Paul Goble
Vienna, April 22 – The indigenous ethnic groups of the Altai Republic are thinking about uniting into a single Altai nation in advance of the 2010 Russian census, lest Moscow decide given how few members there are of any one of them to decide to liquidate the republic and combine it with the neighboring Altai kray.
One of the reasons some officials in the republic say they are pushing the idea is that a recent federal law providing assistance to numerically small communities led some members of the formerly united Altai people to declare themselves Kumandins, Tubulars, Chelkans, Telengits and Altais in order to receive aid (www.narodru.ru/smi20756.html).
But while the individual members of these communities perhaps gained individually, Ivan Belekov, the speaker of the republic’s legislative assembly, told the Regnum news agency yesterday, their individual decisions put the future of the republic they call home very much at risk.
According to the legislative speaker, “before the peoples of the Altai stands the task of preserving the unity of the Altai people and avoiding the loss of federal support which today he indigenous numerically small peoples have.” But the leaders of some of these small groups say that the aid may be more important than the ethnic self-identification.
Nikolai Malchinov, the president of a group promoting the development of the Telengit people, suggested that the authorities were about eight years too late in deciding to talk “directly and openly” about the relationship between the status of the republic as a national home and financial assistance from Moscow. For many, he said, the aid is often more important.
Aleksandr Krachnakov, the head of the Chelkan community, said that 557 people in one district had successfully gone to court in order to secure that ethnic identity and that more were waiting for a final adjudication of their requests. “Stopping this progress,” he said, “is very complicated because people are getting real benefits by doing so.”
And Mariya Sakova, an activist from the Choy district, said that in her region some 387 people had secured the legal right to “consider themselves Tubalars” and thus receive aid. To turn the clock back, she said, would be hard if not impossible. “As a result of the law, we have now our own forest region.”
But Artem Sumachakov, the president of the Association of Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the Altai Republic, said everyone concerned about their fate in that region needs to try to change things. “Under contemporary continues, we are simply obligated, while striving to protect ethnic diversity to try to preserve national unity.”
He said that the leaders of the ethnic communities in the Altai need to reflect on what will happen if they choose to declare themselves members of these various micro-communities rather that part of “a united front of Altais.” On their decision, he said, will depend “whether the republic will survive or not.”
This is not the first time this discussion has broken out in the Altai Republic, officials say. Prior to the 2002 Russian census, republic officials pushed for having indigenous residents declare themselves Altais rather than members of any other group, fearful that if the percentage of Altais was too small, Moscow would abolish the republic.
Russian government officials pointed out that there is nothing in federal legislation that sets a minimum percentage of indigenous people as a condition for the creation or survival of a republic within the federation. But few Altais appear to have believed that, and probably fewer do today given Vladimir Putin’s push for the amalgamation of republics and regions.
Whether as a result of these concerns or simply inertia, 62,192 residents of the Altai Republic, just over 30 percent of the total, declared themselves Altais, with another four percent saying they were members of one or another of the smaller groups whose members republic officials are now seeking to have rejoin the Altais.
Most people are likely to be inclined to dismiss this situation as unimportant given the relatively tiny numbers of people involved. But it is important in at least two respects. On the one hand, it highlights the plasticity of ethnic identity in the Russian Federation and the ability of officials, central and republic-level, to lead people to re-identify for one purpose or another.
And on the other, the Altai case calls attention to something else: Many residents of the Russian Federation believe that only groups with a plurality or even a majority on a particular territory should have an ethnic republic. In the past, that would have worked in favor of the ethnic Russians; but given their numerical decline, it now could work for non-Russian groups.
Consequently, the campaign to secure identification or re-identification of some of the members of the Altai or other groups and its success as measured in the census returns of 2010 are likely to be watched closely both by those who hope to preserve current federal arrangements and those who are interested in changing them.
Wednesday, April 22, 2009
Window on Eurasia: ‘Lenin is Worse than Hitler,’ Senior Moscow Patriarchate Official Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 22 – Today is the 139th birthday of Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state whose body remains as it has since his death in the mausoleum on Red Square, an object of veneration by his supporters and an offense of varying degrees to those who see him as the enemy of national tradition, freedom and faith.
This year, as in every year since Gorbachev’s time, there has been the usual discussion on whether Lenin should be removed from the mausoleum and buried as supposedly was not only his wish but that of his family, with a growing number of Russians saying that they are willing to support or at least not oppose such an action if the government takes it.
But one statement this year, by Archpriest Dimitry Smirnov, head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for Relations with the Armed Forces and Security Services, deserves particular attention because his words likely reflect the views of many in the Church leadership and because they could lead to a break between the church and some Russian nationalists.
Queried by the Rusk.ru portal, which has close ties with the Patriarchate, about what should be done with Lenin’s remains, Archpriest Dimitry said that “the time for burying Lenin arrived already in April 1870.” Indeed, the Church official said, “it would have been better if this bastard had never been born” (www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=182479).
“For me,” Smirnov continued, “Lenin is worse than Hitler. The decision of the powers to bury him will not lead to any social explosion. When the body of Stalin who was ‘a living god’ was carried out of the Mausoleum, no one got upset. What is there to talk about [when it comes to Lenin]?”
After arguing that there is no reason to be concerned about any popular reaction to removing Lenin from Red Square, Smirnov continued with the observation that he “in general is an opponent of burying the body of Lenin. Instead, he should be burned in an oven in Franz-Joseph Land and thrown into the sea there so that his ashes will fall on Europe.”
Or perhaps an even better idea, he argued, would be to bury Lenin’s “corpse on the far side of the moon so that it would not shine on the earth.” But whatever is decided, “one must not bury this evil doer in Holy Russia,” after all the crimes Lenin and the system he set up committed against the Russian people and the Russian church.
Other clerics the portal questioned were more careful in their discussion of the issue, noting the problems involved and the uncertainties of the social and political situation in Russia as a result of the deepening economic crisis, but Smirnov’s unrestrained comments attracted the support of three of the most nationalistic of lay Russian Orthodox groups.
