Paul Goble
Vienna, August 31 – Most commentators who talk about a new cold war emerging after the events in Georgia are referring only to the geopolitical contest between the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance after World War II, but one of Moscow’s most interesting commentators says that any new cold war will not be the second but the third the two sides have engaged in.
By pointing out that there were two earlier such competitions – one prior to the second world war which the USSR ultimately won in the course of that military conflict and the second, better-known one, which Moscow lost decisively, Sergei Karaganov provides some important insights into what the new conflict is likely to look like from Moscow’s perspective.
In a lengthy article in “Rossiiskaya gazeta,” the head of Moscow’s Council on Foreign and Defense Policy says that he is convinced that the world is once again being divided between “ours and theirs,” in which “ours” will be defended regardless of what they do and “theirs” will be condemned no matter how they act (www.rg.ru/2008/08/29/karaganov.html).
According to Karaganov, the new era of conflict reflects both the redistribution of resources in the world following the end of the second cold war, a development that he suggests will be long term, and the rise of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states after the 1991 settlement, a temporary phenomenon but “for those who are losing – a matter of here and now.”
After gaining economically in the immediate wake of the end of the second cold war, the “old” West started to lose out rapidly because increases in the price of oil and gas led to a massive transfer of resources away from the United States and Europe to those states, including Russia, where these critical energy resources came from.
Many of these energy suppliers, again including Russia, were authoritarian or semi-authoritarian, the Moscow analyst says, and this led to the rise of “authoritarian capitalism” as “the ideological system of the new ‘enemy.’” The West needed an enemy to unite, he insists, but its effort to create “’a union of democracies’” against the authoritarian states was “tragicomic.”
Other changes in the world – including the proliferation of nuclear weapons and America’s loss of prestige around the world because of its actions in Iraq – simply reinforced this development, and effort after September 11th to use counter-terrorism as a unifying force proved a failure.
Thus, Karaganov continues, a new cold war became likely. The West is promoting it as a means to recover the positions it has lost. And Moscow has assisted this effort not only because Russia “has become a symbol and incarnation” of the changes the West opposes but also because Moscow has behaved in ways in Georgia and elsewhere that have only added to that image.
Both in the cold wars of the past and in the one starting now, the Moscow specialist on international relations says, geopolitics is more significant than ideology, and that reality, one often overlooked in recent commentaries, is likely to define the course of the international divide now opening.
Russia has certain advantages and certain disadvantages in this renewed struggle, Karaganov argues. On the one hand, it has a freer society and a richer one than in the past, making it more attractive to many. But on the other, it lacks the resources in terms of space, population and GDP that the Soviet Union had, making it less able to compete.
At the same time, however, Russia’s “corrupt state capitalism” is something “hardly any of the thinking and patriotically inclined Russians” are happy about, he says, but the West has not focused on that political and economic elite in this new “cold war” but rather on Russia itself and thus on all Russians.
And it is worth remembering that what he calls “the old West” is now weaker than it was as well. The standing of the U.S. in the world has fallen precipitously because of its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this group of states controls a much smaller portion of the world’s population and GDP than it did 30 years ago.
That helps to explain what has happened in Georgia. According to Karaganov, “Russia had no other way out” except to respond militarily to “the aggression of Tbilisi and of the forces standing behind” it and then to seal its gains on the ground by extending diplomatic recognition to South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
While many are still focusing on those developments alone, “the main goal” of the current rise in tensions involves not Georgia but the potential entry of Ukraine into NATO. “That is absolutely unacceptable for Russia. And even if we were to suddenly agree to this, the logic of events would all the same lead to a confrontation and possibly a military one.”
In order to block this, Moscow must denounce the Russia-NATO Council that when set up ten years ago opened the way to the expansion eastward of the Western alliance and was denounced at the time by some as “’a second Brest peace,’” a reference to the treaty Lenin signed with the Germans in 1918 that sacrificed Russian territory to win time for the Bolsheviks.
“It is time to recognize that this union is not only a relic of ‘the cold war,’ but that it is one of the basic instruments of its rebirth,” Karaganov says.
Two other reports from Moscow about the possibility of a new cold war are worthy of note. First of all, Aleksandr Prokhanov, the editor of the nationalist newspaper “Zavtra,” said on Ekho Moskvy that he welcomed such a conflict because “for Russia, a cold war today represents salvation” (www.echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/536528-echo/).
Without one, he said, Russia would degenerate and die, whereas with one, its citizens will not only bring their money home but focus on developing their country so that it will not lose this latest episode of what he sees as the longstanding and inevitable conflict between Russia and the West.
And for those who are frightened that a new cold war will lead to a hot one, Prokhanov had this to day: “A third world war is not beginning [because] the Americans are not in a position to conduct [it]. They have a terrible crisis, their civilization is collapsing … and they have” incurred huge debts at home and abroad.
And second, Aleksandr Dugin’s nationalist Eurasian website reported today that sources in the Russian ministry of education say that they are preparing a new required course for Russian schools on geopolitics, a course that they suggest may displace current courses in geography (evrazia.org/n.php?id=3893).
The officials reportedly said that the course will explain to students “how to build an empire” as well as “who its enemies and friends are,” content that almost certainly would lead many Russian students to conclude that they and their parents have no option but to restore an empire and to engage in a cold war with the West.
Sunday, August 31, 2008
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Recognition of Breakaway Republics Encourages Tatar Activists
Paul Goble
Vienna, August 31 – The arguments the Kremlin invoked first for intervening in Georgia and then for extending diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia combine to create a precedent that supporters of independence for the Republic of Tatarstan say they plan to use against Moscow.
In a declaration timed to coincide with the 18th anniversary of the adoption of Tatarstan’s declaration of state sovereignty, the All-Tatar Social Center (TOTs) issued over the signature of its president Talgat Bareyev an appeal explaining why Moscow’s moves in Georgia give supporters of Tatar independence new hope (www.novayagazeta.ru/news/312431.html).
“The latest Caucasus war of August 2008,” the appeal says, “led Russia to recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Whatever goals Moscow was pursuing in taking this step, it is important to stress that for the first time in modern history, Russia has recognized the state independence of its own citizens.”
Prior to its introduction of forces into South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the declaration points out, the Russian government invoked the fact that many people in these two breakaway republics had Russian passports and as Russian citizens must be able to count on Moscow to defend them against oppression.
“Consequently,” the appeal continues, “Tatars too, whose Russian citizenship was forcibly imposed as a result of the colonial conquest of their state in the 16th century also have the right to count on rapid liberation and recognition [by Moscow and other states] of their independence.”
In reporting on this appeal, which has been posted on a number of Tatar websites but published so far only in “Novaya gazeta,” that Moscow paper’s reporter Boris Bronshteyn points out that official Kazan has not made any comment about Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, adding that “the word ‘sovereignty’ disappeared long ago from its lexicon.”
And it is certainly the case that relatively few Tatars at present are actively following TOTs in its pursuit of full independence for Tatarstan. But the legal theory that the TOTs declaration makes is an interesting example of the unintended consequences of Moscow’s actions and may have an impact on the thinking of Tatars and others as well.
An example of the kind of support the ideas contained in this declaration are receiving is provided by a Tatar blogger. In a LiveJournal posting, he writes that “after the leadership of Russia showed on August 27th its attitude toward the principle of territorial integrity, then it is possible to forget about such a state formation as the Russian Federation.”
“In front of our eyes,” he continues, “the last empire on earth – the evil empire – is rapidly coming apart” (http://www.margian.livejournal.com/36886.html).
Tatarstan does not need to issue any further declarations on this point, the Tatar blogger says. On August 30, 1990, it declared that it was “not a subject of the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire.” And consequently, all Kazan needs to do now is “to remind the international community about this document and ask for recognition.”
