Paul Goble
Vienna, April 28 – Vladimir Lenin, the Bolshevik leader who seized power in Russia in 1917 has been praised and condemned for many things, but now a Bashkir scholar has celebrated him for a role few have yet acknowledged: Lenin, Rustem Vakhitov argues, deserves recognition and honor for his role as the founder of the Russian Federation.
In a 4,000-word essay posted online this week, Vakhitov, an Ufa-based academic who writes frequently on contemporary affairs, saysthat that Lenin’s importance for Russians today lies in his role as the creator of the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic, the predecessor of the Russian Federation (contrtv.ru/common/3111/).
Arguing that “the cult of Lenin” in Soviet times was not only something the man himself did not want but also has gotten in the way of focusing on what Lenin actually did, Vakhitov says that the best way to begin is by asking the question: “When did the state by the name of the Russian Federation in which we live arise?”
“Many people consider that this took place in 1991 after the collapse of the USSR, but this is not true,” Vakhitov insists, adding that in fact “on December 25, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR passed legislation according to which the RSFSR was renamed [Vakhitov’s italics] as the Russian Federation.”
In support of that contention, the Ufa scholar notes that the law began with the following words: “The Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR affirms: 1. The State the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) from now on will be called the Russian Federation (RF),” as it is known to this day.
What that means, Vakhitov continues, is that in 1991, the RSFSR simply changed its name, out of which were eliminated the words ‘soviet’ and ‘socialist’ as an indication that the Russian Republic had changed its political system and state ideology.” “But,” he continues, “no new state arose as a result.”
The country “retained all the territories and borders of the RSFSR, all its industrial and economic potential, its armed forces, its interior ministry, its special forces and even its political leadership since RSFSR President B.N. Yeltsin, elected according to the laws of the RSFSR was simply transformed into the RF president with all the powers he had.”
Moreover, “the Constitution of the RSFSR from 1978 continued to operate on the territory of the Russian Federation until 1993.” At the same time, of course, “the Russian Federation is the legal successor of the USSR,” as RF President Yeltsin informed the United Nations and other international organizations on the day” the RSFSR was renamed.
“The relations between the RSFSR and the RF are themselves thus a case of continuity,” Vakhitov says. No one had “disavowed” the legal act of the creation of the RSFSR unlike the legal act which created the USSR and which Yeltsin and his Ukrainian and Belarusian counterparts disavowed in Belovezhskaya in December 1991.
In this way, he says, “the Russian Federation is exactly the same state as the RSFSR but under a different name, with a different social-political and economic system, and a different state shield and hymn.” One “would like to add as well a different flag but that is not precisely so: the tricolor was established … when our country was still called the RSFSR.”
Moreover, Vakhitov continues, “the RSFSR [itself] arose on October 25 (November 7), 1917, when the Second All-Russian Congress confirmed the overthrow of the Provisional Government.” That was the moment when the Russian Federation under its current name was created, something Russians should recognize and thereby acknowledge Lenin’s key role.
“In no way,” the Ufa writer continues, is he “denying the right of citizens to express their moral assessment of the figure of V.I. Ulyanov-Lenin, his political activity, and the ideology which he professed.” But his role as the founder of the state in which they live is something that they cannot deny.
Other nations have gone through the same process in dealing with their founders, Vakhitov points out, with the French still honoring figures from the 1789 revolution as founders of modern France even while decrying the extremism and often vicious anti-clericalism of those individuals.
Indeed, the legitimacy of the French Republic depends on doing precisely that, he insists, and in like manner, the legitimacy of the Russian Federation requires respect for its founder, however much many Russians may be properly horrified by many of the crimes Lenin, the Bolsheviks and the Soviet state committed.
Russians should “respect Lenin as the creator of the USSR, the geopolitical heir of the Russian Empire,” he says. They should respect him as “a Russian patriot,” and they should respect him as “one of the creators of Russian federalism, the flexible system of administering the state which,” Vakhitov says, kept the country together after 1917.
“Let us hope,” Vakhitov concludes, “that after decades of deification and demonization, finally emotions will cool and reason will return, and Lenin will become part of our history – contradictory, bloody, but at the same time part of a great and severe history, as has been the history of any great power.”
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Conviction of Activist Who Protested Baptism of Tatar Infants Decried
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 28 – Last Friday’s conviction in a Naberezhny Chelny court of a Tatar activist who had spoken out against the baptism of Tatar infants by a Russian Orthodox priest without the permission of their parents or guardians has sparked protests from the Tatar Social Center (TOTs) as well as from human and religious rights groups elsewhere,.
On Friday, the court found TOTs leader Rafiz Kashapov guilty of provoking interethnic and inter-religious hostility (under Section 1 of Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code) for his article “No to Christianization!” in which he protested the baptism of infants of Tatar nationality, a traditionally Muslim people, and gave him a suspended sentence of 18 months
That article appeared on Kashapov’s blog shortly after a Russian Orthodox priest baptized the children on January 16th of this year without the knowledge or agreement of their parents. His article led to protests in several cities of Tatarstan, and his blog was subsequently suppressed by the authorities.
Now, following Kashapov’s conviction and protests by several rights groups, his own Tatar Social Center has issued an appeal to human rights groups, social and political organizations, and the media of Tatarstan and Russia, denouncing this action and demanding that the authorities reverse course.
But it is a measure of the extent to which the Russian government is in control of the media that the appeal has so far appeared only on other blogs – see, for example, the complete text at blogs.mail.ru/mail/hamm77/38E6454E2B52C97F.html – or on websites hosted beyond the borders of Russia -- mariuver.wordpress.com/2009/04/28/sud-kashapovym/#more-7976.
The declaration, signed by A.Sh. Zalyalutdinov, the chairman of the regional TOTs Assembly, and M.A. Shakirova, the secretary of that group, provides a remarkable portrait of the increasingly frequent misuse of Russia’s anti-extremist laws and the also increasingly frequent cases of official and especially judicial malfeasance in that country.
After outlining the history of Kashapov’s own protest, the declaration states that the investigation of his case occurred “with crude violations of the law,” including moves by officials that prevented the accused attorneys from gaining access to information gathered by the government.
