Paul Goble
Vienna, January 6 – Even if there were no Wahhabi militants, the most frequently used Russian designation for the radical and often violent Salafi trend in Islam, the Islamization of Daghestan would be taking place just as rapidly, according to a leading specialist on religion and nationality in Makhachkala.
Eduard Urazayev, a former republic nationalities minister and now a Daghestani political scientist, told a visiting Russian journalist that the traditional Muslims in that North Caucasus republic and the Muslim Spiritual Directorates have many of the same goals as the Wahhabis but seek to realize them by legal means (rnns.ru/social/189676-nazad-v-srednevekove.html).
And consequently, Uruzayev says,“even if there were no Wahhabis, the Islamization of Daghestan would be proceeded at top speed,” a conclusion that calls into question Moscow’s current approach of seeking to gain support from “traditional” Muslims and to play them off against the “Wahhabi” militants.
Indeed, it suggests that the Russian authorities must either begin a full-scale war against Islam in that republic at least, something that would provoke a backlash, or face the prospect that Daghestan will be a Muslim republic, one that with more mosques than before 1917 and whose government TV broadcasts “a minimum of four hours of religious programming every day.
In an article entitled “Back to Medieval Times,” Igor Rotar cites these and many other judgments of experts about the republic, noting that that the increasing Islamization of Daghestani society will strike any visitor as soon as he or she gets off the airplane at the airport in Makhachkala
Rotar himself asked his taxi driver to stop at a kiosk. Thinking that perhaps the journalist wanted to buy alcohol, the driver said that would be difficult because “the militants prohibit selling [it].” But when told that Rotar only wanted cigarettes, the driver agreed to stop and allow him to do his business.
After getting his pack, Rotar noted that there were bottles of beer along the back of the shop. He told the owner that he understood that was “prohibited by the militants.” The clerk “went white in the face” and said with tears in her eyes ‘Right now, I’ll take the alcohol off the shelf, just don’t blow me up.”
He calmed her down by telling her that he was a journalist and only interested in what is going on. Rotar then asked why she didn’t ask the militia for protection. Her response: “the militants say ‘the day is yours, but the night is ours.’” Rotar noted on a nearby clock that it was already 11:00 pm.
When he queried Urazayev about what Moscow experts take as an article of faith, a deep divide between traditional Muslims and the radicals on all things, the political scientist said that “in reality, traditional Muslims today show no less interest in the Islamization of Daghestan than do the Wahhabis.”
“Today, more than 2500 mosques exist in Daghestan, a greater number of prayer places than there were in pre-revolutionary times,” republic television features programs on Islam every day, and “the official Muslim leadership calls for banning exactly the same thing the radicals do, “although “they seek to achieve this by legal methods.”
At the same time, Rotar says, it would be “an exaggeration” to call Makhachkala “a typical Islamic city.” Only 20 percent of the people dress according to Islamic rules, concerts continue to take place, and wine and beef consumed. But one local artist said that “I fear that already a few years of now, this will be impossible.”
Moreover, there is a struggle within Islam, one that Aleksey Malashenko of Carnegie’s Moscow Center suggests may be just as important as the struggle of Islam as a whole with the Russian authorities. But, as Rotar shows, those who believe that the defeat of the radicals will mean an end to Islamization are dreaming.
And Rotar suggests that the relationships between the traditional Muslims and the Salafi radicals are far more complicated than many suggest, with many of the former sympathetic to the goals of the latter and willing to support the radicals even if they themselves are not prepared to pursue these goals in the same militant way by going into the forests.
Thursday, January 6, 2011
Window on Eurasia: ‘Disintegration of USSR Still Not Over,’ Moscow Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 6 – Most politicians, experts and ordinary people treat the disintegration of the USSR as a single event, but in fact, it is a lengthy process. And today, nearly 20 years after the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States sounded the “death sentence” of the Soviet Union, a Moscow writer says, “the disintegration of the USSR is still not over.”
In an article in Moscow’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Arkady Dubnov says that the events of the last year, from the revolution in Kyrgyzstan, to the failure of the OSCE in the south Caucasus, to the behavior of the Belarusian leadership following the elections there all testify to the fact that the end of the USSR is far from completed (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10699).
The so-called “frozen” conflicts continue to drag on, and even “the hopes that the August 2008 war will be the last stage in the marking out of new state borders in this region are fading.” Moreover, “the mutual distrust among neighbors in the former Soviet communal apartment in the last year, unfortunately, has only multiplied.”