Not only did the Unions of Orthodox Brotherhoods, of Orthodox Banner Carriers, and of the Russian People adopt an official declaration in support of the archpriest’s declaration (www.pycckie.org/novosti/2009/novosti-220409-2.shtml), but they staged a small demonstration in Moscow in support of his ideas (www.pycckie.org/novosti/2009/novosti-220409.shtml).
These are three marginal groups, although their colorful signs and language did attract some media attention, but Smirnov’s words, given his position, are likely to matter a great deal more. Not only is he a senior official in the Moscow Patriarchate, but his proposal almost certainly reflects the thinking if not yet the public position of other churchmen there.
Indeed, it is possible that the archpriest’s remarks may be yet another testing of the political waters by new Patriarch Kirill in order to determine just how far the church can push the government on this issue. It may even be the case that Smirnov’s “extreme” position will be used by the patriarch to case himself as a moderate by calling for Lenin’s burial.
But there is another consequence of Archpriest Dimitry’s remarks that may matter even more. His remarks are certain to offend those Russian nationalists who have chosen to ally themselves with former and not so former communists in order to press their own agendas. And many of them are likely to view the church with even more suspicion and distaste after this.
Consequently, it is even possible that Kirill may find it expedient to fire Dimitry in the name of broader political comity. But Dimitry has many friends in the military, the interior ministry and the FSB, and their power could make any move in that direction difficult, if not impossible.
And thus even as the Duma is considering legislation that might make it a crime to equate Hitler and Stalin during World War II, a leader of the Russian Orthodox Church is going further and insisting not only that Lenin remains worse than Hitler but that his remains should be removed from Red Square and placed on the far side of the moon.
Vienna, April 22 – Today is the 139th birthday of Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state whose body remains as it has since his death in the mausoleum on Red Square, an object of veneration by his supporters and an offense of varying degrees to those who see him as the enemy of national tradition, freedom and faith.
This year, as in every year since Gorbachev’s time, there has been the usual discussion on whether Lenin should be removed from the mausoleum and buried as supposedly was not only his wish but that of his family, with a growing number of Russians saying that they are willing to support or at least not oppose such an action if the government takes it.
But one statement this year, by Archpriest Dimitry Smirnov, head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for Relations with the Armed Forces and Security Services, deserves particular attention because his words likely reflect the views of many in the Church leadership and because they could lead to a break between the church and some Russian nationalists.
Queried by the Rusk.ru portal, which has close ties with the Patriarchate, about what should be done with Lenin’s remains, Archpriest Dimitry said that “the time for burying Lenin arrived already in April 1870.” Indeed, the Church official said, “it would have been better if this bastard had never been born” (www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=182479).
“For me,” Smirnov continued, “Lenin is worse than Hitler. The decision of the powers to bury him will not lead to any social explosion. When the body of Stalin who was ‘a living god’ was carried out of the Mausoleum, no one got upset. What is there to talk about [when it comes to Lenin]?”
After arguing that there is no reason to be concerned about any popular reaction to removing Lenin from Red Square, Smirnov continued with the observation that he “in general is an opponent of burying the body of Lenin. Instead, he should be burned in an oven in Franz-Joseph Land and thrown into the sea there so that his ashes will fall on Europe.”
Or perhaps an even better idea, he argued, would be to bury Lenin’s “corpse on the far side of the moon so that it would not shine on the earth.” But whatever is decided, “one must not bury this evil doer in Holy Russia,” after all the crimes Lenin and the system he set up committed against the Russian people and the Russian church.
Other clerics the portal questioned were more careful in their discussion of the issue, noting the problems involved and the uncertainties of the social and political situation in Russia as a result of the deepening economic crisis, but Smirnov’s unrestrained comments attracted the support of three of the most nationalistic of lay Russian Orthodox groups.
Not only did the Unions of Orthodox Brotherhoods, of Orthodox Banner Carriers, and of the Russian People adopt an official declaration in support of the archpriest’s declaration (www.pycckie.org/novosti/2009/novosti-220409-2.shtml), but they staged a small demonstration in Moscow in support of his ideas (www.pycckie.org/novosti/2009/novosti-220409.shtml).
These are three marginal groups, although their colorful signs and language did attract some media attention, but Smirnov’s words, given his position, are likely to matter a great deal more. Not only is he a senior official in the Moscow Patriarchate, but his proposal almost certainly reflects the thinking if not yet the public position of other churchmen there.
Indeed, it is possible that the archpriest’s remarks may be yet another testing of the political waters by new Patriarch Kirill in order to determine just how far the church can push the government on this issue. It may even be the case that Smirnov’s “extreme” position will be used by the patriarch to case himself as a moderate by calling for Lenin’s burial.
But there is another consequence of Archpriest Dimitry’s remarks that may matter even more. His remarks are certain to offend those Russian nationalists who have chosen to ally themselves with former and not so former communists in order to press their own agendas. And many of them are likely to view the church with even more suspicion and distaste after this.
Consequently, it is even possible that Kirill may find it expedient to fire Dimitry in the name of broader political comity. But Dimitry has many friends in the military, the interior ministry and the FSB, and their power could make any move in that direction difficult, if not impossible.
And thus even as the Duma is considering legislation that might make it a crime to equate Hitler and Stalin during World War II, a leader of the Russian Orthodox Church is going further and insisting not only that Lenin remains worse than Hitler but that his remains should be removed from Red Square and placed on the far side of the moon.
Window on Eurasia: Another Victory for Kadyrov—No Chechens to Be Drafted This Year
Paul Goble
Charlottesville, April 21 – Thirteen years to the day that Russian forces killed Dzhokhar Dudayev, Chechnya’s first president, Ramzan Kadyrov, that republic’s current one, has gained yet another concession from Moscow: The Russian military will not take Chechens this year into Russia’s uniformed service despite increasing the number to be drafted elsewhere.
That announcement in Grozny comes on the heels of Moscow’s declaration of the end of the counter-terrorism operation there, an act that has prompted some to talk about another “victory of Chechnya over Russia,” others to point to the continuing activity of anti-Russian militants there, and still others to argue that Moscow is making a third Chechen war “inevitable.”
