Paul Goble
Vienna, September 6 – Now that Moscow has recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, those two breakaway republics may join the Union State that currently includes only the Russian Federation and Belarus, an action that could give new life to that institution, according to the Union State’s executive secretary.
In an appearance on Ekho Moskvy on Thursday night, Pavel Borodin said this could happen before the end of the year, and he insisted that it would involve mostly economic cooperation and as such would not constitute the annexation of these countries by Russia or “violate any norms of international law (www.echo.msk.ru/programs/razvorot/538019-echo/).
Throughout the program, he insisted that “the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia [does not represent any] expansion of the territory of Russia or the Union State.” Instead, Borodin said, both recognition and the inclusion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was about the creation of new jobs.
At the same time, however, he pointed out that “a citizen of Belarus and a citizen of Russia are citizen[s] of the Union State,” and consequently, once the two new states so far recognized only by the Russian Federation and Nicaragua join, their citizens would become citizens of the Union State as well.
Borodin’s enthusiasm about this possibility clearly reflects his unstated belief that the inclusion of new members in the Union State, even new members like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, will breathe new life into the institution and perhaps lead not only to a deepening of relations among its members but also to an additional expansion in their number.
But there are potentially at least two other consequences of such moves, neither of which does Borodin mention or even imply. On the one hand, if the Union State takes on new life, then it could become the matrix for the reconstitution of a Moscow-centered state potentially far larger than the Russian Federation
That could attract some of the post-Soviet states, but because of the specter it would create of a new empire, the very idea would likely repel others. Moreover, it could lead to demands by some republics within the Russian Federation to become direct members of the Union State, a move most Moscow officials would oppose.
And on the other, if that happens, such a state would need a new leader, and one is clearly available: Vladimir Putin. A year ago, when the Moscow media were full of discussions on how Putin might be able to overcome a constitutional prohibition against a third term, many thought the establishment of a new Union State with a new presidency might do the trick.
That idea was ultimately discarded, largely because of Belarusian resistance – Mensk leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka may like being close to Moscow but he clearly does not want to give up his office except for a more important one – and the current tandem of Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev was elaborated.
But as many analysts have suggested, the current situation may not be the final one, and thus the most important implication of Borodin’s remarks this week is that there are at least some people in Moscow, who are now thinking again about the Union State option and the possibility that the current Russian prime minister could be its president.
Saturday, September 6, 2008
Friday, September 5, 2008
Window on Eurasia: Non-Russians Will Jointly Press Moscow for Self-Determination, Bashkirs Say
Paul Goble
Vienna, September 5 – In yet another echo of Moscow’s decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the leaders of Bashkortostan’s national movement say they will organize a joint protest by all non-Russian groups in the Russian Federation if Moscow continues to ignore Bashkortostan’s rights and demands.
The declaration, issued by the Kuk Bure movement which in the words of the Novyy region news agency “represents the interests of Bashkirs living on the territory of Bashkortostan and Russia,” makes a number of demands which that news outlet has provided an extensive summary (www.nr2.ru/moxkow/194641.html).
The Kuk Bure appeal notes that “the Russian powers that be, while supporting the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia who have suffered from acts of Georgian aggression, is ignoring the elementary requirements of the Bashkir people,” which has been living “in one state with Moscow” for 450 years.
The Russian government, it continues, has “ceased to see and listen to [the Bashkirs] and appears to have no interest in the Bashkirs who Moscow apparently “assumes” have “no other way out” than to follow Moscow’s orders, however much those directives threaten the survival of the Bashkir people.
“The Kremlin does not give the Bashkirs the full opportunity to develop their language as the state language of the Republic of Bashkortostan. Having eliminated the regional component in education, Moscow has shown that it wants to transform the Bashkirs into a faceless crowd with families or clans.”
The appeal further notes that Kuk Bure on May 22 sent a similar appeal to Moscow in which it spoke of the Bashkir’s despair about the future of their language, culture and even the people itself. We were not listened to” then, it says, because the Kremlin simply wants to continue its policy of “zombifying” the Bashkirs “via television.”
“We consider it extremely unjust and dishonest that the federal powers that be, which every year take 80 percent of the natural wealth produced in Bashkortostan ignore the Bashkirs themselves and do not devote attention to the most important national-cultural requirements of the Bashkir people.”
Moscow’s approach, it continues, is “the policy of imperialist colonizers in relationship to an indigenous people.” And consequently, the appeal said, the time has come to ask federal officials in Moscow and in Bashkortostan itself “’what are you doing for the Bashkir people?!’” and to demand an answer.
“The Bashkirs do not have any other land” than their own, the appeal goes on to specify, and thus they do not want to give it up to those from Moscow who do not speak Bashkir, do not respect Bashkirs and take away the resources of the Bashkirs leaving only destruction in their wake.
Given all this, the appeal says, the Bashkirs call on Moscow “to stop the destruction of the Bashkir language, now being promoted by the elimination of the regional component in the education system and to guarantee conditions for the complete realization of the rights of the Bashkir people for self-determination within the framework of the Republic of Bashkortostan!”
These demands, the authors of the appeal said, do not mean that the Bashkirs are seeking complete independence, but they warned that if Moscow does not respond positively to them in the wake of events in Georgia, then, the Bashkirs will organize the country’s non-Russians to press Moscow for the same rights and a return to the situation that existed under Boris Yeltsin.
Whether the Bashkirs in general or the leaders of the Kuk Bure movement in particular have the capacity to do that remains unclear, but their declaration is the clearest signal yet that what Moscow has done in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is resonating strongly among the non-Russians inside the Russian Federation.
