eight church buildings in Suzdal belonging to the Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church, the latest indication of the manner in which Patriarch Kirill is using the state to suppress any independence among Orthodox believers.
That is the conclusion of Aleksandr Khramov, a religious affairs writer, in a commentary published yesterday on Portal-credo.ru, a conclusion highlighting both the newly enthroned patriarch’s well-known authoritarian tendencies and an increasingly dangerous collusion between his church and the Russian state (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1575).
In decisions announced yesterday, the collegiums of the First Appellate Arbitration Court in Vladimir left in force the February 12th judgment of the Vladimir Oblast Arbitration Court which granted a government request to seize the churches, ostensibly because their parishes had violated one or another rules of the use of their properties.
The oblast official who initiated the case has routinely insisted that the Moscow Patriarchate “does not have any relationship to this case,” but that assertion Khramov argues is a total “lie.” The government does not need these churches and almost certainly will hand them over to the local bishop of the Moscow Patriarchate in short order.
Three aspects of this case are especially disturbing, the religious affairs writer says. First, the entire process of going after independent believers “suddenly accelerated after Kirill became the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate,” an indication of his influence with the government generally and President and Mrs. Medvedev in particular.
Thus what is happening in Suzdal sets a precedent that is likely to be used elsewhere in the Russian Federation soon: The Moscow Patriarchate will enlist the power of the state to go after its enemies and even after those believers who seek only the right to worship in their own way independently of Kirill and his “power vertical” inside the church.
Second, while the independent believers plan to appeal, “even now,” Khramov writes, “the majority of them are seized by the darkest forebodings: In the era of ‘missionary mobilization,’ which the new Patriarch has proclaimed, all those unwilling to enter into the ranks of ‘the supporters of the faith’ under the flags of the Moscow Patriarchate” will be in trouble.
And third, there is a very real danger of violent clashes between the followers of such independent churches and the state. On the one hand, because they believe in their mission, the followers of such independent Orthodox groups say they do not plan to simply obey what they see as an illegal and unconstitutional seizure of their property.
Metropolitan Valentin, a leader of the Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church, has publicly declared that “even if they use clubs to drive us out, we will suffer for the truth and suffer for Orthodoxy. We will not give the keys [to the churches to the Russian government for handing over to the Patriarchate]. We will not leave.”
And on the other, the government appears to be gearing up to use force against them. Officials have announced that on May 18th, there will be a large “anti-terrorist training course.” In advance of that, it is already clear that for the Russian government as for the Patriarchate, “the terrorists” in Suzdal will not be “militants but Orthodox believers.”
Such an expansive reading of “terrorist” by the authorities, one that they appear prepared to extend to those whose only crime is that they are not followers of the government-approved faith, may ultimately prove to be the most dangerous aspect of this situation, one that has attracted some attention from religious rights organizations but so far little from anyone else.
Vienna, April 30 – A Russian appeals court has left in force a decision of a lower court to allow allowing the state to seize eight church buildings in Suzdal belonging to the Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church, the latest indication of the manner in which Patriarch Kirill is using the state to suppress any independence among Orthodox believers.
That is the conclusion of Aleksandr Khramov, a religious affairs writer, in a commentary published yesterday on Portal-credo.ru, a conclusion highlighting both the newly enthroned patriarch’s well-known authoritarian tendencies and an increasingly dangerous collusion between his church and the Russian state (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1575).
In decisions announced yesterday, the collegiums of the First Appellate Arbitration Court in Vladimir left in force the February 12th judgment of the Vladimir Oblast Arbitration Court which granted a government request to seize the churches, ostensibly because their parishes had violated one or another rules of the use of their properties.
The oblast official who initiated the case has routinely insisted that the Moscow Patriarchate “does not have any relationship to this case,” but that assertion Khramov argues is a total “lie.” The government does not need these churches and almost certainly will hand them over to the local bishop of the Moscow Patriarchate in short order.
Three aspects of this case are especially disturbing, the religious affairs writer says. First, the entire process of going after independent believers “suddenly accelerated after Kirill became the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate,” an indication of his influence with the government generally and President and Mrs. Medvedev in particular.