The trial itself, the declaration continues, was “closely controlled by the Moscow FSB and the court was subject to strong pressure from the prosecutor.” Moreover, the court’s decision reflected only the testimony of “experts” from Moscow and Kazan because the judge refused to consider “the declarations of independent experts” that were offered by Kashapov.
Both the facts of the case and these violations of judicial procedure, the authors of the declaration say, provide the basis for considering that “the sentence of the court is both without foundation and illegal.” And they say that lawyers for the accused will appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of Tatarstan.
“Many human rights activists, public figures and journalists,” the declaration continues, not only in Tatarstan and Russia but in foreign countries have raised their voices in defense of Rafiz Kashapov, an important public figures who has stood up for the rights and interests of the Tatars and other peoples.”
“We express our deep gratitude to them!” the appeal concludes, especially since some of them, like Ulyanovsk journalist Sergey Kryukov, have themselves become the object of Russian government persecution as a result. Kryukov’s location at the present time, the appeal notes, is unknown.
The Kashapov case, as tragic as it is for him and for the Tatars, highlights two more widespread problems in the Russian Federation, both of which have been well-documented in recent times. On the one hand, Russian courts, as Moscow statistics show, are ever more willing to convict anyone the regime brings charges against (www.vestnikcivitas.ru/pbls/650).
And on the other, the Russian government, for all the talk about “a thaw” under Dmitry Medvedev, appears to be increasingly willing to control reporting about what is actually going on, either by taking down websites as in Kashapov’s case or directly corrupting journalists (www.russiamediamonitor.com/News.html).
In Soviet times, the Western media could be counted on to report such things, but unfortunately, their interest in doing so for whatever reason has declined. And as a result, those who do notice such abuses in Russia especially beyond Moscow’s ring road have a special obligation to try to bring them to the attention of others.
Vienna, April 28 – Last Friday’s conviction in a Naberezhny Chelny court of a Tatar activist who had spoken out against the baptism of Tatar infants by a Russian Orthodox priest without the permission of their parents or guardians has sparked protests from the Tatar Social Center (TOTs) as well as from human and religious rights groups elsewhere,.
On Friday, the court found TOTs leader Rafiz Kashapov guilty of provoking interethnic and inter-religious hostility (under Section 1 of Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code) for his article “No to Christianization!” in which he protested the baptism of infants of Tatar nationality, a traditionally Muslim people, and gave him a suspended sentence of 18 months
That article appeared on Kashapov’s blog shortly after a Russian Orthodox priest baptized the children on January 16th of this year without the knowledge or agreement of their parents. His article led to protests in several cities of Tatarstan, and his blog was subsequently suppressed by the authorities.
Now, following Kashapov’s conviction and protests by several rights groups, his own Tatar Social Center has issued an appeal to human rights groups, social and political organizations, and the media of Tatarstan and Russia, denouncing this action and demanding that the authorities reverse course.
But it is a measure of the extent to which the Russian government is in control of the media that the appeal has so far appeared only on other blogs – see, for example, the complete text at blogs.mail.ru/mail/hamm77/38E6454E2B52C97F.html – or on websites hosted beyond the borders of Russia -- mariuver.wordpress.com/2009/04/28/sud-kashapovym/#more-7976.
The declaration, signed by A.Sh. Zalyalutdinov, the chairman of the regional TOTs Assembly, and M.A. Shakirova, the secretary of that group, provides a remarkable portrait of the increasingly frequent misuse of Russia’s anti-extremist laws and the also increasingly frequent cases of official and especially judicial malfeasance in that country.
After outlining the history of Kashapov’s own protest, the declaration states that the investigation of his case occurred “with crude violations of the law,” including moves by officials that prevented the accused attorneys from gaining access to information gathered by the government.
The trial itself, the declaration continues, was “closely controlled by the Moscow FSB and the court was subject to strong pressure from the prosecutor.” Moreover, the court’s decision reflected only the testimony of “experts” from Moscow and Kazan because the judge refused to consider “the declarations of independent experts” that were offered by Kashapov.
Both the facts of the case and these violations of judicial procedure, the authors of the declaration say, provide the basis for considering that “the sentence of the court is both without foundation and illegal.” And they say that lawyers for the accused will appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of Tatarstan.
“Many human rights activists, public figures and journalists,” the declaration continues, not only in Tatarstan and Russia but in foreign countries have raised their voices in defense of Rafiz Kashapov, an important public figures who has stood up for the rights and interests of the Tatars and other peoples.”
“We express our deep gratitude to them!” the appeal concludes, especially since some of them, like Ulyanovsk journalist Sergey Kryukov, have themselves become the object of Russian government persecution as a result. Kryukov’s location at the present time, the appeal notes, is unknown.
The Kashapov case, as tragic as it is for him and for the Tatars, highlights two more widespread problems in the Russian Federation, both of which have been well-documented in recent times. On the one hand, Russian courts, as Moscow statistics show, are ever more willing to convict anyone the regime brings charges against (www.vestnikcivitas.ru/pbls/650).
And on the other, the Russian government, for all the talk about “a thaw” under Dmitry Medvedev, appears to be increasingly willing to control reporting about what is actually going on, either by taking down websites as in Kashapov’s case or directly corrupting journalists (www.russiamediamonitor.com/News.html).
In Soviet times, the Western media could be counted on to report such things, but unfortunately, their interest in doing so for whatever reason has declined. And as a result, those who do notice such abuses in Russia especially beyond Moscow’s ring road have a special obligation to try to bring them to the attention of others.
Monday, April 27, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Will Moscow Use Financial Crisis to Tighten Control over the Regions?
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 27 – Moscow may use the financial difficulties the governments of some Russian regions have fallen into because of the economic crisis to impose greater control over their spending and perhaps over their entire political operations, a move that one Russian newspaper today says could be a step toward “the ruble vertical.”
But while Russian law makes provision for the center on the basis of a court decision to take control of financial flows in the regions, the legal basis for an even more extensive assertion of Moscow’s power in the regions is disputed, especially given the Kremlin’s ability to appoint and remove governors.
And consequently, these discussions in the Russian capital may either be an attempt to intimidate regional leaders by holding up a threat Moscow may not or even cannot carry through or be a reflection of power struggles between the Kremlin and the Russian White House and between Moscow and the regions.