And that in turn calls attention to a comment by a Ukrainian scholar about the situation across Eurasia. Russian and Western opinion to the contrary, Igor Losev says, “Putin has not resolved the fundamental problems of Russia; he has ‘frozen’ them,” obviously forgetting that “in Russian history after each ‘frost,’ there inevitably follows ‘a thaw.’
Putin’s good fortune and that of his country, Losev goes on to say is that on the territory of the Russian Federation, “no one is working as actively to promote separatist projects as [Moscow] is on the territory of neighboring states.” Were it otherwise, he concludes, “the results would be extremely impressive” (www2.pravda.com.ua/ru/news/2008/9/1/80315.htm).
Vienna, September 5 – In yet another echo of Moscow’s decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the leaders of Bashkortostan’s national movement say they will organize a joint protest by all non-Russian groups in the Russian Federation if Moscow continues to ignore Bashkortostan’s rights and demands.
The declaration, issued by the Kuk Bure movement which in the words of the Novyy region news agency “represents the interests of Bashkirs living on the territory of Bashkortostan and Russia,” makes a number of demands which that news outlet has provided an extensive summary (www.nr2.ru/moxkow/194641.html).
The Kuk Bure appeal notes that “the Russian powers that be, while supporting the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia who have suffered from acts of Georgian aggression, is ignoring the elementary requirements of the Bashkir people,” which has been living “in one state with Moscow” for 450 years.
The Russian government, it continues, has “ceased to see and listen to [the Bashkirs] and appears to have no interest in the Bashkirs who Moscow apparently “assumes” have “no other way out” than to follow Moscow’s orders, however much those directives threaten the survival of the Bashkir people.
“The Kremlin does not give the Bashkirs the full opportunity to develop their language as the state language of the Republic of Bashkortostan. Having eliminated the regional component in education, Moscow has shown that it wants to transform the Bashkirs into a faceless crowd with families or clans.”
The appeal further notes that Kuk Bure on May 22 sent a similar appeal to Moscow in which it spoke of the Bashkir’s despair about the future of their language, culture and even the people itself. We were not listened to” then, it says, because the Kremlin simply wants to continue its policy of “zombifying” the Bashkirs “via television.”
“We consider it extremely unjust and dishonest that the federal powers that be, which every year take 80 percent of the natural wealth produced in Bashkortostan ignore the Bashkirs themselves and do not devote attention to the most important national-cultural requirements of the Bashkir people.”
Moscow’s approach, it continues, is “the policy of imperialist colonizers in relationship to an indigenous people.” And consequently, the appeal said, the time has come to ask federal officials in Moscow and in Bashkortostan itself “’what are you doing for the Bashkir people?!’” and to demand an answer.
“The Bashkirs do not have any other land” than their own, the appeal goes on to specify, and thus they do not want to give it up to those from Moscow who do not speak Bashkir, do not respect Bashkirs and take away the resources of the Bashkirs leaving only destruction in their wake.
Given all this, the appeal says, the Bashkirs call on Moscow “to stop the destruction of the Bashkir language, now being promoted by the elimination of the regional component in the education system and to guarantee conditions for the complete realization of the rights of the Bashkir people for self-determination within the framework of the Republic of Bashkortostan!”
These demands, the authors of the appeal said, do not mean that the Bashkirs are seeking complete independence, but they warned that if Moscow does not respond positively to them in the wake of events in Georgia, then, the Bashkirs will organize the country’s non-Russians to press Moscow for the same rights and a return to the situation that existed under Boris Yeltsin.
Whether the Bashkirs in general or the leaders of the Kuk Bure movement in particular have the capacity to do that remains unclear, but their declaration is the clearest signal yet that what Moscow has done in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is resonating strongly among the non-Russians inside the Russian Federation.
And that in turn calls attention to a comment by a Ukrainian scholar about the situation across Eurasia. Russian and Western opinion to the contrary, Igor Losev says, “Putin has not resolved the fundamental problems of Russia; he has ‘frozen’ them,” obviously forgetting that “in Russian history after each ‘frost,’ there inevitably follows ‘a thaw.’
Putin’s good fortune and that of his country, Losev goes on to say is that on the territory of the Russian Federation, “no one is working as actively to promote separatist projects as [Moscow] is on the territory of neighboring states.” Were it otherwise, he concludes, “the results would be extremely impressive” (www2.pravda.com.ua/ru/news/2008/9/1/80315.htm).
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Wins a Major Victory on Pipelines
Paul Goble
Vienna, September 5 – With Iran’s declaration that it opposes the construction of any undersea pipelines in the Caspian on “ecological grounds” and thus will block any delimitation of the seabed that allows for them and Baku’s decision not to back the West’s push NABUCCO project, Moscow can claim its first major political victory from its invasion of Georgia.
These actions mean that the Russian government will now have full and uncontested control over pipelines between the Caspian basin and the West which pass through Russian territory and will be able either directly or through its clients like the PKK to disrupt the only routes such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan that bypass the Russian Federation.
That does not mean, of course, that Moscow now has effectively reestablished its control over the states of this region – all of them have other interests besides oil and gas – but it does mean that Russia has won a major victory and the West, which all too often in recent years has focused on oil and gas alone, has suffered a major defeat.
Yesterday, Mehti Safari, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, told journalists that Tehran opposes the construction of any undersea pipelines in the Caspian because “this can bring harm to the ecology of the sea.” He noted that exporting countries can send their gas out via either the Russian Federation or Iran (www.oilru.com/news/81667/).
Given the existence of “such possibilities,” the Iranian diplomat said, “why harm” the delicate eco-system of the Caspian? But in making this statement, Tehran was underscoring its willingness to destroy any chance for the completion of the NABUCCO gas pipeline in the near term that the United States and some Western European countries have been pushing for.
