Paul Goble
Staunton, November 11 – Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), told Russian parliamentarians today that the Russian Federation has 72 times as many mosques now as the republic did in 1991, with the number rising from “under 100” at the end of Soviet times to 7200 at present.
At the same time, Gainutdin pointed out, this number is still “not even half of the number of mosques which were on the territory of today’s Russia” before the Russian revolution, adding that “the number of mosques is almost twice more than the number of officially registered Muslim organizations” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38157).
But the SMR leader told the parliamentarians that “it would be only a half truth to speak only about successes” in this regard. On the one hand, there still are not enough mosques “in major cities and small settlements.” And on the other, there is an active “slanderous” campaign against building mosques in Moscow in particular.
According to the SMR press service, as reported by Interfax, “all the guests [at the meeting Gainutdin hosted] expressed their support regarding the construction of mosques in all districts of the capital,” an assertion that raises questions about who was in fact at this meeting given the general opposition among Russians to more mosques in the capital city.
Just how many mosques the more than two million Muslims of Moscow need is a matter of dispute, but it is certainly greater than the five they now have. Shamil Alyautdinov, the imam of the city’s Memorial Mosque, said recently that 100 would be enough, but others have given larger or smaller figures (www.newsru.com/religy/11nov2010/smr.html).
A major reason for the dispute about the numbers needed among Muslims is that many of the faithful make use of smaller and more intimate prayer houses, often organized in the apartments of believers, either to follow their national or religious trends or out of a concern that building more mosques would spark more xenophobia among Russians.
At the same time, there is little agreement on the total number of mosques in the Russian Federation. Gainutdin’s figure is lower than the one many other Muslim leaders give but it is higher than the number many academic experts or Russian Orthodox hierarchs suggest, a reflection of two realities that are often ignored.
On the one hand, building a mosque is considered an act of piety among Muslims, and many wealthy people in the Russian umma have built mosques often in their home villages or even in places where there are no congregations. As a result, some of the mosques that have been erected in recent years have not been used, raising the question of whether they should be counted or not.
And on the other hand, as Russian Orthodox commentators often observe, the requirements for a mosque are such that almost any building can be declared one, something not true in the case of Orthodox churches. As a result, putting up a mosque in almost every case costs less than erecting a church, something that makes it possible for Muslims to boost the numbers of their religious facilities.
But however that may be, the dramatic expansion in the number of mosques in the Russian Federation that Gainutdin pointed to today does reflect the growth of Islam there, a growth fueled both by the new possibilities that have opened up to believers since the end of communism and the demographic growth of traditionally Muslim peoples.
Like other Muslim leaders, the SMR head is proud of that rise, but his decision to talk about just how large it is to a group of Russian parliamentarians has the potential to backfire on the umma, leading some Russians to conclude that no new mosques are needed and others to decide that the Muslim community must be brought under much tighter control.
Thursday, November 11, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Al Qaeda Focusing on Daghestan in the North Caucasus ‘Sunni Triangle,’ Makhachkala Expert Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 11 – Al Qaeda has selected Daghestan as its main center of operations in the North Caucasus “Sunni triangle,” which also includes the republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia, according to a leading expert on Islamic movements who works in the Daghestani capital of Makhachkala.
In an article on Sknews.ru, Ruslan Gereyev, an expert at the Center of Islamic Research of the North Caucasus, argues that both conditions in that republic and the inability of the powers that be there and in Moscow to address them adequately help explain and in fact justify Al Qaeda’s choice (www.sknews.ru/main/43146-dagestan-glavnyj-placdarm-al-kaidy.html).
The Sunni triangle has become “an arena of unceasing terrorist actions,” with both terrorism and criminality “broadening their spheres of influence, sowing fear in society, exerting an influence on the powers that be and business, and denigrating both the customs o fhte peoples and the main beliefs of Islam,” Gereyev says.
“The number of victims [of these plagues] is growing among the civilian population, but the powers that be are not capable of solving the severe social problems … Corrupt people in soft chairs – bureaucrats, prosecutors, judges and militiamen – are in essence the accomplices of the extremists. People are tired of waiting for change,” and they have lost faith in the authorities.
As a result, the Makhachkala expert continues, “present day reality is such that many terrorist organizations in the first instance Al Qaeda advance as their main task the establishment of a single khalifate on the territories of all countries with a Muslim population. As the center of this khalifate, they have chosen Daghestan, in essence already ‘a green republic.’”
According to Gereyev, “the most cruel and strong subdivisions of international terrorist organizations” are now active in Daghestan, “the ideological core of which have become the Wahhabi communities or jamaats.” That is because, he says, the Wahhabis “earlier than the others” were ready to fill “the ideological vacuum” and thus win over young people.