Thus what is happening in Suzdal sets a precedent that is likely to be used elsewhere in the Russian Federation soon: The Moscow Patriarchate will enlist the power of the state to go after its enemies and even after those believers who seek only the right to worship in their own way independently of Kirill and his “power vertical” inside the church.
Second, while the independent believers plan to appeal, “even now,” Khramov writes, “the majority of them are seized by the darkest forebodings: In the era of ‘missionary mobilization,’ which the new Patriarch has proclaimed, all those unwilling to enter into the ranks of ‘the supporters of the faith’ under the flags of the Moscow Patriarchate” will be in trouble.
And third, there is a very real danger of violent clashes between the followers of such independent churches and the state. On the one hand, because they believe in their mission, the followers of such independent Orthodox groups say they do not plan to simply obey what they see as an illegal and unconstitutional seizure of their property.
Metropolitan Valentin, a leader of the Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church, has publicly declared that “even if they use clubs to drive us out, we will suffer for the truth and suffer for Orthodoxy. We will not give the keys [to the churches to the Russian government for handing over to the Patriarchate]. We will not leave.”
And on the other, the government appears to be gearing up to use force against them. Officials have announced that on May 18th, there will be a large “anti-terrorist training course.” In advance of that, it is already clear that for the Russian government as for the Patriarchate, “the terrorists” in Suzdal will not be “militants but Orthodox believers.”
Such an expansive reading of “terrorist” by the authorities, one that they appear prepared to extend to those whose only crime is that they are not followers of the government-approved faith, may ultimately prove to be the most dangerous aspect of this situation, one that has attracted some attention from religious rights organizations but so far little from anyone else.
Window on Eurasia: Russian Media Play Up US Bank’s Call for Moscow Not to Publish Unemployment Data
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 30 – In an unusual but unfortunately not unprecedented development, Russian media are hyping a suggestion by analysts at Bank of America-Merrill Lynch that Moscow should not publish unemployment statistics so frequently lest it lead to “the destabilization of the social situation” in the Russian Federation.
Not only do such notions, however much they might help some investors, violate American principles on the free flow of information, they fail to recognize that such proposals reinforce Moscow’s proclivity to secrecy and generate suspicions among the Russian people that are far more likely to be destabilizing than the release of information would be.
In an article today about the Russian government’s plans to conduct “the anti-crisis Petersburg forum in a new ‘interactive format,’” “Nezavisimaya gazeta” reported that analysts at the US bank have published a new report calling the growth of unemployment in Russia “an ever more significant problem” (www.ng.ru/economics/2009-04-30/4_tvshow.html?insidedoc).
According to the Moscow paper, the American investment analysts, who had earlier identified Russia as one of the most important emerging markets said that “the decision of the [Russian] government to publish statistics on unemployment every month was premature since it could contribute to the destabilization of the situation.”
While “Nezavisimaya gazeta” put this American suggestion at the end of its article, many Russian news outlets have made it the center of their reporting. Newsru.com, for example, headlined its article “The US Advises the Russian Government Not to Publish Unemployment Data in Order to Avoid Instability” (www.newsru.com/russia/30apr2009/bezrabotitsa.html).
But that news agency also noted that this call by an American firm for the Russian government to release even less information than it had was belated. Newsru.com noted that “even before” the Americans offered this advice, the Russian Statistical Committee “had ceased to publish monthly reports.”
That action, one of several cutbacks in statistical and other forms of government information in the Russian Federation, “immediately led media [there] to conclude that the government wants them to reduce their coverage of unwelcome trends,” a desire that the report suggested now enjoyed the support of American bankers as well.
Russian media and Russian officials pay close attention to what Americans, official and otherwise, say about their country, far more than the reverse, and they often invoke such statements to press their own agendas or at least to legitimize them, again in ways very different from the way in which American outlets treat suggestions coming from Russia.
Indeed, Russian outlets have also played up the conclusions of the US-based Eurasia Group on “Risks in an Unstable World” which suggested that growing unemployment and inflation in Russia could lead to a crisis in which Vladimir Putin might soon replace Dmitry Medvedev as president by offering himself as “the savior of the fatherland.”