But the most serious immediate consequence is likely to be a new outburst of anger by groups like the Russian Soldiers Mothers Committee who are already upset by Moscow’s decision to set higher draft quotas in predominantly ethnic Russian areas than in historically Muslim ones an arrangement that means ethnic Russians are more likely to have to serve.
The military commissariat of the Chechen Republic has announced that Chechens will be tested but not drafted this spring, thus removing from the country’s potential draft pool more than 80,000 youths of military age. Officials said they expected Chechens to be drafted in one of the next rounds (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/153184).
But no Chechens living in the republic have been drafted in significant numbers since 1991, a reflection both of the reluctance of parents to send their sons to serve under officers who passed through one or both of the Chechen wars and of a desire on the part Russian officials to avoid the problems of dedovshchina and crime that they would expect if Chechens were drafted.
There were a small number of inductions from Chechnya in 2002 and 2005, but there were protests from within the republic and from commanders as well. And consequently, both Grozny and Moscow have moved very cautiously on this front. Indeed, the very act of checking young Chechens this year to see if they are capable of serving may yet cause problems.
Nurdi Nukhazhiyev, the republic’s human rights ombudsman, says that the young Chechens are healthier than many had expected but that they are “children of war who have not yet passed through social rehabilitation.” And consequently, he says, that they should not be sent into other regions of Russia where “xenophobia” is widespread.
In his opinion, what Moscow should consider is “the formation of military-construction and railroad battalions from among the natives of the republic which would be involved in the recovery efforts directly inside [Chechnya]. That might solve some problems, but it would be virtually certain to create others.
Allowing future Chechen draftees to serve in their home area would almost certainly generate demands by other ethnic and regional groups to allow their draftees to follow suit, something that would if it spread make it difficult if not impossible for the Russian uniformed services to function and could contribute to separatist impulses elsewhere.
Yesterday, in an article published under the rubric “Far from Moscow,” “Yezhednevny zhurnal’s” Yuliya Latynina described the decision to end the counter-terrorism operation as “a victory day of Chechnya over Russia,” a retreat of Russian power even though anti-Moscow forces continue to operate (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=8999).
Indeed, she wrote, there is growing evidence that the militants are once again becoming more active at a time when more and more of them are simply joining Kadyrov’s government without really changing their views. Consequently, for many of them, Moscow’s action represents a victory, but not a victory for Russia.
Meanwhile, new reports indicate that Moscow is not living up to its promises: Since Moscow declared the end of the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya, Russian forces have continued their operations in parts of the republic, highlighting the threats the militants still represent and making a mockery of Moscow’s claims (www.nr2.ru/incidents/229648.html).
And finally, Viktor Alksnis, the outspoken deputy president of the Popular Union Party in Russia, said that Russia’s concessions to Chechnya now are dangerous mistakes because they will, like the Khasavyurt accords of 1996, make yet another war in Chechnya “inevitable” (www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=730784).
Alksnis said that Moscow’s decision to lift the counter-terrorism operation will only cause its opponents to increase their activity, something that will lead to more “victims” among the pro-Moscow population. Indeed, he said, “it is already possible to raise the question about when the third Chechen war will begin.”
“If you fight with terrorists,” he continued, “you must really do so. For this, one needs to declare a regime of martial law, to officially recognize that in the North Caucasus there is an armed revolt and not to invent some new juridical terms like counter-terrorist operation and thus put military people who are fulfilling their obligations in an impossible legal situation.”
But far worse, what Moscow has done by lifting this operation is to grant Kadyrov precisely what Dzhokhar Dudayev sought 15 years ago like control over customs and that Moscow first under Boris Yeltsin and then under Vladimir Putin said had to be retrieved if Russia’s territorial integrity and common legal space were to be maintained.
What does the latest action by the Russian government of Putin and Dmitry Medvedev thus say not just about where Chechnya may be heading but about where the Russian Federation is proceeding as well? Alksnis implicitly asks, a question ever more people in both places seem likely to be asking in the coming days.
Charlottesville, April 21 – Thirteen years to the day that Russian forces killed Dzhokhar Dudayev, Chechnya’s first president, Ramzan Kadyrov, that republic’s current one, has gained yet another concession from Moscow: The Russian military will not take Chechens this year into Russia’s uniformed service despite increasing the number to be drafted elsewhere.
That announcement in Grozny comes on the heels of Moscow’s declaration of the end of the counter-terrorism operation there, an act that has prompted some to talk about another “victory of Chechnya over Russia,” others to point to the continuing activity of anti-Russian militants there, and still others to argue that Moscow is making a third Chechen war “inevitable.”
But the most serious immediate consequence is likely to be a new outburst of anger by groups like the Russian Soldiers Mothers Committee who are already upset by Moscow’s decision to set higher draft quotas in predominantly ethnic Russian areas than in historically Muslim ones an arrangement that means ethnic Russians are more likely to have to serve.
The military commissariat of the Chechen Republic has announced that Chechens will be tested but not drafted this spring, thus removing from the country’s potential draft pool more than 80,000 youths of military age. Officials said they expected Chechens to be drafted in one of the next rounds (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/153184).
But no Chechens living in the republic have been drafted in significant numbers since 1991, a reflection both of the reluctance of parents to send their sons to serve under officers who passed through one or both of the Chechen wars and of a desire on the part Russian officials to avoid the problems of dedovshchina and crime that they would expect if Chechens were drafted.
There were a small number of inductions from Chechnya in 2002 and 2005, but there were protests from within the republic and from commanders as well. And consequently, both Grozny and Moscow have moved very cautiously on this front. Indeed, the very act of checking young Chechens this year to see if they are capable of serving may yet cause problems.
Nurdi Nukhazhiyev, the republic’s human rights ombudsman, says that the young Chechens are healthier than many had expected but that they are “children of war who have not yet passed through social rehabilitation.” And consequently, he says, that they should not be sent into other regions of Russia where “xenophobia” is widespread.