On the one hand, the intervention by Moscow in the regions by imposing direct supervision over them without replacing the government could change the balance between the Russian president who enjoys the power of removal and appointment of regional leaders and the Russian prime minister who controls the ministries that would exercise external control.
And on the other, such moves and even more the threat of them may be intended to crack the whip over regional leaders without engendering the political controversies at a time of economic hardship that the dismissal of regional leaders and the appointment/election of their replacements could easily involve.
Discussions about this do center on a finance ministry document on changes in the budgetary process (www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2009/04/27/193110) and a declaration on Friday by Regional Affairs Minister Viktor Basargin on the possibility of even broader moves (www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1162184&NodesID=2).
The “Vedomosti” article, entitled “The Ruble Vertical,” says that the finance ministry has developed a proposal to expand the conditions under which Moscow could improve external administration of financial operations in the subjects of the federation and sent its ideas to the ministry of regional affairs for coordination.
Under the finance ministry proposal,” “If the government considers it necessary to introduce external administration in any region, it must file suite with the Supreme Arbitrage Court and secure its agreement.” Having done that, Moscow could impose such external rule for a period “up to one year.”
Such external supervision, the paper said, would mean for the regions involved “the actual loss of control over finances” in the cases of regions whose governments were threatened with bankruptcy but would not necessarily lead to the replacement of the governor or the imposition of central control over everything.
This proposal does not go far beyond existing legislation, and most experts with whom that paper and other Russian media outlets saw it as an entirely appropriate response under the conditions of the current economic crisis. But Basargin’s comments are another matter entirely because they appear to open the way for a far broader assertion of central government power.
In a speech on Friday, Basargin said that in the event of shortfalls and other serious violations of budgetary arrangements in the regions, the finance ministry regions involved itself. should “administer the money” and his own ministry of regional affairs should run the regions more generally.
As “Vedomosti” noted, that proposal goes “far beyond existing legislation.” Moreover, it raises serious questions, although as Moscow commentator Aleksey Makarkin pointed out, by leaving the regional heads in place, the residents of any regions where Moscow might take this step “would take it more quietly than the change of the entire [local] leadership.”
In its report today on this discussion, “Kommersant” said that sources in the regional affairs ministry say that “the order for introducing external administration” of the regions “have already been prepared” and that “in the near future, the document will be presented to the government.”
Once that happens, it is likely to generate even more controversy. The finance ministry has not yet signed off, and some Federation Council members told “Kommersant” that Moscow should use its powers to “change people” rather than “wait for years in the hopes that this will solve the problem.”
But it may be that, especially under the conditions of the crisis, neither Moscow nor the regions wants to take any step. Indeed, Vyacheslav Glazychev, who heads the Social Chamber’s commission on regional affairs, said that Basargin’s statement probably was intended to frighten the regions rather than as an indication of where Moscow is heading.
“If the institution of external administration were to be introduced, Glazychev observed, at the present time, “half the country might fall under it,” something that could ensure that the economic crisis would be transformed into a political one even more rapidly than anyone know projects.
Vienna, April 27 – Moscow may use the financial difficulties the governments of some Russian regions have fallen into because of the economic crisis to impose greater control over their spending and perhaps over their entire political operations, a move that one Russian newspaper today says could be a step toward “the ruble vertical.”
But while Russian law makes provision for the center on the basis of a court decision to take control of financial flows in the regions, the legal basis for an even more extensive assertion of Moscow’s power in the regions is disputed, especially given the Kremlin’s ability to appoint and remove governors.
And consequently, these discussions in the Russian capital may either be an attempt to intimidate regional leaders by holding up a threat Moscow may not or even cannot carry through or be a reflection of power struggles between the Kremlin and the Russian White House and between Moscow and the regions.
On the one hand, the intervention by Moscow in the regions by imposing direct supervision over them without replacing the government could change the balance between the Russian president who enjoys the power of removal and appointment of regional leaders and the Russian prime minister who controls the ministries that would exercise external control.
And on the other, such moves and even more the threat of them may be intended to crack the whip over regional leaders without engendering the political controversies at a time of economic hardship that the dismissal of regional leaders and the appointment/election of their replacements could easily involve.
Discussions about this do center on a finance ministry document on changes in the budgetary process (www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2009/04/27/193110) and a declaration on Friday by Regional Affairs Minister Viktor Basargin on the possibility of even broader moves (www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1162184&NodesID=2).
The “Vedomosti” article, entitled “The Ruble Vertical,” says that the finance ministry has developed a proposal to expand the conditions under which Moscow could improve external administration of financial operations in the subjects of the federation and sent its ideas to the ministry of regional affairs for coordination.
Under the finance ministry proposal,” “If the government considers it necessary to introduce external administration in any region, it must file suite with the Supreme Arbitrage Court and secure its agreement.” Having done that, Moscow could impose such external rule for a period “up to one year.”
Such external supervision, the paper said, would mean for the regions involved “the actual loss of control over finances” in the cases of regions whose governments were threatened with bankruptcy but would not necessarily lead to the replacement of the governor or the imposition of central control over everything.
This proposal does not go far beyond existing legislation, and most experts with whom that paper and other Russian media outlets saw it as an entirely appropriate response under the conditions of the current economic crisis. But Basargin’s comments are another matter entirely because they appear to open the way for a far broader assertion of central government power.
In a speech on Friday, Basargin said that in the event of shortfalls and other serious violations of budgetary arrangements in the regions, the finance ministry regions involved itself. should “administer the money” and his own ministry of regional affairs should run the regions more generally.
As “Vedomosti” noted, that proposal goes “far beyond existing legislation.” Moreover, it raises serious questions, although as Moscow commentator Aleksey Makarkin pointed out, by leaving the regional heads in place, the residents of any regions where Moscow might take this step “would take it more quietly than the change of the entire [local] leadership.”
In its report today on this discussion, “Kommersant” said that sources in the regional affairs ministry say that “the order for introducing external administration” of the regions “have already been prepared” and that “in the near future, the document will be presented to the government.”