That makes any American suggestion, especially one for the Russian government to reduce the amount of information available to the Russian people, far more important than it might otherwise be, a reminder if one still is needed for those in the US writing about developments in that country to exercise extreme caution.
Vienna, April 30 – In an unusual but unfortunately not unprecedented development, Russian media are hyping a suggestion by analysts at Bank of America-Merrill Lynch that Moscow should not publish unemployment statistics so frequently lest it lead to “the destabilization of the social situation” in the Russian Federation.
Not only do such notions, however much they might help some investors, violate American principles on the free flow of information, they fail to recognize that such proposals reinforce Moscow’s proclivity to secrecy and generate suspicions among the Russian people that are far more likely to be destabilizing than the release of information would be.
In an article today about the Russian government’s plans to conduct “the anti-crisis Petersburg forum in a new ‘interactive format,’” “Nezavisimaya gazeta” reported that analysts at the US bank have published a new report calling the growth of unemployment in Russia “an ever more significant problem” (www.ng.ru/economics/2009-04-30/4_tvshow.html?insidedoc).
According to the Moscow paper, the American investment analysts, who had earlier identified Russia as one of the most important emerging markets said that “the decision of the [Russian] government to publish statistics on unemployment every month was premature since it could contribute to the destabilization of the situation.”
While “Nezavisimaya gazeta” put this American suggestion at the end of its article, many Russian news outlets have made it the center of their reporting. Newsru.com, for example, headlined its article “The US Advises the Russian Government Not to Publish Unemployment Data in Order to Avoid Instability” (www.newsru.com/russia/30apr2009/bezrabotitsa.html).
But that news agency also noted that this call by an American firm for the Russian government to release even less information than it had was belated. Newsru.com noted that “even before” the Americans offered this advice, the Russian Statistical Committee “had ceased to publish monthly reports.”
That action, one of several cutbacks in statistical and other forms of government information in the Russian Federation, “immediately led media [there] to conclude that the government wants them to reduce their coverage of unwelcome trends,” a desire that the report suggested now enjoyed the support of American bankers as well.
Russian media and Russian officials pay close attention to what Americans, official and otherwise, say about their country, far more than the reverse, and they often invoke such statements to press their own agendas or at least to legitimize them, again in ways very different from the way in which American outlets treat suggestions coming from Russia.
Indeed, Russian outlets have also played up the conclusions of the US-based Eurasia Group on “Risks in an Unstable World” which suggested that growing unemployment and inflation in Russia could lead to a crisis in which Vladimir Putin might soon replace Dmitry Medvedev as president by offering himself as “the savior of the fatherland.”
That makes any American suggestion, especially one for the Russian government to reduce the amount of information available to the Russian people, far more important than it might otherwise be, a reminder if one still is needed for those in the US writing about developments in that country to exercise extreme caution.
Wednesday, April 29, 2009
Window on Eurasia: How Putin’s ‘Dictatorship of Law’ Led to a ‘Dictatorship of "Ments"’
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 29 – American judges, unlike many U.S. specialists on Russia, according to a leading legal affairs journalist in Moscow, instantly understand the meaning if not the origins or precise definition of the widely used Russian slang term “ment” as well as its implications for the possibility of the creation of a state based on law.
But unless the American specialists integrate this concept into their analyses and unless the Russians are able to overcome its consequences, Leonid Nikitinsky argues in a two-part article in “Novaya gazeta,” both will fail to recognize the importance of an independent judicial system for Russia’s and the absurdity of Vladimir Putin’s call for “a dictatorship of law.”
Nikitinsky, the secretary of the Union of Journalists and a commentator on legal affairs, provides not only an explanation of what he says is a term that is almost impossible to translate but also a discussion of why this uniquely Russian phenomenon behind it is so dangerous (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/044/15.html, www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/045/05.html)
As Nikitinsky explains, “the word ‘ment’ comes from the lexicon of thieves” and other criminals. In prisons and camps, the word meant “in the broadest sense” any “enemy” of the prisoners who worked and did not violate the rules of his fellows. But in life outside these institutions, it has acquired a broader meaning.
