Paul Goble
Staunton, January 15 – Just like their Soviet predecessors, today’s Russian rulers recognize they need “the imitation of a critical attitude toward reality” of the kind humor can often provide, but also just like their predecessors, they have set clear rules for what humor is “permitted” and what is not, at least in the mass media, according to a Moscow commentator.
In an article in “Novaya gazeta” this week, Andrey Arkhangelsky describes how this system came into being, how it operates now in comparison with the Soviet past, and, what is particularly intriguing, the set of rules about what the powers that be will permit and what they won’t in today’s Russia (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/001/25.html).
“In Russia,” Arkhangelsky argues, “it has always been necessary to get permission for a joke, and this phenomenon has distorted the genetics of our people no less than serfdom and the GULAG,” even though in contrast to those, “permitted humor” has been the subject of far less attention.
The occasion for his article, Arkhangelsky says, is both the appearance of two new heroes on Russian television, Ivan Urgant and former spy Anna Chapman and the willingness of the powers that be to violate their own rules once a year. The appearance of Chapman, as some have pointed out, is itself humorous: “the celebration of a spy who failed.”
But more intriguingly, the commentator continues, was the decision to allow the return of Putin and Medvedev as puppets, something that had been prohibited but apparently is to be allowed once a year, albeit “without any chances, not even a millimeter” in the way they are shown on New Year’s.
That reflects the fact that “television recognizes its own current archaic quality, is ashamed of its conformism, and is trying to convince us that it is just the opposite,” Arkhangelsky says. But in fact, these exceptions only call attention to the current rules of the game, rules that government permitted humor and much else.
“Social satire,” the Moscow writer says, “is always a dish in demand, but in Russia it is brought to the table only when the command ‘freedom!’ sounds from the very highest levels.” As one of his colleagues has pointed out, Arkhangelsky says, “a joke in Russia is a very serious matter, a signal to the elites” and one they must not fail to pay attention to.
In Gorbachev’s time, “the command ‘freedom!’ sounded from above, but then were quickly were found people who did not stop and ask permission for the next day. Today,” Arkhangelsky says, “there are no such people – and in this is the principle distinction not only of television but of all of today’s society from that” of perestroika times.
“The ‘new jokers,’” he continues share one common characteristic: “they know precisely” what the limits are, even though they may give the impression that they are acting completely independently and spontaneously. Consequently, no one needs to give them instruction; they “understand everything” on their own.
“They understand that one must not joke about Putin or about Medvedev. One must not joke about their wives and children. One must not joke about the Foundations of the Powers that Be or show any doubt in their professionalism and purpose. One must not joke about Surkov or about the Presidential Administration or about the staff of the prime minister.”
In part, of course, it is not so much that jokes could not be made but rather because “the audience of the First Channel in general is not supposed to know all that much” about some of these officials. The same principle applies to jokes about Khodorkovsky. They aren’t told because people should know as little about him as possible.
“In principle,” it is possible to tell jokes about everything else, but in fact, “it is necessary to feel” just what is allowed. And jokesters on Russian television know that they need to tell jokes somewhat less often about Gryzlov than about Mironov, even as they tell jokes about foreign policy, the Olympics and so on.
“I understand this well,” Arkhangelsky says, “because I am a child of Soviet times.” The late Soviet period clearly provided knowledge about “what one could say and what one could not. “This knowledge or better a feeling like the party was a unique thing which the powers did not need to teach as a particular subject but which everyone had.”
Today, “our young heroes are mastering this completely and are covering up what they are doing in a much more talented way than their Soviet predecessors,” a pattern that had led some to fail to see the continuity that is very much at work, one that reflects both the experiences and the needs of the current powers that be.
The need for “permitted humor” had its origins in early Stalinist times when the ruler recognized that “besides bravura praise, there was a need for the imitation of critical attitudes toward reality,” something that humor directed at approved targets well below the top could help supply.
“Today,” Arkhangelsky says, “everything looks much more contemporary, but the essence [of this system which Stalin created] has not changed: the powers, just like 70 years ago, are controlling laughter” in Russia.
This is a measure of how much Russia musts change if it is to join the ranks of “civilized” countries, where jokes about the rulers are the norm. Arkhangelsky gives as an example the situation in Ukraine where “despite pressure on freedom of speech under Yanukovich,” television personalities did not restrain themselves in joking about it.
On the New Year’s broadcast there, the actors “parodied his manner of speaking slowly to the extent that he thinks in Russia and then is forced to choose Ukrainian analogues.” As one of the stars put it, “’And while the president is thinking about the next word … we’ll look at something else.’”
That people in Ukraine can joke about leaders there “inspires hope.” And “when [Russians] cease to be afraid of joking about Putin and Medvedev and when [they] cease to ask permission for this from editors and themselves, then something will have changed in the country and in ourselves.”