Once that happens, it is likely to generate even more controversy. The finance ministry has not yet signed off, and some Federation Council members told “Kommersant” that Moscow should use its powers to “change people” rather than “wait for years in the hopes that this will solve the problem.”
But it may be that, especially under the conditions of the crisis, neither Moscow nor the regions wants to take any step. Indeed, Vyacheslav Glazychev, who heads the Social Chamber’s commission on regional affairs, said that Basargin’s statement probably was intended to frighten the regions rather than as an indication of where Moscow is heading.
“If the institution of external administration were to be introduced, Glazychev observed, at the present time, “half the country might fall under it,” something that could ensure that the economic crisis would be transformed into a political one even more rapidly than anyone know projects.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Ignoring of Iranian Leader’s Anti-Semitism Has Deep Roots, Dangerous Consequences, Russian Commentator Notes
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 27 – Unlike some countries which refused to participate and others whose representatives walked out, the Russian delegation to the UN Conference on the Struggle Against Racism acted as if it “did not notice the anti-Semitic declarations” of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a leading Moscow commentator writes today.
In an essay published in “Novaya gazeta,” Boris Vishnevsky points out that the absence of any Russian reaction was especially troubling because it came on the anniversary of Hitler’s birth and just before the Day of Memory for the Victims of the Holocaust, but he observes that unfortunately such a posture by Moscow has deep roots and sad consequences.
In large part because the UN conference gave a forum for the Iranian leader, who had earlier called for wiping Israel off the face of the earth, described the Holocaust as “an invention of the Zionists,” and warned that Jews “must know that they are living out their last days,” many Western countries refused to participate (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/044/06.html).
Among those, Vishnevsky points out, were the US, Germany, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and Italy, and when Ahmadinejad repeated his inventions and slanders, the representatives of Great Britain, France, the Czech Republic and other countries of the European Union walked out in protest.
“Only Russia,” the Moscow commentator pointed out, “gave the impression that it had not taken notice of the revelations of the Iranian leader.” Instead, Aleksandr Yakovenko, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, said before Ahmadinejad’s speech that “not all manifestations of racism, xenophobia and intolerance” have been eliminated from today’s world.
But at the same time, Yakovenko, who headed the Russian delegation to the Geneva meeting, “assured those who had assembled that ‘the mechanisms of the struggle with ethnic intolerance and xenophobia which exist in Russia are quite effective,’” a claim, Vishnevsky says, is undercut by “the terrifying statistics of Nazi attacks” in Yakovenko’s country.
That claim reflects Moscow’s effort to present itself as a fighter against extremism abroad even as it is doing little or nothing at home: The Russian Duma, he notes, is considering a draft bill that would impose criminal penalties on anyone, including foreign citizens, who denies Russia’s unique role in World War II and then turns up on Russian territory.
If Moscow is indeed serious about fighting extremism, the Moscow writer says, it “might begin with Ahmadinejad and his friends, the leaders of Hamas,” a group Moscow even now refuses to “recognize as a terrorist organization” but instead prefers to view as “worthy and respected partners for negotiations.”
What makes Moscow’s responses or more precisely lack of response to the Iranian leader’s appalling remarks is, in the words of Vishnevsky, that “all this alas has deep historical roots and not only because Soviet and after them Russian officials have traditionally chosen for themselves friends and allies of the most odious international figures.”
As Vishnevsky notes, Soviet and now Russian textbooks, when they talk about the Munich accords, do everything to minimize the reality that “until fascist Germany attacked the USSR, the Kremlin maintained with Hitler the best of relations.” And if these texts mention the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact at all, they ignore many of its aspects.
One thing such books ignore is the speech of Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov on October 31, 1939 – “a month after the beginning of the Second World War,” as Vishnevsky notes – in which the Stalinist leader denounced “the ruling circles of England and France” for trying to “present themselves as battlers for the democratic rights of peoples against Hitlerism.”
“How all this ended,” Vishnevsky writes, “is very well known.” And given that bitter historical experience, he continues, “it would seem” that Russians in particular “would understand once and for all that there cannot be any dialogue, any attempt at mutual understanding or any political correctness in dealings with fascism.”
Instead, they would know, “the struggle with fascism is not a struggle of ideologies, not a struggle of rights and lefts, of social democrats and conservatives, of liberals and statists, where each has its own arguments which deserve respect;” that it is “the struggle of people with cannibals.” And in that, there cannot be “any compromises.”
Unfortunately, and with potentially tragic consequences for the future, that is not an understanding which the Russian government reflected by its failure to take note of and to condemn what the Iranian leader said at a conference to which he should never even have been invited to speak.
Vienna, April 27 – Unlike some countries which refused to participate and others whose representatives walked out, the Russian delegation to the UN Conference on the Struggle Against Racism acted as if it “did not notice the anti-Semitic declarations” of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a leading Moscow commentator writes today.
In an essay published in “Novaya gazeta,” Boris Vishnevsky points out that the absence of any Russian reaction was especially troubling because it came on the anniversary of Hitler’s birth and just before the Day of Memory for the Victims of the Holocaust, but he observes that unfortunately such a posture by Moscow has deep roots and sad consequences.
In large part because the UN conference gave a forum for the Iranian leader, who had earlier called for wiping Israel off the face of the earth, described the Holocaust as “an invention of the Zionists,” and warned that Jews “must know that they are living out their last days,” many Western countries refused to participate (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/044/06.html).
Among those, Vishnevsky points out, were the US, Germany, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and Italy, and when Ahmadinejad repeated his inventions and slanders, the representatives of Great Britain, France, the Czech Republic and other countries of the European Union walked out in protest.
“Only Russia,” the Moscow commentator pointed out, “gave the impression that it had not taken notice of the revelations of the Iranian leader.” Instead, Aleksandr Yakovenko, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, said before Ahmadinejad’s speech that “not all manifestations of racism, xenophobia and intolerance” have been eliminated from today’s world.
But at the same time, Yakovenko, who headed the Russian delegation to the Geneva meeting, “assured those who had assembled that ‘the mechanisms of the struggle with ethnic intolerance and xenophobia which exist in Russia are quite effective,’” a claim, Vishnevsky says, is undercut by “the terrifying statistics of Nazi attacks” in Yakovenko’s country.