In his opinion, what Moscow should consider is “the formation of military-construction and railroad battalions from among the natives of the republic which would be involved in the recovery efforts directly inside [Chechnya]. That might solve some problems, but it would be virtually certain to create others.
Allowing future Chechen draftees to serve in their home area would almost certainly generate demands by other ethnic and regional groups to allow their draftees to follow suit, something that would if it spread make it difficult if not impossible for the Russian uniformed services to function and could contribute to separatist impulses elsewhere.
Yesterday, in an article published under the rubric “Far from Moscow,” “Yezhednevny zhurnal’s” Yuliya Latynina described the decision to end the counter-terrorism operation as “a victory day of Chechnya over Russia,” a retreat of Russian power even though anti-Moscow forces continue to operate (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=8999).
Indeed, she wrote, there is growing evidence that the militants are once again becoming more active at a time when more and more of them are simply joining Kadyrov’s government without really changing their views. Consequently, for many of them, Moscow’s action represents a victory, but not a victory for Russia.
Meanwhile, new reports indicate that Moscow is not living up to its promises: Since Moscow declared the end of the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya, Russian forces have continued their operations in parts of the republic, highlighting the threats the militants still represent and making a mockery of Moscow’s claims (www.nr2.ru/incidents/229648.html).
And finally, Viktor Alksnis, the outspoken deputy president of the Popular Union Party in Russia, said that Russia’s concessions to Chechnya now are dangerous mistakes because they will, like the Khasavyurt accords of 1996, make yet another war in Chechnya “inevitable” (www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=730784).
Alksnis said that Moscow’s decision to lift the counter-terrorism operation will only cause its opponents to increase their activity, something that will lead to more “victims” among the pro-Moscow population. Indeed, he said, “it is already possible to raise the question about when the third Chechen war will begin.”
“If you fight with terrorists,” he continued, “you must really do so. For this, one needs to declare a regime of martial law, to officially recognize that in the North Caucasus there is an armed revolt and not to invent some new juridical terms like counter-terrorist operation and thus put military people who are fulfilling their obligations in an impossible legal situation.”
But far worse, what Moscow has done by lifting this operation is to grant Kadyrov precisely what Dzhokhar Dudayev sought 15 years ago like control over customs and that Moscow first under Boris Yeltsin and then under Vladimir Putin said had to be retrieved if Russia’s territorial integrity and common legal space were to be maintained.
What does the latest action by the Russian government of Putin and Dmitry Medvedev thus say not just about where Chechnya may be heading but about where the Russian Federation is proceeding as well? Alksnis implicitly asks, a question ever more people in both places seem likely to be asking in the coming days.
Tuesday, April 21, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Court Says Internet Portals Can Be Closed for ‘Extremist’ Posts Left by Visitors to Their Sites
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 21 – According to a Moscow court, Russian officials can close down an internet portal if visitors to the site leave comments that the authorities deem to be extremist, a ruling that could force Russian sites to moderate all comments before they are posted or to stop allowing such comments, thereby ending one of the most lively forums in the Russian media.
Yesterday, the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District rejected an appeal by the Urals information agency, URA.ru, which held that it should not be subject to warnings that could open the way for its closure for posts visitors to that site left and the site’s own editors took off within a day (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.150179.html).
That decision, Aksana Panova, the site’s chief editor, said that the decision not only creates “a dangerous precedent” that could be used throughout the Russian Internet but opens the way for abuse because officials could arrange to have someone post “extremist” materials and then pounce even before the site took them off.
She told “Kommersant” that she is convinced that they have been the victims of “a planned campaign,” because URA.ru twice received a warning for the appearance twice of the same “extremist” message that the editors in both cases removed within a day and now is at risk of being shut down (www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1158744).
Even more, she continued, the URA.ru editors immediately turned to the law enforcement agencies of all the regions in which the site has correspondents in an effort to find who had made these posts. But the agencies did not turn up the guilty party despite URA.ru’s provision of the IP addresses of the computers from which these posts came.
Officials responsible for media registration said that they would not necessarily close down sites that carry posts of this kind by visitors to such sites. But that is hardly reassuring because it opens the way to the kind of arbitrariness that is completely at odds with the Russian government’s proclaimed goal of becoming a “law-based” state.
Media and human rights activists are concerned that the Russian government will use this new ruling to selectively punish sites that the powers that be deem to be their opponents. Aleksey Simonov, the president of the Glasnost Defense Foundation, said that “in every region,” the authorities include “people who know which media outlets are loyal and which are not.”
In an open letter to its visitors that appeared on the URA.ru site late yesterday, the editors that “from today, it will be dangerous to find out the opinions of its readers” because that may lead to “quarrels with the government” and ultimately the closure of media outlets that do so (www.ura.ru/content/urfo/20-04-2009/articles/1036253533.html).
“It is no secret,” the editors continue, “that URA.ru does not please everyone: We do not refrain from writing about doubtful financial schemes or the participation of highly-placed bureaucrats in corruption scandals. [And] we consider it correct to publish photographs such as of the cottage of the deputy presidential plenipotentiary and to indicate the cost of its lot.”
From our point of view, they say, “this is the responsibility of journalism and ordinary journalistic work. But certain bureaucrats prefer to deal only with media outlets they ‘control.’” And as this case shows, such bureaucrats now have a new means of putting pressure on media they don’t control or like.
Fortunately, the editors add, the powers that be did not take the final step of closing down URA.ru, but “nevertheless,” they continued, we have been “warned,” and “we have taken the decision to close [the site’s Internet] forum in general,” thus “depriving our readers of the opportunity to discuss news and events in the country.”
Such visitors, they conclude, are now “without a space for discussion.” That is a misfortune for those who rely on URA.ru. But if this case leads other portals to take the same decision – and that seems likely – it will be a tragedy for Russia and a clear indication that the powers that be there have little interest in defending media freedom.