And because Washington opposes the flow of hydrocarbons from the Caspian basin out through Iran, Tehran’s action in fact makes it likely that many of the oil and gas exporting countries in the region will now choose to send more or even all of their gas and oil through the Russian Federation, a longstanding geopolitical goal of Moscow’s.
The geo-economic and geo-political shifts in the Caucasus as a result of Russian actions in Georgia were even more in evidence during US Vice President Dick Cheney’s brief visit to the Azerbaijani capital. According to Russian media reports, it did not go well from either a protocol or a substantive perspective (www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1020720).
First, Cheney was not met at the airport by either President Ilham Aliyev or Prime Minister Artur Rasi-zade. Instead, he was met by the first vice premier and the foreign minister. After that, he was not immediately received by the president but rather had meetings with officials of the BP-Azerbaijan oil company and the American embassy.
Then, officials in the office of the Azerbaijani president told Moscow’s “Kommersant,” Cheney was sufficiently displeased with his conversation with President Aliyev that “as a result he even refused to visit the ceremonial dinner in his honor” that the Azerbaijan leader had organized.
On the one hand, Aliyev indicated that he was not prepared to talk about going ahead with NABUCCO until Baku completes its negotiations with Russia’s Gazprom or indeed do anything else to ”support Washington and [thus] get into an argument with Moscow” given what has happened in Georgia.
And on the other, immediately after the Aliyev-Cheney meeting, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev telephoned the Azerbaijani president, an action which Kremlin sources told the Moscow paper provided Medvedev with the opportunity to explain Russia’s policies and to discuss the possibilities for the Russian and Azerbaijani presidents to meet “in the near future.”
At one level, of course, all this reflects the continuation of President Aliyev’s commitment to what he and his government call “a balanced foreign policy,” one that seeks to navigate between Moscow and the West by avoiding offending either and seeking to develop strong ties with both.
But at another, the way in which the media have covered Vice President Cheney’s visit suggests that if Baku’s policy remains a balanced one, the balance is rather different than it was before Moscow demonstrated with its invasion of Georgia and its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that the game has changed.
Indeed, in reporting this visit, one Baku newspaper used as its headline today words that show just how much has changed over the last month. “It is not accidental,” the paper pointed out that just after the American vice president left Aliyev’s office the Russian president called (www.echo-az.com/politica09.shtml).
UPDATE on September 6: A source at the US Embassy in Baku told 1News.az that a report in Moscow’s “Kommersant” yesterday on the visit of Vice President Dick Cheney to Baku was factually incorrect. The American official did take part in a dinner and left the Azerbaijani capital “very satisfied,” the souce added. “ I understand,” the unnamed official said, “that Russian mass media want to give what they would like to have seen happen for what really did, but nothing that ‘Kommersant’ wrote occurred” (1news.az/world/20080905113732180.html).
Vienna, September 5 – With Iran’s declaration that it opposes the construction of any undersea pipelines in the Caspian on “ecological grounds” and thus will block any delimitation of the seabed that allows for them and Baku’s decision not to back the West’s push NABUCCO project, Moscow can claim its first major political victory from its invasion of Georgia.
These actions mean that the Russian government will now have full and uncontested control over pipelines between the Caspian basin and the West which pass through Russian territory and will be able either directly or through its clients like the PKK to disrupt the only routes such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan that bypass the Russian Federation.
That does not mean, of course, that Moscow now has effectively reestablished its control over the states of this region – all of them have other interests besides oil and gas – but it does mean that Russia has won a major victory and the West, which all too often in recent years has focused on oil and gas alone, has suffered a major defeat.
Yesterday, Mehti Safari, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, told journalists that Tehran opposes the construction of any undersea pipelines in the Caspian because “this can bring harm to the ecology of the sea.” He noted that exporting countries can send their gas out via either the Russian Federation or Iran (www.oilru.com/news/81667/).
Given the existence of “such possibilities,” the Iranian diplomat said, “why harm” the delicate eco-system of the Caspian? But in making this statement, Tehran was underscoring its willingness to destroy any chance for the completion of the NABUCCO gas pipeline in the near term that the United States and some Western European countries have been pushing for.
And because Washington opposes the flow of hydrocarbons from the Caspian basin out through Iran, Tehran’s action in fact makes it likely that many of the oil and gas exporting countries in the region will now choose to send more or even all of their gas and oil through the Russian Federation, a longstanding geopolitical goal of Moscow’s.
The geo-economic and geo-political shifts in the Caucasus as a result of Russian actions in Georgia were even more in evidence during US Vice President Dick Cheney’s brief visit to the Azerbaijani capital. According to Russian media reports, it did not go well from either a protocol or a substantive perspective (www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1020720).
First, Cheney was not met at the airport by either President Ilham Aliyev or Prime Minister Artur Rasi-zade. Instead, he was met by the first vice premier and the foreign minister. After that, he was not immediately received by the president but rather had meetings with officials of the BP-Azerbaijan oil company and the American embassy.
Then, officials in the office of the Azerbaijani president told Moscow’s “Kommersant,” Cheney was sufficiently displeased with his conversation with President Aliyev that “as a result he even refused to visit the ceremonial dinner in his honor” that the Azerbaijan leader had organized.
On the one hand, Aliyev indicated that he was not prepared to talk about going ahead with NABUCCO until Baku completes its negotiations with Russia’s Gazprom or indeed do anything else to ”support Washington and [thus] get into an argument with Moscow” given what has happened in Georgia.
And on the other, immediately after the Aliyev-Cheney meeting, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev telephoned the Azerbaijani president, an action which Kremlin sources told the Moscow paper provided Medvedev with the opportunity to explain Russia’s policies and to discuss the possibilities for the Russian and Azerbaijani presidents to meet “in the near future.”