That claim reflects Moscow’s effort to present itself as a fighter against extremism abroad even as it is doing little or nothing at home: The Russian Duma, he notes, is considering a draft bill that would impose criminal penalties on anyone, including foreign citizens, who denies Russia’s unique role in World War II and then turns up on Russian territory.
If Moscow is indeed serious about fighting extremism, the Moscow writer says, it “might begin with Ahmadinejad and his friends, the leaders of Hamas,” a group Moscow even now refuses to “recognize as a terrorist organization” but instead prefers to view as “worthy and respected partners for negotiations.”
What makes Moscow’s responses or more precisely lack of response to the Iranian leader’s appalling remarks is, in the words of Vishnevsky, that “all this alas has deep historical roots and not only because Soviet and after them Russian officials have traditionally chosen for themselves friends and allies of the most odious international figures.”
As Vishnevsky notes, Soviet and now Russian textbooks, when they talk about the Munich accords, do everything to minimize the reality that “until fascist Germany attacked the USSR, the Kremlin maintained with Hitler the best of relations.” And if these texts mention the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact at all, they ignore many of its aspects.
One thing such books ignore is the speech of Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov on October 31, 1939 – “a month after the beginning of the Second World War,” as Vishnevsky notes – in which the Stalinist leader denounced “the ruling circles of England and France” for trying to “present themselves as battlers for the democratic rights of peoples against Hitlerism.”
“How all this ended,” Vishnevsky writes, “is very well known.” And given that bitter historical experience, he continues, “it would seem” that Russians in particular “would understand once and for all that there cannot be any dialogue, any attempt at mutual understanding or any political correctness in dealings with fascism.”
Instead, they would know, “the struggle with fascism is not a struggle of ideologies, not a struggle of rights and lefts, of social democrats and conservatives, of liberals and statists, where each has its own arguments which deserve respect;” that it is “the struggle of people with cannibals.” And in that, there cannot be “any compromises.”
Unfortunately, and with potentially tragic consequences for the future, that is not an understanding which the Russian government reflected by its failure to take note of and to condemn what the Iranian leader said at a conference to which he should never even have been invited to speak.
Window on Eurasia: ‘Post-Soviet Space’ Beats Out ‘Near Abroad’ Among Russian Users
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 27 – Although many in Moscow and the West continue to refer to the former Soviet republics as Russia’s “near abroad,” a Moscow State University expert has found that Russians now prefer to use the term “post-Soviet space,” their adoption of a term which was first proposed by a Lithuanian writer 17 years ago.
In an essay on “the dominating role of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space,” Aleksey Vlasov says that among the several competing designations for the area that used to be occupied by the USSR, “post-Soviet space” is now more widely used than “near abroad,” according to the Yandex search engine (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/4446/).
According to Vlasov, who writes frequently on relations between the Russian Federation and the other former Soviet republics and occupied Baltic states, a recent Yandex search found that three million Internet pages made reference to “the post-Soviet space,” a million more than mentioned “the countries of the near abroad.”
Because the terminology in which an issue is discussed often determines the way in which it is considered, Vlasov’s exploration of the terms used to describe this part of the world is important as an indication of the extent to which Russian writers, in contrast to some Western ones, have overcome the Soviet inheritance.
The two terms, “near abroad” and “post-Soviet space” have been competing in the Russian lexicon since the disintegration of the USSR. Moscow’s “Izvestiya” used the former term on January 15, 1992, and the late Algis Prazauskas used the latter in “Nezavisimaya gazeta” on February 7th of that year in discussing “the CIS as a post-colonial space.”
Some Russians view these terms as providing a justification for Moscow insisting upon a recognition by all of its special if not indeed exclusive role across the region, and some but far from all Western officials oppose using either term lest it appear to represent a recognition by their governments of just such a Russian “right.”
As British Foreign Secretary David Miliband put it, “Ukraine, Georgia and the others are not ‘a post-Soviet space.’ These are independent sovereign countries which have their own right to territorial integrity.” Consequently, using terms that suggest otherwise is or at least should be “unacceptable.”
In reporting that comment, Vlasov suggests that there is an additional reason why the use of these terms is so sensitive: “In the final analysis,” he says, “the question about the future of the post-Soviet space is a question about the future of Russia itself,” because Moscow wants to retain influence while the former republics want to act independently.
But the problem is even deeper than that, he insists, citing the Moscow commentator Andrey Yermolayev who has argued that “the Soviet Union was not simply a state formation but a state-civilization formation. The remains of that common civilization are not in a position to separate or isolate themselves one from another in the short term.”
Sometimes, Vlasov argues, they attempt to do so but in many cases, they are simply renaming what remains in common. Thus, for example, he points to the proposals of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev to promote Eurasianism, which the Moscow commentator argues is simply another term for significant parts of the earlier common civilization.
At the same time, however, Vlasov acknowledges that “the contours of the future” of this region have not yet “been marked out to the end.” Some portions of it are indeed moving off, but “in full correspondence with the laws of the dialectic, [this region] is including in itself new special objects, which were never part of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union.”
That tendency, he continues, is especially evident if one examines such “integration projects on the post-Soviet space as, for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, one of the creators of which is China which also has its own special interests in the republics of the former Soviet Union.”
But despite “all the contradictions,” Vlasov argues, there are two certainties. On the one hand, the active involvement of “foreign forces” in the CIS countries will lead “not to good but to harm.” And on the other, only Russia can be “the nucleus for the development of modernized processes in the political, economic and social sphere.”
At the same time, however, the Moscow commentator says, “the dominating role of Russia on the post-Soviet space to a large extent is still a foundation of the past and not an achievement of the present. An adequate response to the new challenges of the times, something completely possible, requires from Russia” a great deal.
It requires a more carefully worked out and “at the same time more decisive policy [by Russia] toward its neighbors,” but at the same time, Vlasov argues, this policy must be “responsible,” lest in its efforts to promote unity, Moscow finds itself taking steps that have the effect of driving away others in this region.
Vienna, April 27 – Although many in Moscow and the West continue to refer to the former Soviet republics as Russia’s “near abroad,” a Moscow State University expert has found that Russians now prefer to use the term “post-Soviet space,” their adoption of a term which was first proposed by a Lithuanian writer 17 years ago.