There, the legal affairs journalist continues, it refers to those who exploit their position for financial gain out of entirely selfish motivations and regardless of the rules and includes among others traffic police, the militia, tax officials, and indeed anyone who is in a position to throw his weight around and force those around him to pay up.
Although it is usually discussed in terms of corruption or human rights, in fact, the problem of the “ments” in Russian society is not the one – often what the “ments” are doing is at least nominally legal – or the other – those the “ments” exploit are not having their human rights violated at least in the usual sense.
Nor is the “ment” problem about cruelty and violence, although those are often present or at least implied, Nikitinsky continues. The goal of “ments” “is not cruelty as such but only the use of fear in order to boost the effectiveness of their business.” Indeed, the criminal phrase, “it’s not personal, it’s just business,” perfectly applies.
But at the same time, he continues, “the extreme level of cruelty and force in the system has led to one in which the majority of real [law enforcement] professions who are able to conduct operational work and investigate criminal affairs have left,” opening the way to even crime and even more “ment” abuses.
(Many thought that shifting responsibility for many legal questions from the prosecutors to the courts, something the “ments” actively opposed, would have ended this situation. But in reality, Nikitinsky says, the courts have behaved in such a way that the power of the “ments” has been in no way affected.)
The current “ment” system, which has many analogues in Russian history, took off after Vladimir Putin declared his support for the restoration of “a dictatorship of laws,” an “absurdity” that was popular because it seemed to provide an escape from the wildness of the 1990s and the destruction of “the veneer of civilization” at that time.
By this declaration, Putin “let the genie out of the bottle,” because “each “ment” at his own level” could then “realize” his goals in the marketplace where he could extract the most money from others. In short, Putin established “the dictatorship of the “ment” with its absolute monopoly on profit and its pretensions to a monopoly on ideas as well.”
Such a system could only function at a time of “super profits” from the sale of oil and gas, and its relative stability during that period, now ending, led some people to confuse what Putin had established with “a police state in the usual meaning of that word.” But in fact, what Putin created, was the antithesis of a police state.
“In a police state,” Nikitinsky notes, “the cop on the beat will follow the law whether it is good or bad, but for our “ment”, the law is an optional means of resolving his problems and only that.” As a result, the notion that there is “strict discipline” in the power vertical is a complete “fiction.”
Instead, he continues, “the “ment” state is closer to the formula of feudalism, according to which ‘the vassal of my vassal is not my vassal,’” an arrangement that makes the system far more fragile than it may appear and gives those near the top far less effective power all the way down.
That has many implications, Nikitinsky says. Among the most obvious is that “the level of degeneration (but not corruption!) in the force structures is apparently so great that the traditional measures of ‘struggle with corruption’ are introducing into the administration still greater chaos by intensifying the struggle of “ment” clans among themselves.”
To escape this, the legal affairs analyst argues, will be possible only if Russia pays more attention to the importance of law, independent courts, and the use of juries, something Putin appears to understand, the many judges want out of a desire for self-respect, and that Dmitry Medvedev probably wants but may not be strong enough to insist upon.
If Russia does not move in that direction and soon, Nikitinsky warns, then there is the danger of the rise of precisely the kind of revolutionary situation Vladimir Lenin talked about, one in which “those on top are no longer able to rule, while those at the bottom are no longer willing to continue to live in the way that they have.”
Vienna, April 29 – American judges, unlike many U.S. specialists on Russia, according to a leading legal affairs journalist in Moscow, instantly understand the meaning if not the origins or precise definition of the widely used Russian slang term “ment” as well as its implications for the possibility of the creation of a state based on law.
But unless the American specialists integrate this concept into their analyses and unless the Russians are able to overcome its consequences, Leonid Nikitinsky argues in a two-part article in “Novaya gazeta,” both will fail to recognize the importance of an independent judicial system for Russia’s and the absurdity of Vladimir Putin’s call for “a dictatorship of law.”
