Paul Goble
Vienna, September 5 – Regional and republic heads appointed by Moscow are likely to be less well known among the population and, when known, often less well liked that those elected by the people, yet another negative indication of the negative impact Vladimir Putin had on the state of democracy in the Russian Federation.
At the end of August, the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion (VTsIOM), a polling agency known for its close ties to the Kremlin, surveyed residents in 13 regions whose top officials appointed by then-president Putin between 2005 and 2007. The results are striking and could set the stage for making these posts again subject to election.
According to a report in “Vedomosti” this week, the VTsIOM survey found that “the population does not know its own governors” and that the attitude of the population to them “is not always linked to the state of the economy,” a sharp contrast to what many in Moscow have regularly insisted (www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2008/09/03/159763).
The least well-known of the appointed governors was Valery Potapenko, who heads the Nenets Autonomous District. One quarter of the residents of that region could not recall his name when asked by VTsIOM’s pollsters, and another fifth gave the wrong name altogether – for a total of almost half of the population.
The situation in Sakhalin and Kamchatka, the paper continued, is roughly the same, according to the VTsIOM figures. Often those whom the population gave higher marks to were among the better known, the paper said, but “disliked governors are not always the least known.”
The governors of in the Amur and Kaliningrad regions are known but disliked.
The socio-economic situation in the regions and republics play a role in this, VTsIOM’s Valery Fedorov told the Moscow paper, with governors getting credit for good times and blame for bad ones. But “economics does not influence public opinion everywhere,” he said, noting that residents also evaluate governors in terms of crime and corruption.
The VTsIOM poll highlights one of the ways in which Putin subverted Russia’s fitful transformation into a more open and democratic society. But Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a Moscow specialist on Russian elites, provides evidence for those who argue that Russia could still turn in a democratic direction.
At a media briefing last week reported in the current issue of “Velikaya Epokha,” the sociologist said that there has been a dramatic decline in the percentage of Russian officials who earlier served in the Soviet nomenklatura, a decline that could open the way for a break with the past (www.epochtimes.ru/content/view/19154/3/).
Under Russian President Boris Yeltsin, approximately 50 percent of senior government officials – including Yeltsin himself – had been members of the Soviet nomenklatura. Under Putin, their percentage fell from 38 percent in 2000-2001 to 33 percent in 2007. And now under President Dmitry Medvedev, the figure has fallen to 16.7 percent.
Some of this decline is simply the product of the passing of time. After all, most nomenklatura officials were in their 50s or even older, and it has been 17 years since the Soviet Union collapsed and the Russian Federation emerged. But Kryshtanovskaya argued that this trend is “extraordinarily important.”
With the departure of these Soviet officials, she said, there has been a gradual decline in the impact of the Soviet mentality and Soviet ways of making decisions and implementing policy. But at the same time, she said, no one should expect a major change in the way Moscow officials do business over the next few years as compared to the Putin era.
Even though there are now fewer former nomenklatura workers, she pointed out, the force structures on which Putin’s power has been based are still dominated by them, and the political elite which Kryshtanovskaya studies has not changed as much as this statistic might suggest: 80 percent of it under Medvedev were put in place by Putin.
Friday, September 5, 2008
Thursday, September 4, 2008
Window on Eurasia: Will Georgia Reinforce Putin’s Power or Strengthen Medvedev’s Hand?
Paul Goble
Vienna, September 4 – Russia’s invasion of Georgia and its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have reignited the Moscow guessing game about the personal and power relationship between incumbent Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his predecessor, the man who selected him, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Many commentators have suggested that the Georgian events have shown that Medvedev takes his marching orders from Putin. Others have said that a conflict of this kind has driven the two together, leading Medvedev to sacrifice some of his reformist plants. And still others have suggested that the Georgian events have laid the groundwork for a split between the two men.
No one except perhaps the two men themselves knows which of these scenarios is accurate. But two articles this week, one an interview with Russian novelist Boris Strugatsky and a second providing statistics on the number of times each of the two leaders was referred to in the Russian media provide some interesting grist for this particular rumor mill.
In an interview featured in “Novaya gazeta v Sankt-Peterburg,” Strugatsky argued that the war between Russia and Georgia had “killed the last hope for a ‘Medvedev’ thaw,” something many in Russia and the West had been hoping for ever since the technocrat replaced the KGB officer (www.nr2.ru/moskow/194210.html).
According to Strugatsky, “small victorious wars are harmful to an authoritarian state” because they then act as if they have won the right to do whatever they please “over their own economy and in general over their own people,” an attitude that does not bode well for Russia’s future.
Some have suggested that because of the war, the Russian media has been creating a new worldview among Russians, the novelist says. But that is not the case. The media “are supporting a worldview that already exists. And our worldview – that of the mass population – remains totalitarian: ‘They must fear us.’ ‘We are the best.’” and so on.
Consequently, no one should have “any illusions” about the future. “Ahead are the Great Re-Statification and Decisive Militarization with all the ensuing consequences relative to rights and freedoms. [Medvedev’s] thaw thus ended without having begun. We already have returned to the beginning of the 1980s. God forbid that this doesn’t take us back to the end of the 1930s.”
A second article, in this week’s “Argumenty nedeli” by Mikhail Tul’sky, addresses the issue of the impact of the Georgian conflict on the status of President Medvedev and particularly on the attention he has received in the media relative to that of his predecessor Prime Minister Putin (www.argumenti.ru/publications/7710).
According to Tul’sky, polls taken by the Public Opinion Foundation showed that the percentage of Russians who said they trust Medvedev rose from 45 to 54 percent over the two weeks the military conflict lasted with the share saying they partially trust him and partially not falling from 28 to 24 percent and those who completely mistrust him from 14 to 11 percent.
Over the same period, these surveys found, trust in Putin rose from 68 to 72 percent, figures that are much higher than those for Medvedev. But Tul’sky pointed out, the rates of growth of the popularity of the current president significantly exceed the rates of growth in the popularity of his predecessor,” a pattern that could change the balance between them.