In an essay on “the dominating role of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space,” Aleksey Vlasov says that among the several competing designations for the area that used to be occupied by the USSR, “post-Soviet space” is now more widely used than “near abroad,” according to the Yandex search engine (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/4446/).
According to Vlasov, who writes frequently on relations between the Russian Federation and the other former Soviet republics and occupied Baltic states, a recent Yandex search found that three million Internet pages made reference to “the post-Soviet space,” a million more than mentioned “the countries of the near abroad.”
Because the terminology in which an issue is discussed often determines the way in which it is considered, Vlasov’s exploration of the terms used to describe this part of the world is important as an indication of the extent to which Russian writers, in contrast to some Western ones, have overcome the Soviet inheritance.
The two terms, “near abroad” and “post-Soviet space” have been competing in the Russian lexicon since the disintegration of the USSR. Moscow’s “Izvestiya” used the former term on January 15, 1992, and the late Algis Prazauskas used the latter in “Nezavisimaya gazeta” on February 7th of that year in discussing “the CIS as a post-colonial space.”
Some Russians view these terms as providing a justification for Moscow insisting upon a recognition by all of its special if not indeed exclusive role across the region, and some but far from all Western officials oppose using either term lest it appear to represent a recognition by their governments of just such a Russian “right.”
As British Foreign Secretary David Miliband put it, “Ukraine, Georgia and the others are not ‘a post-Soviet space.’ These are independent sovereign countries which have their own right to territorial integrity.” Consequently, using terms that suggest otherwise is or at least should be “unacceptable.”
In reporting that comment, Vlasov suggests that there is an additional reason why the use of these terms is so sensitive: “In the final analysis,” he says, “the question about the future of the post-Soviet space is a question about the future of Russia itself,” because Moscow wants to retain influence while the former republics want to act independently.
But the problem is even deeper than that, he insists, citing the Moscow commentator Andrey Yermolayev who has argued that “the Soviet Union was not simply a state formation but a state-civilization formation. The remains of that common civilization are not in a position to separate or isolate themselves one from another in the short term.”
Sometimes, Vlasov argues, they attempt to do so but in many cases, they are simply renaming what remains in common. Thus, for example, he points to the proposals of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev to promote Eurasianism, which the Moscow commentator argues is simply another term for significant parts of the earlier common civilization.
At the same time, however, Vlasov acknowledges that “the contours of the future” of this region have not yet “been marked out to the end.” Some portions of it are indeed moving off, but “in full correspondence with the laws of the dialectic, [this region] is including in itself new special objects, which were never part of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union.”
That tendency, he continues, is especially evident if one examines such “integration projects on the post-Soviet space as, for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, one of the creators of which is China which also has its own special interests in the republics of the former Soviet Union.”
But despite “all the contradictions,” Vlasov argues, there are two certainties. On the one hand, the active involvement of “foreign forces” in the CIS countries will lead “not to good but to harm.” And on the other, only Russia can be “the nucleus for the development of modernized processes in the political, economic and social sphere.”
At the same time, however, the Moscow commentator says, “the dominating role of Russia on the post-Soviet space to a large extent is still a foundation of the past and not an achievement of the present. An adequate response to the new challenges of the times, something completely possible, requires from Russia” a great deal.
It requires a more carefully worked out and “at the same time more decisive policy [by Russia] toward its neighbors,” but at the same time, Vlasov argues, this policy must be “responsible,” lest in its efforts to promote unity, Moscow finds itself taking steps that have the effect of driving away others in this region.
Saturday, April 25, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Muslim Paper in Daghestan Marks 15th Anniversary
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 25 – A Muslim newspaper in Daghestan is marking its 15th anniversary, an event that calls into question the assertions of many specialists in Moscow and the West that the Muslim media in the Russian Federation consists of small-tirage publications by individual congregations or sites on the Internet.
The newspaper, “As-Salaam,” was launched in April 1994 on the basis of the media law adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1990 and with the support of both the republic’s Muslim spiritual directorate (MSD) and the Way Foundation, a charitable group based in Makhachkala (www.assalam.ru/assalam2009/332/02-s.shtml).
The paper’s appearance, first in the Russian language and shortly thereafter in Avar as well, represented in the words of its editors on this anniversary “a little ray of truth after the darkness of godlessness” during the Soviet period. And it quickly won the support of readers within Daghestan and then further afield in the Russian Federation and the CIS.
As the editors declared at its founding, the newspaper, which was launched as a monthly but which subsequently became a biweekly, has “the goal” of bringing the foundations of Islam to the population, “talking about the life of Muslim religious leaders, and informing its readers about events in the Muslim world.”
The newspaper’s initial print run was 3,000 copies, but when it started appearing in Avar, Lezgin, Dargin, Lak, Kumyk, Tabasaran, and Chechen, it quickly rose to 30,000 copies. And as of the end of 2008, the combined print runs of these various editions is approximately 70,000, with the Russian-language edition responsible for 32,500 of that total.
Initially, the newspaper was directed at the Muslims of Daghestan, and they remain its base. But the editors say the paper now reaches an audience across the North Caucasus, in other parts of the Russian Federation, and even in some of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
The editors say that the most popular feature of the paper is its question and answer column, but they are proud of the fact that the paper now employs “more than 15 members” of the Union of Journalists of Russia and maintains close ties with Islamic universities around the world, with the Daghestan MSD, and with other experts.
Because Islam is so central to the life of Daghestan and because the faith has been buffeted by various influences in both Soviet times and more recently, the editors say that “every article requires careful checking” in order to ensure that the paper reflects traditional Daghestani Islam and is not affected by dangerous or even incorrect “innovations.”
As a result of this care, the “As-Salaam” writers collective says, the newspaper and especially its editions in national languages “have received a positive response in the government structures [of Daghestan] and at the [Makhachkala] Institute of Language and Literature,” which are convinced that the paper is playing “an essential role” in preserving native languages.
One of the interesting features of this paper is the way individuals and groups can enter subscriptions. They can use the government system, although many Muslims have experienced difficulties with that, or they can subscribe through their local mullahs and imams, who act as agents for the paper.
