Paul Goble
Vienna, April 23 – Dmitry Medvedev’s actions in recent weeks have “disoriented” many in both Russia and in the West, according to a leading Moscow commentator, because such people have failed to understand that in its operations, the leaders of today’s “power vertical” are acting in ways that resemble those of Stalin and his henchmen in the past.
That should be obvious given the simultaneous talk in Moscow now “about the need to improve the image of Russia abroad,” Irina Pavlova argues, and even more the plans to hold a forum in Washington to advance that cause later this month featuring speakers like Andranik Migranyan and Gleb Pavlovsky (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/President/m.150145.html).
But instead, the Moscow commentator continues, “many are concluding that the powers that be [in the Russian Federation] are sending signals [to their own people and the West] about the beginning of a change in policy direction and perhaps about the coming or a new ‘thaw’ or even ‘perestroika.’”
To think in that way, Pavlova argues, is to be taken in by the regime because “all these conversations about signals testify, to put it mildly, about the lack of any appreciation of how the much-ballyhooed ‘vertical’ of power actually operates,” a failure of perception that is especially sad in the case of those Western scholars who have studied the Stalinist regime.
Were Sheilah Fitzpatrick, the author of “Everyday Stalinism,” to talk about “signals” today, that would be “unforgivable,” the Grani.ru commentator suggests, because the American professor knows on the basis of her research that Russian leaders don’t send “signals,” they show their intent by actions that they have often taken great pains to separate themselves from.
“The real powers that be [in Stalin’s time] acted according to the laws of conspiracy, in secret not only from the people but from their own party and outside the bounds of the Constitution.” Only when people saw what took place, Pavlova suggests, could they begin to divine what the leaders really intended.
Russia’s “present powers that be,” the Grani.ru writer adds, “operate in exactly the same way. Is much known to society now, including the members of the United Russia Party about the secret and top secret directives of the hidden behind the scenes politburo of the FSB, MVD, MFA or the Ministry of Defense which are then presented in the directives of these agencies?”
“It is completely certain that many of these directives are given orally so that it will be possible to reconstruct them only on the basis of the actions that follow.” And thus, the Moscow analyst says, “the inalienable aspects of such a conspiratorial type of powers that be are the lie and conscious disinformation.”
To make her point, Pavlova points out that Russian and Western historians have been “struggling for decades trying to establish Stalin’s intentions in 1939 to 1941.” Even now that some of the archives have been open, on many questions, “there are no traces of [Stalin’s] directive activity even in the ‘special file’ of the Politburo.”
“Was he prepared for an aggressive war against Hitler with the goal of the subsequent seizure of Europe?” is a question those archives can’t answer, Pavlova notes, because “in the traditions of conspiracy, Stalin and Zhukov did not put their signatures” on key documents that might otherwise provide the answer.
“Exactly the same history was repeated not long ago at the time of the [Russian] war with Georgia,” she continues. “Where are those directive documents which came from the highest echelons of power which would reveal its intentions and concrete steps in the preparation for this war?” Only the course of events provides an indication of what this guidance consisted of.
Unfortunately, she writes, “society again believed the words of Putin-Medvedev and thus became again the victim of disinformation.” And “those who do not want to be deceived will be forced to devote a great deal of effort if they are to re-establish historical truth” about the Russian-Georgian war.
Now, as in the past, “blind faith in the powers that be without any indication of its secret directive activity is a particular feature of Russian existence,” Pavlova argues. Many Russians, for example, were “shocked” at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s when they found out even what the Stalin-era archives showed about the leadership.
But tragically, “today those who are deciding for themselves whether to serve or not serve the Kremlin have forgotten about this. They are prepared to trust the powers that be about the decisions of which they do not know and cannot even guess” now and even more so in the future.
Pavlova concludes her essay with the following observation: The situation in the upper echelons of power in Moscow today “corresponds to the period of the 1930s. Just as at that time, the regime was still young but it was strengthening itself and ready for action.” And it enjoyed the sympathy of “all who had decided that this was the best choice for the country.”
And as some people have also forgotten, “in Stalin’s time there were not only repressions. There was also a hidden preparation for war, and a well-fed Stalinist elite which closed its eyes both on the domestic and foreign policies of the [Stalinist] leadership of the country.”
Thursday, April 23, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Daghestani President Seeks to Stabilize His Republic by Reversing Putin Policy
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 23 – In order to prevent the situation in his North Caucasus republic from spinning out of control, Mukhu Aliyev, the president of Daghestan, is preparing amendments to the election law that will reverse Vladimir Putin’s plans and allow Makhachkala to allocate positions in the government according to a system of ethnic quotas.
For most of Soviet and post-Soviet times, Moscow permitted Daghestan to reserve particular positions in that republic’s executive and legislative branches for representatives of particular ethnic groups, an arrangement that preserved balance and largely kept the peace in that most multi-ethnic of regions.
But former Russian President Vladimir Putin insisted that Daghestan follow the same rules as in other parts of the country with selections to these offices being decided by majority vote alone, a change that meant many smaller groups lost representation in and attachment to the government.
That has exacerbated ethnic tensions in Daghestan in recent years, and now President Aliyev has announced that he wants to amend Russian legislation so that his republic at least can go back to a quota system in which far more groups will be represented in thus feel a greater attachment to Makhachkala and even Moscow (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/153286).
In comments to Gazeta.ru and Kavkaz-uzel.ru, Aliyev noted that “there are many peoples in Daghestan, with 30 of them alone being indigenous. Four are the largest, and they have traditionally been represented in the organs of power.” That is something that those organizing the political system “must not fail to consider.”
“If [in Daghestan] the president and prime minister and the head of the parliament are members of a single nationality” – something that could happen given the radically different size of ethnic groups there if a pure majoritarian system is put in place – “there will never be stability,” Aliyev continued.
What is needed if Daghestan is to be both stable and democratic is the restoration of the pre-Putin arrangement under the terms of which, as Kavkaz-uzel.ru pointed out, “Avars traditionally received the post of president, Dargins the position of parliamentary speaker, and the prime minister was a Kumyk.”