Nikitinsky, the secretary of the Union of Journalists and a commentator on legal affairs, provides not only an explanation of what he says is a term that is almost impossible to translate but also a discussion of why this uniquely Russian phenomenon behind it is so dangerous (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/044/15.html, www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/045/05.html)
As Nikitinsky explains, “the word ‘ment’ comes from the lexicon of thieves” and other criminals. In prisons and camps, the word meant “in the broadest sense” any “enemy” of the prisoners who worked and did not violate the rules of his fellows. But in life outside these institutions, it has acquired a broader meaning.
There, the legal affairs journalist continues, it refers to those who exploit their position for financial gain out of entirely selfish motivations and regardless of the rules and includes among others traffic police, the militia, tax officials, and indeed anyone who is in a position to throw his weight around and force those around him to pay up.
Although it is usually discussed in terms of corruption or human rights, in fact, the problem of the “ments” in Russian society is not the one – often what the “ments” are doing is at least nominally legal – or the other – those the “ments” exploit are not having their human rights violated at least in the usual sense.
Nor is the “ment” problem about cruelty and violence, although those are often present or at least implied, Nikitinsky continues. The goal of “ments” “is not cruelty as such but only the use of fear in order to boost the effectiveness of their business.” Indeed, the criminal phrase, “it’s not personal, it’s just business,” perfectly applies.
But at the same time, he continues, “the extreme level of cruelty and force in the system has led to one in which the majority of real [law enforcement] professions who are able to conduct operational work and investigate criminal affairs have left,” opening the way to even crime and even more “ment” abuses.
(Many thought that shifting responsibility for many legal questions from the prosecutors to the courts, something the “ments” actively opposed, would have ended this situation. But in reality, Nikitinsky says, the courts have behaved in such a way that the power of the “ments” has been in no way affected.)
The current “ment” system, which has many analogues in Russian history, took off after Vladimir Putin declared his support for the restoration of “a dictatorship of laws,” an “absurdity” that was popular because it seemed to provide an escape from the wildness of the 1990s and the destruction of “the veneer of civilization” at that time.
By this declaration, Putin “let the genie out of the bottle,” because “each “ment” at his own level” could then “realize” his goals in the marketplace where he could extract the most money from others. In short, Putin established “the dictatorship of the “ment” with its absolute monopoly on profit and its pretensions to a monopoly on ideas as well.”
Such a system could only function at a time of “super profits” from the sale of oil and gas, and its relative stability during that period, now ending, led some people to confuse what Putin had established with “a police state in the usual meaning of that word.” But in fact, what Putin created, was the antithesis of a police state.
“In a police state,” Nikitinsky notes, “the cop on the beat will follow the law whether it is good or bad, but for our “ment”, the law is an optional means of resolving his problems and only that.” As a result, the notion that there is “strict discipline” in the power vertical is a complete “fiction.”
Instead, he continues, “the “ment” state is closer to the formula of feudalism, according to which ‘the vassal of my vassal is not my vassal,’” an arrangement that makes the system far more fragile than it may appear and gives those near the top far less effective power all the way down.
That has many implications, Nikitinsky says. Among the most obvious is that “the level of degeneration (but not corruption!) in the force structures is apparently so great that the traditional measures of ‘struggle with corruption’ are introducing into the administration still greater chaos by intensifying the struggle of “ment” clans among themselves.”
To escape this, the legal affairs analyst argues, will be possible only if Russia pays more attention to the importance of law, independent courts, and the use of juries, something Putin appears to understand, the many judges want out of a desire for self-respect, and that Dmitry Medvedev probably wants but may not be strong enough to insist upon.
If Russia does not move in that direction and soon, Nikitinsky warns, then there is the danger of the rise of precisely the kind of revolutionary situation Vladimir Lenin talked about, one in which “those on top are no longer able to rule, while those at the bottom are no longer willing to continue to live in the way that they have.”
Window on Eurasia: Without Naming Russia but Describing Problems There, PACE Calls for Defense of Human Rights Activists
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 29 – By a vote of 113 to 3, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe yesterday passed a resolution calling on member states to protect human rights activists, and although that document does not mention Russia by name, the discussion preceding its adoption shows that attacks on such activists there were a major reason PACE took this step.
