Paul Goble
Staunton, December 29 – Developments over the past year which highlight the continuing “degradation of the state, society, culture, science and technology,” liberal Moscow politician Vladimir Ryzhkov says, raise questions about Russia’s capacity to survive in its current form and about its ability to remain “a single state” over the next decade.
In a comment on his Ekho Moskvy blog yesterday, Ryzhkov says that during the 1990s, this decline was “linked to the weakness of the state, the collapse of the old Soviet economy and the low prices for oil, in the Putin years,” it reflected the diversion of enormous oil earnings by the elite and their neglect of the basic infrastructure of the country and the needs of the people.
Indeed, Ryzhkov continues, “if one put aside the stereotypes and propagandistic clichés, Russia is slowly but truly continuing to be converted into the largest and most militarily and politically powerful ‘failed state’ in the world,” something Chinese analysts have already pointed to (echo.msk.ru/blog/rizhkov/737549-echo.phtml).
The past 12 months, the commentator says, have featured the rapid growth of many “destructive tendencies” which may lead to “the collapse of the government and the country” sometime in the new decade that begins or to a continuing decline if Russia and its regime do not in fact come apart.
Ryzhkov identifies five of these trends. First, he says, there has been “the continuing disintegration and collapse of society,” something expressed in Russia’s continuing decline in the UN human development index, the growth of social inequality, long-term poverty, and “the absence of the growth of the middle class.”
What makes this trend so dangerous, Ryzhkov continues, is that the current powers that be are doing nothing to address it, cutting spending on the development of human capital while increasing spending on the military, the police and the special services, not to mention the support of their own state apparatus.
Second, he says, there has been “the criminalization and growth in the ineffectiveness of the state,” as symbolized by the events in Kushchevskaya. This has reduced Russia’s competitiveness and left the country near the bottom on a wide variety of measures of modernity, reducing its attractiveness as a place to invest and increasing capital flight abroad.
Third, Ryzhkov points to “the growing ineffectiveness of the national economy.” The raw material sector has continued to grow as having the role of monopolies and the size of the state sector, all things that have undercut the possibilities for competition, increased inflation, and led to “a low quality of goods and services” for the population.
Fourth and despite all this, Ryzhkov notes, “Russian elites have manifested an immoderate love for expensive mega-projects” like the Pacific summit in Vladivostok in2012, the Universiade in Kazan in 2013, the Sochi Olympics in 2014, and the soccer championship in 2018, draining ever more money away from necessary social and economic activities.
And fifth, Ryzhkov says, given the other trends and the failures of the Russian political system, Russian society is increasingly characterized by “an atmosphere of general distrust, anger and cynicism,” attitudes that have resulted in “a growth of crime, xenophobia, and violence.”
The Kremlin’s youth policy has not only failed but is counterproductive, educating the young “in a spirit of hatred toward other opinions and democratic values” and failing to overcome “the absence of a policy of integrating various national groups and of a policy of promoting tolerance.”
“In the national republics,” Ryzhkov points out, there continue “a stormy growth of national self-consciousness, a reduction of the share of the ethnic Russian population and a powerful revival of religiosity, including extremism,” often as the direct result of Moscow’s actions or inactions.
Moscow’s appointment of unpopular governors, for example, “has exacerbated the the alienation of the provinces from the federal center. [And] by returning to imperial methods, Moscow … creating the potential for a new wave of separatist attitudes,” with “the weak links” being the North Caucasus, Kaliningrad, the Far East and Yakutia (Sakha).
The future for Russia is particularly clouded by the obvious desire of Vladimir Putin to remain in power “even after 2012” and his “stubborn unwillingness to recognize the destructiveness of the policies he has promoted for the development and integrity of the country.”
Ryzhkov concludes that “in the best case,” Russia faces a long period of “economic stagnation and social decline,” with “super-high corruption and the flight from the country not only of capital but also of one to two million of [the Russian Federation’s] best citizens,” developments the country can ill afford.
But “in the worst case,” the liberal Russian politician argues, “the policy of corruption, monopolization, centralization and illegality [associated with Putin and the powers that be around him] can lead to the de facto collapse of the country already in the decade starting in a few days.”