“What kind of a democracy is it if peoples who live here do not have representation in that organ whose members they supposedly choose? They will think up their own parliament,” he continued, one that will be not only separate from but opposed to the republic and federal structures.
Aliyev said that the arrangements now in place have forced him to repeatedly intervene in the electoral process in his republic, asking some people not to run for office and others to refuse the posts they were elected to, in order to preserve the ethnic balance and thus political stability as best he could.
In the future, of course, Daghestan should “depart from the nationality question in the formation of the organs of power,” Kavkaz-uzel.ru summarized Aliyev’s view, “but the time for that has not yet arrived.” “National feelings just like religious ones” the Daghestan president said, “are very strong. Time and patience are needed.”
While saying that he is preparing amendments that would allow the restoration of the ethnic quota system in Daghestan, Aliyev insisted that he “wasn’t talking about a return to the past. That is impossible.” Instead, he said, he was seeking “amendments which follow the course of contemporary Russian legislation.”
It is unlikely that many in Moscow will see Aliyev’s proposals in that way, but the central government may accept them as a price it is willing to pay lest the situation in the country’s most ethnically fragmented republic spins out of control – even though other non-Russian republics are certain to raise similar demands if Moscow meets those of Makhachkala.
Vienna, April 23 – In order to prevent the situation in his North Caucasus republic from spinning out of control, Mukhu Aliyev, the president of Daghestan, is preparing amendments to the election law that will reverse Vladimir Putin’s plans and allow Makhachkala to allocate positions in the government according to a system of ethnic quotas.
For most of Soviet and post-Soviet times, Moscow permitted Daghestan to reserve particular positions in that republic’s executive and legislative branches for representatives of particular ethnic groups, an arrangement that preserved balance and largely kept the peace in that most multi-ethnic of regions.
But former Russian President Vladimir Putin insisted that Daghestan follow the same rules as in other parts of the country with selections to these offices being decided by majority vote alone, a change that meant many smaller groups lost representation in and attachment to the government.
That has exacerbated ethnic tensions in Daghestan in recent years, and now President Aliyev has announced that he wants to amend Russian legislation so that his republic at least can go back to a quota system in which far more groups will be represented in thus feel a greater attachment to Makhachkala and even Moscow (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/153286).
In comments to Gazeta.ru and Kavkaz-uzel.ru, Aliyev noted that “there are many peoples in Daghestan, with 30 of them alone being indigenous. Four are the largest, and they have traditionally been represented in the organs of power.” That is something that those organizing the political system “must not fail to consider.”
“If [in Daghestan] the president and prime minister and the head of the parliament are members of a single nationality” – something that could happen given the radically different size of ethnic groups there if a pure majoritarian system is put in place – “there will never be stability,” Aliyev continued.
What is needed if Daghestan is to be both stable and democratic is the restoration of the pre-Putin arrangement under the terms of which, as Kavkaz-uzel.ru pointed out, “Avars traditionally received the post of president, Dargins the position of parliamentary speaker, and the prime minister was a Kumyk.”
“What kind of a democracy is it if peoples who live here do not have representation in that organ whose members they supposedly choose? They will think up their own parliament,” he continued, one that will be not only separate from but opposed to the republic and federal structures.
Aliyev said that the arrangements now in place have forced him to repeatedly intervene in the electoral process in his republic, asking some people not to run for office and others to refuse the posts they were elected to, in order to preserve the ethnic balance and thus political stability as best he could.
In the future, of course, Daghestan should “depart from the nationality question in the formation of the organs of power,” Kavkaz-uzel.ru summarized Aliyev’s view, “but the time for that has not yet arrived.” “National feelings just like religious ones” the Daghestan president said, “are very strong. Time and patience are needed.”
While saying that he is preparing amendments that would allow the restoration of the ethnic quota system in Daghestan, Aliyev insisted that he “wasn’t talking about a return to the past. That is impossible.” Instead, he said, he was seeking “amendments which follow the course of contemporary Russian legislation.”
It is unlikely that many in Moscow will see Aliyev’s proposals in that way, but the central government may accept them as a price it is willing to pay lest the situation in the country’s most ethnically fragmented republic spins out of control – even though other non-Russian republics are certain to raise similar demands if Moscow meets those of Makhachkala.
Window on Eurasia: Kremlin Begins Rehabilitation of Yeltsin
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 23 – Two years after his death, Boris Yeltsin, whom many Russians blame for their problems, is being politically rehabilitated by the Kremlin, a reflection of what the first Russian president in fact accomplished and of the desire of some in the current leadership to distance themselves from the policies of Yeltsin’s hand-picked successor, Vladimir Putin.
When Yeltsin died on April 23, 2007, he was one of the most hated men in Russia, routinely blamed by Russians and their leaders for the demise of the Soviet Union, their own country’s loss of status, and many of their own problems. And even now he remains a divisive figure whom many in that country dislike (newsland.ru/Polls/Detail/id/359800/).
But now there are indications that some in the Russian elite are reconsidering his role, either because they recognize what Yeltsin did and did not do in a most difficult time or because they, like Russian and Soviet leaders before them, are seeking a basis for legitimacy even as they distance themselves from some of the policies of their immediate predecessor.
Gleb Pavlovsky, the president of the Foundation for Effective Politics and someone close to the Kremlin, said this week that “Yeltsin was able to do all that was necessary so that Russia did not follow a Yugoslav scenario in the development of events after the Soviet Union ceased its existence” (www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=278174).
“And in this,” Pavlovsky continued, undoubtedly is Yeltsin’s great contribution. … He came to power, after having destroyed the Soviet state but he left his post as president without having destroyed Russia. Had he been more in love with power, [Russia] certainly would not have been able to avoid a civil war.”
Yeltsin was thus a president “without blood” on his hands, the Kremlin political technologist and commentator said. And in the history of Russia, both before and after his two terms in office, that is no small achievement, however much many would disagree, given Yeltsin’s own launch of the war in Chechnya.
