Window on Eurasia: Will Iran Become the Route Out for Caspian Oil – And How Will That Transform the Geopolitics of the Region?

Paul Goble

Vienna, August 30 – The disruption of oil flows via Georgia during the recent violence has made that route significantly less attractive for Caspian oil exporting countries, with some concluding they have no choice but to go via Russia given Iran’s international isolation but at least a few thinking about using Iran to gain greater freedom of maneuver relative to Moscow.
If the governments of the region do decide to ship some or all of their oil via Iran, that would have three serious geopolitical consequences that may rival some of the already enormous geopolitical fallout from Russia’s decision to invade Georgia and to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia (www.nr2.ru/economy/193763.html).
First, given the enormous appetite for oil in the West and Pacific rim, such a shift in Caspian exports would likely put enormous pressure on Washington to soften its approach to Tehran, especially if the United States wants to support the effective independence of the post-Soviet states and thus has no desire to see the oil flow through the Russian Federation.
Second, Iran’s willingness to serve as the route out for Caspian basin oil (or as a market for some of it) would likely set it on a collision course with Moscow, which has made it very clear that it wants to control all oil coming out of the former Soviet space and which would view any change in Iran’s approach or Western hostility to Tehran as not in Russia’s interest.
And third, such a shift would almost certainly affect Turkey and its relations not only with the post-Soviet Turkic states but also with Russia. Ankara’s ties with the former would likely become less important given that oil would be flowing via Iran, and it ties with Moscow would likely strengthen by means of some kind of condominium in the Southern Caucasus.
Beyond doubt, many countries, including both the United States and Russia, albeit for very different reasons, will do what they can to prevent such a shift, but the changes in Georgia and in the international system after Georgia mean that the use of such a route with all the consequences it would entail is no longer as unthinkable as it was a month ago.
The Georgian government and many commentators have suggested that blocking the east-west flow of oil from the Caspian via Georgia, a route that bypasses Russia, was one of the most important reasons behind Moscow’s decision to introduce troops there, an argument both Moscow and other analysts have heatedly denied.
But however that may be, Natalya Kharitonova, a regional analyst at Moscow State University, argues that it is important to focus on “the concrete facts” including both the way in which Russia’s action made Georgia less attractive as a transit corridor and Iran potentially a much more interesting one (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/2067/).
Among the “facts” she lists are the following: “the use of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and of a number of other transportation units as well as the cessation of rail deliveries of oil to the Georgian port of Batumi was stopped” because of the conflict.
That in turn, she notes, forced Baku not only to reduce the amount of oil it pumped but also “to search for alternative routes for the transportation of this resource. As a result, Azerbaijani oil has been flowing through the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. [And] Turkey intends to purchase additional gas from Russia and Iran to compensate.”
At the same time, the Moscow scholar says, “Iran for example has decided to build the Neka-Jask pipeline as a competitor to Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan.” Earlier this week, Iranian sources reported that Azerbaijan had begun exporting some of its oil exports via Iran, although some in Baku denied this (www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=67534§ionid=351020103).
A commentary in the Baku newspaper “Echo” today, indicates that Azerbaijan hopes to develop the east-west pipelines in Georgia but points out that analysts there and in other regional oil-exporting countries are looking at the Iranian route in the hopes of avoiding the consequences of using the Russian one (www.echo-az.com/economica01.shtml, August 30).
Ilham Shaban, the president of the Baku Center of Oil Research, told the paper that “all Western oil companies would like to work in Iran” but can’t easily because of American opposition. But now “invoking the situation in Georgia, they are beginning to advise official Washington to review its relations with Iranian so as to allow them to begin work there.”
He and other experts noted that because of the events in Georgia, “Azerbaijan began to export its oil to international markets through Iran,” even as it sent some of its oil northward via Russia – an example of Badu’s “balanced” foreign policy. But Azerbaijan was not the only regional country to use Iran during this crisis: Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan did so as well.
And another Azerbaijani expert, Gubad Ibadoglu, the head of the Center for Economic Research, pointed to three other reasons the Caspian basin states are now likely to reconsider Iran as a route: First, it is common practice for exporters to want to have multiple pipelines rather than be at the mercy from disruptions of a single one.
Second, exporting oil through Iran to the Gulf is significantly less expensive than sending it through Georgia and Turkey or through Russia. And third – and this may be especially significant in the case of Azerbaijan – oil from the Caspian going via Iran could help meet the fuel needs of the northern part of that country, a section populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis.