At one level, of course, all this reflects the continuation of President Aliyev’s commitment to what he and his government call “a balanced foreign policy,” one that seeks to navigate between Moscow and the West by avoiding offending either and seeking to develop strong ties with both.
But at another, the way in which the media have covered Vice President Cheney’s visit suggests that if Baku’s policy remains a balanced one, the balance is rather different than it was before Moscow demonstrated with its invasion of Georgia and its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that the game has changed.
Indeed, in reporting this visit, one Baku newspaper used as its headline today words that show just how much has changed over the last month. “It is not accidental,” the paper pointed out that just after the American vice president left Aliyev’s office the Russian president called (www.echo-az.com/politica09.shtml).
UPDATE on September 6: A source at the US Embassy in Baku told 1News.az that a report in Moscow’s “Kommersant” yesterday on the visit of Vice President Dick Cheney to Baku was factually incorrect. The American official did take part in a dinner and left the Azerbaijani capital “very satisfied,” the souce added. “ I understand,” the unnamed official said, “that Russian mass media want to give what they would like to have seen happen for what really did, but nothing that ‘Kommersant’ wrote occurred” (1news.az/world/20080905113732180.html).
Window on Eurasia: Appointed Governors Less Well Known to Russians than Elected Ones
Paul Goble
Vienna, September 5 – Regional and republic heads appointed by Moscow are likely to be less well known among the population and, when known, often less well liked that those elected by the people, yet another negative indication of the negative impact Vladimir Putin had on the state of democracy in the Russian Federation.
At the end of August, the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion (VTsIOM), a polling agency known for its close ties to the Kremlin, surveyed residents in 13 regions whose top officials appointed by then-president Putin between 2005 and 2007. The results are striking and could set the stage for making these posts again subject to election.
According to a report in “Vedomosti” this week, the VTsIOM survey found that “the population does not know its own governors” and that the attitude of the population to them “is not always linked to the state of the economy,” a sharp contrast to what many in Moscow have regularly insisted (www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2008/09/03/159763).
The least well-known of the appointed governors was Valery Potapenko, who heads the Nenets Autonomous District. One quarter of the residents of that region could not recall his name when asked by VTsIOM’s pollsters, and another fifth gave the wrong name altogether – for a total of almost half of the population.
The situation in Sakhalin and Kamchatka, the paper continued, is roughly the same, according to the VTsIOM figures. Often those whom the population gave higher marks to were among the better known, the paper said, but “disliked governors are not always the least known.”
The governors of in the Amur and Kaliningrad regions are known but disliked.
The socio-economic situation in the regions and republics play a role in this, VTsIOM’s Valery Fedorov told the Moscow paper, with governors getting credit for good times and blame for bad ones. But “economics does not influence public opinion everywhere,” he said, noting that residents also evaluate governors in terms of crime and corruption.
The VTsIOM poll highlights one of the ways in which Putin subverted Russia’s fitful transformation into a more open and democratic society. But Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a Moscow specialist on Russian elites, provides evidence for those who argue that Russia could still turn in a democratic direction.
At a media briefing last week reported in the current issue of “Velikaya Epokha,” the sociologist said that there has been a dramatic decline in the percentage of Russian officials who earlier served in the Soviet nomenklatura, a decline that could open the way for a break with the past (www.epochtimes.ru/content/view/19154/3/).
Under Russian President Boris Yeltsin, approximately 50 percent of senior government officials – including Yeltsin himself – had been members of the Soviet nomenklatura. Under Putin, their percentage fell from 38 percent in 2000-2001 to 33 percent in 2007. And now under President Dmitry Medvedev, the figure has fallen to 16.7 percent.
Some of this decline is simply the product of the passing of time. After all, most nomenklatura officials were in their 50s or even older, and it has been 17 years since the Soviet Union collapsed and the Russian Federation emerged. But Kryshtanovskaya argued that this trend is “extraordinarily important.”
With the departure of these Soviet officials, she said, there has been a gradual decline in the impact of the Soviet mentality and Soviet ways of making decisions and implementing policy. But at the same time, she said, no one should expect a major change in the way Moscow officials do business over the next few years as compared to the Putin era.
Even though there are now fewer former nomenklatura workers, she pointed out, the force structures on which Putin’s power has been based are still dominated by them, and the political elite which Kryshtanovskaya studies has not changed as much as this statistic might suggest: 80 percent of it under Medvedev were put in place by Putin.
Vienna, September 5 – Regional and republic heads appointed by Moscow are likely to be less well known among the population and, when known, often less well liked that those elected by the people, yet another negative indication of the negative impact Vladimir Putin had on the state of democracy in the Russian Federation.
At the end of August, the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion (VTsIOM), a polling agency known for its close ties to the Kremlin, surveyed residents in 13 regions whose top officials appointed by then-president Putin between 2005 and 2007. The results are striking and could set the stage for making these posts again subject to election.
According to a report in “Vedomosti” this week, the VTsIOM survey found that “the population does not know its own governors” and that the attitude of the population to them “is not always linked to the state of the economy,” a sharp contrast to what many in Moscow have regularly insisted (www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2008/09/03/159763).
The least well-known of the appointed governors was Valery Potapenko, who heads the Nenets Autonomous District. One quarter of the residents of that region could not recall his name when asked by VTsIOM’s pollsters, and another fifth gave the wrong name altogether – for a total of almost half of the population.
The situation in Sakhalin and Kamchatka, the paper continued, is roughly the same, according to the VTsIOM figures. Often those whom the population gave higher marks to were among the better known, the paper said, but “disliked governors are not always the least known.”
The governors of in the Amur and Kaliningrad regions are known but disliked.