Some people want to lay the blame for all this on individual leaders, Dubnov continues, but there is strong evidence that the problem has far deeper and more extensive roots. When the revolution in Kyrgyzstan took place, he notes, Kazakhstan had to close its border with its neighboring state for several months.
Moreover, the response to the Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia highlights just how far things have gone. “Not one of the Russian partners in the CIS has recognized the independence [of these two states] over the past year … not even Belarus” even after promising to do so.
The December events in Minsk, Dubnov adds, “can by right be considered the apotheosis and logical result of the evolution of the Commonwealth on the past to its 20th anniversary,” an event that found a kind of parallel in proposals in Kazakhstan to make Nursultan Nazarbayev president for life.
And what is striking about that, the Moscow writer says, is that “the main pusher for this completely Soviet-type idea was the former overthrower of Soviet canons and dogmas, the well-known Kazakh poet of the 1960s and author of the legendary book about Slavic writing ‘Az i Ya,’ Olzhas Suleymenov.”
“The Belarusian and Kazakhstan variants of ‘the development of democracy’ (as accurately noted Dmitry Medvedev after ‘Lukashenka’s elections when [the Russian president] expressed the hope for the further development of democratic processes in his country) represents” one of the few CIS-wide common trends.
That is because many of its leaders are asking themselves “do we need such ‘a democracy’ which threatens consequences like ‘the Kyrgyz’?” But that commonality rather than serving as the basis for renewed unity across the CIS in fact may point in exactly the opposite direction.
That is because, as both Lukashenka and Nazarbayev have shown, precisely the kind of authoritarianism they manifest requires that they set themselves against others, including those with whom they or their predecessors had effectively cooperated with the Soviet Union was still in existence.
And, although Dubnov does not mention it, the very lack of genuine popular participation that characterizes both their regimes and those of many others across the former Soviet space eventually if not immediately leads those who are excluded to seek to mobilize along ethnic, religious or class lines.
Twenty years ago, such mobilizations helped bring down the Soviet Union; now and in the future, they will guarantee that the disintegration of that common space will continue, and quite possibly, that in turn will be accompanied by the disintegration of some of the states located there.
Vienna, January 6 – Most politicians, experts and ordinary people treat the disintegration of the USSR as a single event, but in fact, it is a lengthy process. And today, nearly 20 years after the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States sounded the “death sentence” of the Soviet Union, a Moscow writer says, “the disintegration of the USSR is still not over.”
In an article in Moscow’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Arkady Dubnov says that the events of the last year, from the revolution in Kyrgyzstan, to the failure of the OSCE in the south Caucasus, to the behavior of the Belarusian leadership following the elections there all testify to the fact that the end of the USSR is far from completed (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10699).
The so-called “frozen” conflicts continue to drag on, and even “the hopes that the August 2008 war will be the last stage in the marking out of new state borders in this region are fading.” Moreover, “the mutual distrust among neighbors in the former Soviet communal apartment in the last year, unfortunately, has only multiplied.”
Some people want to lay the blame for all this on individual leaders, Dubnov continues, but there is strong evidence that the problem has far deeper and more extensive roots. When the revolution in Kyrgyzstan took place, he notes, Kazakhstan had to close its border with its neighboring state for several months.
Moreover, the response to the Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia highlights just how far things have gone. “Not one of the Russian partners in the CIS has recognized the independence [of these two states] over the past year … not even Belarus” even after promising to do so.
The December events in Minsk, Dubnov adds, “can by right be considered the apotheosis and logical result of the evolution of the Commonwealth on the past to its 20th anniversary,” an event that found a kind of parallel in proposals in Kazakhstan to make Nursultan Nazarbayev president for life.
And what is striking about that, the Moscow writer says, is that “the main pusher for this completely Soviet-type idea was the former overthrower of Soviet canons and dogmas, the well-known Kazakh poet of the 1960s and author of the legendary book about Slavic writing ‘Az i Ya,’ Olzhas Suleymenov.”
“The Belarusian and Kazakhstan variants of ‘the development of democracy’ (as accurately noted Dmitry Medvedev after ‘Lukashenka’s elections when [the Russian president] expressed the hope for the further development of democratic processes in his country) represents” one of the few CIS-wide common trends.
That is because many of its leaders are asking themselves “do we need such ‘a democracy’ which threatens consequences like ‘the Kyrgyz’?” But that commonality rather than serving as the basis for renewed unity across the CIS in fact may point in exactly the opposite direction.
That is because, as both Lukashenka and Nazarbayev have shown, precisely the kind of authoritarianism they manifest requires that they set themselves against others, including those with whom they or their predecessors had effectively cooperated with the Soviet Union was still in existence.