Even that typically diplomatic approach was too much for two Russian delegates, however, who, while not denying there have been problems, suggested that some people who call themselves human rights activists are in fact something else and that the situation in Estonia, for example, is far worse than in Russia.
In its report on yesterday’s PACE session, Moscow’s “Kommersant” today described not only the “diplomatic” way in which the Europeans acted but also debate which showed that concerns about Russian behavior had led them to take action and the reactions of the Russians that suggested why it was necessary (www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1163171).
As “Kommersant” noted, “although in the text of the resolution there is not one reference to Russia, precisely the incidents with Russian human rights activists were the ones the PACE delegates offered as examples of the lamentable persecution of the human rights movement” in the Russian Federation.
But the paper continued, “this did not disturb the members of the Russian delegation [who included two United Russia representatives, Dmitry Vyatkin and Sergey Markov]: they assured their colleagues that ‘human rights will triumph’ and that they were ready to do everything so that this will happen as quickly as possible.”
In his presentation on the problem, Holger Hainbach, a member of the PACE commission on legal questions and human rights, noted that in many countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Russian North Caucasus, the powers that be call those who work to defend human rights “spies,” “enemies,” “traitors,” and “extremists.”
In such cases, he continued, these activists are often “subjected to strong forms of repression, including murder, kidnapping and arbitrary arrests.” Therefore, because many of these phenomena come from the governments involved, “they need our defense.”
Other speakers pointed to the recent beating of Lev Ponomaryev, the head of the Moscow Movement For Human Rights, the killing of Sergey Protazanov, the Khimki journalist, who was “had the courage to be interested in the activities of the municipal powers that be” in that suburb of the Russian capital.
But this was too much for the Russian delegates. While acknowledging that the report was “important and timely,” Vyatkin said he wanted to ask “an unwelcome question: Are all those who call themselves defenders of human rights actually that?” Many of them, he suggested, are involved in politics and in the “banal” task of earning money.
Such activities, the United Russian delegate said, “discredit the human rights movement,” although others could have responded that his charges against the members of that movement confirm precisely the kind of problems of official refusal to help them that other delegates at the meeting had been referring to.
And his colleague Markov took a parallel approach. He supported the report but argued that PACE should be focusing on the protection of human rights not in the countries the other speakers had named but rather in Estonia, where he suggested the situation was one that should be a matter of “extreme concern.”
“The special services of Estonia two years ago provoked protests and then cruelly put them down” in the case of the shifting of the statue to the Soviet warrior in downtown Tallinn. That action, Markov continued, suggests that “the goal of the Estonian special services was to destroy human rights activists who defended the rights of non-citizens and Russian speakers.”
Vienna, April 29 – By a vote of 113 to 3, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe yesterday passed a resolution calling on member states to protect human rights activists, and although that document does not mention Russia by name, the discussion preceding its adoption shows that attacks on such activists there were a major reason PACE took this step.
Even that typically diplomatic approach was too much for two Russian delegates, however, who, while not denying there have been problems, suggested that some people who call themselves human rights activists are in fact something else and that the situation in Estonia, for example, is far worse than in Russia.
In its report on yesterday’s PACE session, Moscow’s “Kommersant” today described not only the “diplomatic” way in which the Europeans acted but also debate which showed that concerns about Russian behavior had led them to take action and the reactions of the Russians that suggested why it was necessary (www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1163171).
As “Kommersant” noted, “although in the text of the resolution there is not one reference to Russia, precisely the incidents with Russian human rights activists were the ones the PACE delegates offered as examples of the lamentable persecution of the human rights movement” in the Russian Federation.
But the paper continued, “this did not disturb the members of the Russian delegation [who included two United Russia representatives, Dmitry Vyatkin and Sergey Markov]: they assured their colleagues that ‘human rights will triumph’ and that they were ready to do everything so that this will happen as quickly as possible.”
In his presentation on the problem, Holger Hainbach, a member of the PACE commission on legal questions and human rights, noted that in many countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Russian North Caucasus, the powers that be call those who work to defend human rights “spies,” “enemies,” “traitors,” and “extremists.”