Wednesday, December 29, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Upsurge of Anti-Semitism after Manezh Clashes Prompts More Russian Jews to Leave for Israel
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 29 – Most of the rising tide of xenophobia in Moscow and other Russian cities has been directed at migrants from the North Caucasus, but at least some of it is now focused on Russian Jews, a trend that is prompting an increasing number of this group, often the object of Russian xenophobic attacks in the past, to leave for Israel.
Immediately after the Manezh clash, Aleksandr Kogan of the Israeli portal, izrus.co.il, reported that “many Russian bloggers and authors of extremely popular outlets” wrote stories of an openly anti-Semitic nature, in some cases blaming the Jews for the clashes and in others calling for turning popular anger on them (izrus.co.il/diasporaIL/article/2010-12-22/12870.html).
And less than a week after Russian extremists attacked North Caucasians near the wall of the Kremlin, David Shechter, a spokesman for the Jewish Agency Sokhnut in Moscow, said that “as a result of the disorders and manifestations in Moscow we have noted a sharp increase in interst among the Jewish population” in repatriation to Israel.
Since that time, the situation has moved from the blogosphere to the streets. This week, Schechter told izrus.co.il that “on the wall o fthe metro entrance on Manezh Square have appeared graffiti featuring large black letters [calling for] ‘the Kikes to Get Out of Russia’ and featuring a swastika” (izrus.co.il/diasporail/article/2010-12-27/12925.html).
Such anti-Semitic signs have led additional Russians Jews to consider moving to Israel, Schechter said, “more people than had been expected” during “the January holidays which last about two weeks. “ He noted that “Russian Jews do not always so quickly react to outbursts of anti-Semitism,” a possible indication that they are especially worried now.
Other Jewish activists and commentators have begun to try to put what is going on in context. Yury Kanner, the president of the Russian Jewish Congress, noted that there has been a growth of xenophobic and anti-Semitic articles in the blosophere. But he suggested that the Moscow officials were taking measures (izrus.co.il/diasporaIL/article/2010-12-22/12875.html).
He pointed out that at the time of the disorders, the Russian militia had noticeably increased security around synagogues and other Jewish sites in Moscow, an indication that they were ready to block any threat but also one that shows at least some among the Russian powers that be were concerned that such a threat was entirely possible.
Meanwhile, Yevgeny Levin, a Jerusalem-based commentator, told Portal-Credo.ru, a religious rights site, that while he was far from those who assert that “a serious danger threatens Russian Jews” at the present time, the experience of Jews in Russia in the past means that they fear even the possibility of pogroms (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1820).
He noted that “for the majority of the participants in the December disorders, the Jews, unlike the Caucasians or migrants from Central Asia are a purely theoretical enemy,” there were some anti-Semitic slogans among those in the Manezh Square clashes, an indication of the way that xenophobic attitudes about one group often involve similar feelings toward others.
And Levin continued that “if the powers that be will not take rapid and energic measures for the restoration of peace, many Russian Jews will begin to think seriously about emigration.” Among other things, that should mean that supporters of Jews abroad should consider revising their views about the “potential for repatriation” among Jews in Russia.
To date, the amount of anti-Semitism in Russian cities has been relatively small compared to the level of xenophobia among Russians concerning “people from the Caucasus” and “people from Central Asia.” But these reports are important as a reminder that any reduction in the fight against hatred of other groups can quickly spread.
Moreover, they are a reminder of the continuing relevance of Pastor Niemuller’s classical observation made during the horrors of the Nazi regime in Germany that the failure to speak up in defense of others almost invariably opens the way for attacks on one’s own group and even on oneself.
Staunton, December 29 – Most of the rising tide of xenophobia in Moscow and other Russian cities has been directed at migrants from the North Caucasus, but at least some of it is now focused on Russian Jews, a trend that is prompting an increasing number of this group, often the object of Russian xenophobic attacks in the past, to leave for Israel.
Immediately after the Manezh clash, Aleksandr Kogan of the Israeli portal, izrus.co.il, reported that “many Russian bloggers and authors of extremely popular outlets” wrote stories of an openly anti-Semitic nature, in some cases blaming the Jews for the clashes and in others calling for turning popular anger on them (izrus.co.il/diasporaIL/article/2010-12-22/12870.html).
And less than a week after Russian extremists attacked North Caucasians near the wall of the Kremlin, David Shechter, a spokesman for the Jewish Agency Sokhnut in Moscow, said that “as a result of the disorders and manifestations in Moscow we have noted a sharp increase in interst among the Jewish population” in repatriation to Israel.