Vienna, April 21 – According to a Moscow court, Russian officials can close down an internet portal if visitors to the site leave comments that the authorities deem to be extremist, a ruling that could force Russian sites to moderate all comments before they are posted or to stop allowing such comments, thereby ending one of the most lively forums in the Russian media.
Yesterday, the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District rejected an appeal by the Urals information agency, URA.ru, which held that it should not be subject to warnings that could open the way for its closure for posts visitors to that site left and the site’s own editors took off within a day (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.150179.html).
That decision, Aksana Panova, the site’s chief editor, said that the decision not only creates “a dangerous precedent” that could be used throughout the Russian Internet but opens the way for abuse because officials could arrange to have someone post “extremist” materials and then pounce even before the site took them off.
She told “Kommersant” that she is convinced that they have been the victims of “a planned campaign,” because URA.ru twice received a warning for the appearance twice of the same “extremist” message that the editors in both cases removed within a day and now is at risk of being shut down (www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1158744).
Even more, she continued, the URA.ru editors immediately turned to the law enforcement agencies of all the regions in which the site has correspondents in an effort to find who had made these posts. But the agencies did not turn up the guilty party despite URA.ru’s provision of the IP addresses of the computers from which these posts came.
Officials responsible for media registration said that they would not necessarily close down sites that carry posts of this kind by visitors to such sites. But that is hardly reassuring because it opens the way to the kind of arbitrariness that is completely at odds with the Russian government’s proclaimed goal of becoming a “law-based” state.
Media and human rights activists are concerned that the Russian government will use this new ruling to selectively punish sites that the powers that be deem to be their opponents. Aleksey Simonov, the president of the Glasnost Defense Foundation, said that “in every region,” the authorities include “people who know which media outlets are loyal and which are not.”
In an open letter to its visitors that appeared on the URA.ru site late yesterday, the editors that “from today, it will be dangerous to find out the opinions of its readers” because that may lead to “quarrels with the government” and ultimately the closure of media outlets that do so (www.ura.ru/content/urfo/20-04-2009/articles/1036253533.html).
“It is no secret,” the editors continue, “that URA.ru does not please everyone: We do not refrain from writing about doubtful financial schemes or the participation of highly-placed bureaucrats in corruption scandals. [And] we consider it correct to publish photographs such as of the cottage of the deputy presidential plenipotentiary and to indicate the cost of its lot.”
From our point of view, they say, “this is the responsibility of journalism and ordinary journalistic work. But certain bureaucrats prefer to deal only with media outlets they ‘control.’” And as this case shows, such bureaucrats now have a new means of putting pressure on media they don’t control or like.
Fortunately, the editors add, the powers that be did not take the final step of closing down URA.ru, but “nevertheless,” they continued, we have been “warned,” and “we have taken the decision to close [the site’s Internet] forum in general,” thus “depriving our readers of the opportunity to discuss news and events in the country.”
Such visitors, they conclude, are now “without a space for discussion.” That is a misfortune for those who rely on URA.ru. But if this case leads other portals to take the same decision – and that seems likely – it will be a tragedy for Russia and a clear indication that the powers that be there have little interest in defending media freedom.
Window on Eurasia: Finns Call on Medvedev to End Violations of Rights and Freedoms in Russia
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 21 – Four leading Finnish non-governmental organizations have called on visiting President Dmitry Medvedev to live up to his promises to protect human rights and civic freedoms and to end the violence against journalists and ethnic minorities in the Russian Federation that are creating a gulf between Moscow and Europe.
The appeal, signed by the leaders of the Kiila Social Union, the Finno-Russian Civic Forum, the Finnish Section of Amnesty International, and the Finnish PEN Center, says that its members “had hoped for the development in Russia of a society which shares European values like human rights and civic freedoms” (www.finrosforum.fi/?p=2529).
But given recent developments in various sectors of Russian life, it continues, the signatories “are deeply concerned by the state of the observation of human rights in Russia,” all the more so because Medvedev, as in his interview with “Novaya gazeta,” offered himself as a defender of these rights.
“Are you seriously prepared for a change in the law on non-governmental organizations,” the appeal’s authors ask. Are you genuinely attached to the rule of law and the defense of human rights? And with regard to these questions, the Finnish NGOs challenge the Russian president, “will we see actions and not just words?”
“Over the past 15 years,” the appeal notes, “more than 150 journalists have been killed. And attacks against them and other supporters of civil society “must be stopped, and the guilty brought to justice,” regardless of whether the victims have attracted the attention of the international community or involve less well-known people.
The appeal also expresses the concerns of these groups about the status of national minorities in the Russian Federation. “The multi-cultural tradition is the wealth of Russia,” it says, adding that “we hope for the decisive interference of the government leadership of Russian in the area of racist crimes.”
It continues with an expression of concern about the status of Finno-Ugric peoples in particular, noting that “the open oppression” of one of these groups “has been continuing in the Mari El Republic since 2001,” when then-president Vladimir Putin installed his own man and called for the imposition of a power vertical there.
And the appeal calls for a full investigation of “the military crimes and violation of human rights which took place during the Chechen wars,” for the support of the Chechen people in reestablishing not only the economy of their republic but also democracy and human rights.” Justice requires, it says, “the scrupulous identification of those who violated” these rights.
But perhaps the most provocative part of the appeal is the following. “We are concerned,” the Finnish NGOs say, “that among the deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation are people who have been charged with murder and are wanted on international warrants” but against whom Moscow has failed to take action.
The Finnish appeal calls on Moscow to obey the decisions of the European Human Rights Court, to ratify the protocol on that court, and to help build “effective horizontal cooperation” not just government to government but people to people as part of the European Union’s action plan for Russia.
So far during his two day visit to Helsinki, Medvedev has not commented on this declaration, and most Moscow media have ignored it. But at least two Russian websites have posted it, allowing Russians some access to this Finnish expression of concern about their problems (www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=49EC51027C27E and www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2009/04/20/n_1353915.shtml).