And he predicted that “there will be no small number of countries who will want to do so – a large part of the Islamic world and the countries of the West as well.” Tatarstan was the first in the parade of sovereignties 17 years ago, and now it will finally enjoy the fruits of that effort, one that will mean, the Tatar blogger says, that “the empire must burn!”
Vienna, August 31 – The arguments the Kremlin invoked first for intervening in Georgia and then for extending diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia combine to create a precedent that supporters of independence for the Republic of Tatarstan say they plan to use against Moscow.
In a declaration timed to coincide with the 18th anniversary of the adoption of Tatarstan’s declaration of state sovereignty, the All-Tatar Social Center (TOTs) issued over the signature of its president Talgat Bareyev an appeal explaining why Moscow’s moves in Georgia give supporters of Tatar independence new hope (www.novayagazeta.ru/news/312431.html).
“The latest Caucasus war of August 2008,” the appeal says, “led Russia to recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Whatever goals Moscow was pursuing in taking this step, it is important to stress that for the first time in modern history, Russia has recognized the state independence of its own citizens.”
Prior to its introduction of forces into South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the declaration points out, the Russian government invoked the fact that many people in these two breakaway republics had Russian passports and as Russian citizens must be able to count on Moscow to defend them against oppression.
“Consequently,” the appeal continues, “Tatars too, whose Russian citizenship was forcibly imposed as a result of the colonial conquest of their state in the 16th century also have the right to count on rapid liberation and recognition [by Moscow and other states] of their independence.”
In reporting on this appeal, which has been posted on a number of Tatar websites but published so far only in “Novaya gazeta,” that Moscow paper’s reporter Boris Bronshteyn points out that official Kazan has not made any comment about Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, adding that “the word ‘sovereignty’ disappeared long ago from its lexicon.”
And it is certainly the case that relatively few Tatars at present are actively following TOTs in its pursuit of full independence for Tatarstan. But the legal theory that the TOTs declaration makes is an interesting example of the unintended consequences of Moscow’s actions and may have an impact on the thinking of Tatars and others as well.
An example of the kind of support the ideas contained in this declaration are receiving is provided by a Tatar blogger. In a LiveJournal posting, he writes that “after the leadership of Russia showed on August 27th its attitude toward the principle of territorial integrity, then it is possible to forget about such a state formation as the Russian Federation.”
“In front of our eyes,” he continues, “the last empire on earth – the evil empire – is rapidly coming apart” (http://www.margian.livejournal.com/36886.html).
Tatarstan does not need to issue any further declarations on this point, the Tatar blogger says. On August 30, 1990, it declared that it was “not a subject of the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire.” And consequently, all Kazan needs to do now is “to remind the international community about this document and ask for recognition.”
And he predicted that “there will be no small number of countries who will want to do so – a large part of the Islamic world and the countries of the West as well.” Tatarstan was the first in the parade of sovereignties 17 years ago, and now it will finally enjoy the fruits of that effort, one that will mean, the Tatar blogger says, that “the empire must burn!”
Saturday, August 30, 2008
Window on Eurasia: Will Iran Become the Route Out for Caspian Oil – And How Will That Transform the Geopolitics of the Region?
Paul Goble
Vienna, August 30 – The disruption of oil flows via Georgia during the recent violence has made that route significantly less attractive for Caspian oil exporting countries, with some concluding they have no choice but to go via Russia given Iran’s international isolation but at least a few thinking about using Iran to gain greater freedom of maneuver relative to Moscow.
If the governments of the region do decide to ship some or all of their oil via Iran, that would have three serious geopolitical consequences that may rival some of the already enormous geopolitical fallout from Russia’s decision to invade Georgia and to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia (www.nr2.ru/economy/193763.html).
First, given the enormous appetite for oil in the West and Pacific rim, such a shift in Caspian exports would likely put enormous pressure on Washington to soften its approach to Tehran, especially if the United States wants to support the effective independence of the post-Soviet states and thus has no desire to see the oil flow through the Russian Federation.
Second, Iran’s willingness to serve as the route out for Caspian basin oil (or as a market for some of it) would likely set it on a collision course with Moscow, which has made it very clear that it wants to control all oil coming out of the former Soviet space and which would view any change in Iran’s approach or Western hostility to Tehran as not in Russia’s interest.
And third, such a shift would almost certainly affect Turkey and its relations not only with the post-Soviet Turkic states but also with Russia. Ankara’s ties with the former would likely become less important given that oil would be flowing via Iran, and it ties with Moscow would likely strengthen by means of some kind of condominium in the Southern Caucasus.
Beyond doubt, many countries, including both the United States and Russia, albeit for very different reasons, will do what they can to prevent such a shift, but the changes in Georgia and in the international system after Georgia mean that the use of such a route with all the consequences it would entail is no longer as unthinkable as it was a month ago.
The Georgian government and many commentators have suggested that blocking the east-west flow of oil from the Caspian via Georgia, a route that bypasses Russia, was one of the most important reasons behind Moscow’s decision to introduce troops there, an argument both Moscow and other analysts have heatedly denied.
But however that may be, Natalya Kharitonova, a regional analyst at Moscow State University, argues that it is important to focus on “the concrete facts” including both the way in which Russia’s action made Georgia less attractive as a transit corridor and Iran potentially a much more interesting one (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/2067/).
Among the “facts” she lists are the following: “the use of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and of a number of other transportation units as well as the cessation of rail deliveries of oil to the Georgian port of Batumi was stopped” because of the conflict.
That in turn, she notes, forced Baku not only to reduce the amount of oil it pumped but also “to search for alternative routes for the transportation of this resource. As a result, Azerbaijani oil has been flowing through the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. [And] Turkey intends to purchase additional gas from Russia and Iran to compensate.”
At the same time, the Moscow scholar says, “Iran for example has decided to build the Neka-Jask pipeline as a competitor to Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan.” Earlier this week, Iranian sources reported that Azerbaijan had begun exporting some of its oil exports via Iran, although some in Baku denied this (www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=67534§ionid=351020103).
A commentary in the Baku newspaper “Echo” today, indicates that Azerbaijan hopes to develop the east-west pipelines in Georgia but points out that analysts there and in other regional oil-exporting countries are looking at the Iranian route in the hopes of avoiding the consequences of using the Russian one (www.echo-az.com/economica01.shtml, August 30).
Ilham Shaban, the president of the Baku Center of Oil Research, told the paper that “all Western oil companies would like to work in Iran” but can’t easily because of American opposition. But now “invoking the situation in Georgia, they are beginning to advise official Washington to review its relations with Iranian so as to allow them to begin work there.”
He and other experts noted that because of the events in Georgia, “Azerbaijan began to export its oil to international markets through Iran,” even as it sent some of its oil northward via Russia – an example of Badu’s “balanced” foreign policy. But Azerbaijan was not the only regional country to use Iran during this crisis: Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan did so as well.
And another Azerbaijani expert, Gubad Ibadoglu, the head of the Center for Economic Research, pointed to three other reasons the Caspian basin states are now likely to reconsider Iran as a route: First, it is common practice for exporters to want to have multiple pipelines rather than be at the mercy from disruptions of a single one.
Second, exporting oil through Iran to the Gulf is significantly less expensive than sending it through Georgia and Turkey or through Russia. And third – and this may be especially significant in the case of Azerbaijan – oil from the Caspian going via Iran could help meet the fuel needs of the northern part of that country, a section populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis.
Vienna, August 30 – The disruption of oil flows via Georgia during the recent violence has made that route significantly less attractive for Caspian oil exporting countries, with some concluding they have no choice but to go via Russia given Iran’s international isolation but at least a few thinking about using Iran to gain greater freedom of maneuver relative to Moscow.