Since that time, the situation has moved from the blogosphere to the streets. This week, Schechter told izrus.co.il that “on the wall o fthe metro entrance on Manezh Square have appeared graffiti featuring large black letters [calling for] ‘the Kikes to Get Out of Russia’ and featuring a swastika” (izrus.co.il/diasporail/article/2010-12-27/12925.html).
Such anti-Semitic signs have led additional Russians Jews to consider moving to Israel, Schechter said, “more people than had been expected” during “the January holidays which last about two weeks. “ He noted that “Russian Jews do not always so quickly react to outbursts of anti-Semitism,” a possible indication that they are especially worried now.
Other Jewish activists and commentators have begun to try to put what is going on in context. Yury Kanner, the president of the Russian Jewish Congress, noted that there has been a growth of xenophobic and anti-Semitic articles in the blosophere. But he suggested that the Moscow officials were taking measures (izrus.co.il/diasporaIL/article/2010-12-22/12875.html).
He pointed out that at the time of the disorders, the Russian militia had noticeably increased security around synagogues and other Jewish sites in Moscow, an indication that they were ready to block any threat but also one that shows at least some among the Russian powers that be were concerned that such a threat was entirely possible.
Meanwhile, Yevgeny Levin, a Jerusalem-based commentator, told Portal-Credo.ru, a religious rights site, that while he was far from those who assert that “a serious danger threatens Russian Jews” at the present time, the experience of Jews in Russia in the past means that they fear even the possibility of pogroms (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1820).
He noted that “for the majority of the participants in the December disorders, the Jews, unlike the Caucasians or migrants from Central Asia are a purely theoretical enemy,” there were some anti-Semitic slogans among those in the Manezh Square clashes, an indication of the way that xenophobic attitudes about one group often involve similar feelings toward others.
And Levin continued that “if the powers that be will not take rapid and energic measures for the restoration of peace, many Russian Jews will begin to think seriously about emigration.” Among other things, that should mean that supporters of Jews abroad should consider revising their views about the “potential for repatriation” among Jews in Russia.
To date, the amount of anti-Semitism in Russian cities has been relatively small compared to the level of xenophobia among Russians concerning “people from the Caucasus” and “people from Central Asia.” But these reports are important as a reminder that any reduction in the fight against hatred of other groups can quickly spread.
Moreover, they are a reminder of the continuing relevance of Pastor Niemuller’s classical observation made during the horrors of the Nazi regime in Germany that the failure to speak up in defense of others almost invariably opens the way for attacks on one’s own group and even on oneself.
Window on Eurasia: Medvedev’s Failure to Counter Talk of Letting North Caucasus Go Recalls Gorbachev at His Worst, Kholmogorov Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 29 –Dmitry Medvedev’s willingness to be drawn into discussions about letting the North Caucasus go and the president’s failure to take action to address the reasons some are pushing for a step that would be “suicide” for Russia recall the worst aspects of Mikhail Gorbachev’s days at the end of the USSR, according to a leading Moscow commentator.
In a comment on “Russkaya narodnaya liniya,” Yegor Kholmogorov, editor of the online journal “Russky obozrevatel’,,” argues that proposals to let the North Caucasus go its own way is “bad” in the way “all abstract utopian ideas” that seek to cut through “’a Gordian knot’” are (ruskline.ru/news_rl/2010/12/29/egor_holmogorov_politika_otdelenchestva_samoubijstvo_dlya_strany/).
That is, the outspoken Russian nationalist continues, such ideas are “very beautiful when described but their realization in fact practically always involves great losses and uncompensated harm.” And consequently, those who oppose such proposals must respond to them with specific facts rather than generalized denunciations.
“Objectively,” there is the problem of the lack of correspondence “between those cultural standards and standards of social relations which exist among the mountain peoples of the North Caucaus and those which exist in Russia in general,” Kholmogorov says. And because of ethnic Russian flight, “many regions of the North Caucasus have been de-russified.”
These trends, “together with the demographic and criminal expansion” of people “from these territories” lie behind the idea of “separating” the North Caucasus out from Russia. Indeed, Kholmogorov acknowledges, “the roots of the psychological attitude of those who want to separate all this from themselves are understandable.”
