Paul Goble
Staunton, April 28 – Most Russians do not consider the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate as separate and distinct from the Russian state, a perception that reinforces indifference to matters of faith and that has led many to ignore or disparage the first signs of a genuine religious revival, according to a leading specialist on religious life in Russia.
Roman Lunkin, the director of the Institute of Religion and Law and a leading scholar at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, says this is part of a larger problem: “Religion and chiefly Orthodoxy are conceived in the mass consciousness of Russian society in an irrational and contradictory way” (www.politjournal.ru/index.php?action=News&tek=9555).
“For the majority of [Russians], it is customary to view Orthodox leaders and the Russian Orthodox Church as an institution as a constituent part of the official chronicles on federal television channels and in the press,” Lunkinn says, but when the Church uses these ties to push its agenda, many Russians become angry.
That is because, Lunkin says, Russians are “accustomed to consider themselves as Orthodox and with satisfaction listen to speeches by the Patriarch and the bishops that ‘we are all baptized into Orthodoxy,” but they do not want the Church to try to extend its influence, viewing that as a form of “dangerous clericalization.’”
For most of the post-Soviet period, Orthodox leaders have supported this contradictory view, but “independently from the declared basis of the consteitutional system and the declarations of Orthodox hierarchs that the Church does not want to again become a government church, Orthodoxy has always ceased to be viewed as separate from the state.”
Since 1991, Russian officials and commentators have routinely declared that Orthodoxy is “the preserver of the richness and values of Russian culture and spirituality,” thus replacing the term “people” in the oft-repeated Soviet slogan that “’art belongs to the people’” and thus putting the Church in a complicated position.
Evidence of this is provided in the way in which the media oppose state-supported Orthodoxy and unacceptable “sects,” and the willingness of the Russian people to accept that division, a willingness that shows that “neither in society nor in the media is there an understanding of what faith is, how one can believe and what is religious practice.”
Even more important, all this is evidence of a lack of interest in the faith itself and in the fundamental aspects of the Orthodox religion and a willingness of many Russians to view Orthodoxy iin conjunction with “a semi-pagan culture’ with “astrological-occult” aspects including “superstitions, fortunetelling, diets, and in general about how religion must help.”
This “folklorization of Orthodoxy” is not the result of any “ill intention” or popular inattention. Rather, “under conditions of the existence of the polar opposites” of Official Orthodoxy and sects, “genuine faith does not interest anyone;” and consequently, “what develops is precisely folklore.”
The situation has somewhat improved in recent years, Lunkin says, and he points to the influence of Patriarch Kirill as being a positive one in this regard, an especially interesting comment given that Lunkin has often been criticized by Orthodox hierarchs for his critical attitude toward the Patriarchate.
Evidence of this improvement, of a greater concern with faith rather than form, Lunkin suggests, is to be found in a place many Orthodox hierarchs may not like: in the dissent of the Izhevsk “free thinkers, three priests who declared about their refusal to recall Patriarch Kirill in their prayers and who accused the Church leadership of tight connections with the powers.”
Nonetheless, it is still true, Lunkin says, that “the number of practicing believers as before remains extraordinarily few, and besides this, religious life consists not of Orthodoxy and ‘the sects” but of the most various movements and confessions,” often far beyond Orthodoxy or even Christianity.
“The number of believers who are becoming part of the Russian Orthodox Church in a genuine way is slowly growing, especially to the extent that the Church is becoming more open, more willing to talk about its problems and involved in social projects and the development of parishes.”
Thursday, April 28, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Central Asian Countries May Leave CIS in the Coming Decade, Moscow Analysts Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 28 – The Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States will survive this decade at least, but it will likely have fewer members, with the countries of Central Asia the most likely to exit because they “will make a different geopolitical choice,” according to a leading Moscow specialist on the post-Soviet region.
During a video conference between scholars and officials in Moscow, Tbilisi, Almaaty, Bishkek, and Chisinau, Aleksey Vlasov, director of the Center for Post-Soviet Research at Moscow State University, said that “the nucleus” of the CIS will survive but some of its outlying members will likely leave (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/10364/).