The Wahhabis are ascetic, reject a mediating role for religious leaders, and acknowledge the possibility of direct contact with the Creator. Moreover, they assert that if a khalifate is created, the people will have the right to overthrow or even kill the khalif if he ignores Muslim interests, a popular image for those who feel they have no control over their officials.
Moreover, the Wahhabis have with remarkable success played up the idea that they represent the true faith while traditional Muslims in Daghestan have fallen away and allowed pagan traditions or innovations to contaminate the faith or subordinated Islam to selfish, earthly needs.
But in doing so, the Wahhabis have subordinated Islam to their earthly goal, “recruiting the youth” and directing them in “a holy war” against those Muslims “who do not participate” in such actions, a number that is especially large in a place like Daghestan where Islamic faith and practice is strong.
There are 2500 Muslim religious organizations in that republic, including more than 1900 mosques. In addition, there are a variety of Muslim educational institutions at all levels, an active Muslim media, and Daghestanis “massively” go on the haj, all things that make the Wahhabi strategy against traditional Muslims such an obvious one.
In recruiting young people, “the unification of the supporters of radical Islam in Daghestan have contributed to a situation when in the republic there are arising ever more underground militarized groups with common religious principles about the establishment of a genuinely Islamic state living according to the norms of shariat.”
And “such a semi-military situation in peace times quietly is driving out of the constitutional realm even those who do not view themselves as Wahhabis or as tariqatists,” Gereyev continues, but are forced to act against those who attack them given the shortcomings of the powers that be in the republic.
“The absence of an adequate policy from the central and republic-level powers that be has assisted [the Wahhabi agenda]. Radical Islam has thrown challenges to the Republic of Daghestan which has not been able to develop its own positions, above all in relation to the various branches within Sunni Islam,” Gereyev says.
The Makhachkala expert notes that “Daghestani society has up to now not condemned terrorism and extremism.” That is a matter for “great regret,” but in one sense,it reflects the failure of the powers that be not to make sufficient use of “authoritative religious leaders, scientists, cultural figures and educators.”
“There is no participation of political parties and public organizations in this most important task,” Gereyev says, and as a result, “the ideas of Al Qaeda in its propaganda about a return to ‘pure Islam’ [has been able to occur without much opposition and now] finds full support among definite circles of young people” in Daghestan.
As a result, “the Al Qaeda bureau in the North Caucasus has become more active,” with the immediate objects of [its] terrorists attacks being the Muslim republics themselves which have moderate regimes,” attacks which are now so numerous that they “significantly exceed the number of terrorist actions in West European countries.”
“Especially,” Gereyev says, this is the case “in Daghestan.”
Staunton, November 11 – Al Qaeda has selected Daghestan as its main center of operations in the North Caucasus “Sunni triangle,” which also includes the republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia, according to a leading expert on Islamic movements who works in the Daghestani capital of Makhachkala.
In an article on Sknews.ru, Ruslan Gereyev, an expert at the Center of Islamic Research of the North Caucasus, argues that both conditions in that republic and the inability of the powers that be there and in Moscow to address them adequately help explain and in fact justify Al Qaeda’s choice (www.sknews.ru/main/43146-dagestan-glavnyj-placdarm-al-kaidy.html).
The Sunni triangle has become “an arena of unceasing terrorist actions,” with both terrorism and criminality “broadening their spheres of influence, sowing fear in society, exerting an influence on the powers that be and business, and denigrating both the customs o fhte peoples and the main beliefs of Islam,” Gereyev says.
“The number of victims [of these plagues] is growing among the civilian population, but the powers that be are not capable of solving the severe social problems … Corrupt people in soft chairs – bureaucrats, prosecutors, judges and militiamen – are in essence the accomplices of the extremists. People are tired of waiting for change,” and they have lost faith in the authorities.
As a result, the Makhachkala expert continues, “present day reality is such that many terrorist organizations in the first instance Al Qaeda advance as their main task the establishment of a single khalifate on the territories of all countries with a Muslim population. As the center of this khalifate, they have chosen Daghestan, in essence already ‘a green republic.’”
According to Gereyev, “the most cruel and strong subdivisions of international terrorist organizations” are now active in Daghestan, “the ideological core of which have become the Wahhabi communities or jamaats.” That is because, he says, the Wahhabis “earlier than the others” were ready to fill “the ideological vacuum” and thus win over young people.
The Wahhabis are ascetic, reject a mediating role for religious leaders, and acknowledge the possibility of direct contact with the Creator. Moreover, they assert that if a khalifate is created, the people will have the right to overthrow or even kill the khalif if he ignores Muslim interests, a popular image for those who feel they have no control over their officials.
Moreover, the Wahhabis have with remarkable success played up the idea that they represent the true faith while traditional Muslims in Daghestan have fallen away and allowed pagan traditions or innovations to contaminate the faith or subordinated Islam to selfish, earthly needs.