Aleksey Malashenko of the Moscow Carnegie Center agreed. Under Yeltsin, he told “Vesti,” what should have been destroyed was and what should have been put in its place began to be. And the Carnegie expert pointedly noted that if Yeltsin had enjoyed the oil prices Putin did, “Russia in the 1990s would have been able to avoid many economic difficulties.”
In many ways, this apparent decision of the Kremlin recalls Nikita Khrushchev’s anti-Stalin campaign, a major if not always remarked feature was his call for the country to return to the principles of Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state and the man who clearly inspired Khrushchev’s own youth.
That is how Stalin’s successor sought to distance himself from Stalin’s most egregious crimes while protecting himself and his system by appealing to the man Stalin replaced – even though as many historians quickly pointed out to Khrushchev’s horror, much of what Stalin did was simply carrying out Lenin’s teachings.
And that unwelcome “discovery” ultimately became the basis for the ouster of Khrushchev and his replacement by Leonid Brezhnev, who recognized that the Soviet system was in terrible trouble if its own leaders suggested that the man who had dominated it for most of its existence was a bloodthirsty tyrant.
Consequently, even implicitly attacking one’s own immediate predecessor by building up his predecessor can be a high risk game politically because such an approach can lead some to conclude that the system itself is the problem since the person being built up is the one who chose the one implicitly or in some cases explicitly being criticized.
And just as Khrushchev’s attacks on Stalin ultimately led Soviet citizens to reflect that Lenin had appointed him and that the system itself rather than any one man was the problem, so too it is at least possible that any rehabilitation of Yeltsin could lead some to conclude that the first Russian president’s greatest crime was in fact his selection of his successor.
But however that may be, today, friends and colleagues honored Yeltsin by attending a service at Moscow’s Novodeviche cemetery. Yeltsin’s widow came together with her daughters and they shook hands and spoke with those in attendance, thus displaying precisely the kind of modesty so often lacking in such circumstances (www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=278316).
Vienna, April 23 – Two years after his death, Boris Yeltsin, whom many Russians blame for their problems, is being politically rehabilitated by the Kremlin, a reflection of what the first Russian president in fact accomplished and of the desire of some in the current leadership to distance themselves from the policies of Yeltsin’s hand-picked successor, Vladimir Putin.
When Yeltsin died on April 23, 2007, he was one of the most hated men in Russia, routinely blamed by Russians and their leaders for the demise of the Soviet Union, their own country’s loss of status, and many of their own problems. And even now he remains a divisive figure whom many in that country dislike (newsland.ru/Polls/Detail/id/359800/).
But now there are indications that some in the Russian elite are reconsidering his role, either because they recognize what Yeltsin did and did not do in a most difficult time or because they, like Russian and Soviet leaders before them, are seeking a basis for legitimacy even as they distance themselves from some of the policies of their immediate predecessor.
Gleb Pavlovsky, the president of the Foundation for Effective Politics and someone close to the Kremlin, said this week that “Yeltsin was able to do all that was necessary so that Russia did not follow a Yugoslav scenario in the development of events after the Soviet Union ceased its existence” (www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=278174).
“And in this,” Pavlovsky continued, undoubtedly is Yeltsin’s great contribution. … He came to power, after having destroyed the Soviet state but he left his post as president without having destroyed Russia. Had he been more in love with power, [Russia] certainly would not have been able to avoid a civil war.”
Yeltsin was thus a president “without blood” on his hands, the Kremlin political technologist and commentator said. And in the history of Russia, both before and after his two terms in office, that is no small achievement, however much many would disagree, given Yeltsin’s own launch of the war in Chechnya.
Aleksey Malashenko of the Moscow Carnegie Center agreed. Under Yeltsin, he told “Vesti,” what should have been destroyed was and what should have been put in its place began to be. And the Carnegie expert pointedly noted that if Yeltsin had enjoyed the oil prices Putin did, “Russia in the 1990s would have been able to avoid many economic difficulties.”
In many ways, this apparent decision of the Kremlin recalls Nikita Khrushchev’s anti-Stalin campaign, a major if not always remarked feature was his call for the country to return to the principles of Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state and the man who clearly inspired Khrushchev’s own youth.
That is how Stalin’s successor sought to distance himself from Stalin’s most egregious crimes while protecting himself and his system by appealing to the man Stalin replaced – even though as many historians quickly pointed out to Khrushchev’s horror, much of what Stalin did was simply carrying out Lenin’s teachings.
And that unwelcome “discovery” ultimately became the basis for the ouster of Khrushchev and his replacement by Leonid Brezhnev, who recognized that the Soviet system was in terrible trouble if its own leaders suggested that the man who had dominated it for most of its existence was a bloodthirsty tyrant.
Consequently, even implicitly attacking one’s own immediate predecessor by building up his predecessor can be a high risk game politically because such an approach can lead some to conclude that the system itself is the problem since the person being built up is the one who chose the one implicitly or in some cases explicitly being criticized.
And just as Khrushchev’s attacks on Stalin ultimately led Soviet citizens to reflect that Lenin had appointed him and that the system itself rather than any one man was the problem, so too it is at least possible that any rehabilitation of Yeltsin could lead some to conclude that the first Russian president’s greatest crime was in fact his selection of his successor.
But however that may be, today, friends and colleagues honored Yeltsin by attending a service at Moscow’s Novodeviche cemetery. Yeltsin’s widow came together with her daughters and they shook hands and spoke with those in attendance, thus displaying precisely the kind of modesty so often lacking in such circumstances (www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=278316).
Wednesday, April 22, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Will Non-Russians of the Altai Unite into a Single Nation for the Census?
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 22 – The indigenous ethnic groups of the Altai Republic are thinking about uniting into a single Altai nation in advance of the 2010 Russian census, lest Moscow decide given how few members there are of any one of them to decide to liquidate the republic and combine it with the neighboring Altai kray.
One of the reasons some officials in the republic say they are pushing the idea is that a recent federal law providing assistance to numerically small communities led some members of the formerly united Altai people to declare themselves Kumandins, Tubulars, Chelkans, Telengits and Altais in order to receive aid (www.narodru.ru/smi20756.html).