If the governments of the region do decide to ship some or all of their oil via Iran, that would have three serious geopolitical consequences that may rival some of the already enormous geopolitical fallout from Russia’s decision to invade Georgia and to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia (www.nr2.ru/economy/193763.html).
First, given the enormous appetite for oil in the West and Pacific rim, such a shift in Caspian exports would likely put enormous pressure on Washington to soften its approach to Tehran, especially if the United States wants to support the effective independence of the post-Soviet states and thus has no desire to see the oil flow through the Russian Federation.
Second, Iran’s willingness to serve as the route out for Caspian basin oil (or as a market for some of it) would likely set it on a collision course with Moscow, which has made it very clear that it wants to control all oil coming out of the former Soviet space and which would view any change in Iran’s approach or Western hostility to Tehran as not in Russia’s interest.
And third, such a shift would almost certainly affect Turkey and its relations not only with the post-Soviet Turkic states but also with Russia. Ankara’s ties with the former would likely become less important given that oil would be flowing via Iran, and it ties with Moscow would likely strengthen by means of some kind of condominium in the Southern Caucasus.
Beyond doubt, many countries, including both the United States and Russia, albeit for very different reasons, will do what they can to prevent such a shift, but the changes in Georgia and in the international system after Georgia mean that the use of such a route with all the consequences it would entail is no longer as unthinkable as it was a month ago.
The Georgian government and many commentators have suggested that blocking the east-west flow of oil from the Caspian via Georgia, a route that bypasses Russia, was one of the most important reasons behind Moscow’s decision to introduce troops there, an argument both Moscow and other analysts have heatedly denied.
But however that may be, Natalya Kharitonova, a regional analyst at Moscow State University, argues that it is important to focus on “the concrete facts” including both the way in which Russia’s action made Georgia less attractive as a transit corridor and Iran potentially a much more interesting one (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/2067/).
Among the “facts” she lists are the following: “the use of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and of a number of other transportation units as well as the cessation of rail deliveries of oil to the Georgian port of Batumi was stopped” because of the conflict.
That in turn, she notes, forced Baku not only to reduce the amount of oil it pumped but also “to search for alternative routes for the transportation of this resource. As a result, Azerbaijani oil has been flowing through the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. [And] Turkey intends to purchase additional gas from Russia and Iran to compensate.”
At the same time, the Moscow scholar says, “Iran for example has decided to build the Neka-Jask pipeline as a competitor to Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan.” Earlier this week, Iranian sources reported that Azerbaijan had begun exporting some of its oil exports via Iran, although some in Baku denied this (www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=67534§ionid=351020103).
A commentary in the Baku newspaper “Echo” today, indicates that Azerbaijan hopes to develop the east-west pipelines in Georgia but points out that analysts there and in other regional oil-exporting countries are looking at the Iranian route in the hopes of avoiding the consequences of using the Russian one (www.echo-az.com/economica01.shtml, August 30).
Ilham Shaban, the president of the Baku Center of Oil Research, told the paper that “all Western oil companies would like to work in Iran” but can’t easily because of American opposition. But now “invoking the situation in Georgia, they are beginning to advise official Washington to review its relations with Iranian so as to allow them to begin work there.”
He and other experts noted that because of the events in Georgia, “Azerbaijan began to export its oil to international markets through Iran,” even as it sent some of its oil northward via Russia – an example of Badu’s “balanced” foreign policy. But Azerbaijan was not the only regional country to use Iran during this crisis: Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan did so as well.
And another Azerbaijani expert, Gubad Ibadoglu, the head of the Center for Economic Research, pointed to three other reasons the Caspian basin states are now likely to reconsider Iran as a route: First, it is common practice for exporters to want to have multiple pipelines rather than be at the mercy from disruptions of a single one.
Second, exporting oil through Iran to the Gulf is significantly less expensive than sending it through Georgia and Turkey or through Russia. And third – and this may be especially significant in the case of Azerbaijan – oil from the Caspian going via Iran could help meet the fuel needs of the northern part of that country, a section populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis.
Window on Eurasia Shorts for August 30 – Georgian Events
Some news items about events in and around Georgia during the last week which have attracted less attention than they deserve:
NOT ALL RUSSIAN ANALYSTS AGREE WITH PUTIN ON AMERICAN ELECTIONS. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s suggestion that the Bush White House pushed Tbilisi to provoke Russia as part of an effort to boost the electoral chances of Republic candidate John McCain has received widespread coverage not only in the Russian media but in American outlets as well (www.mignews.ru/news/politic/cis/280808_171244_69112.html). But many
Russian analysts do not agree with him either on the existence of a White House plot or on what the outcome of the US election is likely to be (www.nr2.ru/policy/192867.html).
HAMAS WANTS TO HELP MOSCOW BUILD ‘A NEW WORLD ORDER.’ Hamas, which welcomed Moscow’s extension of diplomatic recognition to the two breakaway republics in Georgia, has announced that it is ready to help the Kremlin build “a new world order” directed against Israel and the United States (zavtra.ru/cgi//veil//data/zavtra/08/771/41.html). The Georgian foreign ministry on August 29 congratulated Moscow on its new alliance with this terrorist group. Meanwhile, however, Moscow’s effort to get other countries to follow its lead on Abkhazia and South Ossetia has fallen flat. Venezuela’s Ugo Chavez has expressed sympathy but neither Caracas nor Mensk has moved (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.140732.html). Given that Moscow routinely compares what it has done to the West’s support for Kosovo, it is perhaps worth noting that 46 countries have now recognized that Balkan republic (http://www.nm.md/daily/article/2008/08/29/0101.html/).
RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS STEP UP CAMPAIGN TO LINK JEWS TO GEORGIA. Russia’s extreme right continues its effort to blame Israel and the Jews for their support of Georgia against Russia, an effort that could lead those attacking “persons from the Caucasus” to attack Jews (www.za-nauku.ru//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=917&Itemid=36).
RUSSIAN JEWS IN ISRAEL URGE DIASPORA NOT TO BUY ANYTHING GEORGIAN. A group of Russian Jews living in Israel have urged their compatriots not to buy anything Georgian in order to demonstrate their support for South Ossetia and to weaken the regime in Tbilisi, a call that some Russian nationalists welcome (www.homeru.com/news/content/view/6059/174/).
RUSSIANS DEBATE THE IMPACT OF MOSCOW’S ACTIONS IN GEORGIA ON RUSSIA. A few Russian analysts argue that Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will lead to demands for independence by at least some of the non-Russian republics within the Russian Federation (www.regnum.ru/news/1046955.html). But far more Russian analysts and officials insist that there is no danger of “a domino effect” inside their country (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/2119/).
WESTERN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS ACTIVE IN CAUCASUS DENOUNCED AS ‘BANDITS’ … Russian commentators have been stepping up their attacks on human rights groups either based in Western countries or funded from abroad over the last several weeks. A particularly blatant and vicious example called these groups “bandits” because of their work in the Caucasus region (www.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=1584).
… AS HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH RELEASES SATELLITE PHOTOS SHOWING ETHNIC CLEANSING SOUTH OSSETIA. Human Rights Watch, one of the groups Russian media have been attacking, has used satellite photography to show that Russian and South Ossetian forces have engaged in the ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages in that breakaway republic (abkhazeti.info/news/1220052197.php).
LIBERAL COMMENTATOR SAYS RUSSIA AS ‘A PIRATE STATE’ SHOULD HAVE A PIRATE FLAG… Valeriya Novodvorskaya, a liberal Russian commentator, says that as Moscow’s actions in Georgia have shown, Russia has become “a pirate state” and should be flying a pirate flag rather than a tricolor one intended to stress its links to the countries of Europe (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/p.140673.html).