But that is where “the problem begins,” he adds.
“Russia does not exist in a vacuum at the level of international relations. Today [Russians] live not in Assyria or in Babylon and even not under Comrade Stalin.” Instead, they live in the world of the 21st century, and in that world, the Russian Federation would, if it “separated out” the North Caucasus, find itself in terrible difficulties.
“It would be isolated and under the most severe international sanctions, including accusations of genocide. That is, in fact, [Russians] would repeat the fate of Serbia under Milosevic.” And according to Kholmogorov, “present day Russia is not ready” to find itself in that position.
Moreover, he says, “separating out” the North Caucasus “would require a colossal amount of military, political and organizational measures for securing the borders,” all the more so because Russia would in effect be handing “this region over to international terrorism” and thus still threatened by people from that region.
“If Israel having built a wall around the Palestinian territories has not been able to guarantee its own security, then precisely the same way, Russia would not be able to guarantee its security.” And still worse, Russia would have to have a much tougher border regime not only with the now independent North Caucasus but everywhere else as well.
And “finally,” Kholmogorov says, there is “the most important aspect: If we retreat from the principle of the unity and integrity of Russia in one place, then ‘the domino principle’ will begin to work elsewhere,” leading to “the separating out of Tatarstan and Yakutia and the formation of a new Kazan and Astrakhan khanate and so on and so forth.”
“Having begun to cut apart the country,” Kholmogorov argues, “we already will not be in a position to stop the coming apart of the federation.” In short, those who are attracted by the idea of separating out the North Caucasus are playing with a notion that, if adopted, would mean “suicide” for Russia.
The National Democrats who have made this idea a plank in their program are not very numerous, and “the majority of Russian nationalists,” Kholmogorov who numbers himself among them, is “categorically” against this idea “precisely because they understand perfectly well what would follow from it.”
More disturbing than the proposal of a clutch of would be politicians, he continues, is the spread of this notion as a kind of “mass prejudice,” in which large numbers of Russians accept this “simple but mistaken political idea.” And if this notion does capture the masses, then “no rational arguments” will be able to stop it.
In this regard, Kholmogorov says, the role that Medvedev and others among the powers that be is “quite doubtful” given that they have allowed themselves to be “drawn into discussion of this problem” without “presenting to society serious arguments” as to why this approach would be “categorically unacceptable.”
Making general declarations such as “we must not allow the collapse of the federation” and the like without such arguments “recalls the behavior of Gorbachev who also at a certain point began very actively to discuss the theme of ‘the disintegration of the country,’” discussions that had the effect of accelerating that process.
What the powers that be should be doing is providing “concrete facts” or “best of all keeping quiet on this theme but taking measures which will free society from the need of discussing” such a dangerous step for their country and themselves as “the separation out of the North Caucasus.”
Among those steps, he suggests, are “the establishment of the equality of all peoples o fhte country before the law, the categorical prohibition of any extraterritoriality for representatives of North Caucasian peoples on the territory of Russia, [and] the tightening of the immigration regime, about which so much is said today.”
In addition, Kholmogorov continues, there needs to be “a serious review of relations inside the federation,” which at present means that “regions which are the most alienated from the Russian language, culture and population” nonetheless “receive the maximum contributions [from the rest of the country] and enjoy the maximum freedom within the country.”
If Moscow took those steps, no one would be talking about “separating out” the North Caucasus. Indeed, such proposals are “simply a mark of despair” over current conditions because, Kholmogorov says, “no one wants” to give up territories over which Russians have shed so much blood for so long.
Staunton, December 29 –Dmitry Medvedev’s willingness to be drawn into discussions about letting the North Caucasus go and the president’s failure to take action to address the reasons some are pushing for a step that would be “suicide” for Russia recall the worst aspects of Mikhail Gorbachev’s days at the end of the USSR, according to a leading Moscow commentator.
In a comment on “Russkaya narodnaya liniya,” Yegor Kholmogorov, editor of the online journal “Russky obozrevatel’,,” argues that proposals to let the North Caucasus go its own way is “bad” in the way “all abstract utopian ideas” that seek to cut through “’a Gordian knot’” are (ruskline.ru/news_rl/2010/12/29/egor_holmogorov_politika_otdelenchestva_samoubijstvo_dlya_strany/).