Window on Eurasia Shorts for August 30 – Georgian Events

Some news items about events in and around Georgia during the last week which have attracted less attention than they deserve:

NOT ALL RUSSIAN ANALYSTS AGREE WITH PUTIN ON AMERICAN ELECTIONS. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s suggestion that the Bush White House pushed Tbilisi to provoke Russia as part of an effort to boost the electoral chances of Republic candidate John McCain has received widespread coverage not only in the Russian media but in American outlets as well (www.mignews.ru/news/politic/cis/280808_171244_69112.html). But many
Russian analysts do not agree with him either on the existence of a White House plot or on what the outcome of the US election is likely to be (www.nr2.ru/policy/192867.html).

HAMAS WANTS TO HELP MOSCOW BUILD ‘A NEW WORLD ORDER.’ Hamas, which welcomed Moscow’s extension of diplomatic recognition to the two breakaway republics in Georgia, has announced that it is ready to help the Kremlin build “a new world order” directed against Israel and the United States (zavtra.ru/cgi//veil//data/zavtra/08/771/41.html). The Georgian foreign ministry on August 29 congratulated Moscow on its new alliance with this terrorist group. Meanwhile, however, Moscow’s effort to get other countries to follow its lead on Abkhazia and South Ossetia has fallen flat. Venezuela’s Ugo Chavez has expressed sympathy but neither Caracas nor Mensk has moved (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.140732.html). Given that Moscow routinely compares what it has done to the West’s support for Kosovo, it is perhaps worth noting that 46 countries have now recognized that Balkan republic (http://www.nm.md/daily/article/2008/08/29/0101.html/).

RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS STEP UP CAMPAIGN TO LINK JEWS TO GEORGIA. Russia’s extreme right continues its effort to blame Israel and the Jews for their support of Georgia against Russia, an effort that could lead those attacking “persons from the Caucasus” to attack Jews (www.za-nauku.ru//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=917&Itemid=36).

RUSSIAN JEWS IN ISRAEL URGE DIASPORA NOT TO BUY ANYTHING GEORGIAN. A group of Russian Jews living in Israel have urged their compatriots not to buy anything Georgian in order to demonstrate their support for South Ossetia and to weaken the regime in Tbilisi, a call that some Russian nationalists welcome (www.homeru.com/news/content/view/6059/174/).

RUSSIANS DEBATE THE IMPACT OF MOSCOW’S ACTIONS IN GEORGIA ON RUSSIA. A few Russian analysts argue that Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will lead to demands for independence by at least some of the non-Russian republics within the Russian Federation (www.regnum.ru/news/1046955.html). But far more Russian analysts and officials insist that there is no danger of “a domino effect” inside their country (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/2119/).

WESTERN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS ACTIVE IN CAUCASUS DENOUNCED AS ‘BANDITS’ … Russian commentators have been stepping up their attacks on human rights groups either based in Western countries or funded from abroad over the last several weeks. A particularly blatant and vicious example called these groups “bandits” because of their work in the Caucasus region (www.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=1584).

… AS HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH RELEASES SATELLITE PHOTOS SHOWING ETHNIC CLEANSING SOUTH OSSETIA. Human Rights Watch, one of the groups Russian media have been attacking, has used satellite photography to show that Russian and South Ossetian forces have engaged in the ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages in that breakaway republic (abkhazeti.info/news/1220052197.php).

LIBERAL COMMENTATOR SAYS RUSSIA AS ‘A PIRATE STATE’ SHOULD HAVE A PIRATE FLAG… Valeriya Novodvorskaya, a liberal Russian commentator, says that as Moscow’s actions in Georgia have shown, Russia has become “a pirate state” and should be flying a pirate flag rather than a tricolor one intended to stress its links to the countries of Europe (grani.ru/Politics/Russia/p.140673.html).

… WHILE ONE RUSSIAN SAYS HE NO LONGER RECOGNIZES ‘SELF-PROCLAIMED’ RUSSIAN FEDERATION. One Russian at least is taking an even more radical step to protest Moscow’s actions in Georgia. He has posted online a declaration saying that “effective immediately” he no longer recognizes “the self-proclaimed Russian Federation” as a state or himself as its citizen (yun.complife.ru/miscell/norussia.htm).