But in doing so, the Wahhabis have subordinated Islam to their earthly goal, “recruiting the youth” and directing them in “a holy war” against those Muslims “who do not participate” in such actions, a number that is especially large in a place like Daghestan where Islamic faith and practice is strong.
There are 2500 Muslim religious organizations in that republic, including more than 1900 mosques. In addition, there are a variety of Muslim educational institutions at all levels, an active Muslim media, and Daghestanis “massively” go on the haj, all things that make the Wahhabi strategy against traditional Muslims such an obvious one.
In recruiting young people, “the unification of the supporters of radical Islam in Daghestan have contributed to a situation when in the republic there are arising ever more underground militarized groups with common religious principles about the establishment of a genuinely Islamic state living according to the norms of shariat.”
And “such a semi-military situation in peace times quietly is driving out of the constitutional realm even those who do not view themselves as Wahhabis or as tariqatists,” Gereyev continues, but are forced to act against those who attack them given the shortcomings of the powers that be in the republic.
“The absence of an adequate policy from the central and republic-level powers that be has assisted [the Wahhabi agenda]. Radical Islam has thrown challenges to the Republic of Daghestan which has not been able to develop its own positions, above all in relation to the various branches within Sunni Islam,” Gereyev says.
The Makhachkala expert notes that “Daghestani society has up to now not condemned terrorism and extremism.” That is a matter for “great regret,” but in one sense,it reflects the failure of the powers that be not to make sufficient use of “authoritative religious leaders, scientists, cultural figures and educators.”
“There is no participation of political parties and public organizations in this most important task,” Gereyev says, and as a result, “the ideas of Al Qaeda in its propaganda about a return to ‘pure Islam’ [has been able to occur without much opposition and now] finds full support among definite circles of young people” in Daghestan.
As a result, “the Al Qaeda bureau in the North Caucasus has become more active,” with the immediate objects of [its] terrorists attacks being the Muslim republics themselves which have moderate regimes,” attacks which are now so numerous that they “significantly exceed the number of terrorist actions in West European countries.”
“Especially,” Gereyev says, this is the case “in Daghestan.”
Window on Eurasia: In the Baltics, Moscow Turns from Supporting Ethnic Russian Parties to Backing Broader but Still Sympathetic Ones, Russian Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 11 – Moscow is no longer placing its bets on the often-marginal ethnic Russian parties in the three Baltic countries, preferring instead to support broad-based political parties which are sympathetic to the Russian Federation and have a real chance to come to power, according to a Moscow historian and publicist.
In an essay in “Russky zhurnal” today, Boris Sokolov says that the parties Moscow is now most interested in are Edgar Savisaar’s Center Party in Estonia, Nil Ushakov’s Center of Accord in Latvia, and, until quite recently, Victor Uspaskis’ Labor Party in Lithuania (www.russ.ru/pole/Pribaltijskij-vopros).
And as a result of Moscow’s support for these groups, he continues, Russia’s backing of Russian-language parties who “openly were focused on Russia and dreaming about the rebirth of the Union in one or another form” has reduced these often marginal parties still further, something Sokolov says is obvious “to the unaided eye.”
Thus in Estonia, the ethnic Russian Night Patrol has faded into insignificance since the period of protests around the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn, and the Russian-language party ZaPChEL garnered only 1.4 percent of the vote in the recent Latvian elections, with most of its former electorate choosing instead to back Ushakov.
The situation in Lithuania is different, n large part because there has never been a single Russian party or organization. There are three reasons for this, Sokolov says. First, Lithuania adopted a more liberal citizenship law so many ethnic Russians became citizens and voted for Lithuanian parties.
Second, the share of Russian speakers in Lithuania is only “a little more than 16 percent,” far smaller than in Estonia and especially in Latvia. And third, the Russian language community is extremely diverse, with almost half of it consisting of ethnic Poles who look toward Poland rather than the Russian Federation.
For all those reasons, Sokolov continues, Moscow “from the very beginning” sought to support parties and politicians of “an all-Lithuanian direction,” people like Rolandas Paksas and Victor Uspaskis. But because those people and their parties are now viewed as “belonging to the past rather than the future,” Moscow is “searching for new political partners.”
By cutting back its support for openly pro-Russian parties, Moscow “perhaps is losing the support of the more pro-Russian inclined politicians and populations, but on the other hand, it is acquiring real, albeit not very obvious from the outside, influence on real political processes in the Baltic countries.”
“The elections in Latvia just like the elections in Estonia have shown,” Sokolov says, “that today the majority of the Russian-language voters are voting for all-national parties” which the Russian speakers perceive as representing their interests and having a real chance to win some share of power.
Ultimately, the Russian analyst suggests, “particularly in the case of the evolution of the Latvian political system toward a two-party system,” the Center of Accord Party “could become one of the two main parties” of the country. And while Russian voter supporter would be critical, the level of the party’s “pro-Russianness” would probably decline to make that happen.