The socio-economic situation in the regions and republics play a role in this, VTsIOM’s Valery Fedorov told the Moscow paper, with governors getting credit for good times and blame for bad ones. But “economics does not influence public opinion everywhere,” he said, noting that residents also evaluate governors in terms of crime and corruption.
The VTsIOM poll highlights one of the ways in which Putin subverted Russia’s fitful transformation into a more open and democratic society. But Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a Moscow specialist on Russian elites, provides evidence for those who argue that Russia could still turn in a democratic direction.
At a media briefing last week reported in the current issue of “Velikaya Epokha,” the sociologist said that there has been a dramatic decline in the percentage of Russian officials who earlier served in the Soviet nomenklatura, a decline that could open the way for a break with the past (www.epochtimes.ru/content/view/19154/3/).
Under Russian President Boris Yeltsin, approximately 50 percent of senior government officials – including Yeltsin himself – had been members of the Soviet nomenklatura. Under Putin, their percentage fell from 38 percent in 2000-2001 to 33 percent in 2007. And now under President Dmitry Medvedev, the figure has fallen to 16.7 percent.
Some of this decline is simply the product of the passing of time. After all, most nomenklatura officials were in their 50s or even older, and it has been 17 years since the Soviet Union collapsed and the Russian Federation emerged. But Kryshtanovskaya argued that this trend is “extraordinarily important.”
With the departure of these Soviet officials, she said, there has been a gradual decline in the impact of the Soviet mentality and Soviet ways of making decisions and implementing policy. But at the same time, she said, no one should expect a major change in the way Moscow officials do business over the next few years as compared to the Putin era.
Even though there are now fewer former nomenklatura workers, she pointed out, the force structures on which Putin’s power has been based are still dominated by them, and the political elite which Kryshtanovskaya studies has not changed as much as this statistic might suggest: 80 percent of it under Medvedev were put in place by Putin.
Thursday, September 4, 2008
Window on Eurasia: Will Georgia Reinforce Putin’s Power or Strengthen Medvedev’s Hand?
Paul Goble
Vienna, September 4 – Russia’s invasion of Georgia and its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have reignited the Moscow guessing game about the personal and power relationship between incumbent Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his predecessor, the man who selected him, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Many commentators have suggested that the Georgian events have shown that Medvedev takes his marching orders from Putin. Others have said that a conflict of this kind has driven the two together, leading Medvedev to sacrifice some of his reformist plants. And still others have suggested that the Georgian events have laid the groundwork for a split between the two men.
No one except perhaps the two men themselves knows which of these scenarios is accurate. But two articles this week, one an interview with Russian novelist Boris Strugatsky and a second providing statistics on the number of times each of the two leaders was referred to in the Russian media provide some interesting grist for this particular rumor mill.
In an interview featured in “Novaya gazeta v Sankt-Peterburg,” Strugatsky argued that the war between Russia and Georgia had “killed the last hope for a ‘Medvedev’ thaw,” something many in Russia and the West had been hoping for ever since the technocrat replaced the KGB officer (www.nr2.ru/moskow/194210.html).
According to Strugatsky, “small victorious wars are harmful to an authoritarian state” because they then act as if they have won the right to do whatever they please “over their own economy and in general over their own people,” an attitude that does not bode well for Russia’s future.
Some have suggested that because of the war, the Russian media has been creating a new worldview among Russians, the novelist says. But that is not the case. The media “are supporting a worldview that already exists. And our worldview – that of the mass population – remains totalitarian: ‘They must fear us.’ ‘We are the best.’” and so on.
Consequently, no one should have “any illusions” about the future. “Ahead are the Great Re-Statification and Decisive Militarization with all the ensuing consequences relative to rights and freedoms. [Medvedev’s] thaw thus ended without having begun. We already have returned to the beginning of the 1980s. God forbid that this doesn’t take us back to the end of the 1930s.”
A second article, in this week’s “Argumenty nedeli” by Mikhail Tul’sky, addresses the issue of the impact of the Georgian conflict on the status of President Medvedev and particularly on the attention he has received in the media relative to that of his predecessor Prime Minister Putin (www.argumenti.ru/publications/7710).
According to Tul’sky, polls taken by the Public Opinion Foundation showed that the percentage of Russians who said they trust Medvedev rose from 45 to 54 percent over the two weeks the military conflict lasted with the share saying they partially trust him and partially not falling from 28 to 24 percent and those who completely mistrust him from 14 to 11 percent.
Over the same period, these surveys found, trust in Putin rose from 68 to 72 percent, figures that are much higher than those for Medvedev. But Tul’sky pointed out, the rates of growth of the popularity of the current president significantly exceed the rates of growth in the popularity of his predecessor,” a pattern that could change the balance between them.
One reason for Medvedev’s relative rise, the “Argumenty nedeli” journalist says, is that “in August 2008, for the first time, President Dmitry Medvedev was cited much more often in the Russian mass media than was Prime Minister Vladimir Putin,” a striking development given that until the Georgian conflict, Medvedev had never approached Putin’s numbers.
But in August, according to the Interfax news agency data system, Medvedev was mentioned in the Russian mass media 6635 times, while Putin was mentioned only 4662. Some might say Putin arranged this so Medvedev could take the blame if things had gone wrong, but others are sure to suggest Medvedev may enjoy the attention and the power that may go with it.
Vienna, September 4 – Russia’s invasion of Georgia and its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have reignited the Moscow guessing game about the personal and power relationship between incumbent Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his predecessor, the man who selected him, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Many commentators have suggested that the Georgian events have shown that Medvedev takes his marching orders from Putin. Others have said that a conflict of this kind has driven the two together, leading Medvedev to sacrifice some of his reformist plants. And still others have suggested that the Georgian events have laid the groundwork for a split between the two men.