Vlasov mentioned three “factors” which he said would prevent the complete unraveling of the CIS: “the absence of visas, Russian as a common language of communication, and the still existing trade and economic preferences in relations among the [Commonwealth member] states.”
“If the three components disappear,” he continued, “the CIS as such will not exist. In this case, the CIS will be transformed into a club of interests, the presidents will meet twice a year, some questions will be discussed, but not more than that. While these exist, it is necessary to add to them certain motives so that the system will not weaken but be strengthened.”
Another participant in the video conference, Sergey Mikheyev, the director general of the Moscow Center of Political Conjuncture, agreed. He said that in his view, the CIS “in one form or another will be preserved over the course of the next decade because there exist definite preconditions for this.”
There are actually many reasons for “integration within the framework of the CIS,” Mikheyev said. “The question is in how deep this integration can be. As far as the membership is concerned, then it certainly can be changed, but this to a significant degree depends on external factors because around the perimeter of the CIS, destructive processes are taking place.”
As far as the countries of Central Asia are concerned, the Moscow analyst said, “the question could be put in a still worse form.” That is because those countries are “not simply reorienting themselves” but because outside forces are promoting this “in a quite dangerous key.”
The remarks of Vlasov and Mikheyev represent a remarkably open acknowledgement by those close to the powers that be in Moscow that the CIS is hardly the vibrant organization Russian leaders often seek to present it as. But more than that, their words point back to the way in which the CIS itself was in fact organized.
The CIS was not created at Belovezhe as many now think. Instead, the actions of the presidents of the three Slavic republics prompted the leaders of the Central Asian Muslim states to meet and consider forming their own organization. Fearful of what that might mean, Russian leaders then organized a meeting in Kazakhstan to link the two groups into the CIS.
The comments of Vlasov and Mikheyev this week suggest that 20 years on, the organization has not been able to overcome that original division effectively and that it, rather than the withdrawal of Georgia or the assumption of associate status by Turkmenistan, is likely to be the defining vector in that organization’s future existence.
Staunton, April 28 – The Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States will survive this decade at least, but it will likely have fewer members, with the countries of Central Asia the most likely to exit because they “will make a different geopolitical choice,” according to a leading Moscow specialist on the post-Soviet region.
During a video conference between scholars and officials in Moscow, Tbilisi, Almaaty, Bishkek, and Chisinau, Aleksey Vlasov, director of the Center for Post-Soviet Research at Moscow State University, said that “the nucleus” of the CIS will survive but some of its outlying members will likely leave (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/10364/).
Vlasov mentioned three “factors” which he said would prevent the complete unraveling of the CIS: “the absence of visas, Russian as a common language of communication, and the still existing trade and economic preferences in relations among the [Commonwealth member] states.”
“If the three components disappear,” he continued, “the CIS as such will not exist. In this case, the CIS will be transformed into a club of interests, the presidents will meet twice a year, some questions will be discussed, but not more than that. While these exist, it is necessary to add to them certain motives so that the system will not weaken but be strengthened.”
Another participant in the video conference, Sergey Mikheyev, the director general of the Moscow Center of Political Conjuncture, agreed. He said that in his view, the CIS “in one form or another will be preserved over the course of the next decade because there exist definite preconditions for this.”
There are actually many reasons for “integration within the framework of the CIS,” Mikheyev said. “The question is in how deep this integration can be. As far as the membership is concerned, then it certainly can be changed, but this to a significant degree depends on external factors because around the perimeter of the CIS, destructive processes are taking place.”
As far as the countries of Central Asia are concerned, the Moscow analyst said, “the question could be put in a still worse form.” That is because those countries are “not simply reorienting themselves” but because outside forces are promoting this “in a quite dangerous key.”
The remarks of Vlasov and Mikheyev represent a remarkably open acknowledgement by those close to the powers that be in Moscow that the CIS is hardly the vibrant organization Russian leaders often seek to present it as. But more than that, their words point back to the way in which the CIS itself was in fact organized.
The CIS was not created at Belovezhe as many now think. Instead, the actions of the presidents of the three Slavic republics prompted the leaders of the Central Asian Muslim states to meet and consider forming their own organization. Fearful of what that might mean, Russian leaders then organized a meeting in Kazakhstan to link the two groups into the CIS.