Unfortunately, up to now, “the right to joke [about Russian leaders] belongs only to them – and then only once a year.”
Saturday, January 15, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Repression of Its Opponents will Backfire, Solidarity Leader Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, January 15 – The harshness with which the Russian powers that be are suppressing any action by the opposition is backfiring, one opposition leader says, reinforcing the commitment of opposition figures to continue the struggle and attracting ever more Russians to their side.
In an essay on the “Osobaya bukhva” portal yesterday, Ilya Yashin, a leading of the Solidarity Movement, says that the arrests of the leaders of opposition demonstrations in recent weeks and the harsh sentence handed down to Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev are not having the result the authorities expected.
These actions have not intimidated opposition figures or caused Russians to distance themselves from them but rather have increased public awareness that the political course Vladimir Putin began in 1999 has not changed and that talk about “a thaw” under Dmitry Medvedev is “an illusion … and does not have anything in common with reality.”
“The political climate in [Russia],” Yashin says, “has not softened even for a second” over the last decade. Instead, “with each passing year and each passing month, it has become ever harsher” (www.specletter.com/obcshestvo/2011-01-14/politicheskii-tsiklon-nakryl-stranu-v-1999-godu-ottepel-eto-illjuzija.html).
The regime’s recent actions show this, he argues, and they also show that the powers that be are preparing for “the next pre-election campaign,” one that Yashin suggests “will be even harsher and in a more radical key than the voting in 2007,” one that featured “the formation of an image of the enemy with the help of the propagandistic resources of the Kremlin.”
The upcoming campaigns in 2011 and 2012, Yashin argues, “will proceed along approximately according to the same scenario,” on e that shows that “the ‘national leader’ does not intend to yield power to anyone and will use any means to retain it, including force” if need be.
Moreover, Yashin says, what has occurred over the last few weeks show that “the split in the tandem about which so much was said in 2010 does not exist.” There are disagreements in style, “but unfortunately the thing is that Dmitry Medvedev is not the chief of state. Vladimir Putin was and remains ‘the master’ of Russia.”
Some are saying that things can’t get worse, but, Yashin says, “I am not such an optimist. I think that they can get worse.” Sentences can get heavier, more people can be detained at demonstrations. And the current situation may not last. Indeed, “the situation can be changed at any moment.”
A major reason for that pessimism is “the example of Belarus on the political climate of which the Russian prime minister is clearly orienting himself. Vladimir Putin,” Yashin continues, “is a diligent student of Alyakandr Lukashenka.” The two men have many common habits of mind and policies.
According to Yashin, in fact, Putin “is trying to apply in Russia a political model similar to the Belarusian only more adapted to the contemporary world.”
But there is another side to this equation, and that may serve as the basis for hope. 2010 was a record year for protests over the entire period of Putin’s rule, and the repressive measures he has taken against them have proving counterproductive. Instead of intimidating people, these actions are drawing more people into the ranks of the regime’s opponents.
Consequently, Yashin suggests, “there is a basis for optimism.” If the Putin regime is continuing the approach of the past, the Russian people are changing. And their attitudes rather than the repressive measures of the state will shape the future, regardless of how much suffering lies ahead for the opposition and the population at large.
Staunton, January 15 – The harshness with which the Russian powers that be are suppressing any action by the opposition is backfiring, one opposition leader says, reinforcing the commitment of opposition figures to continue the struggle and attracting ever more Russians to their side.
In an essay on the “Osobaya bukhva” portal yesterday, Ilya Yashin, a leading of the Solidarity Movement, says that the arrests of the leaders of opposition demonstrations in recent weeks and the harsh sentence handed down to Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev are not having the result the authorities expected.
These actions have not intimidated opposition figures or caused Russians to distance themselves from them but rather have increased public awareness that the political course Vladimir Putin began in 1999 has not changed and that talk about “a thaw” under Dmitry Medvedev is “an illusion … and does not have anything in common with reality.”
“The political climate in [Russia],” Yashin says, “has not softened even for a second” over the last decade. Instead, “with each passing year and each passing month, it has become ever harsher” (www.specletter.com/obcshestvo/2011-01-14/politicheskii-tsiklon-nakryl-stranu-v-1999-godu-ottepel-eto-illjuzija.html).
The regime’s recent actions show this, he argues, and they also show that the powers that be are preparing for “the next pre-election campaign,” one that Yashin suggests “will be even harsher and in a more radical key than the voting in 2007,” one that featured “the formation of an image of the enemy with the help of the propagandistic resources of the Kremlin.”
The upcoming campaigns in 2011 and 2012, Yashin argues, “will proceed along approximately according to the same scenario,” on e that shows that “the ‘national leader’ does not intend to yield power to anyone and will use any means to retain it, including force” if need be.