No one except perhaps the two men themselves knows which of these scenarios is accurate. But two articles this week, one an interview with Russian novelist Boris Strugatsky and a second providing statistics on the number of times each of the two leaders was referred to in the Russian media provide some interesting grist for this particular rumor mill.
In an interview featured in “Novaya gazeta v Sankt-Peterburg,” Strugatsky argued that the war between Russia and Georgia had “killed the last hope for a ‘Medvedev’ thaw,” something many in Russia and the West had been hoping for ever since the technocrat replaced the KGB officer (www.nr2.ru/moskow/194210.html).
According to Strugatsky, “small victorious wars are harmful to an authoritarian state” because they then act as if they have won the right to do whatever they please “over their own economy and in general over their own people,” an attitude that does not bode well for Russia’s future.
Some have suggested that because of the war, the Russian media has been creating a new worldview among Russians, the novelist says. But that is not the case. The media “are supporting a worldview that already exists. And our worldview – that of the mass population – remains totalitarian: ‘They must fear us.’ ‘We are the best.’” and so on.
Consequently, no one should have “any illusions” about the future. “Ahead are the Great Re-Statification and Decisive Militarization with all the ensuing consequences relative to rights and freedoms. [Medvedev’s] thaw thus ended without having begun. We already have returned to the beginning of the 1980s. God forbid that this doesn’t take us back to the end of the 1930s.”
A second article, in this week’s “Argumenty nedeli” by Mikhail Tul’sky, addresses the issue of the impact of the Georgian conflict on the status of President Medvedev and particularly on the attention he has received in the media relative to that of his predecessor Prime Minister Putin (www.argumenti.ru/publications/7710).
According to Tul’sky, polls taken by the Public Opinion Foundation showed that the percentage of Russians who said they trust Medvedev rose from 45 to 54 percent over the two weeks the military conflict lasted with the share saying they partially trust him and partially not falling from 28 to 24 percent and those who completely mistrust him from 14 to 11 percent.
Over the same period, these surveys found, trust in Putin rose from 68 to 72 percent, figures that are much higher than those for Medvedev. But Tul’sky pointed out, the rates of growth of the popularity of the current president significantly exceed the rates of growth in the popularity of his predecessor,” a pattern that could change the balance between them.
One reason for Medvedev’s relative rise, the “Argumenty nedeli” journalist says, is that “in August 2008, for the first time, President Dmitry Medvedev was cited much more often in the Russian mass media than was Prime Minister Vladimir Putin,” a striking development given that until the Georgian conflict, Medvedev had never approached Putin’s numbers.
But in August, according to the Interfax news agency data system, Medvedev was mentioned in the Russian mass media 6635 times, while Putin was mentioned only 4662. Some might say Putin arranged this so Medvedev could take the blame if things had gone wrong, but others are sure to suggest Medvedev may enjoy the attention and the power that may go with it.
Window on Eurasia: Kremlin Thinking about Firing Zyazikov, But Russia’s Siloviki Back Him
Paul Goble
Vienna, September 4 – An unnamed official in the office of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told a Moscow newspaper that the status of Ingushetia head Murat Zyazikov was now “very poor” after his opponent Magomed Yevloyev was murdered while in the custody of Zyazikov’s police and that the Kremlin was “thinking” about his future.
In reporting this today, “Vedomosti” has provided the clearest indication that Medvedev may decide that Zyazikov, who has attracted the condemnation of the Ingush people, human rights groups, and Duma deputies, should be dismissed before his actions spark a further explosion in his republic (www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2008/09/04/159918).
But even as this comment surfaced, officials in the force structures in the capitals of both Ingushetia and the Russian Federation were working to defend him by seeking to blame the victim and his friends for what happened, apparently mindful of the serious consequences for themselves and their leader Prime Minister Vladimir Putin if Zyazikov is sacked.
In reporting the Kremlin insider’s comment, the Moscow daily added the following comment: So far, Medvedev’s cadres policy has not taken final shape, but Putin in the past did dismiss regional leaders who got in trouble, after waiting a decent interval so that it did not look as if Moscow was making any concession to protesters.
Putin fired Aleksandr Dzasokhov of North Ossetia after the Beslan tragedy, the paper pointed out, and he got rid of Karachayevo-Cherkessia head Mustafa Batdyyev, albeit only three years after government buildings were seized in the capital of the republic he was serving as president.
Whether Medvedev will deal with Zyazikov given the scandal the latter’s actions have created with more dispatch than Putin might have, the paper said. It cited the observation of Moscow political scientist Aleksandr Kynyev who suggested that such a change is “possible” but clearly far from certain.
But even as the Kremlin mulled doing something about Zyazikov, the siloviki were doing what they could to protect him from the consequences of the murder he so clearly arranged. Prosecutors in Ingushetia have opened a criminal case against two Yevloyev supporters to try to shift the blame to them (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/Regions/m.140958.html).
In particular, the Ingushetia prosecutors have indicated that they plan to file charges against Magomed Khazbiyev and Maksharip Aushev for using force against representatives of the state, carrying concealed weapons, and engaging in a conspiracy. If convicted, the two could face as much as 17 years in prison (www.agentura.ru/?id=1220441880).
And it is likely that many of the siloviki in Moscow, including the FSB and the military and possibly their chief patron Vladimir Putin, will work behind the scenes to support Zyazikov lest his dismissal and a serious investigation of what he has done since Putin appointed him create political problems for other siloviki leaders and the prime minister in particular.
Were Zyazikov to be fired quickly, many in the Ingush opposition would likely press for other changes, especially if Moscow tried to impose in his place another outsider or representative of the force structures. And many in neighboring republics and in Moscow would be encouraged to challenge the illegitimate powers such people have amassed.