The comments of Vlasov and Mikheyev this week suggest that 20 years on, the organization has not been able to overcome that original division effectively and that it, rather than the withdrawal of Georgia or the assumption of associate status by Turkmenistan, is likely to be the defining vector in that organization’s future existence.
Window on Eurasia: Regional Paper Considers Impact of Russia’s Possible Disintegration on Samara Oblast
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 28 – Many analysts in Moscow and the West have talked in general terms about what they see as the probable disintegration of the Russian Federation into a number of independent states, but a Samara paper this week has taken the next step and discussed what independence would mean for that oblast.
And while this article’s prognostications are no more certain of coming true than those who discuss this possibility in more general terms, they are interesting and important for what they say about how ordinary people are thinking about such outcomes and what their views say about their current expectations and fears.
In an essay in the Tol’yatti paper “Ponedel’nik,” Aleksandr Gremin says that he is not calling for the disintegration of Russia – that is a criminal offense – but only seeking “to analyze what awaits Samara oblast if in the country for one reason or another begins a parade of sovereignties” (rus.ruvr.ru/2011/04/26/49421674.html).
As he points out, “predictions of Russia’s disintegration into regional principalities, khalifates, republics and confederations” are nothing new. They have been a staple of articles from “serious institutes” in the Russian capital and abroad, with most disturbing prognoses eing “the separation of Siberia from European Russia and a split along the Volga-Urals line.”
If the UN is correct, Gremin continues, by 2030, the population of Russia will “fall to 118 million” and “this means that in Siberia and in the Far East the population will be less than would be needed to keep their territories within Russia.” The North Caucasus will likely have already left, “in a Kosovo scenario,” as soon as “the river of money from Moscow runs out.”
Indeed, given the international community’s interest in the natural resources of the Russian lands, the Kosovo “scenario” is the most probable way the disintegration of Russia will be arranged, with “local referend[a], unilateral declaration[s] of independence, [and] recognition of sovereignty by the key powers, the US, China and the European Union.”
“Kaliningrad is already prepared to run to Europe,” Gremin says, and “the rich national regions like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are already anticipating the fruits of [such future] independence” from Moscow.
While this process could be violent, it might be peaceful as was the disintegration of the Soviet Union 20 years ago. “The heads of the subjects of the federation could meeting somewhere in Gorki, sign something like the Belovezhe accords, and return to their gubernias already with the status of presidents, general secretaries, beloved leaders, and emperors.”
“You don’t believe this?” Gremin addresses his readers. “But this is precisely what happened in 1991!”
In such a scenario, Samara oblast, he continues, would occupy a “special” position. Samara is a wealthy region, “and up to 70 percent of the taxes collected there go to Moscow.” As a result, “many suppose that with such resources, we [Samarans] having acquired independence would live as the rich, full and happy.”
But Gremin argues, those who think so are mistaken. “Independence would not work in Samara oblast’s favor,” and “here is why.” On the one hand, Moscow would not want to give us up, and on the other, very quickly, “other strong young states” would “immediately become interested in us.”
“Look at a map,” the journalist suggests. Samara would find itself in that event wedged between “one Islamic world – Kazakhstan, Turkey and Iran – and another Islamic world Kazan and Ufa.” Neighboring Orenburg, “also a Russian area rich with oil and gas,” would find itself “in a similar situation.”
As a result, “Samara oblast will never be a self-standing independent state.” Instead it will be fought over by Moscow and “a Tatar-Kazakh alliance.” Indeed that has happened before and “more than once.” And “all our cities – Samara, Saratov, Orenburg and Stavropol – were founded as fortresses, as fortified regions and bases for the conduct of military operations.”
“In the medium term historical perspective,” Gremin suggests, “Samara oblast would automatically fall into the sphere of interests of the Islamic world and territorially would be included apparently within Tatarstan and not Moscow – in part because we the local population already today do not like the Moscow occupation regime and often spend weekends in Kazan.”