Nonetheless, the Russian voter in Latvia will matter both because the number of Russian speakers who become citizens and thus gain the right to vote is growing and because the Center of Accord also is winning support among ethnic Latvians who do not view it as “an ethnic Russian-language party.”
Moscow is clearly betting on the left and center-left parties, a strategy that appears to have the best chance of success in Latvia. In Estonia and Lithuania, in contrast, “the positions of the pro-Russian forces are not so strong,” as a result of the smaller share of ethnic Russians in the population and electorate, better economic conditions, and the personalities of party leaders.
Sokolov says in conclusion that “the transition from support in the Baltic countries of forces oriented to the restoration of the USSR to support of all-national parties which do not put under doubt the political independence of their countries and reflect Western democratic values is a step toward … civilized relations” between Russia and the Baltic countries.
But he adds that the Kremlin may encounter problems as a result of choosing this path, especially because the parties it backs because they are pro-Russian at some level will almost certainly have to become less so if they are to win power in any one of the three Baltic countries let alone more than that.
Staunton, November 11 – Moscow is no longer placing its bets on the often-marginal ethnic Russian parties in the three Baltic countries, preferring instead to support broad-based political parties which are sympathetic to the Russian Federation and have a real chance to come to power, according to a Moscow historian and publicist.
In an essay in “Russky zhurnal” today, Boris Sokolov says that the parties Moscow is now most interested in are Edgar Savisaar’s Center Party in Estonia, Nil Ushakov’s Center of Accord in Latvia, and, until quite recently, Victor Uspaskis’ Labor Party in Lithuania (www.russ.ru/pole/Pribaltijskij-vopros).
And as a result of Moscow’s support for these groups, he continues, Russia’s backing of Russian-language parties who “openly were focused on Russia and dreaming about the rebirth of the Union in one or another form” has reduced these often marginal parties still further, something Sokolov says is obvious “to the unaided eye.”
Thus in Estonia, the ethnic Russian Night Patrol has faded into insignificance since the period of protests around the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn, and the Russian-language party ZaPChEL garnered only 1.4 percent of the vote in the recent Latvian elections, with most of its former electorate choosing instead to back Ushakov.
The situation in Lithuania is different, n large part because there has never been a single Russian party or organization. There are three reasons for this, Sokolov says. First, Lithuania adopted a more liberal citizenship law so many ethnic Russians became citizens and voted for Lithuanian parties.
Second, the share of Russian speakers in Lithuania is only “a little more than 16 percent,” far smaller than in Estonia and especially in Latvia. And third, the Russian language community is extremely diverse, with almost half of it consisting of ethnic Poles who look toward Poland rather than the Russian Federation.
For all those reasons, Sokolov continues, Moscow “from the very beginning” sought to support parties and politicians of “an all-Lithuanian direction,” people like Rolandas Paksas and Victor Uspaskis. But because those people and their parties are now viewed as “belonging to the past rather than the future,” Moscow is “searching for new political partners.”
By cutting back its support for openly pro-Russian parties, Moscow “perhaps is losing the support of the more pro-Russian inclined politicians and populations, but on the other hand, it is acquiring real, albeit not very obvious from the outside, influence on real political processes in the Baltic countries.”
“The elections in Latvia just like the elections in Estonia have shown,” Sokolov says, “that today the majority of the Russian-language voters are voting for all-national parties” which the Russian speakers perceive as representing their interests and having a real chance to win some share of power.
Ultimately, the Russian analyst suggests, “particularly in the case of the evolution of the Latvian political system toward a two-party system,” the Center of Accord Party “could become one of the two main parties” of the country. And while Russian voter supporter would be critical, the level of the party’s “pro-Russianness” would probably decline to make that happen.
Nonetheless, the Russian voter in Latvia will matter both because the number of Russian speakers who become citizens and thus gain the right to vote is growing and because the Center of Accord also is winning support among ethnic Latvians who do not view it as “an ethnic Russian-language party.”
Moscow is clearly betting on the left and center-left parties, a strategy that appears to have the best chance of success in Latvia. In Estonia and Lithuania, in contrast, “the positions of the pro-Russian forces are not so strong,” as a result of the smaller share of ethnic Russians in the population and electorate, better economic conditions, and the personalities of party leaders.
Sokolov says in conclusion that “the transition from support in the Baltic countries of forces oriented to the restoration of the USSR to support of all-national parties which do not put under doubt the political independence of their countries and reflect Western democratic values is a step toward … civilized relations” between Russia and the Baltic countries.
But he adds that the Kremlin may encounter problems as a result of choosing this path, especially because the parties it backs because they are pro-Russian at some level will almost certainly have to become less so if they are to win power in any one of the three Baltic countries let alone more than that.
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