One reason for Medvedev’s relative rise, the “Argumenty nedeli” journalist says, is that “in August 2008, for the first time, President Dmitry Medvedev was cited much more often in the Russian mass media than was Prime Minister Vladimir Putin,” a striking development given that until the Georgian conflict, Medvedev had never approached Putin’s numbers.
But in August, according to the Interfax news agency data system, Medvedev was mentioned in the Russian mass media 6635 times, while Putin was mentioned only 4662. Some might say Putin arranged this so Medvedev could take the blame if things had gone wrong, but others are sure to suggest Medvedev may enjoy the attention and the power that may go with it.
Vienna, September 4 – Russia’s invasion of Georgia and its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have reignited the Moscow guessing game about the personal and power relationship between incumbent Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his predecessor, the man who selected him, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Many commentators have suggested that the Georgian events have shown that Medvedev takes his marching orders from Putin. Others have said that a conflict of this kind has driven the two together, leading Medvedev to sacrifice some of his reformist plants. And still others have suggested that the Georgian events have laid the groundwork for a split between the two men.
No one except perhaps the two men themselves knows which of these scenarios is accurate. But two articles this week, one an interview with Russian novelist Boris Strugatsky and a second providing statistics on the number of times each of the two leaders was referred to in the Russian media provide some interesting grist for this particular rumor mill.
In an interview featured in “Novaya gazeta v Sankt-Peterburg,” Strugatsky argued that the war between Russia and Georgia had “killed the last hope for a ‘Medvedev’ thaw,” something many in Russia and the West had been hoping for ever since the technocrat replaced the KGB officer (www.nr2.ru/moskow/194210.html).
According to Strugatsky, “small victorious wars are harmful to an authoritarian state” because they then act as if they have won the right to do whatever they please “over their own economy and in general over their own people,” an attitude that does not bode well for Russia’s future.
Some have suggested that because of the war, the Russian media has been creating a new worldview among Russians, the novelist says. But that is not the case. The media “are supporting a worldview that already exists. And our worldview – that of the mass population – remains totalitarian: ‘They must fear us.’ ‘We are the best.’” and so on.
Consequently, no one should have “any illusions” about the future. “Ahead are the Great Re-Statification and Decisive Militarization with all the ensuing consequences relative to rights and freedoms. [Medvedev’s] thaw thus ended without having begun. We already have returned to the beginning of the 1980s. God forbid that this doesn’t take us back to the end of the 1930s.”
A second article, in this week’s “Argumenty nedeli” by Mikhail Tul’sky, addresses the issue of the impact of the Georgian conflict on the status of President Medvedev and particularly on the attention he has received in the media relative to that of his predecessor Prime Minister Putin (www.argumenti.ru/publications/7710).
According to Tul’sky, polls taken by the Public Opinion Foundation showed that the percentage of Russians who said they trust Medvedev rose from 45 to 54 percent over the two weeks the military conflict lasted with the share saying they partially trust him and partially not falling from 28 to 24 percent and those who completely mistrust him from 14 to 11 percent.
Over the same period, these surveys found, trust in Putin rose from 68 to 72 percent, figures that are much higher than those for Medvedev. But Tul’sky pointed out, the rates of growth of the popularity of the current president significantly exceed the rates of growth in the popularity of his predecessor,” a pattern that could change the balance between them.
One reason for Medvedev’s relative rise, the “Argumenty nedeli” journalist says, is that “in August 2008, for the first time, President Dmitry Medvedev was cited much more often in the Russian mass media than was Prime Minister Vladimir Putin,” a striking development given that until the Georgian conflict, Medvedev had never approached Putin’s numbers.
But in August, according to the Interfax news agency data system, Medvedev was mentioned in the Russian mass media 6635 times, while Putin was mentioned only 4662. Some might say Putin arranged this so Medvedev could take the blame if things had gone wrong, but others are sure to suggest Medvedev may enjoy the attention and the power that may go with it.
Window on Eurasia: Kremlin Thinking about Firing Zyazikov, But Russia’s Siloviki Back Him
Paul Goble
Vienna, September 4 – An unnamed official in the office of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told a Moscow newspaper that the status of Ingushetia head Murat Zyazikov was now “very poor” after his opponent Magomed Yevloyev was murdered while in the custody of Zyazikov’s police and that the Kremlin was “thinking” about his future.
In reporting this today, “Vedomosti” has provided the clearest indication that Medvedev may decide that Zyazikov, who has attracted the condemnation of the Ingush people, human rights groups, and Duma deputies, should be dismissed before his actions spark a further explosion in his republic (www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2008/09/04/159918).
But even as this comment surfaced, officials in the force structures in the capitals of both Ingushetia and the Russian Federation were working to defend him by seeking to blame the victim and his friends for what happened, apparently mindful of the serious consequences for themselves and their leader Prime Minister Vladimir Putin if Zyazikov is sacked.
In reporting the Kremlin insider’s comment, the Moscow daily added the following comment: So far, Medvedev’s cadres policy has not taken final shape, but Putin in the past did dismiss regional leaders who got in trouble, after waiting a decent interval so that it did not look as if Moscow was making any concession to protesters.
Putin fired Aleksandr Dzasokhov of North Ossetia after the Beslan tragedy, the paper pointed out, and he got rid of Karachayevo-Cherkessia head Mustafa Batdyyev, albeit only three years after government buildings were seized in the capital of the republic he was serving as president.
Whether Medvedev will deal with Zyazikov given the scandal the latter’s actions have created with more dispatch than Putin might have, the paper said. It cited the observation of Moscow political scientist Aleksandr Kynyev who suggested that such a change is “possible” but clearly far from certain.