Can such a scenario be avoided? Gremin asks rhetorically, and then he observes that “the majority of researches are convinced that it already cannot be. In the ‘blessed’ [first decade of this century] powere was occupied already by others than those that were needed” for an alternative future.
The journalist’s concluding advice to his Russian readers is “Learn Tatar.”
Staunton, April 28 – Many analysts in Moscow and the West have talked in general terms about what they see as the probable disintegration of the Russian Federation into a number of independent states, but a Samara paper this week has taken the next step and discussed what independence would mean for that oblast.
And while this article’s prognostications are no more certain of coming true than those who discuss this possibility in more general terms, they are interesting and important for what they say about how ordinary people are thinking about such outcomes and what their views say about their current expectations and fears.
In an essay in the Tol’yatti paper “Ponedel’nik,” Aleksandr Gremin says that he is not calling for the disintegration of Russia – that is a criminal offense – but only seeking “to analyze what awaits Samara oblast if in the country for one reason or another begins a parade of sovereignties” (rus.ruvr.ru/2011/04/26/49421674.html).
As he points out, “predictions of Russia’s disintegration into regional principalities, khalifates, republics and confederations” are nothing new. They have been a staple of articles from “serious institutes” in the Russian capital and abroad, with most disturbing prognoses eing “the separation of Siberia from European Russia and a split along the Volga-Urals line.”
If the UN is correct, Gremin continues, by 2030, the population of Russia will “fall to 118 million” and “this means that in Siberia and in the Far East the population will be less than would be needed to keep their territories within Russia.” The North Caucasus will likely have already left, “in a Kosovo scenario,” as soon as “the river of money from Moscow runs out.”
Indeed, given the international community’s interest in the natural resources of the Russian lands, the Kosovo “scenario” is the most probable way the disintegration of Russia will be arranged, with “local referend[a], unilateral declaration[s] of independence, [and] recognition of sovereignty by the key powers, the US, China and the European Union.”
“Kaliningrad is already prepared to run to Europe,” Gremin says, and “the rich national regions like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are already anticipating the fruits of [such future] independence” from Moscow.
While this process could be violent, it might be peaceful as was the disintegration of the Soviet Union 20 years ago. “The heads of the subjects of the federation could meeting somewhere in Gorki, sign something like the Belovezhe accords, and return to their gubernias already with the status of presidents, general secretaries, beloved leaders, and emperors.”
“You don’t believe this?” Gremin addresses his readers. “But this is precisely what happened in 1991!”
In such a scenario, Samara oblast, he continues, would occupy a “special” position. Samara is a wealthy region, “and up to 70 percent of the taxes collected there go to Moscow.” As a result, “many suppose that with such resources, we [Samarans] having acquired independence would live as the rich, full and happy.”
But Gremin argues, those who think so are mistaken. “Independence would not work in Samara oblast’s favor,” and “here is why.” On the one hand, Moscow would not want to give us up, and on the other, very quickly, “other strong young states” would “immediately become interested in us.”
“Look at a map,” the journalist suggests. Samara would find itself in that event wedged between “one Islamic world – Kazakhstan, Turkey and Iran – and another Islamic world Kazan and Ufa.” Neighboring Orenburg, “also a Russian area rich with oil and gas,” would find itself “in a similar situation.”
As a result, “Samara oblast will never be a self-standing independent state.” Instead it will be fought over by Moscow and “a Tatar-Kazakh alliance.” Indeed that has happened before and “more than once.” And “all our cities – Samara, Saratov, Orenburg and Stavropol – were founded as fortresses, as fortified regions and bases for the conduct of military operations.”
“In the medium term historical perspective,” Gremin suggests, “Samara oblast would automatically fall into the sphere of interests of the Islamic world and territorially would be included apparently within Tatarstan and not Moscow – in part because we the local population already today do not like the Moscow occupation regime and often spend weekends in Kazan.”
Can such a scenario be avoided? Gremin asks rhetorically, and then he observes that “the majority of researches are convinced that it already cannot be. In the ‘blessed’ [first decade of this century] powere was occupied already by others than those that were needed” for an alternative future.
The journalist’s concluding advice to his Russian readers is “Learn Tatar.”
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