Moreover, Yashin says, what has occurred over the last few weeks show that “the split in the tandem about which so much was said in 2010 does not exist.” There are disagreements in style, “but unfortunately the thing is that Dmitry Medvedev is not the chief of state. Vladimir Putin was and remains ‘the master’ of Russia.”
Some are saying that things can’t get worse, but, Yashin says, “I am not such an optimist. I think that they can get worse.” Sentences can get heavier, more people can be detained at demonstrations. And the current situation may not last. Indeed, “the situation can be changed at any moment.”
A major reason for that pessimism is “the example of Belarus on the political climate of which the Russian prime minister is clearly orienting himself. Vladimir Putin,” Yashin continues, “is a diligent student of Alyakandr Lukashenka.” The two men have many common habits of mind and policies.
According to Yashin, in fact, Putin “is trying to apply in Russia a political model similar to the Belarusian only more adapted to the contemporary world.”
But there is another side to this equation, and that may serve as the basis for hope. 2010 was a record year for protests over the entire period of Putin’s rule, and the repressive measures he has taken against them have proving counterproductive. Instead of intimidating people, these actions are drawing more people into the ranks of the regime’s opponents.
Consequently, Yashin suggests, “there is a basis for optimism.” If the Putin regime is continuing the approach of the past, the Russian people are changing. And their attitudes rather than the repressive measures of the state will shape the future, regardless of how much suffering lies ahead for the opposition and the population at large.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Losing Battle for Hearts and Minds of Young Muslims in the North Caucasus, Expert Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, January 15 – Moscow is increasingly losing the battle for the hearts of minds of young Muslims in the North Caucasus to Islamist radicals, according ot a leading specialist on the region, the result not only of the success the radicals have had in getting their message to this group but also of the failure of the Russian authorities to counter this activity.
In a detailed analysis posted on Geopolitika.ru, Igor Dobayev, a professor at the Southern Federal University in Rostov, argues that terrorism cannot be defeated by force alone and that the Russian side in the more important battle for hearts and minds of young Muslims in the North Caucasus is losing to the radicals (geopolitica.ru/Articles/1148/).
Unfortunately, most Russian officials and commentators, he suggests, continue to focus on the number of the opposition killed, wounded and captured and on the number of terrorist actions to suggest that Moscow is winning the battle on the ground. But that leads to a serious misreading of the situation.
On the one hand, there are serious problems with the statistics not only because those reporting them have a vested interest in projecting success but also because there has been a change in the definition of terrorist acts in Russian law that has led to a spurious “decline” in their number and made “terrorist acts in [Russia] an extremely rare crime.”
And on the other, focusing on body counts has had the effect of detracting attention from a fundamental change in the way in which Islamist militants are prosecuting the conflict and the success they have had in reaching out to young people, a success that Moscow has not yet found a way to counter effectively.
Indeed, Dobayev says, if one looks at the statistical record as a whole, then one sees that “the situation in 2008-2010 on the territory of the Southern Federal District was characterized by a sharp increase in terrorist activity by the illegal armed formations,” and not a decline as many have suggested.
Moreover, during this period, “the Islamists have been directing their attacks above all against the force structures” in order to suggest to the population that these institutions are “not capable of guaranteeing security” and that the people can count only on the Islamists rather than on state institutions, thus depriving the powers of a potentially important ally.
.And even as the force structures increased their activity in 2010, capturing or killing more militants, their Islamist opponents “have been taking active measures” not only to recruit replacements but also to spread their message more broadly in the population, efforts that Dobayev says have been more or less successful.
To spread their message, the militants have published and distributed “books, brochures, broadsides, DVD disks, video cassettes and of course use the possibilities offered by the Internet.” Russian forces routinely confiscate such production, but over the last two years there has been a major shift in where these materials are found.
“If in 2008, these materials were uncovered in a majority cases in hiding places and at the bases of militants, then, beginning in 2009, they have been found primarily in the homes of citizens,” especially in Daghstan. And they have been found ever more often among young people, the chief recruiting target of the militant.
As a result, young people make up most of the ranks of the militants, forming 80 percent of more of the units, a pattern that suggests the militants are recruiting for the long term. And Dobayev adds, without details, “the militants have begun to try to recruit Slavs into their ranks,” people who could be used beyond the borders of the North Caucasus.
Clearly, force alone is not going to solve the problem,m and “the struggle ‘for minds’ [needs to become] the most important constituent part of the anti-terrorist strategy,’ an approach that will “require a lengthy period” for success. Unfortunately, despite Moscow’s plans for this for the period 2008 to 2012, the Russian side has made relatively little progress.
Russian efforts in this direction, Dobayev continues, have not been based on a careful study of the situation and the use of specialists. Instead, officials have acted on the basis of ignorance or assumptions about reality that are often incorrect, something that has reduced the effectiveness of the programs that have been put in place.