But even as the Kremlin mulled doing something about Zyazikov, the siloviki were doing what they could to protect him from the consequences of the murder he so clearly arranged. Prosecutors in Ingushetia have opened a criminal case against two Yevloyev supporters to try to shift the blame to them (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/Regions/m.140958.html).
In particular, the Ingushetia prosecutors have indicated that they plan to file charges against Magomed Khazbiyev and Maksharip Aushev for using force against representatives of the state, carrying concealed weapons, and engaging in a conspiracy. If convicted, the two could face as much as 17 years in prison (www.agentura.ru/?id=1220441880).
And it is likely that many of the siloviki in Moscow, including the FSB and the military and possibly their chief patron Vladimir Putin, will work behind the scenes to support Zyazikov lest his dismissal and a serious investigation of what he has done since Putin appointed him create political problems for other siloviki leaders and the prime minister in particular.
Were Zyazikov to be fired quickly, many in the Ingush opposition would likely press for other changes, especially if Moscow tried to impose in his place another outsider or representative of the force structures. And many in neighboring republics and in Moscow would be encouraged to challenge the illegitimate powers such people have amassed.
That makes the stakes high, but there is a reason why the stakes for some in Moscow are higher still. This week, the Voice of Beslan, a social organization that seeks an independent investigation into the Beslan tragedy of four years ago, demanded that prosecutors take a deposition from Putin (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1228417.html).
Not surprisingly, given the current state of power relations in Russia, prosecutors dismissed this call saying that there was no basis for interrogating Putin because he had had nothing to do with Beslan, a statement so at odds with what is known that it has emboldened the Voice of Beslan to demand that the authorities bring criminal charges against Putin.
Unless things change dramatically in Moscow, there is no chance that such charges, however justified, will ever be brought, but public suggestions that they should be, calls likely to increase if Zyazikov and his ilk are fired, will inevitably erode the authority and power of the prime minister.
And consequently, the fight over Zyazikov’s future is about far more than that former FSB general, the republic to which he has done so much harm, or the other non-Russian republics in the North Caucasus who are watching what happens. It is about whether Russian officials who believe they are above the law will be brought to justice -- or remain in power.
Vienna, September 4 – An unnamed official in the office of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told a Moscow newspaper that the status of Ingushetia head Murat Zyazikov was now “very poor” after his opponent Magomed Yevloyev was murdered while in the custody of Zyazikov’s police and that the Kremlin was “thinking” about his future.
In reporting this today, “Vedomosti” has provided the clearest indication that Medvedev may decide that Zyazikov, who has attracted the condemnation of the Ingush people, human rights groups, and Duma deputies, should be dismissed before his actions spark a further explosion in his republic (www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2008/09/04/159918).
But even as this comment surfaced, officials in the force structures in the capitals of both Ingushetia and the Russian Federation were working to defend him by seeking to blame the victim and his friends for what happened, apparently mindful of the serious consequences for themselves and their leader Prime Minister Vladimir Putin if Zyazikov is sacked.
In reporting the Kremlin insider’s comment, the Moscow daily added the following comment: So far, Medvedev’s cadres policy has not taken final shape, but Putin in the past did dismiss regional leaders who got in trouble, after waiting a decent interval so that it did not look as if Moscow was making any concession to protesters.
Putin fired Aleksandr Dzasokhov of North Ossetia after the Beslan tragedy, the paper pointed out, and he got rid of Karachayevo-Cherkessia head Mustafa Batdyyev, albeit only three years after government buildings were seized in the capital of the republic he was serving as president.
Whether Medvedev will deal with Zyazikov given the scandal the latter’s actions have created with more dispatch than Putin might have, the paper said. It cited the observation of Moscow political scientist Aleksandr Kynyev who suggested that such a change is “possible” but clearly far from certain.
But even as the Kremlin mulled doing something about Zyazikov, the siloviki were doing what they could to protect him from the consequences of the murder he so clearly arranged. Prosecutors in Ingushetia have opened a criminal case against two Yevloyev supporters to try to shift the blame to them (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/Regions/m.140958.html).
In particular, the Ingushetia prosecutors have indicated that they plan to file charges against Magomed Khazbiyev and Maksharip Aushev for using force against representatives of the state, carrying concealed weapons, and engaging in a conspiracy. If convicted, the two could face as much as 17 years in prison (www.agentura.ru/?id=1220441880).
And it is likely that many of the siloviki in Moscow, including the FSB and the military and possibly their chief patron Vladimir Putin, will work behind the scenes to support Zyazikov lest his dismissal and a serious investigation of what he has done since Putin appointed him create political problems for other siloviki leaders and the prime minister in particular.
Were Zyazikov to be fired quickly, many in the Ingush opposition would likely press for other changes, especially if Moscow tried to impose in his place another outsider or representative of the force structures. And many in neighboring republics and in Moscow would be encouraged to challenge the illegitimate powers such people have amassed.
That makes the stakes high, but there is a reason why the stakes for some in Moscow are higher still. This week, the Voice of Beslan, a social organization that seeks an independent investigation into the Beslan tragedy of four years ago, demanded that prosecutors take a deposition from Putin (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1228417.html).
Not surprisingly, given the current state of power relations in Russia, prosecutors dismissed this call saying that there was no basis for interrogating Putin because he had had nothing to do with Beslan, a statement so at odds with what is known that it has emboldened the Voice of Beslan to demand that the authorities bring criminal charges against Putin.
Unless things change dramatically in Moscow, there is no chance that such charges, however justified, will ever be brought, but public suggestions that they should be, calls likely to increase if Zyazikov and his ilk are fired, will inevitably erode the authority and power of the prime minister.
And consequently, the fight over Zyazikov’s future is about far more than that former FSB general, the republic to which he has done so much harm, or the other non-Russian republics in the North Caucasus who are watching what happens. It is about whether Russian officials who believe they are above the law will be brought to justice -- or remain in power.