In such cases, he continued, these activists are often “subjected to strong forms of repression, including murder, kidnapping and arbitrary arrests.” Therefore, because many of these phenomena come from the governments involved, “they need our defense.”
Other speakers pointed to the recent beating of Lev Ponomaryev, the head of the Moscow Movement For Human Rights, the killing of Sergey Protazanov, the Khimki journalist, who was “had the courage to be interested in the activities of the municipal powers that be” in that suburb of the Russian capital.
But this was too much for the Russian delegates. While acknowledging that the report was “important and timely,” Vyatkin said he wanted to ask “an unwelcome question: Are all those who call themselves defenders of human rights actually that?” Many of them, he suggested, are involved in politics and in the “banal” task of earning money.
Such activities, the United Russian delegate said, “discredit the human rights movement,” although others could have responded that his charges against the members of that movement confirm precisely the kind of problems of official refusal to help them that other delegates at the meeting had been referring to.
And his colleague Markov took a parallel approach. He supported the report but argued that PACE should be focusing on the protection of human rights not in the countries the other speakers had named but rather in Estonia, where he suggested the situation was one that should be a matter of “extreme concern.”
“The special services of Estonia two years ago provoked protests and then cruelly put them down” in the case of the shifting of the statue to the Soviet warrior in downtown Tallinn. That action, Markov continued, suggests that “the goal of the Estonian special services was to destroy human rights activists who defended the rights of non-citizens and Russian speakers.”
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Now Has Reason to Fear the Fascism It Helped to Develop
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 29 – The conviction on the eve of Victory Day of a Russian for opposing fascism calls attention to two interrelated developments in the Russian Federation, Moscow journalist Yuliya Latynina says in a column today: “fascism is convenient for the regime. But during a crisis, it may be turned against the rulers.”
Writing in “Novaya gazeta,” Latynina uses the conviction of Aleksey Olesinov, head of the Antifa Youth Movement, and the violent suppression by the militia of a public demonstration in support of him to point out the ways in which fascism is spreading in Russia and the threat it poses to those in the regime who have sought to use it against their opponents.
“Fascism,” the Moscow journalist writes, “is an ideology which asserts the exceptional quality of a particular people and explains that all around it are its enemies. If you will,” she continues, “try to find ten differences between that and what [the pro-Kremlin youth group] ‘Nashi’ professes” (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/045/06.html).
Or, she continues, try to find any differences between fascism and “the official ideology of the powers that be who send their children to London, keep their money in Switzerland, buy villages in Nice but explain to the lumpen at Lake Seliger that the West hates us because Russians are a great people.”
If what these groups are propagating is not “the ideology of fascism, Latynina asks rhetorically, “then how should this ideology be called?
Moreover, she says, the current ideology of the Russian powers that be, like fascism, “presupposes enemies of two types: external and internal.” Fighting the latter is not so easy “in an age of nuclear weapons and Swiss bank accounts,” but “conducting a war against one’s own business is far easier” and it is easier still to beat up rights activists like Lev Ponomaryev.
And Latynina points out that despite the views of its adepts, “fascism is hardly an ideology of heroes. Rather it is an ideology which allows the dregs of society to imagine that they are heroes. One can die for the Motherland without any fascism. But to burn up children in concentration camps and feel oneself a savior of the Fatherland, a fascist ideology is required.”
In many countries in the past, there have been “cruelly vertical empires build on the mechanism of institutionalized theft,” she writes. Using power, the leaders of these regimes stole as much as they wanted and remained in power as long as there was more to steal and enough to buy off those who might challenge them. But when the loot ran out, so did their power.
“The situation in Russia is very similar,” she insists. “The unwritten agreement between the upper reaches of the elite and the ruling class of the lumpen bureaucracy is simple: Every year, one must be able to take more money than in the one before from the internal enemy, the businessman.”
The problem for the regime, Latynina says, is that this “unwritten” agreement worked until the current crisis. Now, it is far from clear whether the regime can keep stealing enough to pay off its servants or whether these servants encouraged by that regime to think they have a right to such loot will turn on those who can’t or turn to others who might be able to.