But while the individual members of these communities perhaps gained individually, Ivan Belekov, the speaker of the republic’s legislative assembly, told the Regnum news agency yesterday, their individual decisions put the future of the republic they call home very much at risk.
According to the legislative speaker, “before the peoples of the Altai stands the task of preserving the unity of the Altai people and avoiding the loss of federal support which today he indigenous numerically small peoples have.” But the leaders of some of these small groups say that the aid may be more important than the ethnic self-identification.
Nikolai Malchinov, the president of a group promoting the development of the Telengit people, suggested that the authorities were about eight years too late in deciding to talk “directly and openly” about the relationship between the status of the republic as a national home and financial assistance from Moscow. For many, he said, the aid is often more important.
Aleksandr Krachnakov, the head of the Chelkan community, said that 557 people in one district had successfully gone to court in order to secure that ethnic identity and that more were waiting for a final adjudication of their requests. “Stopping this progress,” he said, “is very complicated because people are getting real benefits by doing so.”
And Mariya Sakova, an activist from the Choy district, said that in her region some 387 people had secured the legal right to “consider themselves Tubalars” and thus receive aid. To turn the clock back, she said, would be hard if not impossible. “As a result of the law, we have now our own forest region.”
But Artem Sumachakov, the president of the Association of Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the Altai Republic, said everyone concerned about their fate in that region needs to try to change things. “Under contemporary continues, we are simply obligated, while striving to protect ethnic diversity to try to preserve national unity.”
He said that the leaders of the ethnic communities in the Altai need to reflect on what will happen if they choose to declare themselves members of these various micro-communities rather that part of “a united front of Altais.” On their decision, he said, will depend “whether the republic will survive or not.”
This is not the first time this discussion has broken out in the Altai Republic, officials say. Prior to the 2002 Russian census, republic officials pushed for having indigenous residents declare themselves Altais rather than members of any other group, fearful that if the percentage of Altais was too small, Moscow would abolish the republic.
Russian government officials pointed out that there is nothing in federal legislation that sets a minimum percentage of indigenous people as a condition for the creation or survival of a republic within the federation. But few Altais appear to have believed that, and probably fewer do today given Vladimir Putin’s push for the amalgamation of republics and regions.
Whether as a result of these concerns or simply inertia, 62,192 residents of the Altai Republic, just over 30 percent of the total, declared themselves Altais, with another four percent saying they were members of one or another of the smaller groups whose members republic officials are now seeking to have rejoin the Altais.
Most people are likely to be inclined to dismiss this situation as unimportant given the relatively tiny numbers of people involved. But it is important in at least two respects. On the one hand, it highlights the plasticity of ethnic identity in the Russian Federation and the ability of officials, central and republic-level, to lead people to re-identify for one purpose or another.
And on the other, the Altai case calls attention to something else: Many residents of the Russian Federation believe that only groups with a plurality or even a majority on a particular territory should have an ethnic republic. In the past, that would have worked in favor of the ethnic Russians; but given their numerical decline, it now could work for non-Russian groups.
Consequently, the campaign to secure identification or re-identification of some of the members of the Altai or other groups and its success as measured in the census returns of 2010 are likely to be watched closely both by those who hope to preserve current federal arrangements and those who are interested in changing them.
Vienna, April 22 – The indigenous ethnic groups of the Altai Republic are thinking about uniting into a single Altai nation in advance of the 2010 Russian census, lest Moscow decide given how few members there are of any one of them to decide to liquidate the republic and combine it with the neighboring Altai kray.
One of the reasons some officials in the republic say they are pushing the idea is that a recent federal law providing assistance to numerically small communities led some members of the formerly united Altai people to declare themselves Kumandins, Tubulars, Chelkans, Telengits and Altais in order to receive aid (www.narodru.ru/smi20756.html).
But while the individual members of these communities perhaps gained individually, Ivan Belekov, the speaker of the republic’s legislative assembly, told the Regnum news agency yesterday, their individual decisions put the future of the republic they call home very much at risk.
According to the legislative speaker, “before the peoples of the Altai stands the task of preserving the unity of the Altai people and avoiding the loss of federal support which today he indigenous numerically small peoples have.” But the leaders of some of these small groups say that the aid may be more important than the ethnic self-identification.
Nikolai Malchinov, the president of a group promoting the development of the Telengit people, suggested that the authorities were about eight years too late in deciding to talk “directly and openly” about the relationship between the status of the republic as a national home and financial assistance from Moscow. For many, he said, the aid is often more important.
Aleksandr Krachnakov, the head of the Chelkan community, said that 557 people in one district had successfully gone to court in order to secure that ethnic identity and that more were waiting for a final adjudication of their requests. “Stopping this progress,” he said, “is very complicated because people are getting real benefits by doing so.”
And Mariya Sakova, an activist from the Choy district, said that in her region some 387 people had secured the legal right to “consider themselves Tubalars” and thus receive aid. To turn the clock back, she said, would be hard if not impossible. “As a result of the law, we have now our own forest region.”
But Artem Sumachakov, the president of the Association of Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the Altai Republic, said everyone concerned about their fate in that region needs to try to change things. “Under contemporary continues, we are simply obligated, while striving to protect ethnic diversity to try to preserve national unity.”
He said that the leaders of the ethnic communities in the Altai need to reflect on what will happen if they choose to declare themselves members of these various micro-communities rather that part of “a united front of Altais.” On their decision, he said, will depend “whether the republic will survive or not.”
This is not the first time this discussion has broken out in the Altai Republic, officials say. Prior to the 2002 Russian census, republic officials pushed for having indigenous residents declare themselves Altais rather than members of any other group, fearful that if the percentage of Altais was too small, Moscow would abolish the republic.
Russian government officials pointed out that there is nothing in federal legislation that sets a minimum percentage of indigenous people as a condition for the creation or survival of a republic within the federation. But few Altais appear to have believed that, and probably fewer do today given Vladimir Putin’s push for the amalgamation of republics and regions.