Window on Eurasia: After Georgia, Bashkirs Invoke Self-Determination Right against Putin’s Power Vertical
Paul Goble
Vienna, September 4 – Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has led ever more Bashkirs to express their dissatisfaction with the status their republic and their nation now have within the Russian Federation and to invoke the principle of national self-determination as the basis for a solution.
That does not mean that the members of this Turkic Muslim group on the Middle Volga are about to press for independence, although there is some sentiment for that step, but rather that ethnic Bashkirs are convinced that now is the time to regain for themselves some of the rights they lost during the presidency of Vladimir Putin.
And consequently, they are now prepared to challenge the Russian government on those grounds, invoking the right of nations to self-determination both as a means to convince others that their demands should be met and, perhaps equally important, as a threat to Moscow if the central government decides to ignore them.
These are just some of the conclusions suggested by the results of a focus group of the leaders of various Bashkir social organizations conducted by the Network of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning in Bashkortostan at the end of August and reported by the Regnum.ru news agency yesterday (www.regnum.ru/news/1049977.html).
The group included representatives of the World Kurultai of Bashkirs, the Union of Bashkir Youth, the Institute of History at the Ufa Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the dean of the history faculty at Bashkir State University, the head of the philosophy department at another Ufa school, and the vice president of the “Gray Wolves” national movement.
In the wake of the events in Georgia, Regnum.ru repotted, all members of this group invoked the right of nations to self-determination in their discussion of how to overcome what they view as the current less than satisfactory state of the rights of Bashkirs and the Republic of Bashkortostan.
And collectively, on the basis of that, the members of this focus group made five points. First, they said that with the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, they “expect a broadening of the rights of the titular ethnos of Bashkortostan and an increase in both the actual and formal status of this subject of the Federation.”
Second, they said that in the wake of what Moscow has done in Georgia, “the president of Bashkortostan can be only a Bashkir by nationality, who knows the Bashkir language,” an arrangement they said that would restore earlier practice and one that must be fixed in law so that it will not be changed again.
Third, they insisted that “it is necessary to return the norm and practice of general elections of the head of a subject of the Russian Federation,” something that Vladimir Putin did away with but an arrangement that is absolutely essential for nations within Russia under the terms of the right of nations to self-determination.
Fourth, the participants in this focus group said that the fiscal policies of the Russian Federation must be changed so that donor regions like Bashkortostan can keep more of what they have been paying in taxes rather than having to hand it over to the central government for its uses and transfer to other regions.
And fifth, the participants said, the right of nations to self-determination requires that Moscow reduce its efforts to limit the powers of republic governments to deal with the situation on their own territories, as Moscow has been doing since Putin came to power, and to transfer back some of the powers which Moscow has already seized. .
The Regnum.ru report notes that Bashkirs in general and the members of this focus group in particular were among the first to come out in support of Russia’s military moves to defend the South Ossetians and the Abkhazians and even to back Moscow’s recognition of the two breakaway republics.
But those actions may not mean what Moscow hoped they meant. Instead, Regnum.ru said, such support may reflect “a hope that this could give them the occasion for demanding the broadening of rights and authority of the ‘national’ subjects [in Russia], which have been seriously reduced over the last eight years during the construction of the ‘power vertical.’”
To the extent that is the logic of the Bashkirs – and the extensive quotations from the participants in this focus group makes it clear that is the case for them – then Moscow’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is having a domino effect with the Russian Federation, even if it is not yet as dramatic as many think it will become.
Vienna, September 4 – Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has led ever more Bashkirs to express their dissatisfaction with the status their republic and their nation now have within the Russian Federation and to invoke the principle of national self-determination as the basis for a solution.
That does not mean that the members of this Turkic Muslim group on the Middle Volga are about to press for independence, although there is some sentiment for that step, but rather that ethnic Bashkirs are convinced that now is the time to regain for themselves some of the rights they lost during the presidency of Vladimir Putin.
And consequently, they are now prepared to challenge the Russian government on those grounds, invoking the right of nations to self-determination both as a means to convince others that their demands should be met and, perhaps equally important, as a threat to Moscow if the central government decides to ignore them.
These are just some of the conclusions suggested by the results of a focus group of the leaders of various Bashkir social organizations conducted by the Network of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning in Bashkortostan at the end of August and reported by the Regnum.ru news agency yesterday (www.regnum.ru/news/1049977.html).
The group included representatives of the World Kurultai of Bashkirs, the Union of Bashkir Youth, the Institute of History at the Ufa Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the dean of the history faculty at Bashkir State University, the head of the philosophy department at another Ufa school, and the vice president of the “Gray Wolves” national movement.
In the wake of the events in Georgia, Regnum.ru repotted, all members of this group invoked the right of nations to self-determination in their discussion of how to overcome what they view as the current less than satisfactory state of the rights of Bashkirs and the Republic of Bashkortostan.
And collectively, on the basis of that, the members of this focus group made five points. First, they said that with the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, they “expect a broadening of the rights of the titular ethnos of Bashkortostan and an increase in both the actual and formal status of this subject of the Federation.”
Second, they said that in the wake of what Moscow has done in Georgia, “the president of Bashkortostan can be only a Bashkir by nationality, who knows the Bashkir language,” an arrangement they said that would restore earlier practice and one that must be fixed in law so that it will not be changed again.
Third, they insisted that “it is necessary to return the norm and practice of general elections of the head of a subject of the Russian Federation,” something that Vladimir Putin did away with but an arrangement that is absolutely essential for nations within Russia under the terms of the right of nations to self-determination.
Fourth, the participants in this focus group said that the fiscal policies of the Russian Federation must be changed so that donor regions like Bashkortostan can keep more of what they have been paying in taxes rather than having to hand it over to the central government for its uses and transfer to other regions.
And fifth, the participants said, the right of nations to self-determination requires that Moscow reduce its efforts to limit the powers of republic governments to deal with the situation on their own territories, as Moscow has been doing since Putin came to power, and to transfer back some of the powers which Moscow has already seized. .