That is, the outspoken Russian nationalist continues, such ideas are “very beautiful when described but their realization in fact practically always involves great losses and uncompensated harm.” And consequently, those who oppose such proposals must respond to them with specific facts rather than generalized denunciations.
“Objectively,” there is the problem of the lack of correspondence “between those cultural standards and standards of social relations which exist among the mountain peoples of the North Caucaus and those which exist in Russia in general,” Kholmogorov says. And because of ethnic Russian flight, “many regions of the North Caucasus have been de-russified.”
These trends, “together with the demographic and criminal expansion” of people “from these territories” lie behind the idea of “separating” the North Caucasus out from Russia. Indeed, Kholmogorov acknowledges, “the roots of the psychological attitude of those who want to separate all this from themselves are understandable.”
But that is where “the problem begins,” he adds.
“Russia does not exist in a vacuum at the level of international relations. Today [Russians] live not in Assyria or in Babylon and even not under Comrade Stalin.” Instead, they live in the world of the 21st century, and in that world, the Russian Federation would, if it “separated out” the North Caucasus, find itself in terrible difficulties.
“It would be isolated and under the most severe international sanctions, including accusations of genocide. That is, in fact, [Russians] would repeat the fate of Serbia under Milosevic.” And according to Kholmogorov, “present day Russia is not ready” to find itself in that position.
Moreover, he says, “separating out” the North Caucasus “would require a colossal amount of military, political and organizational measures for securing the borders,” all the more so because Russia would in effect be handing “this region over to international terrorism” and thus still threatened by people from that region.
“If Israel having built a wall around the Palestinian territories has not been able to guarantee its own security, then precisely the same way, Russia would not be able to guarantee its security.” And still worse, Russia would have to have a much tougher border regime not only with the now independent North Caucasus but everywhere else as well.
And “finally,” Kholmogorov says, there is “the most important aspect: If we retreat from the principle of the unity and integrity of Russia in one place, then ‘the domino principle’ will begin to work elsewhere,” leading to “the separating out of Tatarstan and Yakutia and the formation of a new Kazan and Astrakhan khanate and so on and so forth.”
“Having begun to cut apart the country,” Kholmogorov argues, “we already will not be in a position to stop the coming apart of the federation.” In short, those who are attracted by the idea of separating out the North Caucasus are playing with a notion that, if adopted, would mean “suicide” for Russia.
The National Democrats who have made this idea a plank in their program are not very numerous, and “the majority of Russian nationalists,” Kholmogorov who numbers himself among them, is “categorically” against this idea “precisely because they understand perfectly well what would follow from it.”
More disturbing than the proposal of a clutch of would be politicians, he continues, is the spread of this notion as a kind of “mass prejudice,” in which large numbers of Russians accept this “simple but mistaken political idea.” And if this notion does capture the masses, then “no rational arguments” will be able to stop it.
In this regard, Kholmogorov says, the role that Medvedev and others among the powers that be is “quite doubtful” given that they have allowed themselves to be “drawn into discussion of this problem” without “presenting to society serious arguments” as to why this approach would be “categorically unacceptable.”
Making general declarations such as “we must not allow the collapse of the federation” and the like without such arguments “recalls the behavior of Gorbachev who also at a certain point began very actively to discuss the theme of ‘the disintegration of the country,’” discussions that had the effect of accelerating that process.
What the powers that be should be doing is providing “concrete facts” or “best of all keeping quiet on this theme but taking measures which will free society from the need of discussing” such a dangerous step for their country and themselves as “the separation out of the North Caucasus.”
Among those steps, he suggests, are “the establishment of the equality of all peoples o fhte country before the law, the categorical prohibition of any extraterritoriality for representatives of North Caucasian peoples on the territory of Russia, [and] the tightening of the immigration regime, about which so much is said today.”
In addition, Kholmogorov continues, there needs to be “a serious review of relations inside the federation,” which at present means that “regions which are the most alienated from the Russian language, culture and population” nonetheless “receive the maximum contributions [from the rest of the country] and enjoy the maximum freedom within the country.”
If Moscow took those steps, no one would be talking about “separating out” the North Caucasus. Indeed, such proposals are “simply a mark of despair” over current conditions because, Kholmogorov says, “no one wants” to give up territories over which Russians have shed so much blood for so long.
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