That makes the stakes high, but there is a reason why the stakes for some in Moscow are higher still. This week, the Voice of Beslan, a social organization that seeks an independent investigation into the Beslan tragedy of four years ago, demanded that prosecutors take a deposition from Putin (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1228417.html).
Not surprisingly, given the current state of power relations in Russia, prosecutors dismissed this call saying that there was no basis for interrogating Putin because he had had nothing to do with Beslan, a statement so at odds with what is known that it has emboldened the Voice of Beslan to demand that the authorities bring criminal charges against Putin.
Unless things change dramatically in Moscow, there is no chance that such charges, however justified, will ever be brought, but public suggestions that they should be, calls likely to increase if Zyazikov and his ilk are fired, will inevitably erode the authority and power of the prime minister.
And consequently, the fight over Zyazikov’s future is about far more than that former FSB general, the republic to which he has done so much harm, or the other non-Russian republics in the North Caucasus who are watching what happens. It is about whether Russian officials who believe they are above the law will be brought to justice -- or remain in power.
Vienna, September 4 – An unnamed official in the office of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told a Moscow newspaper that the status of Ingushetia head Murat Zyazikov was now “very poor” after his opponent Magomed Yevloyev was murdered while in the custody of Zyazikov’s police and that the Kremlin was “thinking” about his future.
In reporting this today, “Vedomosti” has provided the clearest indication that Medvedev may decide that Zyazikov, who has attracted the condemnation of the Ingush people, human rights groups, and Duma deputies, should be dismissed before his actions spark a further explosion in his republic (www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2008/09/04/159918).
But even as this comment surfaced, officials in the force structures in the capitals of both Ingushetia and the Russian Federation were working to defend him by seeking to blame the victim and his friends for what happened, apparently mindful of the serious consequences for themselves and their leader Prime Minister Vladimir Putin if Zyazikov is sacked.
In reporting the Kremlin insider’s comment, the Moscow daily added the following comment: So far, Medvedev’s cadres policy has not taken final shape, but Putin in the past did dismiss regional leaders who got in trouble, after waiting a decent interval so that it did not look as if Moscow was making any concession to protesters.
Putin fired Aleksandr Dzasokhov of North Ossetia after the Beslan tragedy, the paper pointed out, and he got rid of Karachayevo-Cherkessia head Mustafa Batdyyev, albeit only three years after government buildings were seized in the capital of the republic he was serving as president.
Whether Medvedev will deal with Zyazikov given the scandal the latter’s actions have created with more dispatch than Putin might have, the paper said. It cited the observation of Moscow political scientist Aleksandr Kynyev who suggested that such a change is “possible” but clearly far from certain.
But even as the Kremlin mulled doing something about Zyazikov, the siloviki were doing what they could to protect him from the consequences of the murder he so clearly arranged. Prosecutors in Ingushetia have opened a criminal case against two Yevloyev supporters to try to shift the blame to them (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/Regions/m.140958.html).
In particular, the Ingushetia prosecutors have indicated that they plan to file charges against Magomed Khazbiyev and Maksharip Aushev for using force against representatives of the state, carrying concealed weapons, and engaging in a conspiracy. If convicted, the two could face as much as 17 years in prison (www.agentura.ru/?id=1220441880).
And it is likely that many of the siloviki in Moscow, including the FSB and the military and possibly their chief patron Vladimir Putin, will work behind the scenes to support Zyazikov lest his dismissal and a serious investigation of what he has done since Putin appointed him create political problems for other siloviki leaders and the prime minister in particular.
Were Zyazikov to be fired quickly, many in the Ingush opposition would likely press for other changes, especially if Moscow tried to impose in his place another outsider or representative of the force structures. And many in neighboring republics and in Moscow would be encouraged to challenge the illegitimate powers such people have amassed.
That makes the stakes high, but there is a reason why the stakes for some in Moscow are higher still. This week, the Voice of Beslan, a social organization that seeks an independent investigation into the Beslan tragedy of four years ago, demanded that prosecutors take a deposition from Putin (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1228417.html).
Not surprisingly, given the current state of power relations in Russia, prosecutors dismissed this call saying that there was no basis for interrogating Putin because he had had nothing to do with Beslan, a statement so at odds with what is known that it has emboldened the Voice of Beslan to demand that the authorities bring criminal charges against Putin.
Unless things change dramatically in Moscow, there is no chance that such charges, however justified, will ever be brought, but public suggestions that they should be, calls likely to increase if Zyazikov and his ilk are fired, will inevitably erode the authority and power of the prime minister.
And consequently, the fight over Zyazikov’s future is about far more than that former FSB general, the republic to which he has done so much harm, or the other non-Russian republics in the North Caucasus who are watching what happens. It is about whether Russian officials who believe they are above the law will be brought to justice -- or remain in power.
Window on Eurasia: After Georgia, Bashkirs Invoke Self-Determination Right against Putin’s Power Vertical
Paul Goble
Vienna, September 4 – Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has led ever more Bashkirs to express their dissatisfaction with the status their republic and their nation now have within the Russian Federation and to invoke the principle of national self-determination as the basis for a solution.
That does not mean that the members of this Turkic Muslim group on the Middle Volga are about to press for independence, although there is some sentiment for that step, but rather that ethnic Bashkirs are convinced that now is the time to regain for themselves some of the rights they lost during the presidency of Vladimir Putin.
And consequently, they are now prepared to challenge the Russian government on those grounds, invoking the right of nations to self-determination both as a means to convince others that their demands should be met and, perhaps equally important, as a threat to Moscow if the central government decides to ignore them.
These are just some of the conclusions suggested by the results of a focus group of the leaders of various Bashkir social organizations conducted by the Network of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning in Bashkortostan at the end of August and reported by the Regnum.ru news agency yesterday (www.regnum.ru/news/1049977.html).