And, although Dubnov does not mention it, the very lack of genuine popular participation that characterizes both their regimes and those of many others across the former Soviet space eventually if not immediately leads those who are excluded to seek to mobilize along ethnic, religious or class lines.
Twenty years ago, such mobilizations helped bring down the Soviet Union; now and in the future, they will guarantee that the disintegration of that common space will continue, and quite possibly, that in turn will be accompanied by the disintegration of some of the states located there.
Window on Eurasia: Yeltsin-Era Experts Must ‘Not Play a Role’ in Defining Russia’s Future, Moscow Patriarchate Official Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 6 – Russia’s “expert stratum of the 1990s” must not be allowed to play “any decisive role” in defining the future of the country given their share of the blame for failures in the economy and international relations during that decade, according to the head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s department on church-society relations.
In an article in the January issue of his department’s “Rus’ derzhavnaya” paper, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, a protégé of Patriarch Kirill, says that such people must be excluded from serious decision-making, the clearest indication yet of where the Moscow Patriarchate is positioning itself politically (www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=print&div=12590).
Instead, Russia must rely on the appearance of “a new and more creative group of experts,” who do not have the baggage of the 1990s such as the racing after money in the electoral campaigns of that decade, and who “must find a way to popular support and together with the people influence the taking of decisions.
But “unfortunately,” Chaplin continues, it sometimes appears that people are still “listening to this hopelessly compromised elite which offers recipes for nationality policy drawn from the end of the 1980s – recipes which never worked and which now are simply dangerous” because conditions require not “babbling” but rather “extraordinary measures.”
Chaplin’s comment came in response to continuing discussions about how Moscow should react to nationality problems such as those manifested most prominently in the clashes in the Russian capital’s Manezh Square three weeks ago, discussions that have featured proposals ranging from giving the North Caucasus independence to greater repression.
Thanks to God and to the efforts of law enforcement agencies, the archpriest said, Russians in this and other recent cases have “not been divided by blood and Russia was saved from total inter-ethnic fighting.” But Chaplin argues, “problems remain” and must be addressed if the country is to avoid disaster.
Now, he says, “it is necessary that the powers with the participation of society must look truth in the face and begin to solve these problems not only at the level of words but also at the level of legislative actions and administrative actions.” And that in turn is going to require some fundamental changes.
“It is obvious,” the senior churchman says, “that the connection between the powers and the majority of the people in the country is weak,” a pattern that is exacerbated by divides in the understanding of “the past, present and future” and that makes it very difficult “to guarasntee a secure and stable course of development” for the country.
And adding to this problem is that far too often the people and the powers listen to members of “the hopelessly compromised elite” which continues to propose nationality policies from the 1980s, policies that “never worked and that “now are simply dangerous for the situation requires not babbling but rather extraordinary measures.”
The powers that be need to take into consideration “the opinion of the people” and to adopt policies the people favor or to change those people do not like. Otherwise, Chaplin says, the authorities will be “putting Russia [again] on the edge of a catastrophe just as was the case in 1917.”
“I am convinced,” Chaplin argues, “that any speeches and slogans” directed against any people or promoting inter-ethnic hostility “must be excluded.” But at the same time, he continues “illegal migration must also be completely excluded, just as any other violation of the law must be” in Russia.
And he suggests that the rise of “Nazi, neo-pagan and other such groups,” who are trying either to gain power or win “millions of supporters” represents a serious danger.” The history of the 20th century shows that radical groups having obtained power or influence never are able to lead the country to a prosperous and peaceful life.”
“The history of Russia after 1917 and of Germany in the 1930s and 1940s clearly shows this,” and Chaplin says that “if the movement of concerned people is formed as a movement or Nazis or neo-pagans, then this will be a bad thing for everyone and in the first instance for the Russian people.”
. “Today, the Russian people needs a national rebirth so that its system of values, its faith and culture will define the actions of the powers and all social processes,” but in this rebirth in the future, he says, those who mislead the country in the 1990s must not be allowed to play a role lest they take Russia down the wrong path once again.
What makes Chaplin’s comment important is that it represents the clearest statement of the Moscow Patriarchate’s attempt to combine opposition to the events of the 1990s and to the Soviet system with support for both an expanded role for the Russian people in the country’s political process and for a tough law-and-order regime.
Whether that combination of positions is sustainable in the Russia of today, of course, remains to be seen, but at the very least it provides the Church as have many of Chaplin’s essays in the past with the flexibility to change sides from the powers to the people or the reverse as the political winds appear to dictate.