Although “As-Salaam” conceives itself primarily as a print outlet, the paper does maintain a website on which both current and most (since 2004) issues of the paper are available, thus providing a rich source of information about the state of Islam in Russia’s most Muslim region (http://www.assalam.ru/arhiv/index.shtml).
Indeed, the articles in the current issue alone – including reports on Islam in Africa, Wahhabism, and the national struggles of the peoples of the North Caucasus -- suggest some of the range of a publication that has been largely ignored by experts in Moscow and the West but not by Muslims in Daghestan or elsewhere in the former Soviet space.
Vienna, April 25 – A Muslim newspaper in Daghestan is marking its 15th anniversary, an event that calls into question the assertions of many specialists in Moscow and the West that the Muslim media in the Russian Federation consists of small-tirage publications by individual congregations or sites on the Internet.
The newspaper, “As-Salaam,” was launched in April 1994 on the basis of the media law adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1990 and with the support of both the republic’s Muslim spiritual directorate (MSD) and the Way Foundation, a charitable group based in Makhachkala (www.assalam.ru/assalam2009/332/02-s.shtml).
The paper’s appearance, first in the Russian language and shortly thereafter in Avar as well, represented in the words of its editors on this anniversary “a little ray of truth after the darkness of godlessness” during the Soviet period. And it quickly won the support of readers within Daghestan and then further afield in the Russian Federation and the CIS.
As the editors declared at its founding, the newspaper, which was launched as a monthly but which subsequently became a biweekly, has “the goal” of bringing the foundations of Islam to the population, “talking about the life of Muslim religious leaders, and informing its readers about events in the Muslim world.”
The newspaper’s initial print run was 3,000 copies, but when it started appearing in Avar, Lezgin, Dargin, Lak, Kumyk, Tabasaran, and Chechen, it quickly rose to 30,000 copies. And as of the end of 2008, the combined print runs of these various editions is approximately 70,000, with the Russian-language edition responsible for 32,500 of that total.
Initially, the newspaper was directed at the Muslims of Daghestan, and they remain its base. But the editors say the paper now reaches an audience across the North Caucasus, in other parts of the Russian Federation, and even in some of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
The editors say that the most popular feature of the paper is its question and answer column, but they are proud of the fact that the paper now employs “more than 15 members” of the Union of Journalists of Russia and maintains close ties with Islamic universities around the world, with the Daghestan MSD, and with other experts.
Because Islam is so central to the life of Daghestan and because the faith has been buffeted by various influences in both Soviet times and more recently, the editors say that “every article requires careful checking” in order to ensure that the paper reflects traditional Daghestani Islam and is not affected by dangerous or even incorrect “innovations.”
As a result of this care, the “As-Salaam” writers collective says, the newspaper and especially its editions in national languages “have received a positive response in the government structures [of Daghestan] and at the [Makhachkala] Institute of Language and Literature,” which are convinced that the paper is playing “an essential role” in preserving native languages.
One of the interesting features of this paper is the way individuals and groups can enter subscriptions. They can use the government system, although many Muslims have experienced difficulties with that, or they can subscribe through their local mullahs and imams, who act as agents for the paper.
Although “As-Salaam” conceives itself primarily as a print outlet, the paper does maintain a website on which both current and most (since 2004) issues of the paper are available, thus providing a rich source of information about the state of Islam in Russia’s most Muslim region (http://www.assalam.ru/arhiv/index.shtml).
Indeed, the articles in the current issue alone – including reports on Islam in Africa, Wahhabism, and the national struggles of the peoples of the North Caucasus -- suggest some of the range of a publication that has been largely ignored by experts in Moscow and the West but not by Muslims in Daghestan or elsewhere in the former Soviet space.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Youths Committing More Hate Crimes, Officials Say
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 25 – The number of cases of “extremist actions” by Moscow school children has increased dramatically over the last three years, making the face of extremism in the Russian capital ever younger and constituting a trend Russian officials say reflects at least in part the indifference of many teachers and students to such actions.
Speaking to a meeting of the Moscow city education department this week, Grigory Krasnov, the deputy chief of the capital’s militia, said that “if in 2006, pupils committed six extremist crimes, in 2007, we recorded 20, and in 2008, 64,” most in ethnically mixed areas of the Russian capital ( www.newsmsk.com/article/22Apr2009/school_extrem.html).
Given that sociologists and rights activists have suggested that such crimes are often not reported or registered by the authorities when individuals affected try to get the powers that be to take action, these numbers are all undoubtedly too low, but the trend that Krasnov points to is disturbing on two grounds.
On the one hand, it suggests that xenophobic attitudes are increasingly common in the schools of the Russian capital given the general cultural messages in the media and the increasing share of the student bodies of these schools which members of non-Russian nationalities now constitute.
And on the other, and perhaps even more worrisome, is Krasnov’s observation that “when we asked about the characteristics of the youths have committed crimes, we found out that class leaders describe them as conscientious, not inclined to conflict and on the whole positive personalities.”
In addition, the Moscow militia officer said, “the extremist manifestations [which his officers registered] were not identified by inspectors working in the schools, even though the young people did not reveal their views and had adopted [the kind of clothes, language and behavior associated with extremism.”
“This is either indifference,” Krasnov continued, “or an attempt to minimize the situation.” But regardless of which explanation is correct, he suggested, that approach by those who should be on the first line of defense against crimes of this and other kinds almost certainly is making the situation worse.
The militia official also discussed the broader problem of crimes committed by young people. He said that the number of such crimes was growing not because native Muscovites were committing them – the number of crimes committed by them has actually fallen, Krasnov said – but because of crimes committed by young people “coming in from nearby regions.”
Such outer suburbs – Lyubertsy is perhaps the most infamous of these areas – have long been a source of criminal and xenophobic activities, but Krasnov’s comments suggest that residents of such places are now preying on residents of the central districts, a trend that if true could point to even more crime in the future.
Meanwhile, in a related development, Aleksandr Bastrykin, the head of the Investigations Committee of the Russian Federation Procuracy, provided his own explanation for the rise in crime among young people and his own prescription for what the Russian authorities should be doing to counter it (www.rosbalt.ru/2009/04/23/635818.html).