MOSCOW OFFICIALS SAY U.S. ‘REVIEWING CANDIDATES’ TO REPLACE SAAKASHVILI. In a transparent effort to sow discord in Tbilisi and to raise new questions in Europe about the Georgian government, Russian officials and commentators are suggesting that Georgian opposition figures are now travelling to Washington or meeting with American officials elsewhere as part of a supposed vetting process in which the United States will choose who will succeed Mihkiel Saakashvili (http://www.nr2.ru/inworld/192936.html).

RUSSIA’S MUSLIMS BACK MOSCOW ON RECOGNIZING ABKHAZIA, SOUTH OSSETIA. Russia’s Muslim establishment – including the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD), and almost all other MSD heads – have backed Moscow’s moves in Georgia and called on Muslim countries to follow Russia’s lead and extend diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia (www.islam.ru/rus/2008-08-25/#22385 and www.islam.ru/rus/2008-08-28/#22458).

CRITICISM OF QUALITY OF RUSSIAN MILITARY ACTION IN GEORGIA INTENSIFIES. As more information comes out about Russian military actions in Georgia, an increasing number of Russian analysts are suggesting that Russian forces were not only poorly equipped but did not perform all that well in Georgia, winning as Soviet forces typically did only by their overwhelming numbers (www.polit.ru/analytics/2008/08/27/vol.html). And several have openly complained that this is an especially unfortunate situation because Russia has been spending more on defense but appears from the events in the Caucasus to be getting less for it (http://www.newizv.ru/news/2008-08-27/96780/).

Window on Eurasia Shorts for August 30 – Non-Georgian Items

Below are a few news items from the last week about developments in the post-Soviet space that have been overshadowed by the Georgian events but that merit attention.

MUSLIMS WIN 10 OF RUSSIA’S 23 GOLD MEDALS AT BEIJING GAMES. Muslims in the Russian Federation have been celebrating that their co-religionists won ten of the 23 gold medals the Russian team brought back from Beijing (www.islamnews.ru/news-13973.html). The percentage of Muslim winners is roughly twice the share of Muslims in the Russian population, something many Muslims see as a harbinger of the future. Especially pleased by this outcome were the Circassians, whose athlete won five of the ten medals Russia’s Muslims did (www.ingushetiya.ru/news/15342.html). The Russian umma is also well-represented on Russia’s Para-Olympic team: 20 of the members of that group which is headed to Beijing this week reportedly are Muslims and prayed at a mosque before departing for the Chinese capital (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusnews/4282/).

IF MOSCOW RAISES PENSION AGE, FEW RUSSIAN MEN WILL LIVE TO COLLECT. The Russian government’s plan to raise the age at which Russians can retire will mean that many Russian men will never live to collect a pension. At present, the average life expectancy for men in the Russian Federation is under 58 and falling, a figure four to seven years younger than the new proposed retirement ages (www.flb.ru/info/44419.html).

NEW MUSLIM UNIVERISTY GRADS SWEAR TO FIGHT WAHHABISM. The pro-Kremlin Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Mufti Talgat Tajuddin required all 58 graduates of the Russian Islamic University to swear that they would never depart from the principles of the Hanafi rite of Sunni Islam and that they would always struggle against “Wahhabism and religious extremism in all its manifestations” (www.islamrt.ru/htm/news/news.htm#384).

ORTHODOX MONK PREDICTS CHINESE WILL OCCUPY YEKATERINBURG IN NOVEMBER, URGES RUSSIANS TO FLEE. An especially inflammatory example of religious commentary in the Russian Federation today is a prediction by the head of the Russian Orthodox monastery in Alatyr in Udmurtia that the Chinese are about to “seize” Yekaterinburg and that Russians should prepare to flee (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=monitor&id=12695). His prediction and prescription for which there is no evidence has been making the rounds of Orthodox and Russian nationalist web sites and has even appeared in Moscow’s “Izvestiya” newspaper.