And while some in the tandem will be only too pleased to hear part of his and the Church’s message, they are certain to be worried about other aspects of it. And the powers that be are certain to be especially concerned by this latest indication that the Moscow Patriarchate is positioning itself for a future political role that may lead it to be more independent from the state.
Vienna, January 6 – Russia’s “expert stratum of the 1990s” must not be allowed to play “any decisive role” in defining the future of the country given their share of the blame for failures in the economy and international relations during that decade, according to the head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s department on church-society relations.
In an article in the January issue of his department’s “Rus’ derzhavnaya” paper, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, a protégé of Patriarch Kirill, says that such people must be excluded from serious decision-making, the clearest indication yet of where the Moscow Patriarchate is positioning itself politically (www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=print&div=12590).
Instead, Russia must rely on the appearance of “a new and more creative group of experts,” who do not have the baggage of the 1990s such as the racing after money in the electoral campaigns of that decade, and who “must find a way to popular support and together with the people influence the taking of decisions.
But “unfortunately,” Chaplin continues, it sometimes appears that people are still “listening to this hopelessly compromised elite which offers recipes for nationality policy drawn from the end of the 1980s – recipes which never worked and which now are simply dangerous” because conditions require not “babbling” but rather “extraordinary measures.”
Chaplin’s comment came in response to continuing discussions about how Moscow should react to nationality problems such as those manifested most prominently in the clashes in the Russian capital’s Manezh Square three weeks ago, discussions that have featured proposals ranging from giving the North Caucasus independence to greater repression.
Thanks to God and to the efforts of law enforcement agencies, the archpriest said, Russians in this and other recent cases have “not been divided by blood and Russia was saved from total inter-ethnic fighting.” But Chaplin argues, “problems remain” and must be addressed if the country is to avoid disaster.
Now, he says, “it is necessary that the powers with the participation of society must look truth in the face and begin to solve these problems not only at the level of words but also at the level of legislative actions and administrative actions.” And that in turn is going to require some fundamental changes.
“It is obvious,” the senior churchman says, “that the connection between the powers and the majority of the people in the country is weak,” a pattern that is exacerbated by divides in the understanding of “the past, present and future” and that makes it very difficult “to guarasntee a secure and stable course of development” for the country.
And adding to this problem is that far too often the people and the powers listen to members of “the hopelessly compromised elite” which continues to propose nationality policies from the 1980s, policies that “never worked and that “now are simply dangerous for the situation requires not babbling but rather extraordinary measures.”
The powers that be need to take into consideration “the opinion of the people” and to adopt policies the people favor or to change those people do not like. Otherwise, Chaplin says, the authorities will be “putting Russia [again] on the edge of a catastrophe just as was the case in 1917.”
“I am convinced,” Chaplin argues, “that any speeches and slogans” directed against any people or promoting inter-ethnic hostility “must be excluded.” But at the same time, he continues “illegal migration must also be completely excluded, just as any other violation of the law must be” in Russia.
And he suggests that the rise of “Nazi, neo-pagan and other such groups,” who are trying either to gain power or win “millions of supporters” represents a serious danger.” The history of the 20th century shows that radical groups having obtained power or influence never are able to lead the country to a prosperous and peaceful life.”
“The history of Russia after 1917 and of Germany in the 1930s and 1940s clearly shows this,” and Chaplin says that “if the movement of concerned people is formed as a movement or Nazis or neo-pagans, then this will be a bad thing for everyone and in the first instance for the Russian people.”
. “Today, the Russian people needs a national rebirth so that its system of values, its faith and culture will define the actions of the powers and all social processes,” but in this rebirth in the future, he says, those who mislead the country in the 1990s must not be allowed to play a role lest they take Russia down the wrong path once again.
What makes Chaplin’s comment important is that it represents the clearest statement of the Moscow Patriarchate’s attempt to combine opposition to the events of the 1990s and to the Soviet system with support for both an expanded role for the Russian people in the country’s political process and for a tough law-and-order regime.
Whether that combination of positions is sustainable in the Russia of today, of course, remains to be seen, but at the very least it provides the Church as have many of Chaplin’s essays in the past with the flexibility to change sides from the powers to the people or the reverse as the political winds appear to dictate.
And while some in the tandem will be only too pleased to hear part of his and the Church’s message, they are certain to be worried about other aspects of it. And the powers that be are certain to be especially concerned by this latest indication that the Moscow Patriarchate is positioning itself for a future political role that may lead it to be more independent from the state.
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