The Regnum.ru report notes that Bashkirs in general and the members of this focus group in particular were among the first to come out in support of Russia’s military moves to defend the South Ossetians and the Abkhazians and even to back Moscow’s recognition of the two breakaway republics.
But those actions may not mean what Moscow hoped they meant. Instead, Regnum.ru said, such support may reflect “a hope that this could give them the occasion for demanding the broadening of rights and authority of the ‘national’ subjects [in Russia], which have been seriously reduced over the last eight years during the construction of the ‘power vertical.’”
To the extent that is the logic of the Bashkirs – and the extensive quotations from the participants in this focus group makes it clear that is the case for them – then Moscow’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is having a domino effect with the Russian Federation, even if it is not yet as dramatic as many think it will become.
Wednesday, September 3, 2008
Window on Eurasia: Ingush Tragedy Likely to ‘End with a New Andizhan,’ Latynina Warns
Paul Goble
Vienna, September 3 – Former FSB general and current Ingushetia head Murat Zyazikov is likely to respond to protests against his rule following the death of Magomed Yevloyev at the hands of his security forces with “a new Andizhan,” a crushing blow that will intimidate the opposition and leave Moscow no choice but to support him to the hilt.
That conclusion, with its reference to Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s suppression of demonstrations in his country in MY 2005, is offered by Yuliya Latynina, a distinguished Russian journalist who has specialized in recent years on the North Caucasus, in an analysis published today in Moscow’s “Yezhednevniy zhurnal” (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=8372).
“After the murder of Magomed Yevloyev,” Latynina says, “the legal Ingush opposition found itself in the same position that [Georgian President] Mikhail Saakashvili did the evening of [August] 7.” It is did nothing, it would lose face and trust; if it responded, “it would call forth a crushing blow.”
The Ingush opposition has responded, and consequently, she argues, “it is completely possible that this will end” with Zyazikov employing massive and lethal force against it, “a new Andizhan.” That will intimidate law-abiding Ingush but give a new boost to militants like Rustamat Makhauri and Magas.
. In other comments, Latynina dismisses two other arguments that some have made in recent days. On the one hand, she suggests that “Ingushetia is too small a republic to blow up [because] it does not have a critical mass.” If it is destroyed completely, “no one in the world will even notice.”
And on the other, she says that those who argue that Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia opens “a Pandora’s box” in the North Caucasus where other republics may seek to follow suit. But independence she says, is not won “by the invocation of precedents” but by those who “take up arms.”
At the same time, she continues, “the destabilization of the Caucasus” since the Georgian events reflects a fundamental divide in the Russian Federation. As a country, “Russia needs peace [there], but the siloviki need stars and power,” something they can only win by stirring up trouble and engaging in more violent acts.
Moreover, she adds, “the contemporary Russian model of power is so constructed that those in power can do anything – from the most familiar things like corruption to the most exotic like loss of control over the territory of a republic.” In this situation, the real criminals are not those who take bribes or assist in murders but those who have made this system possible.
In this situation, Latynina concludes, Zyazikov should not be viewed as “the hand of Moscow.” Instead, “Moscow and the Kremlin have become [his] hostages. There is nothing that he might do that Moscow would not be forced to approve.” He knows that, and consequently the immediate future in Ingushetia looks dire indeed.
Latynina’s comments and her reference to Andizhan will attract more attention to a statement by a 27-year-old former officer of the Uzbekistan National Security Service upon his defection in London (www.rferl.org/content/Former_Uzbek_Spy_Seeks_Asylum/1195372.html picked up by kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2008/09/03/60745.shtml).
According to Ikram Yabukov, Islam Karimov personally gave the order for the use of lethal force in Andizhan which left 1500 protesters there dead, the most dramatic of the Uzbek president’s actions against his own people and the one that prompted him to move abroad, hopefully beyond the reach of Karimov’s agents.
And Latynina’s words, which are always attended to by Western correspondents, should also have the effect of calling attention to the latest act of desperation by the people of Ingushetia in the face of Zyazikov’s increasing willingness to use force to preserve himself in power (www.ingushetiya.ru/news/15420.html).
Late yesterday, the Ingush opposition issued an appeal to the leaders of Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan and Canada to grant them citizenship so they might enjoy what protections that might offer against new threats from Zyazikov and his force structures.
In making their appeal, the Ingush opposition said that the deteriorating situation in their republic “requires immediate intervention by the international community.” If that does not happen, then “the political murders, the suppression of independent thinking, and attacks on the rights and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation will acquire a threatening character.”
And the Ingush appeal concluded in what seems to be an act of despair rather than real hope that “the world must finally recognize that today a new authoritarian regime is being constructed in Russia, one for which there do not exist such concepts as human rights and the freedoms of its citizens.”
Vienna, September 3 – Former FSB general and current Ingushetia head Murat Zyazikov is likely to respond to protests against his rule following the death of Magomed Yevloyev at the hands of his security forces with “a new Andizhan,” a crushing blow that will intimidate the opposition and leave Moscow no choice but to support him to the hilt.
That conclusion, with its reference to Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s suppression of demonstrations in his country in MY 2005, is offered by Yuliya Latynina, a distinguished Russian journalist who has specialized in recent years on the North Caucasus, in an analysis published today in Moscow’s “Yezhednevniy zhurnal” (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=8372).
“After the murder of Magomed Yevloyev,” Latynina says, “the legal Ingush opposition found itself in the same position that [Georgian President] Mikhail Saakashvili did the evening of [August] 7.” It is did nothing, it would lose face and trust; if it responded, “it would call forth a crushing blow.”
The Ingush opposition has responded, and consequently, she argues, “it is completely possible that this will end” with Zyazikov employing massive and lethal force against it, “a new Andizhan.” That will intimidate law-abiding Ingush but give a new boost to militants like Rustamat Makhauri and Magas.