TATARSTAN INCREASES STATUS, RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICIALS WORKING WITH RELIGIOUS GROUPS. Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiyev has transformed his republic’s Council on Religious Affairs into an Administration for Religious Affairs, thus elevating its powers within the government. Shaimiyev did not change the leadership of this body, but its officials say that they will now focus on evaluating religious literature and academic programs for extremism (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusnews/4224/). Two things make this action important: On the one hand, it will put additional pressure on Moscow to form a Council on Religious Affairs, something Muslims want but that the Orthodox Church opposes. And on the other, it will centralize in Tatarstan at least expertise on “extremism,” thus potentially limiting the power of prosecutors and judges to rely on whomever they want to reach their verdicts in such cases.

RUSSIANS CAN’T GET OFFICIAL DATA THEY’RE ENTITLED TO -- BUT CAN BUY THAT TO WHICH THEY AREN’T. According to an article in “Novyye izvestiya,” Russians are facing ever greater obstacles in obtaining government information that the law says they are entitled to. But at the same time, the paper reports, many officials are quite prepared to give them information the law says they are not supposed to have if they pay the necessary bribes (www.newizv.ru/news/2008-08-26/96698/).

FINNISH WRITER SAYS ESTONIA WILL ‘DISAPPEAR’ WITHIN TEN YEARS. A new book by a Finnish writer says that Estonia, which now has only 1.3 million people, will “disappear” in ten years or perhaps sooner, an argument that has been taken up by the Russian-language press there and one that could contribute to a deterioration of ethnic relations there (www.dzd.ee/?SID=2e72e885dfe61fc1059dc1c3887a0a1d&n=17&a=2790).

ETHNIC CONFLICTS ESPECIALLY LIKELY IN SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS, DPNI SAYS. The openly xenophobic Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) has published a survey of interethnic violence across the Russian Federation and says that serious ethnic conflicts occur far more often in Russia’s smaller cities and towns than they do in the larger cities, something that means that many human rights groups may be underreporting the number of such clashes because they do not have people on the scene outside of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other large urban areas (www.dpni.org/articles/kommentari/9805/)

REGION IN KARELIA SEEKS TO BE RECLASSIFIED AS ‘NATIONAL’ ONE. Residents of Pryzhinskiy rayon near Petrazavodsk have asked that their district be reclassified as a “national” one, an action that challenges Vladimir Putin’s ongoing drive to eliminate most ethnic autonomies and one that suggests ethnic groups in hitherto non-ethnic areas may follow suit (finnougoria.ru/news/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=7136). It is as yet unclear with the Karelian government will go along. According to the 2002 census, 37 percent of the district’s 18,224 residents were Karelians, 46 percent were Russians, six percent Finns, and 11 percent others.

PUSH FOR MOSCOW MEMORIAL FOR NADEZHDA MANDELSTAM CONTINUES. For some years, the admirers of the great Russian memoirist Nadezhda Mandelstam have sought to erect suitable memorials to her in Moscow and other Russian cities, but they have faced obstacles from officialdom. An article posted at www.polit.ru/dossie/2008/08/25/chron.html. Meanwhile, opposition leader Gari Kasparov says that a monument to murdered journalist Anna Politkovskaya will be raised only after the fall of the current “bloody” Russian regime (http://www.sobkorr.ru/news/48B930B7C7DAD.html).

EUROPEAN STUDY OF EAST-WEST SPLIT DIVIDES WORLD INTO RED STATES BLUE STATES. A West European study of the ways in which countries have changed sides since the end of the Cold War includes maps which, extrapolating recent American practice, identify countries as “red states” or “blue states” (www.nr2.ru/pmr/192810.html). Those backing Moscow are shown in red, and there are a lot fewer of the red states today than 20 years ago.

Window on Eurasia: Lukyanov Explains Why Moscow Doubled Its Strategic Bet in Georgia