… WHILE ONE RUSSIAN SAYS HE NO LONGER RECOGNIZES ‘SELF-PROCLAIMED’ RUSSIAN FEDERATION. One Russian at least is taking an even more radical step to protest Moscow’s actions in Georgia. He has posted online a declaration saying that “effective immediately” he no longer recognizes “the self-proclaimed Russian Federation” as a state or himself as its citizen (yun.complife.ru/miscell/norussia.htm).
MOSCOW OFFICIALS SAY U.S. ‘REVIEWING CANDIDATES’ TO REPLACE SAAKASHVILI. In a transparent effort to sow discord in Tbilisi and to raise new questions in Europe about the Georgian government, Russian officials and commentators are suggesting that Georgian opposition figures are now travelling to Washington or meeting with American officials elsewhere as part of a supposed vetting process in which the United States will choose who will succeed Mihkiel Saakashvili (http://www.nr2.ru/inworld/192936.html).
RUSSIA’S MUSLIMS BACK MOSCOW ON RECOGNIZING ABKHAZIA, SOUTH OSSETIA. Russia’s Muslim establishment – including the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD), and almost all other MSD heads – have backed Moscow’s moves in Georgia and called on Muslim countries to follow Russia’s lead and extend diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia (www.islam.ru/rus/2008-08-25/#22385 and www.islam.ru/rus/2008-08-28/#22458).
CRITICISM OF QUALITY OF RUSSIAN MILITARY ACTION IN GEORGIA INTENSIFIES. As more information comes out about Russian military actions in Georgia, an increasing number of Russian analysts are suggesting that Russian forces were not only poorly equipped but did not perform all that well in Georgia, winning as Soviet forces typically did only by their overwhelming numbers (www.polit.ru/analytics/2008/08/27/vol.html). And several have openly complained that this is an especially unfortunate situation because Russia has been spending more on defense but appears from the events in the Caucasus to be getting less for it (http://www.newizv.ru/news/2008-08-27/96780/).
NOT ALL RUSSIAN ANALYSTS AGREE WITH PUTIN ON AMERICAN ELECTIONS. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s suggestion that the Bush White House pushed Tbilisi to provoke Russia as part of an effort to boost the electoral chances of Republic candidate John McCain has received widespread coverage not only in the Russian media but in American outlets as well (www.mignews.ru/news/politic/cis/280808_171244_69112.html). But many
Russian analysts do not agree with him either on the existence of a White House plot or on what the outcome of the US election is likely to be (www.nr2.ru/policy/192867.html).
HAMAS WANTS TO HELP MOSCOW BUILD ‘A NEW WORLD ORDER.’ Hamas, which welcomed Moscow’s extension of diplomatic recognition to the two breakaway republics in Georgia, has announced that it is ready to help the Kremlin build “a new world order” directed against Israel and the United States (zavtra.ru/cgi//veil//data/zavtra/08/771/41.html). The Georgian foreign ministry on August 29 congratulated Moscow on its new alliance with this terrorist group. Meanwhile, however, Moscow’s effort to get other countries to follow its lead on Abkhazia and South Ossetia has fallen flat. Venezuela’s Ugo Chavez has expressed sympathy but neither Caracas nor Mensk has moved (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.140732.html). Given that Moscow routinely compares what it has done to the West’s support for Kosovo, it is perhaps worth noting that 46 countries have now recognized that Balkan republic (http://www.nm.md/daily/article/2008/08/29/0101.html/).
RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS STEP UP CAMPAIGN TO LINK JEWS TO GEORGIA. Russia’s extreme right continues its effort to blame Israel and the Jews for their support of Georgia against Russia, an effort that could lead those attacking “persons from the Caucasus” to attack Jews (www.za-nauku.ru//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=917&Itemid=36).
RUSSIAN JEWS IN ISRAEL URGE DIASPORA NOT TO BUY ANYTHING GEORGIAN. A group of Russian Jews living in Israel have urged their compatriots not to buy anything Georgian in order to demonstrate their support for South Ossetia and to weaken the regime in Tbilisi, a call that some Russian nationalists welcome (www.homeru.com/news/content/view/6059/174/).
RUSSIANS DEBATE THE IMPACT OF MOSCOW’S ACTIONS IN GEORGIA ON RUSSIA. A few Russian analysts argue that Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will lead to demands for independence by at least some of the non-Russian republics within the Russian Federation (www.regnum.ru/news/1046955.html). But far more Russian analysts and officials insist that there is no danger of “a domino effect” inside their country (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/2119/).
WESTERN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS ACTIVE IN CAUCASUS DENOUNCED AS ‘BANDITS’ … Russian commentators have been stepping up their attacks on human rights groups either based in Western countries or funded from abroad over the last several weeks. A particularly blatant and vicious example called these groups “bandits” because of their work in the Caucasus region (www.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=1584).
… AS HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH RELEASES SATELLITE PHOTOS SHOWING ETHNIC CLEANSING SOUTH OSSETIA. Human Rights Watch, one of the groups Russian media have been attacking, has used satellite photography to show that Russian and South Ossetian forces have engaged in the ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages in that breakaway republic (abkhazeti.info/news/1220052197.php).
LIBERAL COMMENTATOR SAYS RUSSIA AS ‘A PIRATE STATE’ SHOULD HAVE A PIRATE FLAG… Valeriya Novodvorskaya, a liberal Russian commentator, says that as Moscow’s actions in Georgia have shown, Russia has become “a pirate state” and should be flying a pirate flag rather than a tricolor one intended to stress its links to the countries of Europe (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/p.140673.html).
… WHILE ONE RUSSIAN SAYS HE NO LONGER RECOGNIZES ‘SELF-PROCLAIMED’ RUSSIAN FEDERATION. One Russian at least is taking an even more radical step to protest Moscow’s actions in Georgia. He has posted online a declaration saying that “effective immediately” he no longer recognizes “the self-proclaimed Russian Federation” as a state or himself as its citizen (yun.complife.ru/miscell/norussia.htm).
MOSCOW OFFICIALS SAY U.S. ‘REVIEWING CANDIDATES’ TO REPLACE SAAKASHVILI. In a transparent effort to sow discord in Tbilisi and to raise new questions in Europe about the Georgian government, Russian officials and commentators are suggesting that Georgian opposition figures are now travelling to Washington or meeting with American officials elsewhere as part of a supposed vetting process in which the United States will choose who will succeed Mihkiel Saakashvili (http://www.nr2.ru/inworld/192936.html).
RUSSIA’S MUSLIMS BACK MOSCOW ON RECOGNIZING ABKHAZIA, SOUTH OSSETIA. Russia’s Muslim establishment – including the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD), and almost all other MSD heads – have backed Moscow’s moves in Georgia and called on Muslim countries to follow Russia’s lead and extend diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia (www.islam.ru/rus/2008-08-25/#22385 and www.islam.ru/rus/2008-08-28/#22458).
CRITICISM OF QUALITY OF RUSSIAN MILITARY ACTION IN GEORGIA INTENSIFIES. As more information comes out about Russian military actions in Georgia, an increasing number of Russian analysts are suggesting that Russian forces were not only poorly equipped but did not perform all that well in Georgia, winning as Soviet forces typically did only by their overwhelming numbers (www.polit.ru/analytics/2008/08/27/vol.html). And several have openly complained that this is an especially unfortunate situation because Russia has been spending more on defense but appears from the events in the Caucasus to be getting less for it (http://www.newizv.ru/news/2008-08-27/96780/).
Window on Eurasia Shorts for August 30 – Non-Georgian Items
Below are a few news items from the last week about developments in the post-Soviet space that have been overshadowed by the Georgian events but that merit attention.