That is clearly a growing concern for the powers that be in Moscow, especially since they have done little or nothing to create the kind institutions such as independent courts or the rule of law that might prevent this reaction by those influenced by fascism from sweeping the “power vertical” and all those in it aside in one more case of “a pitiless Russian revolt.”
To the extent that Latynina is right, a conference on combating extremism that took place this week in Yekaterinburg may prove to be a bellwether event. There, human rights activists, prosecutors, and officials met to discuss how to struggle with extremism through the use of “scientific” measures (www.nr2.ru/ekb/230712.html).
But if the rights activists at this meeting stressed the importance of law in combating extremism, officials there, including prosecutors, appeared as they have in the past to be more concerned about having sufficient police power to combat it, an approach that almost certainly will make the problem worse rather than better in the coming weeks and months.
Vienna, April 29 – The conviction on the eve of Victory Day of a Russian for opposing fascism calls attention to two interrelated developments in the Russian Federation, Moscow journalist Yuliya Latynina says in a column today: “fascism is convenient for the regime. But during a crisis, it may be turned against the rulers.”
Writing in “Novaya gazeta,” Latynina uses the conviction of Aleksey Olesinov, head of the Antifa Youth Movement, and the violent suppression by the militia of a public demonstration in support of him to point out the ways in which fascism is spreading in Russia and the threat it poses to those in the regime who have sought to use it against their opponents.
“Fascism,” the Moscow journalist writes, “is an ideology which asserts the exceptional quality of a particular people and explains that all around it are its enemies. If you will,” she continues, “try to find ten differences between that and what [the pro-Kremlin youth group] ‘Nashi’ professes” (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/045/06.html).
Or, she continues, try to find any differences between fascism and “the official ideology of the powers that be who send their children to London, keep their money in Switzerland, buy villages in Nice but explain to the lumpen at Lake Seliger that the West hates us because Russians are a great people.”
If what these groups are propagating is not “the ideology of fascism, Latynina asks rhetorically, “then how should this ideology be called?
Moreover, she says, the current ideology of the Russian powers that be, like fascism, “presupposes enemies of two types: external and internal.” Fighting the latter is not so easy “in an age of nuclear weapons and Swiss bank accounts,” but “conducting a war against one’s own business is far easier” and it is easier still to beat up rights activists like Lev Ponomaryev.
And Latynina points out that despite the views of its adepts, “fascism is hardly an ideology of heroes. Rather it is an ideology which allows the dregs of society to imagine that they are heroes. One can die for the Motherland without any fascism. But to burn up children in concentration camps and feel oneself a savior of the Fatherland, a fascist ideology is required.”
In many countries in the past, there have been “cruelly vertical empires build on the mechanism of institutionalized theft,” she writes. Using power, the leaders of these regimes stole as much as they wanted and remained in power as long as there was more to steal and enough to buy off those who might challenge them. But when the loot ran out, so did their power.
“The situation in Russia is very similar,” she insists. “The unwritten agreement between the upper reaches of the elite and the ruling class of the lumpen bureaucracy is simple: Every year, one must be able to take more money than in the one before from the internal enemy, the businessman.”
The problem for the regime, Latynina says, is that this “unwritten” agreement worked until the current crisis. Now, it is far from clear whether the regime can keep stealing enough to pay off its servants or whether these servants encouraged by that regime to think they have a right to such loot will turn on those who can’t or turn to others who might be able to.
That is clearly a growing concern for the powers that be in Moscow, especially since they have done little or nothing to create the kind institutions such as independent courts or the rule of law that might prevent this reaction by those influenced by fascism from sweeping the “power vertical” and all those in it aside in one more case of “a pitiless Russian revolt.”
To the extent that Latynina is right, a conference on combating extremism that took place this week in Yekaterinburg may prove to be a bellwether event. There, human rights activists, prosecutors, and officials met to discuss how to struggle with extremism through the use of “scientific” measures (www.nr2.ru/ekb/230712.html).
But if the rights activists at this meeting stressed the importance of law in combating extremism, officials there, including prosecutors, appeared as they have in the past to be more concerned about having sufficient police power to combat it, an approach that almost certainly will make the problem worse rather than better in the coming weeks and months.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