Paul Goble

Vienna, August 29 – Despite the international outcry Moscow knew it would face if it recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it felt that the West’s uncritical support of Georgian leader Mihkiel Saakashvili and Russian popular attitudes that the regime had cultivated left the Kremlin with no choice by to go ahead, a leading Russian foreign policy expert says.
And in choosing to expand the dimensions of the Georgian crisis by taking that step, the editor of Russia’s leading foreign policy journal said, the Kremlin calculated and continues to believe that the West, because of globalization and its own internal contradictions, will not stay united against Moscow for long (globalaffairs.ru/redcol/0/10214.html).
If the Kremlin has correctly evaluated how the West will act, then the current Russian leadership will have dramatically changed the international rules of the game in its favor. But if it is wrong, the Moscow editor says, Russia will find itself in extreme difficulty because it lacks the resources of the old Soviet Union.
In either case, Lukyanov argues, the consequences of what he describes as this most “risky game,” one that he says reflects not Russian self-confidence but rather a kind of emotional desperation on the part of its leaders, will be immense not only for the Russian Federation but also for Georgia, Russia’s other neighbors and the international community.
Because Lukyanov’s article is perhaps the most sensitive and nuanced discussion of why Moscow has acted in the way that it has and because any effort by Georgia and the West to try to resolve this conflict depends on a clear-eyed assessment of Moscow’s motivations, Lukyanov’s argument is worth following in some detail.
According to Lukyanov, the Russian-Georgian crisis has passed through a series of phases, each entailing different risk and each raising the stakes for Moscow. First, there was Moscow’s military advance into Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a step that many could accept as a legitimate act of support for Moscow’s peacekeepers there.
Then, the Russian military moved into Georgia proper, a territory that no one had ever viewed as disputed, and took actions to destroy Tbilisi’s military and economic infrastructure in ways that few anywhere were prepared to describe as anything but naked aggression but again one that Moscow could in principle at least pull back from after declaring victory.
And finally, there was the Kremlin’s decision to unilaterally extend diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, an action that challenges the current rules of the game of the international community and one from which Moscow could retreat from only very publicly with a loss of face both at home and abroad.
Given those risks, Lukyanov asks, why did Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin cross this particular Rubicon at this time? The foreign policy expert suggests there were three compelling reasons.
First, he writes, “the Russian leadership like the overwhelming majority of Russians was shocked by the unanimous support the West gave to Saakashvili” -- despite actions by the Georgian leader which most Russians believed were “war crimes” that the entire “civilized world” should be condemning.
When Moscow has talked about the West’s double standards in this case, Lukyanov continues, it in fact believes that the West has been acting with “unconcealed cynicism” there. As a result, in “this emotional atmosphere” and convinced that the West had gone too far, the Kremlin decided at each stage to take “a more radical position.”
Second, the Kremlin quickly came to understand that it would not be able to secure a political blessing for what it had achieved by military means. No one was prepared to help Moscow out, and to a certain extent the Russian government was trapped by its own actions in 1999. Then it insisted on the principle of territorial integrity in the former Yugoslavia.
But in the current situation, Moscow was not prepared to maintain that principle not only because of its military gains on the ground but also because the Russian leadership was convinced that in the current environment and given the West’s attitude, it would lose its position as the sole peacekeeping nation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
And third, Lukyanov argues, there was for the Russian leadership a compelling “internal factor.” Given the emotions that the Kremlin and its media had whipped up, the Russian people would have viewed any concession by Moscow not only as a sign of weakness but as an act calling casting doubt on Putin’s insistence that Russia is back as a power to be reckoned with.
Many Russian commentators and many ordinary Russians felt after the military phase of the conflict was over that Russia was about to have its victory on the ground “snatched away from it” by diplomacy. And consequently, the Kremlin concluded that it needed to take a more radical step to show that it was not backing down, however high the stakes became.
That decision, the Moscow editor says, “is not a testament to the self-confidence” of the leadership “but does point to its willingness to take a great risk” and to play for the highest stakes, instead of pursuing all diplomatic avenues that it might have used to achieve a settlement acceptable to most sides.
Moreover, “the unwillingness of the West to permit Russia to have a strategic victory and in this way to declare its right to a sphere of influence became something beyond doubt.” And thus the conflict passed from one where discussions were possible to another where diplomacy was not an immediate option.
The Kremlin thus acted in a way to demonstrate that it could function on its own and force its neighbors to “seriously think about who is the real ‘boss’ in this region.” And if it achieved that goal, then “the question about new rules of the international game, in the elaboration of which Moscow will be an equal participant, would be a practical matter.”
Certainly Moscow expected some kind of reaction from the Western institutions. That was certainly “predictable.” But the issue for Moscow was whether NATO, the OSCE, the European Union and the Council of Europe could in fact agree to do “something concrete” and for a sustained period against Moscow if the Russians did not back down.
“The experience of previous years suggested to them a negative answer to that question: the degradation of all these organizations began long ago and has clearly progressed.” And thus in Moscow’s calculus, even if a Russian action as in Georgia caused these groups to form up for a time, any accord to punish Russia would not last for very long.
One of the big differences between the Cold War and the present, Lukyanov says, is that the Soviet threat which disciplined the European Union and NATO and allowed them to unite is no more, and the international environment is not defined by the relatively simple “confrontation of two blocks” but by multiple cross-cutting cleavages and agreements..
Russian President Medvedev has said that the Kremlin isn’t disturbed by the prospect of a Cold War, but Lukyanov argues, he “is not completely correct” in saying that. Not only has the international environment changed, making Russia more interdependent with other countries but it lacks many of the power resources the Soviet Union had.
Fortunately for Russia, the West has changed too. Globalization has affected everyone, and “the more developed a country is, the firmer is the web of the most varied dependencies in which it finds itself.” Europe needs Russian gas, and the United States is tied down by so many often conflict commitments that its freedom of action is less than many suppose.
This, Lukyanov, is what the current Russian leadership is counting on “The West has adapted only with difficulty to the realities of the 21st century” – the intermixing of politics and economics and the rise of countries in the third world. In short, the international system has become “more multidimensional” compared to “a quarter of a century ago.”
By recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the teeth of an overwhelmingly negative international reaction but in the expectation that the world community will soon find reasons to soften its approach to Russia, Lukyanov concludes, Moscow has started “an extremely risky game with very high stakes,” in which “both victory and defeat” could change everything.

Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Moves in Georgia Spark Calls for Recognition of Captive Nations in Russia

Paul Goble

Vienna, August 29 – Prior to Moscow’s extension of diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia – a step no other country has yet followed – many in both Russia and the West argued that Moscow should not take that step lest others raise the issue of independence for some of the non-Russian republics within the Russian Federation.
Now that the Kremlin has gone ahead anyway, ever more people in the West, including both politicians and diaspora communities with close ties to ethnic minorities in the Russian Federation are raising this issue in order to highlight what all of them insist is a demonstration of Moscow’s double standards.
And while it is unlikely that any Western government would in fact move to recognize any of these countries, such statements will not only infuriate the Russian government and many ordinary Russians but encourage independence-minded people in at least some of these areas, forcing Moscow to devote more resources, including coercive ones, to control the situation.
The current discussion began, according to most accounts, when Senator John McCain, the Republican candidate for president of the United States, suggested that “after Russia illegally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Western countries ought to think about the independence of the North Caucasus and Chechnya.”
“I think in the coming weeks,” McCain continued, “we will conduct a serious discussion on this theme. Russia accuses the West of double standards. We will reply to these accusations of the Kremlin and point to its double standards regarding Chechnya and the North Caucasus (kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2008/08/28/60612.shtml).
But the senator’s words are only part of a much larger discussion of this possibility of a Western challenge in response to Moscow’s so far solitary recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries. And there have been three developments on this front that are especially worthy of attention.
First and not surprisingly, Chechens in Georgia have called for international recognition of their homeland, even though its pro-Moscow president Ramzan Kadyrov has dismissed that possibility. Khizri Aldamov, a leader of the Chechen diaspora in Tbilisi, said yesterday that Russia had made “a big mistake” by its moves, one that would echo across the North Caucasus.
He pointed out that “Chechnya, Daghestan, Ingushetia and Karachayevo-Cherkessia – for these peoples, the main goal is to leave Russia. They are all rising” against Moscow, and he called on them to “unite in a war with Russia,” a step he said “the world should support (http://www.nr2.ru/incidents/193414.html).
Second, celebrations by Circassian diaspora groups of Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia almost certainly do not represent only support for Moscow’s action. Indeed, in almost every case, they reflect a desire that if the situation in the Caucasus loosens up, their lands too will have a chance to gain recognition as independent states.
And third, and most expansively, the Belarusian Youth Front, which operates in Prague rather than in Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s Mensk, issued a call yesterday for the West to extend recognition to all the captive peoples inside the Russian Federation and now ruled from Moscow (http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2008/08/27/ic_news_112_296538/).
“The events of the last month have shown the world,” the Youth Front said in its declaration, “that the use of force by Russia is intended to result in the restoration of the Soviet Union and the re-establishment of the ‘empire of evil.’ The occupation policy which the Kremlin is conducting must be condemned by all the civilized countries of the world.”
In response to Moscow’s move on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the authors of the appeal said that they “call upon the countries of Europe and American to recognize the independence of the Chechen Republic, the Republic of Daghestan, and the Republic of Ingushetia,” whose peoples have been struggling for their independence for more than a century.
And they added that “if this is not sufficient for an end of Russian aggression, then the international community should raise the question about the independence of the other autonomous republics of the Russian Federation,” including “Adygeya, the Altai, Buryatia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachayevo-Cherkesia, Karelia, Komi, Mari El, Mordovia, Sakha, [North] Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Udmurtia, Khakasia and Chuvasia.”