MUSLIMS WIN 10 OF RUSSIA’S 23 GOLD MEDALS AT BEIJING GAMES. Muslims in the Russian Federation have been celebrating that their co-religionists won ten of the 23 gold medals the Russian team brought back from Beijing (www.islamnews.ru/news-13973.html). The percentage of Muslim winners is roughly twice the share of Muslims in the Russian population, something many Muslims see as a harbinger of the future. Especially pleased by this outcome were the Circassians, whose athlete won five of the ten medals Russia’s Muslims did (www.ingushetiya.ru/news/15342.html). The Russian umma is also well-represented on Russia’s Para-Olympic team: 20 of the members of that group which is headed to Beijing this week reportedly are Muslims and prayed at a mosque before departing for the Chinese capital (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusnews/4282/).
IF MOSCOW RAISES PENSION AGE, FEW RUSSIAN MEN WILL LIVE TO COLLECT. The Russian government’s plan to raise the age at which Russians can retire will mean that many Russian men will never live to collect a pension. At present, the average life expectancy for men in the Russian Federation is under 58 and falling, a figure four to seven years younger than the new proposed retirement ages (www.flb.ru/info/44419.html).
NEW MUSLIM UNIVERISTY GRADS SWEAR TO FIGHT WAHHABISM. The pro-Kremlin Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Mufti Talgat Tajuddin required all 58 graduates of the Russian Islamic University to swear that they would never depart from the principles of the Hanafi rite of Sunni Islam and that they would always struggle against “Wahhabism and religious extremism in all its manifestations” (www.islamrt.ru/htm/news/news.htm#384).
ORTHODOX MONK PREDICTS CHINESE WILL OCCUPY YEKATERINBURG IN NOVEMBER, URGES RUSSIANS TO FLEE. An especially inflammatory example of religious commentary in the Russian Federation today is a prediction by the head of the Russian Orthodox monastery in Alatyr in Udmurtia that the Chinese are about to “seize” Yekaterinburg and that Russians should prepare to flee (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=monitor&id=12695). His prediction and prescription for which there is no evidence has been making the rounds of Orthodox and Russian nationalist web sites and has even appeared in Moscow’s “Izvestiya” newspaper.
TATARSTAN INCREASES STATUS, RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICIALS WORKING WITH RELIGIOUS GROUPS. Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiyev has transformed his republic’s Council on Religious Affairs into an Administration for Religious Affairs, thus elevating its powers within the government. Shaimiyev did not change the leadership of this body, but its officials say that they will now focus on evaluating religious literature and academic programs for extremism (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusnews/4224/). Two things make this action important: On the one hand, it will put additional pressure on Moscow to form a Council on Religious Affairs, something Muslims want but that the Orthodox Church opposes. And on the other, it will centralize in Tatarstan at least expertise on “extremism,” thus potentially limiting the power of prosecutors and judges to rely on whomever they want to reach their verdicts in such cases.
RUSSIANS CAN’T GET OFFICIAL DATA THEY’RE ENTITLED TO -- BUT CAN BUY THAT TO WHICH THEY AREN’T. According to an article in “Novyye izvestiya,” Russians are facing ever greater obstacles in obtaining government information that the law says they are entitled to. But at the same time, the paper reports, many officials are quite prepared to give them information the law says they are not supposed to have if they pay the necessary bribes (www.newizv.ru/news/2008-08-26/96698/).
FINNISH WRITER SAYS ESTONIA WILL ‘DISAPPEAR’ WITHIN TEN YEARS. A new book by a Finnish writer says that Estonia, which now has only 1.3 million people, will “disappear” in ten years or perhaps sooner, an argument that has been taken up by the Russian-language press there and one that could contribute to a deterioration of ethnic relations there (www.dzd.ee/?SID=2e72e885dfe61fc1059dc1c3887a0a1d&n=17&a=2790).
ETHNIC CONFLICTS ESPECIALLY LIKELY IN SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS, DPNI SAYS. The openly xenophobic Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) has published a survey of interethnic violence across the Russian Federation and says that serious ethnic conflicts occur far more often in Russia’s smaller cities and towns than they do in the larger cities, something that means that many human rights groups may be underreporting the number of such clashes because they do not have people on the scene outside of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other large urban areas (www.dpni.org/articles/kommentari/9805/)
REGION IN KARELIA SEEKS TO BE RECLASSIFIED AS ‘NATIONAL’ ONE. Residents of Pryzhinskiy rayon near Petrazavodsk have asked that their district be reclassified as a “national” one, an action that challenges Vladimir Putin’s ongoing drive to eliminate most ethnic autonomies and one that suggests ethnic groups in hitherto non-ethnic areas may follow suit (finnougoria.ru/news/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=7136). It is as yet unclear with the Karelian government will go along. According to the 2002 census, 37 percent of the district’s 18,224 residents were Karelians, 46 percent were Russians, six percent Finns, and 11 percent others.
PUSH FOR MOSCOW MEMORIAL FOR NADEZHDA MANDELSTAM CONTINUES. For some years, the admirers of the great Russian memoirist Nadezhda Mandelstam have sought to erect suitable memorials to her in Moscow and other Russian cities, but they have faced obstacles from officialdom. An article posted at www.polit.ru/dossie/2008/08/25/chron.html. Meanwhile, opposition leader Gari Kasparov says that a monument to murdered journalist Anna Politkovskaya will be raised only after the fall of the current “bloody” Russian regime (http://www.sobkorr.ru/news/48B930B7C7DAD.html).
EUROPEAN STUDY OF EAST-WEST SPLIT DIVIDES WORLD INTO RED STATES BLUE STATES. A West European study of the ways in which countries have changed sides since the end of the Cold War includes maps which, extrapolating recent American practice, identify countries as “red states” or “blue states” (www.nr2.ru/pmr/192810.html). Those backing Moscow are shown in red, and there are a lot fewer of the red states today than 20 years ago.
MUSLIMS WIN 10 OF RUSSIA’S 23 GOLD MEDALS AT BEIJING GAMES. Muslims in the Russian Federation have been celebrating that their co-religionists won ten of the 23 gold medals the Russian team brought back from Beijing (www.islamnews.ru/news-13973.html). The percentage of Muslim winners is roughly twice the share of Muslims in the Russian population, something many Muslims see as a harbinger of the future. Especially pleased by this outcome were the Circassians, whose athlete won five of the ten medals Russia’s Muslims did (www.ingushetiya.ru/news/15342.html). The Russian umma is also well-represented on Russia’s Para-Olympic team: 20 of the members of that group which is headed to Beijing this week reportedly are Muslims and prayed at a mosque before departing for the Chinese capital (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusnews/4282/).
IF MOSCOW RAISES PENSION AGE, FEW RUSSIAN MEN WILL LIVE TO COLLECT. The Russian government’s plan to raise the age at which Russians can retire will mean that many Russian men will never live to collect a pension. At present, the average life expectancy for men in the Russian Federation is under 58 and falling, a figure four to seven years younger than the new proposed retirement ages (www.flb.ru/info/44419.html).
NEW MUSLIM UNIVERISTY GRADS SWEAR TO FIGHT WAHHABISM. The pro-Kremlin Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Mufti Talgat Tajuddin required all 58 graduates of the Russian Islamic University to swear that they would never depart from the principles of the Hanafi rite of Sunni Islam and that they would always struggle against “Wahhabism and religious extremism in all its manifestations” (www.islamrt.ru/htm/news/news.htm#384).
ORTHODOX MONK PREDICTS CHINESE WILL OCCUPY YEKATERINBURG IN NOVEMBER, URGES RUSSIANS TO FLEE. An especially inflammatory example of religious commentary in the Russian Federation today is a prediction by the head of the Russian Orthodox monastery in Alatyr in Udmurtia that the Chinese are about to “seize” Yekaterinburg and that Russians should prepare to flee (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=monitor&id=12695). His prediction and prescription for which there is no evidence has been making the rounds of Orthodox and Russian nationalist web sites and has even appeared in Moscow’s “Izvestiya” newspaper.