Whether as a result of these concerns or simply inertia, 62,192 residents of the Altai Republic, just over 30 percent of the total, declared themselves Altais, with another four percent saying they were members of one or another of the smaller groups whose members republic officials are now seeking to have rejoin the Altais.
Most people are likely to be inclined to dismiss this situation as unimportant given the relatively tiny numbers of people involved. But it is important in at least two respects. On the one hand, it highlights the plasticity of ethnic identity in the Russian Federation and the ability of officials, central and republic-level, to lead people to re-identify for one purpose or another.
And on the other, the Altai case calls attention to something else: Many residents of the Russian Federation believe that only groups with a plurality or even a majority on a particular territory should have an ethnic republic. In the past, that would have worked in favor of the ethnic Russians; but given their numerical decline, it now could work for non-Russian groups.
Consequently, the campaign to secure identification or re-identification of some of the members of the Altai or other groups and its success as measured in the census returns of 2010 are likely to be watched closely both by those who hope to preserve current federal arrangements and those who are interested in changing them.
Window on Eurasia: ‘Lenin is Worse than Hitler,’ Senior Moscow Patriarchate Official Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 22 – Today is the 139th birthday of Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state whose body remains as it has since his death in the mausoleum on Red Square, an object of veneration by his supporters and an offense of varying degrees to those who see him as the enemy of national tradition, freedom and faith.
This year, as in every year since Gorbachev’s time, there has been the usual discussion on whether Lenin should be removed from the mausoleum and buried as supposedly was not only his wish but that of his family, with a growing number of Russians saying that they are willing to support or at least not oppose such an action if the government takes it.
But one statement this year, by Archpriest Dimitry Smirnov, head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for Relations with the Armed Forces and Security Services, deserves particular attention because his words likely reflect the views of many in the Church leadership and because they could lead to a break between the church and some Russian nationalists.
Queried by the Rusk.ru portal, which has close ties with the Patriarchate, about what should be done with Lenin’s remains, Archpriest Dimitry said that “the time for burying Lenin arrived already in April 1870.” Indeed, the Church official said, “it would have been better if this bastard had never been born” (www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=182479).
“For me,” Smirnov continued, “Lenin is worse than Hitler. The decision of the powers to bury him will not lead to any social explosion. When the body of Stalin who was ‘a living god’ was carried out of the Mausoleum, no one got upset. What is there to talk about [when it comes to Lenin]?”
After arguing that there is no reason to be concerned about any popular reaction to removing Lenin from Red Square, Smirnov continued with the observation that he “in general is an opponent of burying the body of Lenin. Instead, he should be burned in an oven in Franz-Joseph Land and thrown into the sea there so that his ashes will fall on Europe.”
Or perhaps an even better idea, he argued, would be to bury Lenin’s “corpse on the far side of the moon so that it would not shine on the earth.” But whatever is decided, “one must not bury this evil doer in Holy Russia,” after all the crimes Lenin and the system he set up committed against the Russian people and the Russian church.
Other clerics the portal questioned were more careful in their discussion of the issue, noting the problems involved and the uncertainties of the social and political situation in Russia as a result of the deepening economic crisis, but Smirnov’s unrestrained comments attracted the support of three of the most nationalistic of lay Russian Orthodox groups.
Not only did the Unions of Orthodox Brotherhoods, of Orthodox Banner Carriers, and of the Russian People adopt an official declaration in support of the archpriest’s declaration (www.pycckie.org/novosti/2009/novosti-220409-2.shtml), but they staged a small demonstration in Moscow in support of his ideas (www.pycckie.org/novosti/2009/novosti-220409.shtml).
These are three marginal groups, although their colorful signs and language did attract some media attention, but Smirnov’s words, given his position, are likely to matter a great deal more. Not only is he a senior official in the Moscow Patriarchate, but his proposal almost certainly reflects the thinking if not yet the public position of other churchmen there.
Indeed, it is possible that the archpriest’s remarks may be yet another testing of the political waters by new Patriarch Kirill in order to determine just how far the church can push the government on this issue. It may even be the case that Smirnov’s “extreme” position will be used by the patriarch to case himself as a moderate by calling for Lenin’s burial.
But there is another consequence of Archpriest Dimitry’s remarks that may matter even more. His remarks are certain to offend those Russian nationalists who have chosen to ally themselves with former and not so former communists in order to press their own agendas. And many of them are likely to view the church with even more suspicion and distaste after this.
Consequently, it is even possible that Kirill may find it expedient to fire Dimitry in the name of broader political comity. But Dimitry has many friends in the military, the interior ministry and the FSB, and their power could make any move in that direction difficult, if not impossible.
And thus even as the Duma is considering legislation that might make it a crime to equate Hitler and Stalin during World War II, a leader of the Russian Orthodox Church is going further and insisting not only that Lenin remains worse than Hitler but that his remains should be removed from Red Square and placed on the far side of the moon.
Vienna, April 22 – Today is the 139th birthday of Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state whose body remains as it has since his death in the mausoleum on Red Square, an object of veneration by his supporters and an offense of varying degrees to those who see him as the enemy of national tradition, freedom and faith.
This year, as in every year since Gorbachev’s time, there has been the usual discussion on whether Lenin should be removed from the mausoleum and buried as supposedly was not only his wish but that of his family, with a growing number of Russians saying that they are willing to support or at least not oppose such an action if the government takes it.
But one statement this year, by Archpriest Dimitry Smirnov, head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for Relations with the Armed Forces and Security Services, deserves particular attention because his words likely reflect the views of many in the Church leadership and because they could lead to a break between the church and some Russian nationalists.
Queried by the Rusk.ru portal, which has close ties with the Patriarchate, about what should be done with Lenin’s remains, Archpriest Dimitry said that “the time for burying Lenin arrived already in April 1870.” Indeed, the Church official said, “it would have been better if this bastard had never been born” (www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=182479).
“For me,” Smirnov continued, “Lenin is worse than Hitler. The decision of the powers to bury him will not lead to any social explosion. When the body of Stalin who was ‘a living god’ was carried out of the Mausoleum, no one got upset. What is there to talk about [when it comes to Lenin]?”