Window on Eurasia: Moscow Fears Public Support for its Georgian Policy May Soften as Western Sanctions Bite

Paul Goble

Vienna, August 29 – Russians, according to all recent polls, overwhelmingly support what Moscow has done in Georgia, but many of those sampled do not believe Moscow “won” there at least when compared to other participants, an indication that this public support may be softer than the Kremlin clearly expects or that Western media routinely report.
Moreover, announcements by Russian officials that the Western response to Moscow’s invasion and recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is likely to lead to higher prices for Russian consumers, threaten the country’s economic modernization, and make foreign travel more difficult could erode Russian support for the Kremlin’s policies.
And in an indication that some in the Russian government are worried about that possibility, the communications ministry there has announced that it is drafting a new law that will push the media there to shift from “the propaganda of personal freedoms and wealth to the affirmation of a new cult of health, patriotism and a ‘socially responsible’ way of life.”
Typical of the polls showing Russian support for Moscow’s policies is one conducted by the Levada Center. In response to its query as to whether Russia had behaved correctly by getting involved in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict on the Ossetian side, 87 percent of the sample said that Moscow had been right to do so (www.levada.ru/press/2008082701.html).
But the same survey found that only 27 percent said that Russia had “won out” in this conflict, with 25 percent saying no one had, 19 percent saying that the United States had, 17 percent saying the leadership of South Ossetia had, and 11 percent saying that NATO had, an indication that Russians have doubts on whether this course of action has worked to their benefit.
(Intriguingly, when asked how they expected the current tensions between Russia and the West to play out, 48 percent said they thought that relations would “gradually return to what they had been before this incident, while 35 percent said they expected tensions to grow possibly into “a new Cold War.”)
Meanwhile, another poll found that a third of Russians believe that there is a high probability that major clashes will resume between Russian and Georgian forces, an increase of six percent over the last week and a possibility that could either cause more Russians to back the Kremlin or more to question its policies (www.polit.ru/research/2008/08/28/fom34.html).
But potentially more serious drivers of shifts in Russian public opinion on this issue are statements by officials and analysts that Aleksey Usov of the “Novyy Region” news service summarized as pointing to what he suggested may be a significant “worsening of the level of life of Russians themselves” (http://www.nr2.ru/economy/193455.html).
The West’s indication that it will put off Russia’s inclusion in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Moscow’s response that it will selectively suspend some of the agreements it had reached with the WTO as part of the admissions process will send prices for meat and other goods up at least in the short term, officials say.
Russia will be able to compensate for that after some months, agriculture minister Aleksey Gordeyev said yesterday, but some of the other consequences of the worsening of relations between Russia and the West are going to be far more difficult for the Russian government and ordinary Russians to cope with.
On the one hand, Russian firms are likely to find it far more difficult to attract foreign investors or to secure foreign financing, something that at the very least will make it more difficult for Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to modernize and diversity his country’s economy beyond the oil and gas sector.
And on the other, the new rise in East-West tensions is likely to lead to a tightening of visa regimes and a significant delay in talks for visa free travel to European Union countries and thus make it far more difficult for Russians to travel abroad, something that many of them identify as one of the chief gains resulting from the end of the Soviet Union.
Not surprisingly, the Russian government has decided to counter such arguments by launching a new ideological campaign. Today, the communications ministry announced that it is preparing a new law that would encourage media outlets to end their “propaganda of personal freedom and wealth” (www.nr2.ru/society/193587.html).
Instead, ministry officials will urge media outlets to promote “a cult of health, patriotism, and ‘a socially responsible’ way of life,” thus reorienting the views of Russians who have been subject “for almost 20 years to the cult of money, success and petty bourgeois comfort” as the highest goals.
The officials stressed that this campaign would be “voluntary,” but they pointedly suggested that those media outlets that went along could count on government support while those that don’t will be subject to the closest official scrutiny, yet another tightening of the screws on Russia’s already hard-pressed media outlets.