TATARSTAN INCREASES STATUS, RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICIALS WORKING WITH RELIGIOUS GROUPS. Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiyev has transformed his republic’s Council on Religious Affairs into an Administration for Religious Affairs, thus elevating its powers within the government. Shaimiyev did not change the leadership of this body, but its officials say that they will now focus on evaluating religious literature and academic programs for extremism (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusnews/4224/). Two things make this action important: On the one hand, it will put additional pressure on Moscow to form a Council on Religious Affairs, something Muslims want but that the Orthodox Church opposes. And on the other, it will centralize in Tatarstan at least expertise on “extremism,” thus potentially limiting the power of prosecutors and judges to rely on whomever they want to reach their verdicts in such cases.
RUSSIANS CAN’T GET OFFICIAL DATA THEY’RE ENTITLED TO -- BUT CAN BUY THAT TO WHICH THEY AREN’T. According to an article in “Novyye izvestiya,” Russians are facing ever greater obstacles in obtaining government information that the law says they are entitled to. But at the same time, the paper reports, many officials are quite prepared to give them information the law says they are not supposed to have if they pay the necessary bribes (www.newizv.ru/news/2008-08-26/96698/).
FINNISH WRITER SAYS ESTONIA WILL ‘DISAPPEAR’ WITHIN TEN YEARS. A new book by a Finnish writer says that Estonia, which now has only 1.3 million people, will “disappear” in ten years or perhaps sooner, an argument that has been taken up by the Russian-language press there and one that could contribute to a deterioration of ethnic relations there (www.dzd.ee/?SID=2e72e885dfe61fc1059dc1c3887a0a1d&n=17&a=2790).
ETHNIC CONFLICTS ESPECIALLY LIKELY IN SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS, DPNI SAYS. The openly xenophobic Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) has published a survey of interethnic violence across the Russian Federation and says that serious ethnic conflicts occur far more often in Russia’s smaller cities and towns than they do in the larger cities, something that means that many human rights groups may be underreporting the number of such clashes because they do not have people on the scene outside of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other large urban areas (www.dpni.org/articles/kommentari/9805/)
REGION IN KARELIA SEEKS TO BE RECLASSIFIED AS ‘NATIONAL’ ONE. Residents of Pryzhinskiy rayon near Petrazavodsk have asked that their district be reclassified as a “national” one, an action that challenges Vladimir Putin’s ongoing drive to eliminate most ethnic autonomies and one that suggests ethnic groups in hitherto non-ethnic areas may follow suit (finnougoria.ru/news/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=7136). It is as yet unclear with the Karelian government will go along. According to the 2002 census, 37 percent of the district’s 18,224 residents were Karelians, 46 percent were Russians, six percent Finns, and 11 percent others.
PUSH FOR MOSCOW MEMORIAL FOR NADEZHDA MANDELSTAM CONTINUES. For some years, the admirers of the great Russian memoirist Nadezhda Mandelstam have sought to erect suitable memorials to her in Moscow and other Russian cities, but they have faced obstacles from officialdom. An article posted at www.polit.ru/dossie/2008/08/25/chron.html. Meanwhile, opposition leader Gari Kasparov says that a monument to murdered journalist Anna Politkovskaya will be raised only after the fall of the current “bloody” Russian regime (http://www.sobkorr.ru/news/48B930B7C7DAD.html).
EUROPEAN STUDY OF EAST-WEST SPLIT DIVIDES WORLD INTO RED STATES BLUE STATES. A West European study of the ways in which countries have changed sides since the end of the Cold War includes maps which, extrapolating recent American practice, identify countries as “red states” or “blue states” (www.nr2.ru/pmr/192810.html). Those backing Moscow are shown in red, and there are a lot fewer of the red states today than 20 years ago.
Friday, August 29, 2008
Window on Eurasia: Lukyanov Explains Why Moscow Doubled Its Strategic Bet in Georgia
Paul Goble
Vienna, August 29 – Despite the international outcry Moscow knew it would face if it recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it felt that the West’s uncritical support of Georgian leader Mihkiel Saakashvili and Russian popular attitudes that the regime had cultivated left the Kremlin with no choice by to go ahead, a leading Russian foreign policy expert says.
And in choosing to expand the dimensions of the Georgian crisis by taking that step, the editor of Russia’s leading foreign policy journal said, the Kremlin calculated and continues to believe that the West, because of globalization and its own internal contradictions, will not stay united against Moscow for long (globalaffairs.ru/redcol/0/10214.html).
If the Kremlin has correctly evaluated how the West will act, then the current Russian leadership will have dramatically changed the international rules of the game in its favor. But if it is wrong, the Moscow editor says, Russia will find itself in extreme difficulty because it lacks the resources of the old Soviet Union.
In either case, Lukyanov argues, the consequences of what he describes as this most “risky game,” one that he says reflects not Russian self-confidence but rather a kind of emotional desperation on the part of its leaders, will be immense not only for the Russian Federation but also for Georgia, Russia’s other neighbors and the international community.
Because Lukyanov’s article is perhaps the most sensitive and nuanced discussion of why Moscow has acted in the way that it has and because any effort by Georgia and the West to try to resolve this conflict depends on a clear-eyed assessment of Moscow’s motivations, Lukyanov’s argument is worth following in some detail.
According to Lukyanov, the Russian-Georgian crisis has passed through a series of phases, each entailing different risk and each raising the stakes for Moscow. First, there was Moscow’s military advance into Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a step that many could accept as a legitimate act of support for Moscow’s peacekeepers there.
Then, the Russian military moved into Georgia proper, a territory that no one had ever viewed as disputed, and took actions to destroy Tbilisi’s military and economic infrastructure in ways that few anywhere were prepared to describe as anything but naked aggression but again one that Moscow could in principle at least pull back from after declaring victory.
And finally, there was the Kremlin’s decision to unilaterally extend diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, an action that challenges the current rules of the game of the international community and one from which Moscow could retreat from only very publicly with a loss of face both at home and abroad.
Given those risks, Lukyanov asks, why did Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin cross this particular Rubicon at this time? The foreign policy expert suggests there were three compelling reasons.
First, he writes, “the Russian leadership like the overwhelming majority of Russians was shocked by the unanimous support the West gave to Saakashvili” -- despite actions by the Georgian leader which most Russians believed were “war crimes” that the entire “civilized world” should be condemning.
When Moscow has talked about the West’s double standards in this case, Lukyanov continues, it in fact believes that the West has been acting with “unconcealed cynicism” there. As a result, in “this emotional atmosphere” and convinced that the West had gone too far, the Kremlin decided at each stage to take “a more radical position.”
Second, the Kremlin quickly came to understand that it would not be able to secure a political blessing for what it had achieved by military means. No one was prepared to help Moscow out, and to a certain extent the Russian government was trapped by its own actions in 1999. Then it insisted on the principle of territorial integrity in the former Yugoslavia.
But in the current situation, Moscow was not prepared to maintain that principle not only because of its military gains on the ground but also because the Russian leadership was convinced that in the current environment and given the West’s attitude, it would lose its position as the sole peacekeeping nation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
And third, Lukyanov argues, there was for the Russian leadership a compelling “internal factor.” Given the emotions that the Kremlin and its media had whipped up, the Russian people would have viewed any concession by Moscow not only as a sign of weakness but as an act calling casting doubt on Putin’s insistence that Russia is back as a power to be reckoned with.
Many Russian commentators and many ordinary Russians felt after the military phase of the conflict was over that Russia was about to have its victory on the ground “snatched away from it” by diplomacy. And consequently, the Kremlin concluded that it needed to take a more radical step to show that it was not backing down, however high the stakes became.
That decision, the Moscow editor says, “is not a testament to the self-confidence” of the leadership “but does point to its willingness to take a great risk” and to play for the highest stakes, instead of pursuing all diplomatic avenues that it might have used to achieve a settlement acceptable to most sides.