After arguing that there is no reason to be concerned about any popular reaction to removing Lenin from Red Square, Smirnov continued with the observation that he “in general is an opponent of burying the body of Lenin. Instead, he should be burned in an oven in Franz-Joseph Land and thrown into the sea there so that his ashes will fall on Europe.”
Or perhaps an even better idea, he argued, would be to bury Lenin’s “corpse on the far side of the moon so that it would not shine on the earth.” But whatever is decided, “one must not bury this evil doer in Holy Russia,” after all the crimes Lenin and the system he set up committed against the Russian people and the Russian church.
Other clerics the portal questioned were more careful in their discussion of the issue, noting the problems involved and the uncertainties of the social and political situation in Russia as a result of the deepening economic crisis, but Smirnov’s unrestrained comments attracted the support of three of the most nationalistic of lay Russian Orthodox groups.
Not only did the Unions of Orthodox Brotherhoods, of Orthodox Banner Carriers, and of the Russian People adopt an official declaration in support of the archpriest’s declaration (www.pycckie.org/novosti/2009/novosti-220409-2.shtml), but they staged a small demonstration in Moscow in support of his ideas (www.pycckie.org/novosti/2009/novosti-220409.shtml).
These are three marginal groups, although their colorful signs and language did attract some media attention, but Smirnov’s words, given his position, are likely to matter a great deal more. Not only is he a senior official in the Moscow Patriarchate, but his proposal almost certainly reflects the thinking if not yet the public position of other churchmen there.
Indeed, it is possible that the archpriest’s remarks may be yet another testing of the political waters by new Patriarch Kirill in order to determine just how far the church can push the government on this issue. It may even be the case that Smirnov’s “extreme” position will be used by the patriarch to case himself as a moderate by calling for Lenin’s burial.
But there is another consequence of Archpriest Dimitry’s remarks that may matter even more. His remarks are certain to offend those Russian nationalists who have chosen to ally themselves with former and not so former communists in order to press their own agendas. And many of them are likely to view the church with even more suspicion and distaste after this.
Consequently, it is even possible that Kirill may find it expedient to fire Dimitry in the name of broader political comity. But Dimitry has many friends in the military, the interior ministry and the FSB, and their power could make any move in that direction difficult, if not impossible.
And thus even as the Duma is considering legislation that might make it a crime to equate Hitler and Stalin during World War II, a leader of the Russian Orthodox Church is going further and insisting not only that Lenin remains worse than Hitler but that his remains should be removed from Red Square and placed on the far side of the moon.
Window on Eurasia: Another Victory for Kadyrov—No Chechens to Be Drafted This Year
Paul Goble
Charlottesville, April 21 – Thirteen years to the day that Russian forces killed Dzhokhar Dudayev, Chechnya’s first president, Ramzan Kadyrov, that republic’s current one, has gained yet another concession from Moscow: The Russian military will not take Chechens this year into Russia’s uniformed service despite increasing the number to be drafted elsewhere.
That announcement in Grozny comes on the heels of Moscow’s declaration of the end of the counter-terrorism operation there, an act that has prompted some to talk about another “victory of Chechnya over Russia,” others to point to the continuing activity of anti-Russian militants there, and still others to argue that Moscow is making a third Chechen war “inevitable.”
But the most serious immediate consequence is likely to be a new outburst of anger by groups like the Russian Soldiers Mothers Committee who are already upset by Moscow’s decision to set higher draft quotas in predominantly ethnic Russian areas than in historically Muslim ones an arrangement that means ethnic Russians are more likely to have to serve.
The military commissariat of the Chechen Republic has announced that Chechens will be tested but not drafted this spring, thus removing from the country’s potential draft pool more than 80,000 youths of military age. Officials said they expected Chechens to be drafted in one of the next rounds (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/153184).
But no Chechens living in the republic have been drafted in significant numbers since 1991, a reflection both of the reluctance of parents to send their sons to serve under officers who passed through one or both of the Chechen wars and of a desire on the part Russian officials to avoid the problems of dedovshchina and crime that they would expect if Chechens were drafted.
There were a small number of inductions from Chechnya in 2002 and 2005, but there were protests from within the republic and from commanders as well. And consequently, both Grozny and Moscow have moved very cautiously on this front. Indeed, the very act of checking young Chechens this year to see if they are capable of serving may yet cause problems.
Nurdi Nukhazhiyev, the republic’s human rights ombudsman, says that the young Chechens are healthier than many had expected but that they are “children of war who have not yet passed through social rehabilitation.” And consequently, he says, that they should not be sent into other regions of Russia where “xenophobia” is widespread.
In his opinion, what Moscow should consider is “the formation of military-construction and railroad battalions from among the natives of the republic which would be involved in the recovery efforts directly inside [Chechnya]. That might solve some problems, but it would be virtually certain to create others.
Allowing future Chechen draftees to serve in their home area would almost certainly generate demands by other ethnic and regional groups to allow their draftees to follow suit, something that would if it spread make it difficult if not impossible for the Russian uniformed services to function and could contribute to separatist impulses elsewhere.
Yesterday, in an article published under the rubric “Far from Moscow,” “Yezhednevny zhurnal’s” Yuliya Latynina described the decision to end the counter-terrorism operation as “a victory day of Chechnya over Russia,” a retreat of Russian power even though anti-Moscow forces continue to operate (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=8999).
Indeed, she wrote, there is growing evidence that the militants are once again becoming more active at a time when more and more of them are simply joining Kadyrov’s government without really changing their views. Consequently, for many of them, Moscow’s action represents a victory, but not a victory for Russia.
Meanwhile, new reports indicate that Moscow is not living up to its promises: Since Moscow declared the end of the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya, Russian forces have continued their operations in parts of the republic, highlighting the threats the militants still represent and making a mockery of Moscow’s claims (www.nr2.ru/incidents/229648.html).
And finally, Viktor Alksnis, the outspoken deputy president of the Popular Union Party in Russia, said that Russia’s concessions to Chechnya now are dangerous mistakes because they will, like the Khasavyurt accords of 1996, make yet another war in Chechnya “inevitable” (www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=730784).