. In other comments, Latynina dismisses two other arguments that some have made in recent days. On the one hand, she suggests that “Ingushetia is too small a republic to blow up [because] it does not have a critical mass.” If it is destroyed completely, “no one in the world will even notice.”
And on the other, she says that those who argue that Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia opens “a Pandora’s box” in the North Caucasus where other republics may seek to follow suit. But independence she says, is not won “by the invocation of precedents” but by those who “take up arms.”
At the same time, she continues, “the destabilization of the Caucasus” since the Georgian events reflects a fundamental divide in the Russian Federation. As a country, “Russia needs peace [there], but the siloviki need stars and power,” something they can only win by stirring up trouble and engaging in more violent acts.
Moreover, she adds, “the contemporary Russian model of power is so constructed that those in power can do anything – from the most familiar things like corruption to the most exotic like loss of control over the territory of a republic.” In this situation, the real criminals are not those who take bribes or assist in murders but those who have made this system possible.
In this situation, Latynina concludes, Zyazikov should not be viewed as “the hand of Moscow.” Instead, “Moscow and the Kremlin have become [his] hostages. There is nothing that he might do that Moscow would not be forced to approve.” He knows that, and consequently the immediate future in Ingushetia looks dire indeed.
Latynina’s comments and her reference to Andizhan will attract more attention to a statement by a 27-year-old former officer of the Uzbekistan National Security Service upon his defection in London (www.rferl.org/content/Former_Uzbek_Spy_Seeks_Asylum/1195372.html picked up by kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2008/09/03/60745.shtml).
According to Ikram Yabukov, Islam Karimov personally gave the order for the use of lethal force in Andizhan which left 1500 protesters there dead, the most dramatic of the Uzbek president’s actions against his own people and the one that prompted him to move abroad, hopefully beyond the reach of Karimov’s agents.
And Latynina’s words, which are always attended to by Western correspondents, should also have the effect of calling attention to the latest act of desperation by the people of Ingushetia in the face of Zyazikov’s increasing willingness to use force to preserve himself in power (www.ingushetiya.ru/news/15420.html).
Late yesterday, the Ingush opposition issued an appeal to the leaders of Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan and Canada to grant them citizenship so they might enjoy what protections that might offer against new threats from Zyazikov and his force structures.
In making their appeal, the Ingush opposition said that the deteriorating situation in their republic “requires immediate intervention by the international community.” If that does not happen, then “the political murders, the suppression of independent thinking, and attacks on the rights and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation will acquire a threatening character.”
And the Ingush appeal concluded in what seems to be an act of despair rather than real hope that “the world must finally recognize that today a new authoritarian regime is being constructed in Russia, one for which there do not exist such concepts as human rights and the freedoms of its citizens.”
Window on Eurasia: Muslims Seen Moving into Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Changing Religious Balance in Both
Paul Goble
Vienna, September 3 – Russia’s military and political actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are likely to have another unintended consequence: they are likely to make it easier and more attractive for Muslim émigrés from the North Caucasus to return there and change the ethno-religious balance not only in these two republics but in the region more generally.
At present, Muslims constitute approximately 35 percent of the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but both Muslim leaders there and analysts in Moscow say that the new situation which has arisen in the wake of Russia’s moves in Georgia is certain to increase that figure, possibly to the tipping point of more than 50 percent.
In an interview given to “NZ-Religii” and published today, Timur Dzyba, the mufti of Abkhazia, said that Muslims in his republic – including Abkhaz, North Caucasians, Tatars, Bashkirs and Turks – have been able to maintain their share of the population in recent times but now expect to expand it (religion.ng.ru/facts/2008-09-03/1_suhum.html?mthree=2).
In the 19th century, he noted, the tsarist authorities expelled “a significant part of the Abkhaz-Abaza population.” Nows, perhaps as many as 500,000 Abkhaz live abroad, as well as many of the five million strong Circassian communities there who view themselves as closely related to the Abkhaz and who have celebrated Sukhumi’s declaration of independence.
After the war in 1992-93, the mufti continued, the Abkhaz authorities established a Committee for the Repatriation of the Abkhaz, and over the past 15 years, more than 1,000 have returned. But now, the mufti said, far more are likely to do so as the republic’s economy improves and as transportation ties with Turkey expand.
Contacts between Abkhazia and the Abkhaz of Turkey are expanding rapidly, he said, and as a result, “repatriation will become more intense,” with visa problems reduced to a minimum and the government in Sukhumi actively interested in developing its ties with Turkey and boosting the size of its population.
Dzyba insisted that relations between Muslims and Christians in Abkhazia are good, that those returning are not going to be informed by the events of the 19th century – “times have changed” – and that the expanding Muslim population will not lead to demands that Muslims play a larger role in the government offices in Sukhumi.
One reason for his confidence in this regard, the mufti pointed out, is that Abkhazia’s Muslims have developed ties with the traditional Muslim leaders of the Russian Federation. And another is that the level of religious knowledge and activity among the Muslim community in Abkhazia remains low.
But even as he invoked this as a reason for believing that an increase in the percentage of Muslims there will not destabilize the situation, the Islamic leader said that he hoped that the influx of Abkhaz and other groups from abroad, many of whom are more deeply religious than the Abkhaz in Abkhazia have been, would lead to a rebirth of Islam there.
Meanwhile, in a comment to the Portal-Credo.ru website, Andrey Gusev argued that the religious balance in South Ossetia is also set to change under the new circumstances, as a result of both immigration and the activities of the mufti of North Ossetia, Ali-haji Yevsteyev, an ethnic Russian convert to Islam (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1452).
Saying that “it is difficult to predict” whether the Islamic factor will grow in Abkhazia as a result of immigration, Gusev said that “in Ossetia (North and South), it is obviously doing so.” Immigration and demographic factors are increasing the share of Muslims there, but far more important is the work of Mufti Yevsteyev.