Moreover, Russian officials have been less than enthusiastic about strengthening the indigenous Muslim leadership, often viewing it as part of the problem rather than part of the solution but thereby ceding the field to radicals already on the ground and to the far more influential Muslim training centers abroad.
Some 1500 young people from Daghestan alone have gone to study in foreign Muslim centers – and “about 500” have already returned. As a result, Dobayev says, “imams who are supporters of traditional Islam are gradually being driven out of the mosques by their more educated competitors who have been trained abroad.” The consequences of that are obvious.
In additional to using force and solving social problems, Moscow must support both more academic investigations in the North Caucasus and more Muslim education inside Russia, Dobayev concludes, if it is to have any hope of winning back the local population to its side, isolating the militants, and thereby pacifying the region.
Staunton, January 15 – Moscow is increasingly losing the battle for the hearts of minds of young Muslims in the North Caucasus to Islamist radicals, according ot a leading specialist on the region, the result not only of the success the radicals have had in getting their message to this group but also of the failure of the Russian authorities to counter this activity.
In a detailed analysis posted on Geopolitika.ru, Igor Dobayev, a professor at the Southern Federal University in Rostov, argues that terrorism cannot be defeated by force alone and that the Russian side in the more important battle for hearts and minds of young Muslims in the North Caucasus is losing to the radicals (geopolitica.ru/Articles/1148/).
Unfortunately, most Russian officials and commentators, he suggests, continue to focus on the number of the opposition killed, wounded and captured and on the number of terrorist actions to suggest that Moscow is winning the battle on the ground. But that leads to a serious misreading of the situation.
On the one hand, there are serious problems with the statistics not only because those reporting them have a vested interest in projecting success but also because there has been a change in the definition of terrorist acts in Russian law that has led to a spurious “decline” in their number and made “terrorist acts in [Russia] an extremely rare crime.”
And on the other, focusing on body counts has had the effect of detracting attention from a fundamental change in the way in which Islamist militants are prosecuting the conflict and the success they have had in reaching out to young people, a success that Moscow has not yet found a way to counter effectively.
Indeed, Dobayev says, if one looks at the statistical record as a whole, then one sees that “the situation in 2008-2010 on the territory of the Southern Federal District was characterized by a sharp increase in terrorist activity by the illegal armed formations,” and not a decline as many have suggested.
Moreover, during this period, “the Islamists have been directing their attacks above all against the force structures” in order to suggest to the population that these institutions are “not capable of guaranteeing security” and that the people can count only on the Islamists rather than on state institutions, thus depriving the powers of a potentially important ally.
.And even as the force structures increased their activity in 2010, capturing or killing more militants, their Islamist opponents “have been taking active measures” not only to recruit replacements but also to spread their message more broadly in the population, efforts that Dobayev says have been more or less successful.
To spread their message, the militants have published and distributed “books, brochures, broadsides, DVD disks, video cassettes and of course use the possibilities offered by the Internet.” Russian forces routinely confiscate such production, but over the last two years there has been a major shift in where these materials are found.
“If in 2008, these materials were uncovered in a majority cases in hiding places and at the bases of militants, then, beginning in 2009, they have been found primarily in the homes of citizens,” especially in Daghstan. And they have been found ever more often among young people, the chief recruiting target of the militant.
As a result, young people make up most of the ranks of the militants, forming 80 percent of more of the units, a pattern that suggests the militants are recruiting for the long term. And Dobayev adds, without details, “the militants have begun to try to recruit Slavs into their ranks,” people who could be used beyond the borders of the North Caucasus.
Clearly, force alone is not going to solve the problem,m and “the struggle ‘for minds’ [needs to become] the most important constituent part of the anti-terrorist strategy,’ an approach that will “require a lengthy period” for success. Unfortunately, despite Moscow’s plans for this for the period 2008 to 2012, the Russian side has made relatively little progress.
Russian efforts in this direction, Dobayev continues, have not been based on a careful study of the situation and the use of specialists. Instead, officials have acted on the basis of ignorance or assumptions about reality that are often incorrect, something that has reduced the effectiveness of the programs that have been put in place.
Moreover, Russian officials have been less than enthusiastic about strengthening the indigenous Muslim leadership, often viewing it as part of the problem rather than part of the solution but thereby ceding the field to radicals already on the ground and to the far more influential Muslim training centers abroad.
Some 1500 young people from Daghestan alone have gone to study in foreign Muslim centers – and “about 500” have already returned. As a result, Dobayev says, “imams who are supporters of traditional Islam are gradually being driven out of the mosques by their more educated competitors who have been trained abroad.” The consequences of that are obvious.
In additional to using force and solving social problems, Moscow must support both more academic investigations in the North Caucasus and more Muslim education inside Russia, Dobayev concludes, if it is to have any hope of winning back the local population to its side, isolating the militants, and thereby pacifying the region.
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