Vienna, April 21 – Four leading Finnish non-governmental organizations have called on visiting President Dmitry Medvedev to live up to his promises to protect human rights and civic freedoms and to end the violence against journalists and ethnic minorities in the Russian Federation that are creating a gulf between Moscow and Europe.
The appeal, signed by the leaders of the Kiila Social Union, the Finno-Russian Civic Forum, the Finnish Section of Amnesty International, and the Finnish PEN Center, says that its members “had hoped for the development in Russia of a society which shares European values like human rights and civic freedoms” (www.finrosforum.fi/?p=2529).
But given recent developments in various sectors of Russian life, it continues, the signatories “are deeply concerned by the state of the observation of human rights in Russia,” all the more so because Medvedev, as in his interview with “Novaya gazeta,” offered himself as a defender of these rights.
“Are you seriously prepared for a change in the law on non-governmental organizations,” the appeal’s authors ask. Are you genuinely attached to the rule of law and the defense of human rights? And with regard to these questions, the Finnish NGOs challenge the Russian president, “will we see actions and not just words?”
“Over the past 15 years,” the appeal notes, “more than 150 journalists have been killed. And attacks against them and other supporters of civil society “must be stopped, and the guilty brought to justice,” regardless of whether the victims have attracted the attention of the international community or involve less well-known people.
The appeal also expresses the concerns of these groups about the status of national minorities in the Russian Federation. “The multi-cultural tradition is the wealth of Russia,” it says, adding that “we hope for the decisive interference of the government leadership of Russian in the area of racist crimes.”
It continues with an expression of concern about the status of Finno-Ugric peoples in particular, noting that “the open oppression” of one of these groups “has been continuing in the Mari El Republic since 2001,” when then-president Vladimir Putin installed his own man and called for the imposition of a power vertical there.
And the appeal calls for a full investigation of “the military crimes and violation of human rights which took place during the Chechen wars,” for the support of the Chechen people in reestablishing not only the economy of their republic but also democracy and human rights.” Justice requires, it says, “the scrupulous identification of those who violated” these rights.
But perhaps the most provocative part of the appeal is the following. “We are concerned,” the Finnish NGOs say, “that among the deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation are people who have been charged with murder and are wanted on international warrants” but against whom Moscow has failed to take action.
The Finnish appeal calls on Moscow to obey the decisions of the European Human Rights Court, to ratify the protocol on that court, and to help build “effective horizontal cooperation” not just government to government but people to people as part of the European Union’s action plan for Russia.
So far during his two day visit to Helsinki, Medvedev has not commented on this declaration, and most Moscow media have ignored it. But at least two Russian websites have posted it, allowing Russians some access to this Finnish expression of concern about their problems (www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=49EC51027C27E and www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2009/04/20/n_1353915.shtml).
Monday, April 20, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Medvedev ‘Imitates’ Political Reform to Defend Putin’s System, Moscow Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 20 – Despite a series of much-publicized events that some commentators in Moscow and the West suggest represent significant “breakthroughs” to “liberalization,” a Russian commentator argues that Dmitry Medvedev is in fact offering “the imitation of political reform” in order to defend Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian system.
In an article in today’s “Gazeta,” Vladimir Milov, the head of the Moscow Institute of Energetic Politics, says that during April, President Medvedev has “thrown out to society a whole bouquet” of “’signals’” suggesting a dramatic change in the political climate in Russian toward a more liberal order (www.gazeta.ru/column/milov/2976296.shtml).
But a careful consideration of what the Russian president has said and even more of the sources of his comments and actions suggests that “there is no basis to expect serious changes in the policy of the ruling clan” and that any “hopes for the softening of the [current] political course are once again premature.”
Indeed, Milov says, “there is no doubt that we are dealing with the latest playing with liberal society, the goal of which consists of the neutralization of any outburst of freedom-loving attitudes as a result of the sharpening of the crisis and the ineffectiveness of government anti-crisis measures.”
As in the past, the Moscow analyst says, Medvedev’s words into which so many have invested so much do not point to anything “concrete.” Instead, they suggest yet again that “the president has taken upon himself the role of the good cop,” with the task of keeping off balance and parrying those “dissatisfied with the authoritarianism of the representatives of the elite.”
This “tactic,” which Medvedev has practiced so long that one could call it a strategy, “was most clearly formulated in a report of the Center for Political Technologies on ‘Democracy: the Development of the Russian Model.” That paper “denied the need for a significant liberalization of the social-political system and the creation of conditions for pluralism.”
“On the contrary,” Milov notes, that paper called for the continuation of the existing system and its defense through the elaboration of “a certain kind of pseudo-democratic accessories” such as the use of government-controlled “opposition” parties and the creation of possibilities for their representation in the parliament.
Such actions do little or nothing to change the system, however much many want to believe otherwise, but they do make for good public relations, Milov argues. And they can under conditions of economic crisis distract the attention of those who are suffering but who want to be offered some hope for the future.
Public reaction even to the efforts of Boris Nemtsov to raise certain “sharp” questions in his campaign for mayor of Sochi demonstrated to the siloviki and the bureaucracy, the Moscow analyst continues, just how dangerous for them would be any “weakening of control over politics and the media.”
The powers that be, he argues, understand that their “extraordinarily egoistic defense of interests of the narrow ruling clan over the last ten years” could under those circumstances open the way to a more general attack on their leaders and themselves, a risk that none of them is now prepared to take.
It is of course “possible” that Medvedev would like to change things – indeed, the plausibility of the idea that he would makes him more effective in his current role – but he is surrounded by people who do not want change because any change would be a threat to their power and property. And consequently, Milov says, they remain in a position to block it.
Meanwhile, in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Aleksandr Podrabinek provides details about one of Medvedev’s efforts to present himself as committed to some kind of liberalization, his meeting last week with those human rights activists who have been “co-opted” into the Presidential Council for Supporting the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights.”
From Medvedev’s perspective, the meeting was clearly “successful” because it showed off “as it were the human face of the current Russian powers that be” and “showed Russian society that even the enemies of authoritarian power – the human rights activists – are very successfully being integrated into the power vertical” (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=8994).