“A product of a mixed Russian-Ossetin family which professed Orthodoxy,” Gusev noted, “Yevsteyev is well educated (he has degrees from two Muslim universities) and is the first mufti directly elected by believers and not by the [Russian government-backed] Islamic-bureaucratic” structures.
That has given him enormous authority locally, something that has allowed him to stand up to the political authorities but also a quality has attracted some negative reviews from Russian commanders and officials on the scene and from the heads of the Muslim Spiritual Directorates (MSDs) in neighboring republics.
Meanwhile, the Moscow Patriarchate has not been willing to accept Orthodox parishes in the two breakaway republics, despite requests from both places. It does not want to create a precedent that church borders should follow political ones, a notion Kyiv would be happy to deploy against Moscow (religion.ng.ru/facts/2008-09-03/1_osetia.html?mthree=1).
Vienna, September 3 – Russia’s military and political actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are likely to have another unintended consequence: they are likely to make it easier and more attractive for Muslim émigrés from the North Caucasus to return there and change the ethno-religious balance not only in these two republics but in the region more generally.
At present, Muslims constitute approximately 35 percent of the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but both Muslim leaders there and analysts in Moscow say that the new situation which has arisen in the wake of Russia’s moves in Georgia is certain to increase that figure, possibly to the tipping point of more than 50 percent.
In an interview given to “NZ-Religii” and published today, Timur Dzyba, the mufti of Abkhazia, said that Muslims in his republic – including Abkhaz, North Caucasians, Tatars, Bashkirs and Turks – have been able to maintain their share of the population in recent times but now expect to expand it (religion.ng.ru/facts/2008-09-03/1_suhum.html?mthree=2).
In the 19th century, he noted, the tsarist authorities expelled “a significant part of the Abkhaz-Abaza population.” Nows, perhaps as many as 500,000 Abkhaz live abroad, as well as many of the five million strong Circassian communities there who view themselves as closely related to the Abkhaz and who have celebrated Sukhumi’s declaration of independence.
After the war in 1992-93, the mufti continued, the Abkhaz authorities established a Committee for the Repatriation of the Abkhaz, and over the past 15 years, more than 1,000 have returned. But now, the mufti said, far more are likely to do so as the republic’s economy improves and as transportation ties with Turkey expand.
Contacts between Abkhazia and the Abkhaz of Turkey are expanding rapidly, he said, and as a result, “repatriation will become more intense,” with visa problems reduced to a minimum and the government in Sukhumi actively interested in developing its ties with Turkey and boosting the size of its population.
Dzyba insisted that relations between Muslims and Christians in Abkhazia are good, that those returning are not going to be informed by the events of the 19th century – “times have changed” – and that the expanding Muslim population will not lead to demands that Muslims play a larger role in the government offices in Sukhumi.
One reason for his confidence in this regard, the mufti pointed out, is that Abkhazia’s Muslims have developed ties with the traditional Muslim leaders of the Russian Federation. And another is that the level of religious knowledge and activity among the Muslim community in Abkhazia remains low.
But even as he invoked this as a reason for believing that an increase in the percentage of Muslims there will not destabilize the situation, the Islamic leader said that he hoped that the influx of Abkhaz and other groups from abroad, many of whom are more deeply religious than the Abkhaz in Abkhazia have been, would lead to a rebirth of Islam there.
Meanwhile, in a comment to the Portal-Credo.ru website, Andrey Gusev argued that the religious balance in South Ossetia is also set to change under the new circumstances, as a result of both immigration and the activities of the mufti of North Ossetia, Ali-haji Yevsteyev, an ethnic Russian convert to Islam (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1452).
Saying that “it is difficult to predict” whether the Islamic factor will grow in Abkhazia as a result of immigration, Gusev said that “in Ossetia (North and South), it is obviously doing so.” Immigration and demographic factors are increasing the share of Muslims there, but far more important is the work of Mufti Yevsteyev.
“A product of a mixed Russian-Ossetin family which professed Orthodoxy,” Gusev noted, “Yevsteyev is well educated (he has degrees from two Muslim universities) and is the first mufti directly elected by believers and not by the [Russian government-backed] Islamic-bureaucratic” structures.
That has given him enormous authority locally, something that has allowed him to stand up to the political authorities but also a quality has attracted some negative reviews from Russian commanders and officials on the scene and from the heads of the Muslim Spiritual Directorates (MSDs) in neighboring republics.
Meanwhile, the Moscow Patriarchate has not been willing to accept Orthodox parishes in the two breakaway republics, despite requests from both places. It does not want to create a precedent that church borders should follow political ones, a notion Kyiv would be happy to deploy against Moscow (religion.ng.ru/facts/2008-09-03/1_osetia.html?mthree=1).
Window on Eurasia: High Rates of Incarceration Shaping Russian Life and Moscow’s Image Abroad
Paul Goble
Vienna, September 3 – Nearly 25 percent of Russian men have passed through their country’s prison system at some point in their lives, an enormous share of the total and a group whose experiences are shaping Russian society, politics, and even the country’s image in foreign capitals, according to a retired Supreme Court justice.
In yesterday’s “Rossiiskaya gazeta,” Vladimir Radchenko provided extensive data to support his argument that the percentage of Russians who are in or who have passed through what he calls “our ‘prison population’” has reached a critical level in terms of its impact on the broader society (rg.ru/2008/09/02/radchenko.html).
The impact of those who returned from the GULAG in the 1950s has received a great deal of attention, but that of those who were convicted or jailed at the end of the Soviet period or since 1991 has received less, Radchenko notes. But he points out that the numbers in each case are large and current judicial arrangements suggest the numbers and impact are on thel increase.
Between 1992 and 2007, more than 15 million citizens of the Russian Federation were convicted in criminal cases, and five million of them served time in the country’s prisons or camps, figures that constitute more than 10 percent and three percent of the population respectively.