He told a meeting in St. Petersburg this week that “the liberalization of the 1990s had led to a growth of crime among minors. Children rape and beat one another,” he continued, “something that didn’t happen in the times of the USSR.” And he suggested that it was time to return “to the Soviet system of Pioneer and patriotic camps.”
Bastrykin also lashed out at the media, complaining that in recent years, media leaders have been “unwilling” to face up to the consequences of the violence they report and show, apparently having failed to think “that they have their own children and [the latter] may see all this dirt.”
The Moscow prosecutor urged that the country “reestablish the old Soviet system which included sports and patriotic camps in order to correct this situation” and help young people escape from the moral “collapse” of recent times. In this, he was supported by his St. Petersburg colleague Sergey Zaytsev, who said such steps would in fact reduce youth crime.
But several participants in the meeting in the northern capital sharply disagreed. Dmitry Dubrovsky, the director of the Smolny Institute’s Human Rights Program, for example, said that those who sought to excuse the actions of skinheads by saying they “incorrectly understood” the meaning of patriotism are wrong.
“Skinheads,” he said, are “least of all like poor confused children. On the contrary, they have an ideological base, and they correctly understand specifically Russian patriotism, which is based on a search for an external and internal enemy and the conducting of an active struggle with it.”
“In this sense,” Dubrovsky continued, Russia’s skinheads “understand our patriotism correctly and are carrying it to its logical conclusion.” More than that, many Russian Nazis, he said, are the products of precisely the military-patriotic sports clubs that Bastrykin and his allies see as a panacea for this problem.
Those clubs, the human rights activist pointed out, have “their own definite system of values, literature, symbols, music and films. Many current Russian patriotic camps not only do not deflect youths from extremist ideas [as Bastrykin says he would like them to do] but on the contrary make it more likely” that young Russians will accept these ideas rather than any others.
Vienna, April 25 – The number of cases of “extremist actions” by Moscow school children has increased dramatically over the last three years, making the face of extremism in the Russian capital ever younger and constituting a trend Russian officials say reflects at least in part the indifference of many teachers and students to such actions.
Speaking to a meeting of the Moscow city education department this week, Grigory Krasnov, the deputy chief of the capital’s militia, said that “if in 2006, pupils committed six extremist crimes, in 2007, we recorded 20, and in 2008, 64,” most in ethnically mixed areas of the Russian capital ( www.newsmsk.com/article/22Apr2009/school_extrem.html).
Given that sociologists and rights activists have suggested that such crimes are often not reported or registered by the authorities when individuals affected try to get the powers that be to take action, these numbers are all undoubtedly too low, but the trend that Krasnov points to is disturbing on two grounds.
On the one hand, it suggests that xenophobic attitudes are increasingly common in the schools of the Russian capital given the general cultural messages in the media and the increasing share of the student bodies of these schools which members of non-Russian nationalities now constitute.
And on the other, and perhaps even more worrisome, is Krasnov’s observation that “when we asked about the characteristics of the youths have committed crimes, we found out that class leaders describe them as conscientious, not inclined to conflict and on the whole positive personalities.”
In addition, the Moscow militia officer said, “the extremist manifestations [which his officers registered] were not identified by inspectors working in the schools, even though the young people did not reveal their views and had adopted [the kind of clothes, language and behavior associated with extremism.”
“This is either indifference,” Krasnov continued, “or an attempt to minimize the situation.” But regardless of which explanation is correct, he suggested, that approach by those who should be on the first line of defense against crimes of this and other kinds almost certainly is making the situation worse.
The militia official also discussed the broader problem of crimes committed by young people. He said that the number of such crimes was growing not because native Muscovites were committing them – the number of crimes committed by them has actually fallen, Krasnov said – but because of crimes committed by young people “coming in from nearby regions.”
Such outer suburbs – Lyubertsy is perhaps the most infamous of these areas – have long been a source of criminal and xenophobic activities, but Krasnov’s comments suggest that residents of such places are now preying on residents of the central districts, a trend that if true could point to even more crime in the future.
Meanwhile, in a related development, Aleksandr Bastrykin, the head of the Investigations Committee of the Russian Federation Procuracy, provided his own explanation for the rise in crime among young people and his own prescription for what the Russian authorities should be doing to counter it (www.rosbalt.ru/2009/04/23/635818.html).
He told a meeting in St. Petersburg this week that “the liberalization of the 1990s had led to a growth of crime among minors. Children rape and beat one another,” he continued, “something that didn’t happen in the times of the USSR.” And he suggested that it was time to return “to the Soviet system of Pioneer and patriotic camps.”
Bastrykin also lashed out at the media, complaining that in recent years, media leaders have been “unwilling” to face up to the consequences of the violence they report and show, apparently having failed to think “that they have their own children and [the latter] may see all this dirt.”
The Moscow prosecutor urged that the country “reestablish the old Soviet system which included sports and patriotic camps in order to correct this situation” and help young people escape from the moral “collapse” of recent times. In this, he was supported by his St. Petersburg colleague Sergey Zaytsev, who said such steps would in fact reduce youth crime.
But several participants in the meeting in the northern capital sharply disagreed. Dmitry Dubrovsky, the director of the Smolny Institute’s Human Rights Program, for example, said that those who sought to excuse the actions of skinheads by saying they “incorrectly understood” the meaning of patriotism are wrong.
“Skinheads,” he said, are “least of all like poor confused children. On the contrary, they have an ideological base, and they correctly understand specifically Russian patriotism, which is based on a search for an external and internal enemy and the conducting of an active struggle with it.”
“In this sense,” Dubrovsky continued, Russia’s skinheads “understand our patriotism correctly and are carrying it to its logical conclusion.” More than that, many Russian Nazis, he said, are the products of precisely the military-patriotic sports clubs that Bastrykin and his allies see as a panacea for this problem.
Those clubs, the human rights activist pointed out, have “their own definite system of values, literature, symbols, music and films. Many current Russian patriotic camps not only do not deflect youths from extremist ideas [as Bastrykin says he would like them to do] but on the contrary make it more likely” that young Russians will accept these ideas rather than any others.
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