Moreover, Podrabinek continued, this unusual and much-covered meeting “gave the human rights activists the chance to melt in an ecstasy of love and gratitude to President Medvedev and gave Medvedev the rare chance to present himself as a man of broader views with a great political future.”
In remarkably brutal terms, Podrabinek attacks those who attended the meeting and concludes that “it is becoming shameful to call oneself a human rights activist when others who do so in an obsequious fashion run to the Kremlin to say flattering words to a nonentity who is occupying a post other than his own.”
Podrabinek’s comments about those human rights activists who did attend are certainly too sharp. Many of those at the meeting could and would certainly respond that they did so not because of what Medvedev and his mentor Putin have done but rather because they are committed to exploiting any remaining chances they have to improve the situation.
But Podrabinek’s comments are appropriate for those not there who celebrated that meeting and several other recent Medvedev actions as turning points in the history of the country. They, unlike the rights activists Podrabinek criticizes, are not only deceiving themselves but serving precisely the interests of those whose policies they claim to oppose.
Vienna, April 20 – Despite a series of much-publicized events that some commentators in Moscow and the West suggest represent significant “breakthroughs” to “liberalization,” a Russian commentator argues that Dmitry Medvedev is in fact offering “the imitation of political reform” in order to defend Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian system.
In an article in today’s “Gazeta,” Vladimir Milov, the head of the Moscow Institute of Energetic Politics, says that during April, President Medvedev has “thrown out to society a whole bouquet” of “’signals’” suggesting a dramatic change in the political climate in Russian toward a more liberal order (www.gazeta.ru/column/milov/2976296.shtml).
But a careful consideration of what the Russian president has said and even more of the sources of his comments and actions suggests that “there is no basis to expect serious changes in the policy of the ruling clan” and that any “hopes for the softening of the [current] political course are once again premature.”
Indeed, Milov says, “there is no doubt that we are dealing with the latest playing with liberal society, the goal of which consists of the neutralization of any outburst of freedom-loving attitudes as a result of the sharpening of the crisis and the ineffectiveness of government anti-crisis measures.”
As in the past, the Moscow analyst says, Medvedev’s words into which so many have invested so much do not point to anything “concrete.” Instead, they suggest yet again that “the president has taken upon himself the role of the good cop,” with the task of keeping off balance and parrying those “dissatisfied with the authoritarianism of the representatives of the elite.”
This “tactic,” which Medvedev has practiced so long that one could call it a strategy, “was most clearly formulated in a report of the Center for Political Technologies on ‘Democracy: the Development of the Russian Model.” That paper “denied the need for a significant liberalization of the social-political system and the creation of conditions for pluralism.”
“On the contrary,” Milov notes, that paper called for the continuation of the existing system and its defense through the elaboration of “a certain kind of pseudo-democratic accessories” such as the use of government-controlled “opposition” parties and the creation of possibilities for their representation in the parliament.
Such actions do little or nothing to change the system, however much many want to believe otherwise, but they do make for good public relations, Milov argues. And they can under conditions of economic crisis distract the attention of those who are suffering but who want to be offered some hope for the future.
Public reaction even to the efforts of Boris Nemtsov to raise certain “sharp” questions in his campaign for mayor of Sochi demonstrated to the siloviki and the bureaucracy, the Moscow analyst continues, just how dangerous for them would be any “weakening of control over politics and the media.”
The powers that be, he argues, understand that their “extraordinarily egoistic defense of interests of the narrow ruling clan over the last ten years” could under those circumstances open the way to a more general attack on their leaders and themselves, a risk that none of them is now prepared to take.
It is of course “possible” that Medvedev would like to change things – indeed, the plausibility of the idea that he would makes him more effective in his current role – but he is surrounded by people who do not want change because any change would be a threat to their power and property. And consequently, Milov says, they remain in a position to block it.
Meanwhile, in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Aleksandr Podrabinek provides details about one of Medvedev’s efforts to present himself as committed to some kind of liberalization, his meeting last week with those human rights activists who have been “co-opted” into the Presidential Council for Supporting the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights.”
From Medvedev’s perspective, the meeting was clearly “successful” because it showed off “as it were the human face of the current Russian powers that be” and “showed Russian society that even the enemies of authoritarian power – the human rights activists – are very successfully being integrated into the power vertical” (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=8994).
Moreover, Podrabinek continued, this unusual and much-covered meeting “gave the human rights activists the chance to melt in an ecstasy of love and gratitude to President Medvedev and gave Medvedev the rare chance to present himself as a man of broader views with a great political future.”
In remarkably brutal terms, Podrabinek attacks those who attended the meeting and concludes that “it is becoming shameful to call oneself a human rights activist when others who do so in an obsequious fashion run to the Kremlin to say flattering words to a nonentity who is occupying a post other than his own.”
Podrabinek’s comments about those human rights activists who did attend are certainly too sharp. Many of those at the meeting could and would certainly respond that they did so not because of what Medvedev and his mentor Putin have done but rather because they are committed to exploiting any remaining chances they have to improve the situation.
But Podrabinek’s comments are appropriate for those not there who celebrated that meeting and several other recent Medvedev actions as turning points in the history of the country. They, unlike the rights activists Podrabinek criticizes, are not only deceiving themselves but serving precisely the interests of those whose policies they claim to oppose.
Window on Eurasia: Is Official Ankara Distancing Itself from the Circassians?
Paul Goble
Vienna, April 20 – Turkish government officials at the last moment announced that they would not participate in a long-scheduled conference on relations between Turkey and the Caucasus, a decision that suggests Ankara may have decided to lower its public profile in this area as part of its effort to expand its cooperation with Moscow in the Caucasus.
But if Ankara has indeed decided to do so – and Russian pressure on Turkey has been strong, especially given Moscow’s sensitivities about the Sochi Olympics whose convention many Circassians oppose – Turkish officials are certain to come under increasing pressure from the more than five million Turkish citizens of Circassian descent to reverse this course.