These figures represent a huge jump from the late Soviet period, Radchenko points out. Between 1987 and 1991, statistics show, only 2.5 million Russians were convicted, a figure almost 50 percent lower per year than in the post-Soviet Russian Federation, although higher than the immediately preceding period because of a tightening of republic legal codes.
At present, the jurist continues, Russian society is being flooded with those – one quarter of the adult male population – who now have “a jail education” either in Soviet or Russian penal institutions. Not only does this show that draconian laws do not cut crime – indeed, they may result in more crimes being registered – but it points to other developments as well.
Radchenko focuses on the first of these consequences and urges both a revision in the country’s criminal code to reduce the number of those convicted incarcerated and to improve the ways in which the penal system prepares those it is about to release for re-entry into the larger society.
But others are highlighting Radchenko’s argument about the impact of such massive prison experience in Russian society and are extending it as well. In a commentary on the Sobkorr.ru portal yesterday, Yuri Gladysh notes that such experience is leading to “the criminalization of Russian society” (www.sobkorr.ru/news/48BD279FBE652.html).
Not only are prisons and camps leading their graduates to commit more crimes, he writes, but the release and return of those who have served time “is contributing to the rapid transformation of the country into an enormous ‘zone,’ with all the ensuring consequences” that are increasingly on public view.
Ever more widely are individual Russians and Russian leaders using “criminal terminology,” the former because so many of them have experience with the prison system and the latter because this allows them to portray themselves as being close to the people. Vladimir Putin’s comments about the Chechens in 2000 and the Georgians now are classic examples.
But that is far from the worst consequence of former prisoners on Russian society, Gladysh insists. On the one hand, their attitudes are having a rapid and large impact on the values of that society, undermining much of the “social-cultural” foundation on which Russian society has rested “for several centuries.
And on the other, the criminalization of Russia, especially as it has affected the actions and statements of Russian leaders, has now had a serious impact on the image of Russia abroad, both among its competitors and more recently among its supposed closest friends, an impact that is reducing Moscow’s influence.
That has become especially obvious during the Georgian crisis, the Sobkorr.ru commentator says. And it can be clearly seen in the ways Russian leaders have talked and acted over the last few weeks and Moscow propagandists have regularly accused the West of wanting to act as “international gendarmes.”
“But how could it be otherwise?” Gladysh asks rhetorically and with obvious bitterness. “After all, when they are confronted by hooligans, law-abiding citizens usually call the police. That is a completely natural reaction.”
Vienna, September 3 – Nearly 25 percent of Russian men have passed through their country’s prison system at some point in their lives, an enormous share of the total and a group whose experiences are shaping Russian society, politics, and even the country’s image in foreign capitals, according to a retired Supreme Court justice.
In yesterday’s “Rossiiskaya gazeta,” Vladimir Radchenko provided extensive data to support his argument that the percentage of Russians who are in or who have passed through what he calls “our ‘prison population’” has reached a critical level in terms of its impact on the broader society (rg.ru/2008/09/02/radchenko.html).
The impact of those who returned from the GULAG in the 1950s has received a great deal of attention, but that of those who were convicted or jailed at the end of the Soviet period or since 1991 has received less, Radchenko notes. But he points out that the numbers in each case are large and current judicial arrangements suggest the numbers and impact are on thel increase.
Between 1992 and 2007, more than 15 million citizens of the Russian Federation were convicted in criminal cases, and five million of them served time in the country’s prisons or camps, figures that constitute more than 10 percent and three percent of the population respectively.
These figures represent a huge jump from the late Soviet period, Radchenko points out. Between 1987 and 1991, statistics show, only 2.5 million Russians were convicted, a figure almost 50 percent lower per year than in the post-Soviet Russian Federation, although higher than the immediately preceding period because of a tightening of republic legal codes.
At present, the jurist continues, Russian society is being flooded with those – one quarter of the adult male population – who now have “a jail education” either in Soviet or Russian penal institutions. Not only does this show that draconian laws do not cut crime – indeed, they may result in more crimes being registered – but it points to other developments as well.
Radchenko focuses on the first of these consequences and urges both a revision in the country’s criminal code to reduce the number of those convicted incarcerated and to improve the ways in which the penal system prepares those it is about to release for re-entry into the larger society.
But others are highlighting Radchenko’s argument about the impact of such massive prison experience in Russian society and are extending it as well. In a commentary on the Sobkorr.ru portal yesterday, Yuri Gladysh notes that such experience is leading to “the criminalization of Russian society” (www.sobkorr.ru/news/48BD279FBE652.html).
Not only are prisons and camps leading their graduates to commit more crimes, he writes, but the release and return of those who have served time “is contributing to the rapid transformation of the country into an enormous ‘zone,’ with all the ensuring consequences” that are increasingly on public view.
Ever more widely are individual Russians and Russian leaders using “criminal terminology,” the former because so many of them have experience with the prison system and the latter because this allows them to portray themselves as being close to the people. Vladimir Putin’s comments about the Chechens in 2000 and the Georgians now are classic examples.
But that is far from the worst consequence of former prisoners on Russian society, Gladysh insists. On the one hand, their attitudes are having a rapid and large impact on the values of that society, undermining much of the “social-cultural” foundation on which Russian society has rested “for several centuries.
And on the other, the criminalization of Russia, especially as it has affected the actions and statements of Russian leaders, has now had a serious impact on the image of Russia abroad, both among its competitors and more recently among its supposed closest friends, an impact that is reducing Moscow’s influence.
That has become especially obvious during the Georgian crisis, the Sobkorr.ru commentator says. And it can be clearly seen in the ways Russian leaders have talked and acted over the last few weeks and Moscow propagandists have regularly accused the West of wanting to act as “international gendarmes.”
“But how could it be otherwise?” Gladysh asks rhetorically and with obvious bitterness. “After all, when they are confronted by hooligans, law-abiding citizens usually call the police. That is a completely natural reaction.”
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