Window on Eurasia: Russian Anti-Semites Play Up Links Between Georgia and Israel

Paul Goble

Vienna, August 28 – Russian anti-Semites are using their media outlets to play up the links between Georgia and Israel and what they claim is the central role of the Jewish state in helping Georgia to become a military threat to Russia, reportage that cannot fail in the current environment to rekindle anti-Semitic attitudes among some radical Russian nationalists.
And while both the number of Jews in Russia and the number of openly anti-Semitic Russians are smaller than in the past, the xenophobic passions whipped up by groups like the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) could at some point be directed against the Jewish community there if such efforts to link Israel and the Jews to Georgia continue unabated.
Up to now, most of the articles linking Georgians and Jews together and denouncing both have appeared on extremist blogs and websites rather than in the more generally accessible print or electronic media, but the same thing could be said about groups like DPNI which have used the web to mobilize their followers against immigrants and “people from the Caucasus.”
An example of this anti-Semitic attack on Israeli and Jewish ties to Georgia is provided by an article entitled “Why is Israel Helping the Georgians?” by Igor Savin, who is not identified by position, that first appeared on the “Russkaya ideya” portal but has since been reproduced on a number of others with larger audiences (srn.rusidea.org/?a=50027).
Savin said that he was “compelled” to bring to the attention of those Russian nationalists who share his views because Anatoly Nogovitsyn, the deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, had said at the end of last week that he could “confirm” that “Israel had delivered to Georgia arms and had helped train its military,” although the general offered no details.
But according to the author of this article, those details are available in Jewish publications, like “Yevreyskoye slovo” as well as regular Israeli news outlets for anyone who takes the time to read them. And he cites these sources extensively to show just how much Israeli aid both in equipment and training to Georgia there has been.
The more disturbing part of this attack, however, involves not what Israel has contributed to Georgia’s security but rather pictures highlighting Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s involvement with the Jewish community inside his own country and suggestions that his wife’s Jewish background is why Israel backed Georgia.
According to Savin, various Russian websites including the notorious Kompromat.ru have reported that among Saakashvili’s “ties” to the West are his “’western wife’ – Sandra Rulofs (also known as Sandra Eduardovna Rulovski or Rulovski). In all official biographies,” he said, Saakashvili’s wife is for some reason called Dutch, although Dutch is only her citizenship.”
“Her father,” the anti-Semitic writer continued, “migrated to Holland from the Czech Republic as a Jew, and her mother, according to some accounts is a Polish Jew and according to others a local Dutch one.” And all that, Savin said, is why a sign appeared in Jerusalem during the last Georgian elections urging all Georgian Jews there to “vote for Misha.”
“From all these facts,” Savin insists, “it becomes clear that in Georgia have come to power Georgian-speaking Jews who are supported by the United States and Israel with arms and money for the transparent goal of creating another source of tension in the Caucasus as an occasion for the interference of NATO” in that region’s affairs.
And he notes, that when what he calls “the Georgian attack on South Ossetia took place, a sizeable group of Israeli journalists, including from Ha’aretz and the Ynet portal arrived in Georgia to make sure that the world knew from the start precisely Georgia’s version of what was taking place rather than the truth.
Reasonable people would immediately dismiss this pastiche of salacious suggestions as dangerously wrong, but Russian xenophobes are not in that category. And in the overheated world they live in, at least some are likely to read the writings of Savin and others as being enough reason to attack Jews and well as Georgians living in the Russian Federation.
One can only hope that the Russian government will come to its senses and crack down on those who suggest attacking either, but so far, while Moscow has moved against those who criticize its policies in Georgia and elsewhere, it has done little or nothing to stop outlets like those expressed by Savin and his ilk that spew poisonous against Jews and other groups.