Moreover, “the unwillingness of the West to permit Russia to have a strategic victory and in this way to declare its right to a sphere of influence became something beyond doubt.” And thus the conflict passed from one where discussions were possible to another where diplomacy was not an immediate option.
The Kremlin thus acted in a way to demonstrate that it could function on its own and force its neighbors to “seriously think about who is the real ‘boss’ in this region.” And if it achieved that goal, then “the question about new rules of the international game, in the elaboration of which Moscow will be an equal participant, would be a practical matter.”
Certainly Moscow expected some kind of reaction from the Western institutions. That was certainly “predictable.” But the issue for Moscow was whether NATO, the OSCE, the European Union and the Council of Europe could in fact agree to do “something concrete” and for a sustained period against Moscow if the Russians did not back down.
“The experience of previous years suggested to them a negative answer to that question: the degradation of all these organizations began long ago and has clearly progressed.” And thus in Moscow’s calculus, even if a Russian action as in Georgia caused these groups to form up for a time, any accord to punish Russia would not last for very long.
One of the big differences between the Cold War and the present, Lukyanov says, is that the Soviet threat which disciplined the European Union and NATO and allowed them to unite is no more, and the international environment is not defined by the relatively simple “confrontation of two blocks” but by multiple cross-cutting cleavages and agreements..
Russian President Medvedev has said that the Kremlin isn’t disturbed by the prospect of a Cold War, but Lukyanov argues, he “is not completely correct” in saying that. Not only has the international environment changed, making Russia more interdependent with other countries but it lacks many of the power resources the Soviet Union had.
Fortunately for Russia, the West has changed too. Globalization has affected everyone, and “the more developed a country is, the firmer is the web of the most varied dependencies in which it finds itself.” Europe needs Russian gas, and the United States is tied down by so many often conflict commitments that its freedom of action is less than many suppose.
This, Lukyanov, is what the current Russian leadership is counting on “The West has adapted only with difficulty to the realities of the 21st century” – the intermixing of politics and economics and the rise of countries in the third world. In short, the international system has become “more multidimensional” compared to “a quarter of a century ago.”
By recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the teeth of an overwhelmingly negative international reaction but in the expectation that the world community will soon find reasons to soften its approach to Russia, Lukyanov concludes, Moscow has started “an extremely risky game with very high stakes,” in which “both victory and defeat” could change everything.
Vienna, August 29 – Despite the international outcry Moscow knew it would face if it recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it felt that the West’s uncritical support of Georgian leader Mihkiel Saakashvili and Russian popular attitudes that the regime had cultivated left the Kremlin with no choice by to go ahead, a leading Russian foreign policy expert says.
And in choosing to expand the dimensions of the Georgian crisis by taking that step, the editor of Russia’s leading foreign policy journal said, the Kremlin calculated and continues to believe that the West, because of globalization and its own internal contradictions, will not stay united against Moscow for long (globalaffairs.ru/redcol/0/10214.html).
If the Kremlin has correctly evaluated how the West will act, then the current Russian leadership will have dramatically changed the international rules of the game in its favor. But if it is wrong, the Moscow editor says, Russia will find itself in extreme difficulty because it lacks the resources of the old Soviet Union.
In either case, Lukyanov argues, the consequences of what he describes as this most “risky game,” one that he says reflects not Russian self-confidence but rather a kind of emotional desperation on the part of its leaders, will be immense not only for the Russian Federation but also for Georgia, Russia’s other neighbors and the international community.
Because Lukyanov’s article is perhaps the most sensitive and nuanced discussion of why Moscow has acted in the way that it has and because any effort by Georgia and the West to try to resolve this conflict depends on a clear-eyed assessment of Moscow’s motivations, Lukyanov’s argument is worth following in some detail.
According to Lukyanov, the Russian-Georgian crisis has passed through a series of phases, each entailing different risk and each raising the stakes for Moscow. First, there was Moscow’s military advance into Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a step that many could accept as a legitimate act of support for Moscow’s peacekeepers there.
Then, the Russian military moved into Georgia proper, a territory that no one had ever viewed as disputed, and took actions to destroy Tbilisi’s military and economic infrastructure in ways that few anywhere were prepared to describe as anything but naked aggression but again one that Moscow could in principle at least pull back from after declaring victory.
And finally, there was the Kremlin’s decision to unilaterally extend diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, an action that challenges the current rules of the game of the international community and one from which Moscow could retreat from only very publicly with a loss of face both at home and abroad.
Given those risks, Lukyanov asks, why did Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin cross this particular Rubicon at this time? The foreign policy expert suggests there were three compelling reasons.
First, he writes, “the Russian leadership like the overwhelming majority of Russians was shocked by the unanimous support the West gave to Saakashvili” -- despite actions by the Georgian leader which most Russians believed were “war crimes” that the entire “civilized world” should be condemning.
When Moscow has talked about the West’s double standards in this case, Lukyanov continues, it in fact believes that the West has been acting with “unconcealed cynicism” there. As a result, in “this emotional atmosphere” and convinced that the West had gone too far, the Kremlin decided at each stage to take “a more radical position.”
Second, the Kremlin quickly came to understand that it would not be able to secure a political blessing for what it had achieved by military means. No one was prepared to help Moscow out, and to a certain extent the Russian government was trapped by its own actions in 1999. Then it insisted on the principle of territorial integrity in the former Yugoslavia.
But in the current situation, Moscow was not prepared to maintain that principle not only because of its military gains on the ground but also because the Russian leadership was convinced that in the current environment and given the West’s attitude, it would lose its position as the sole peacekeeping nation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
And third, Lukyanov argues, there was for the Russian leadership a compelling “internal factor.” Given the emotions that the Kremlin and its media had whipped up, the Russian people would have viewed any concession by Moscow not only as a sign of weakness but as an act calling casting doubt on Putin’s insistence that Russia is back as a power to be reckoned with.
Many Russian commentators and many ordinary Russians felt after the military phase of the conflict was over that Russia was about to have its victory on the ground “snatched away from it” by diplomacy. And consequently, the Kremlin concluded that it needed to take a more radical step to show that it was not backing down, however high the stakes became.
That decision, the Moscow editor says, “is not a testament to the self-confidence” of the leadership “but does point to its willingness to take a great risk” and to play for the highest stakes, instead of pursuing all diplomatic avenues that it might have used to achieve a settlement acceptable to most sides.
Moreover, “the unwillingness of the West to permit Russia to have a strategic victory and in this way to declare its right to a sphere of influence became something beyond doubt.” And thus the conflict passed from one where discussions were possible to another where diplomacy was not an immediate option.
The Kremlin thus acted in a way to demonstrate that it could function on its own and force its neighbors to “seriously think about who is the real ‘boss’ in this region.” And if it achieved that goal, then “the question about new rules of the international game, in the elaboration of which Moscow will be an equal participant, would be a practical matter.”
Certainly Moscow expected some kind of reaction from the Western institutions. That was certainly “predictable.” But the issue for Moscow was whether NATO, the OSCE, the European Union and the Council of Europe could in fact agree to do “something concrete” and for a sustained period against Moscow if the Russians did not back down.
“The experience of previous years suggested to them a negative answer to that question: the degradation of all these organizations began long ago and has clearly progressed.” And thus in Moscow’s calculus, even if a Russian action as in Georgia caused these groups to form up for a time, any accord to punish Russia would not last for very long.
One of the big differences between the Cold War and the present, Lukyanov says, is that the Soviet threat which disciplined the European Union and NATO and allowed them to unite is no more, and the international environment is not defined by the relatively simple “confrontation of two blocks” but by multiple cross-cutting cleavages and agreements..