The group included representatives of the World Kurultai of Bashkirs, the Union of Bashkir Youth, the Institute of History at the Ufa Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the dean of the history faculty at Bashkir State University, the head of the philosophy department at another Ufa school, and the vice president of the “Gray Wolves” national movement.
In the wake of the events in Georgia, Regnum.ru repotted, all members of this group invoked the right of nations to self-determination in their discussion of how to overcome what they view as the current less than satisfactory state of the rights of Bashkirs and the Republic of Bashkortostan.
And collectively, on the basis of that, the members of this focus group made five points. First, they said that with the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, they “expect a broadening of the rights of the titular ethnos of Bashkortostan and an increase in both the actual and formal status of this subject of the Federation.”
Second, they said that in the wake of what Moscow has done in Georgia, “the president of Bashkortostan can be only a Bashkir by nationality, who knows the Bashkir language,” an arrangement they said that would restore earlier practice and one that must be fixed in law so that it will not be changed again.
Third, they insisted that “it is necessary to return the norm and practice of general elections of the head of a subject of the Russian Federation,” something that Vladimir Putin did away with but an arrangement that is absolutely essential for nations within Russia under the terms of the right of nations to self-determination.
Fourth, the participants in this focus group said that the fiscal policies of the Russian Federation must be changed so that donor regions like Bashkortostan can keep more of what they have been paying in taxes rather than having to hand it over to the central government for its uses and transfer to other regions.
And fifth, the participants said, the right of nations to self-determination requires that Moscow reduce its efforts to limit the powers of republic governments to deal with the situation on their own territories, as Moscow has been doing since Putin came to power, and to transfer back some of the powers which Moscow has already seized. .
The Regnum.ru report notes that Bashkirs in general and the members of this focus group in particular were among the first to come out in support of Russia’s military moves to defend the South Ossetians and the Abkhazians and even to back Moscow’s recognition of the two breakaway republics.
But those actions may not mean what Moscow hoped they meant. Instead, Regnum.ru said, such support may reflect “a hope that this could give them the occasion for demanding the broadening of rights and authority of the ‘national’ subjects [in Russia], which have been seriously reduced over the last eight years during the construction of the ‘power vertical.’”
To the extent that is the logic of the Bashkirs – and the extensive quotations from the participants in this focus group makes it clear that is the case for them – then Moscow’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is having a domino effect with the Russian Federation, even if it is not yet as dramatic as many think it will become.
Vienna, September 4 – Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has led ever more Bashkirs to express their dissatisfaction with the status their republic and their nation now have within the Russian Federation and to invoke the principle of national self-determination as the basis for a solution.
That does not mean that the members of this Turkic Muslim group on the Middle Volga are about to press for independence, although there is some sentiment for that step, but rather that ethnic Bashkirs are convinced that now is the time to regain for themselves some of the rights they lost during the presidency of Vladimir Putin.
And consequently, they are now prepared to challenge the Russian government on those grounds, invoking the right of nations to self-determination both as a means to convince others that their demands should be met and, perhaps equally important, as a threat to Moscow if the central government decides to ignore them.
These are just some of the conclusions suggested by the results of a focus group of the leaders of various Bashkir social organizations conducted by the Network of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning in Bashkortostan at the end of August and reported by the Regnum.ru news agency yesterday (www.regnum.ru/news/1049977.html).
The group included representatives of the World Kurultai of Bashkirs, the Union of Bashkir Youth, the Institute of History at the Ufa Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the dean of the history faculty at Bashkir State University, the head of the philosophy department at another Ufa school, and the vice president of the “Gray Wolves” national movement.
In the wake of the events in Georgia, Regnum.ru repotted, all members of this group invoked the right of nations to self-determination in their discussion of how to overcome what they view as the current less than satisfactory state of the rights of Bashkirs and the Republic of Bashkortostan.
And collectively, on the basis of that, the members of this focus group made five points. First, they said that with the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, they “expect a broadening of the rights of the titular ethnos of Bashkortostan and an increase in both the actual and formal status of this subject of the Federation.”
Second, they said that in the wake of what Moscow has done in Georgia, “the president of Bashkortostan can be only a Bashkir by nationality, who knows the Bashkir language,” an arrangement they said that would restore earlier practice and one that must be fixed in law so that it will not be changed again.
Third, they insisted that “it is necessary to return the norm and practice of general elections of the head of a subject of the Russian Federation,” something that Vladimir Putin did away with but an arrangement that is absolutely essential for nations within Russia under the terms of the right of nations to self-determination.
Fourth, the participants in this focus group said that the fiscal policies of the Russian Federation must be changed so that donor regions like Bashkortostan can keep more of what they have been paying in taxes rather than having to hand it over to the central government for its uses and transfer to other regions.
And fifth, the participants said, the right of nations to self-determination requires that Moscow reduce its efforts to limit the powers of republic governments to deal with the situation on their own territories, as Moscow has been doing since Putin came to power, and to transfer back some of the powers which Moscow has already seized. .
The Regnum.ru report notes that Bashkirs in general and the members of this focus group in particular were among the first to come out in support of Russia’s military moves to defend the South Ossetians and the Abkhazians and even to back Moscow’s recognition of the two breakaway republics.
But those actions may not mean what Moscow hoped they meant. Instead, Regnum.ru said, such support may reflect “a hope that this could give them the occasion for demanding the broadening of rights and authority of the ‘national’ subjects [in Russia], which have been seriously reduced over the last eight years during the construction of the ‘power vertical.’”
To the extent that is the logic of the Bashkirs – and the extensive quotations from the participants in this focus group makes it clear that is the case for them – then Moscow’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is having a domino effect with the Russian Federation, even if it is not yet as dramatic as many think it will become.
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