Alksnis said that Moscow’s decision to lift the counter-terrorism operation will only cause its opponents to increase their activity, something that will lead to more “victims” among the pro-Moscow population. Indeed, he said, “it is already possible to raise the question about when the third Chechen war will begin.”
“If you fight with terrorists,” he continued, “you must really do so. For this, one needs to declare a regime of martial law, to officially recognize that in the North Caucasus there is an armed revolt and not to invent some new juridical terms like counter-terrorist operation and thus put military people who are fulfilling their obligations in an impossible legal situation.”
But far worse, what Moscow has done by lifting this operation is to grant Kadyrov precisely what Dzhokhar Dudayev sought 15 years ago like control over customs and that Moscow first under Boris Yeltsin and then under Vladimir Putin said had to be retrieved if Russia’s territorial integrity and common legal space were to be maintained.
What does the latest action by the Russian government of Putin and Dmitry Medvedev thus say not just about where Chechnya may be heading but about where the Russian Federation is proceeding as well? Alksnis implicitly asks, a question ever more people in both places seem likely to be asking in the coming days.
Charlottesville, April 21 – Thirteen years to the day that Russian forces killed Dzhokhar Dudayev, Chechnya’s first president, Ramzan Kadyrov, that republic’s current one, has gained yet another concession from Moscow: The Russian military will not take Chechens this year into Russia’s uniformed service despite increasing the number to be drafted elsewhere.
That announcement in Grozny comes on the heels of Moscow’s declaration of the end of the counter-terrorism operation there, an act that has prompted some to talk about another “victory of Chechnya over Russia,” others to point to the continuing activity of anti-Russian militants there, and still others to argue that Moscow is making a third Chechen war “inevitable.”
But the most serious immediate consequence is likely to be a new outburst of anger by groups like the Russian Soldiers Mothers Committee who are already upset by Moscow’s decision to set higher draft quotas in predominantly ethnic Russian areas than in historically Muslim ones an arrangement that means ethnic Russians are more likely to have to serve.
The military commissariat of the Chechen Republic has announced that Chechens will be tested but not drafted this spring, thus removing from the country’s potential draft pool more than 80,000 youths of military age. Officials said they expected Chechens to be drafted in one of the next rounds (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/153184).
But no Chechens living in the republic have been drafted in significant numbers since 1991, a reflection both of the reluctance of parents to send their sons to serve under officers who passed through one or both of the Chechen wars and of a desire on the part Russian officials to avoid the problems of dedovshchina and crime that they would expect if Chechens were drafted.
There were a small number of inductions from Chechnya in 2002 and 2005, but there were protests from within the republic and from commanders as well. And consequently, both Grozny and Moscow have moved very cautiously on this front. Indeed, the very act of checking young Chechens this year to see if they are capable of serving may yet cause problems.
Nurdi Nukhazhiyev, the republic’s human rights ombudsman, says that the young Chechens are healthier than many had expected but that they are “children of war who have not yet passed through social rehabilitation.” And consequently, he says, that they should not be sent into other regions of Russia where “xenophobia” is widespread.
In his opinion, what Moscow should consider is “the formation of military-construction and railroad battalions from among the natives of the republic which would be involved in the recovery efforts directly inside [Chechnya]. That might solve some problems, but it would be virtually certain to create others.
Allowing future Chechen draftees to serve in their home area would almost certainly generate demands by other ethnic and regional groups to allow their draftees to follow suit, something that would if it spread make it difficult if not impossible for the Russian uniformed services to function and could contribute to separatist impulses elsewhere.
Yesterday, in an article published under the rubric “Far from Moscow,” “Yezhednevny zhurnal’s” Yuliya Latynina described the decision to end the counter-terrorism operation as “a victory day of Chechnya over Russia,” a retreat of Russian power even though anti-Moscow forces continue to operate (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=8999).
Indeed, she wrote, there is growing evidence that the militants are once again becoming more active at a time when more and more of them are simply joining Kadyrov’s government without really changing their views. Consequently, for many of them, Moscow’s action represents a victory, but not a victory for Russia.
Meanwhile, new reports indicate that Moscow is not living up to its promises: Since Moscow declared the end of the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya, Russian forces have continued their operations in parts of the republic, highlighting the threats the militants still represent and making a mockery of Moscow’s claims (www.nr2.ru/incidents/229648.html).
And finally, Viktor Alksnis, the outspoken deputy president of the Popular Union Party in Russia, said that Russia’s concessions to Chechnya now are dangerous mistakes because they will, like the Khasavyurt accords of 1996, make yet another war in Chechnya “inevitable” (www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=730784).
Alksnis said that Moscow’s decision to lift the counter-terrorism operation will only cause its opponents to increase their activity, something that will lead to more “victims” among the pro-Moscow population. Indeed, he said, “it is already possible to raise the question about when the third Chechen war will begin.”
“If you fight with terrorists,” he continued, “you must really do so. For this, one needs to declare a regime of martial law, to officially recognize that in the North Caucasus there is an armed revolt and not to invent some new juridical terms like counter-terrorist operation and thus put military people who are fulfilling their obligations in an impossible legal situation.”
But far worse, what Moscow has done by lifting this operation is to grant Kadyrov precisely what Dzhokhar Dudayev sought 15 years ago like control over customs and that Moscow first under Boris Yeltsin and then under Vladimir Putin said had to be retrieved if Russia’s territorial integrity and common legal space were to be maintained.
What does the latest action by the Russian government of Putin and Dmitry Medvedev thus say not just about where Chechnya may be heading but about where the Russian Federation is proceeding as well? Alksnis implicitly asks, a question ever more people in both places seem likely to be asking in the coming days.
Tuesday, April 21, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Court Says Internet Portals Can Be Closed for ‘Extremist’ Posts Left by Visitors to Their Sites
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 21 – According to a Moscow court, Russian officials can close down an internet portal if visitors to the site leave comments that the authorities deem to be extremist, a ruling that could force Russian sites to moderate all comments before they are posted or to stop allowing such comments, thereby ending one of the most lively forums in the Russian media.