Russian President Medvedev has said that the Kremlin isn’t disturbed by the prospect of a Cold War, but Lukyanov argues, he “is not completely correct” in saying that. Not only has the international environment changed, making Russia more interdependent with other countries but it lacks many of the power resources the Soviet Union had.
Fortunately for Russia, the West has changed too. Globalization has affected everyone, and “the more developed a country is, the firmer is the web of the most varied dependencies in which it finds itself.” Europe needs Russian gas, and the United States is tied down by so many often conflict commitments that its freedom of action is less than many suppose.
This, Lukyanov, is what the current Russian leadership is counting on “The West has adapted only with difficulty to the realities of the 21st century” – the intermixing of politics and economics and the rise of countries in the third world. In short, the international system has become “more multidimensional” compared to “a quarter of a century ago.”
By recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the teeth of an overwhelmingly negative international reaction but in the expectation that the world community will soon find reasons to soften its approach to Russia, Lukyanov concludes, Moscow has started “an extremely risky game with very high stakes,” in which “both victory and defeat” could change everything.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Moves in Georgia Spark Calls for Recognition of Captive Nations in Russia
Paul Goble
Vienna, August 29 – Prior to Moscow’s extension of diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia – a step no other country has yet followed – many in both Russia and the West argued that Moscow should not take that step lest others raise the issue of independence for some of the non-Russian republics within the Russian Federation.
Now that the Kremlin has gone ahead anyway, ever more people in the West, including both politicians and diaspora communities with close ties to ethnic minorities in the Russian Federation are raising this issue in order to highlight what all of them insist is a demonstration of Moscow’s double standards.
And while it is unlikely that any Western government would in fact move to recognize any of these countries, such statements will not only infuriate the Russian government and many ordinary Russians but encourage independence-minded people in at least some of these areas, forcing Moscow to devote more resources, including coercive ones, to control the situation.
The current discussion began, according to most accounts, when Senator John McCain, the Republican candidate for president of the United States, suggested that “after Russia illegally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Western countries ought to think about the independence of the North Caucasus and Chechnya.”
“I think in the coming weeks,” McCain continued, “we will conduct a serious discussion on this theme. Russia accuses the West of double standards. We will reply to these accusations of the Kremlin and point to its double standards regarding Chechnya and the North Caucasus (kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2008/08/28/60612.shtml).
But the senator’s words are only part of a much larger discussion of this possibility of a Western challenge in response to Moscow’s so far solitary recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries. And there have been three developments on this front that are especially worthy of attention.
First and not surprisingly, Chechens in Georgia have called for international recognition of their homeland, even though its pro-Moscow president Ramzan Kadyrov has dismissed that possibility. Khizri Aldamov, a leader of the Chechen diaspora in Tbilisi, said yesterday that Russia had made “a big mistake” by its moves, one that would echo across the North Caucasus.
He pointed out that “Chechnya, Daghestan, Ingushetia and Karachayevo-Cherkessia – for these peoples, the main goal is to leave Russia. They are all rising” against Moscow, and he called on them to “unite in a war with Russia,” a step he said “the world should support (http://www.nr2.ru/incidents/193414.html).
Second, celebrations by Circassian diaspora groups of Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia almost certainly do not represent only support for Moscow’s action. Indeed, in almost every case, they reflect a desire that if the situation in the Caucasus loosens up, their lands too will have a chance to gain recognition as independent states.
And third, and most expansively, the Belarusian Youth Front, which operates in Prague rather than in Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s Mensk, issued a call yesterday for the West to extend recognition to all the captive peoples inside the Russian Federation and now ruled from Moscow (http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2008/08/27/ic_news_112_296538/).
“The events of the last month have shown the world,” the Youth Front said in its declaration, “that the use of force by Russia is intended to result in the restoration of the Soviet Union and the re-establishment of the ‘empire of evil.’ The occupation policy which the Kremlin is conducting must be condemned by all the civilized countries of the world.”
In response to Moscow’s move on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the authors of the appeal said that they “call upon the countries of Europe and American to recognize the independence of the Chechen Republic, the Republic of Daghestan, and the Republic of Ingushetia,” whose peoples have been struggling for their independence for more than a century.
And they added that “if this is not sufficient for an end of Russian aggression, then the international community should raise the question about the independence of the other autonomous republics of the Russian Federation,” including “Adygeya, the Altai, Buryatia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachayevo-Cherkesia, Karelia, Komi, Mari El, Mordovia, Sakha, [North] Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Udmurtia, Khakasia and Chuvasia.”
Vienna, August 29 – Prior to Moscow’s extension of diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia – a step no other country has yet followed – many in both Russia and the West argued that Moscow should not take that step lest others raise the issue of independence for some of the non-Russian republics within the Russian Federation.
Now that the Kremlin has gone ahead anyway, ever more people in the West, including both politicians and diaspora communities with close ties to ethnic minorities in the Russian Federation are raising this issue in order to highlight what all of them insist is a demonstration of Moscow’s double standards.
And while it is unlikely that any Western government would in fact move to recognize any of these countries, such statements will not only infuriate the Russian government and many ordinary Russians but encourage independence-minded people in at least some of these areas, forcing Moscow to devote more resources, including coercive ones, to control the situation.
The current discussion began, according to most accounts, when Senator John McCain, the Republican candidate for president of the United States, suggested that “after Russia illegally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Western countries ought to think about the independence of the North Caucasus and Chechnya.”
“I think in the coming weeks,” McCain continued, “we will conduct a serious discussion on this theme. Russia accuses the West of double standards. We will reply to these accusations of the Kremlin and point to its double standards regarding Chechnya and the North Caucasus (kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2008/08/28/60612.shtml).
But the senator’s words are only part of a much larger discussion of this possibility of a Western challenge in response to Moscow’s so far solitary recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries. And there have been three developments on this front that are especially worthy of attention.
First and not surprisingly, Chechens in Georgia have called for international recognition of their homeland, even though its pro-Moscow president Ramzan Kadyrov has dismissed that possibility. Khizri Aldamov, a leader of the Chechen diaspora in Tbilisi, said yesterday that Russia had made “a big mistake” by its moves, one that would echo across the North Caucasus.
He pointed out that “Chechnya, Daghestan, Ingushetia and Karachayevo-Cherkessia – for these peoples, the main goal is to leave Russia. They are all rising” against Moscow, and he called on them to “unite in a war with Russia,” a step he said “the world should support (http://www.nr2.ru/incidents/193414.html).
Second, celebrations by Circassian diaspora groups of Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia almost certainly do not represent only support for Moscow’s action. Indeed, in almost every case, they reflect a desire that if the situation in the Caucasus loosens up, their lands too will have a chance to gain recognition as independent states.
And third, and most expansively, the Belarusian Youth Front, which operates in Prague rather than in Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s Mensk, issued a call yesterday for the West to extend recognition to all the captive peoples inside the Russian Federation and now ruled from Moscow (http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2008/08/27/ic_news_112_296538/).
“The events of the last month have shown the world,” the Youth Front said in its declaration, “that the use of force by Russia is intended to result in the restoration of the Soviet Union and the re-establishment of the ‘empire of evil.’ The occupation policy which the Kremlin is conducting must be condemned by all the civilized countries of the world.”
In response to Moscow’s move on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the authors of the appeal said that they “call upon the countries of Europe and American to recognize the independence of the Chechen Republic, the Republic of Daghestan, and the Republic of Ingushetia,” whose peoples have been struggling for their independence for more than a century.
And they added that “if this is not sufficient for an end of Russian aggression, then the international community should raise the question about the independence of the other autonomous republics of the Russian Federation,” including “Adygeya, the Altai, Buryatia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachayevo-Cherkesia, Karelia, Komi, Mari El, Mordovia, Sakha, [North] Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Udmurtia, Khakasia and Chuvasia.”
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