Officials of the Khase Circassian Federation of Turkey (KAFFED) said they were “extremely surprised” that Turkish government officials who earlier had agreed to come and were listed on the program announced the day before the conference began that they would not take part (www.natpress.net/stat.php?id=3831).
“Nevertheless,” the organizers from KAFFED said, “the conference took place as scheduled,” and they insisted that “the large number of people who visited the conference provides evidence that [many in Turkish] society consider the questions raised at [this April 14 meeting] to be important.”
Some speakers, like Guven Sak, the head of the Turkish Foundation for Economic Research, even suggested that the failure of Turkish officials to take part in the meeting had the effect of underscoring just how important and sensitive issues involving the Circassians in the North Caucasus have become.
Sak argued that discussions of these issues are helping people in Turkey to see that the Caucasus cannot be reduced to the question of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. That region, he said, “is very important from any point of view. It must be considered as a whole. And only such a view will be effective.”
KAFFED President Jihan Jandemir said that his organization had created a Center for Scientific and Strategic Research on the Caucasus (KAFSAM) in order to make use of its ability to draw on reports from Circassian co-ethnics in the Caucasus and thus provide a more accurate picture of what is taking place in the Caucasus.
“The situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is very important for us,” Jandemir continued, “and Turkey can play an essential role in improving it.” Among the steps Ankara should take, he said, was to simplify the visa regime between Abkhazia and Turkey, something he had hoped to have a foreign ministry official explain at this meeting.
Another speaker, Onur Oymen, the deputy chief of the Turkish Popular Republican Party, said that the issue of Ankara’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia was not now on the agenda of Turkish officials. And he suggested that Circassians should not expect any movement anytime soon.
“Not one country has ever been recognized immediately,” he said, somewhat distorting the historical record. “The Soviet Union, for example was recognized [by the United States] only in 1933. And the Chinese People’s Republic, [which] was formed in 1949, was recognized [by Washington] only in 1975,” 26 years later.
Another speaker, Hasan Kanbolat, the head of the ORSAM Center for Strategic Research on the Near East, pointed both to Ankara’s past reluctance to pay close attention to the Caucasus, which after all is in Turkey’s backyard, and to the reasons why many in Turkish society are going to push their government to do so in the future.
According to Kanbolat, Turkish military sources did not even publish maps of the Caucasus between 1887 and 1993, unwilling to focus on these regions. But, he continued, “the collapse of the USSR has opened the eyes of Turkey and forced it to look at the Caucasus” and at its peoples.
And at the same time, the ORSAM Center head said, “almost 40 percent of the population of the Black Sea and Aegean coasts of Turkey consists of people who were resettled there as a result of genocide, ethnic cleansing and forced migration approximately 130 years ago.” They have not forgotten that past, and they will not let Ankara forget either.
Vienna, April 20 – Turkish government officials at the last moment announced that they would not participate in a long-scheduled conference on relations between Turkey and the Caucasus, a decision that suggests Ankara may have decided to lower its public profile in this area as part of its effort to expand its cooperation with Moscow in the Caucasus.
But if Ankara has indeed decided to do so – and Russian pressure on Turkey has been strong, especially given Moscow’s sensitivities about the Sochi Olympics whose convention many Circassians oppose – Turkish officials are certain to come under increasing pressure from the more than five million Turkish citizens of Circassian descent to reverse this course.
Officials of the Khase Circassian Federation of Turkey (KAFFED) said they were “extremely surprised” that Turkish government officials who earlier had agreed to come and were listed on the program announced the day before the conference began that they would not take part (www.natpress.net/stat.php?id=3831).
“Nevertheless,” the organizers from KAFFED said, “the conference took place as scheduled,” and they insisted that “the large number of people who visited the conference provides evidence that [many in Turkish] society consider the questions raised at [this April 14 meeting] to be important.”
Some speakers, like Guven Sak, the head of the Turkish Foundation for Economic Research, even suggested that the failure of Turkish officials to take part in the meeting had the effect of underscoring just how important and sensitive issues involving the Circassians in the North Caucasus have become.
Sak argued that discussions of these issues are helping people in Turkey to see that the Caucasus cannot be reduced to the question of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. That region, he said, “is very important from any point of view. It must be considered as a whole. And only such a view will be effective.”
KAFFED President Jihan Jandemir said that his organization had created a Center for Scientific and Strategic Research on the Caucasus (KAFSAM) in order to make use of its ability to draw on reports from Circassian co-ethnics in the Caucasus and thus provide a more accurate picture of what is taking place in the Caucasus.
“The situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is very important for us,” Jandemir continued, “and Turkey can play an essential role in improving it.” Among the steps Ankara should take, he said, was to simplify the visa regime between Abkhazia and Turkey, something he had hoped to have a foreign ministry official explain at this meeting.
Another speaker, Onur Oymen, the deputy chief of the Turkish Popular Republican Party, said that the issue of Ankara’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia was not now on the agenda of Turkish officials. And he suggested that Circassians should not expect any movement anytime soon.
“Not one country has ever been recognized immediately,” he said, somewhat distorting the historical record. “The Soviet Union, for example was recognized [by the United States] only in 1933. And the Chinese People’s Republic, [which] was formed in 1949, was recognized [by Washington] only in 1975,” 26 years later.
Another speaker, Hasan Kanbolat, the head of the ORSAM Center for Strategic Research on the Near East, pointed both to Ankara’s past reluctance to pay close attention to the Caucasus, which after all is in Turkey’s backyard, and to the reasons why many in Turkish society are going to push their government to do so in the future.
According to Kanbolat, Turkish military sources did not even publish maps of the Caucasus between 1887 and 1993, unwilling to focus on these regions. But, he continued, “the collapse of the USSR has opened the eyes of Turkey and forced it to look at the Caucasus” and at its peoples.
And at the same time, the ORSAM Center head said, “almost 40 percent of the population of the Black Sea and Aegean coasts of Turkey consists of people who were resettled there as a result of genocide, ethnic cleansing and forced migration approximately 130 years ago.” They have not forgotten that past, and they will not let Ankara forget either.
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