Yesterday, the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District rejected an appeal by the Urals information agency, URA.ru, which held that it should not be subject to warnings that could open the way for its closure for posts visitors to that site left and the site’s own editors took off within a day (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.150179.html).
That decision, Aksana Panova, the site’s chief editor, said that the decision not only creates “a dangerous precedent” that could be used throughout the Russian Internet but opens the way for abuse because officials could arrange to have someone post “extremist” materials and then pounce even before the site took them off.
She told “Kommersant” that she is convinced that they have been the victims of “a planned campaign,” because URA.ru twice received a warning for the appearance twice of the same “extremist” message that the editors in both cases removed within a day and now is at risk of being shut down (www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1158744).
Even more, she continued, the URA.ru editors immediately turned to the law enforcement agencies of all the regions in which the site has correspondents in an effort to find who had made these posts. But the agencies did not turn up the guilty party despite URA.ru’s provision of the IP addresses of the computers from which these posts came.
Officials responsible for media registration said that they would not necessarily close down sites that carry posts of this kind by visitors to such sites. But that is hardly reassuring because it opens the way to the kind of arbitrariness that is completely at odds with the Russian government’s proclaimed goal of becoming a “law-based” state.
Media and human rights activists are concerned that the Russian government will use this new ruling to selectively punish sites that the powers that be deem to be their opponents. Aleksey Simonov, the president of the Glasnost Defense Foundation, said that “in every region,” the authorities include “people who know which media outlets are loyal and which are not.”
In an open letter to its visitors that appeared on the URA.ru site late yesterday, the editors that “from today, it will be dangerous to find out the opinions of its readers” because that may lead to “quarrels with the government” and ultimately the closure of media outlets that do so (www.ura.ru/content/urfo/20-04-2009/articles/1036253533.html).
“It is no secret,” the editors continue, “that URA.ru does not please everyone: We do not refrain from writing about doubtful financial schemes or the participation of highly-placed bureaucrats in corruption scandals. [And] we consider it correct to publish photographs such as of the cottage of the deputy presidential plenipotentiary and to indicate the cost of its lot.”
From our point of view, they say, “this is the responsibility of journalism and ordinary journalistic work. But certain bureaucrats prefer to deal only with media outlets they ‘control.’” And as this case shows, such bureaucrats now have a new means of putting pressure on media they don’t control or like.
Fortunately, the editors add, the powers that be did not take the final step of closing down URA.ru, but “nevertheless,” they continued, we have been “warned,” and “we have taken the decision to close [the site’s Internet] forum in general,” thus “depriving our readers of the opportunity to discuss news and events in the country.”
Such visitors, they conclude, are now “without a space for discussion.” That is a misfortune for those who rely on URA.ru. But if this case leads other portals to take the same decision – and that seems likely – it will be a tragedy for Russia and a clear indication that the powers that be there have little interest in defending media freedom.
Vienna, April 21 – According to a Moscow court, Russian officials can close down an internet portal if visitors to the site leave comments that the authorities deem to be extremist, a ruling that could force Russian sites to moderate all comments before they are posted or to stop allowing such comments, thereby ending one of the most lively forums in the Russian media.
Yesterday, the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District rejected an appeal by the Urals information agency, URA.ru, which held that it should not be subject to warnings that could open the way for its closure for posts visitors to that site left and the site’s own editors took off within a day (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.150179.html).
That decision, Aksana Panova, the site’s chief editor, said that the decision not only creates “a dangerous precedent” that could be used throughout the Russian Internet but opens the way for abuse because officials could arrange to have someone post “extremist” materials and then pounce even before the site took them off.
She told “Kommersant” that she is convinced that they have been the victims of “a planned campaign,” because URA.ru twice received a warning for the appearance twice of the same “extremist” message that the editors in both cases removed within a day and now is at risk of being shut down (www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1158744).
Even more, she continued, the URA.ru editors immediately turned to the law enforcement agencies of all the regions in which the site has correspondents in an effort to find who had made these posts. But the agencies did not turn up the guilty party despite URA.ru’s provision of the IP addresses of the computers from which these posts came.
Officials responsible for media registration said that they would not necessarily close down sites that carry posts of this kind by visitors to such sites. But that is hardly reassuring because it opens the way to the kind of arbitrariness that is completely at odds with the Russian government’s proclaimed goal of becoming a “law-based” state.
Media and human rights activists are concerned that the Russian government will use this new ruling to selectively punish sites that the powers that be deem to be their opponents. Aleksey Simonov, the president of the Glasnost Defense Foundation, said that “in every region,” the authorities include “people who know which media outlets are loyal and which are not.”
In an open letter to its visitors that appeared on the URA.ru site late yesterday, the editors that “from today, it will be dangerous to find out the opinions of its readers” because that may lead to “quarrels with the government” and ultimately the closure of media outlets that do so (www.ura.ru/content/urfo/20-04-2009/articles/1036253533.html).
“It is no secret,” the editors continue, “that URA.ru does not please everyone: We do not refrain from writing about doubtful financial schemes or the participation of highly-placed bureaucrats in corruption scandals. [And] we consider it correct to publish photographs such as of the cottage of the deputy presidential plenipotentiary and to indicate the cost of its lot.”
From our point of view, they say, “this is the responsibility of journalism and ordinary journalistic work. But certain bureaucrats prefer to deal only with media outlets they ‘control.’” And as this case shows, such bureaucrats now have a new means of putting pressure on media they don’t control or like.
Fortunately, the editors add, the powers that be did not take the final step of closing down URA.ru, but “nevertheless,” they continued, we have been “warned,” and “we have taken the decision to close [the site’s Internet] forum in general,” thus “depriving our readers of the opportunity to discuss news and events in the country.”
Such visitors, they conclude, are now “without a space for discussion.” That is a misfortune for those who rely on URA.ru. But if this case leads other portals to take the same decision – and that seems likely – it will be a tragedy for Russia and a clear indication that the powers that be there have little interest in defending media freedom.
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