Window on Eurasia: The Lessons of Three Anniversaries

Paul Goble

Vienna, August 19 – Today is the 10th anniversary of Russia’s default on its international financial obligations and the 17th anniversary of the launch of the failed coup against Mikhail Gorbachev that precipitated the end of the Soviet Union, and tomorrow is the 40th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, an event that marked a low point in the Cold War.
Each of these events remains important less because of the exact details of what happened in the past than because of the very different lessons the Russians, on the one hand, and people in the West, on the other, have drawn from them, sharply contrasting lessons that continue to inform what Moscow does and how the West reacts.
The first of these by date is the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invastion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, an action taken in the name of the Brezhnev Doctrine to prevent the emergence of “socialism with a human face” in Prague but that had the unintended consequence of sparking the beginnings of organized public protests in Moscow against Soviet policies.
Many in the West view that event as part and parcel of the Communist System rather than a reflection of Russian geopolitical interests. As US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said last week, that action was part of the Soviet past, an immoral action rooted in a discredited system that hurt Moscow at the time and ultimately contributed to its destruction.
But what the Russian people and the especially Russian leaders recall of that event and its consequences is very different. The Russian people, as a recent poll highlighted, either know little or nothing about it, and those who do continue to accept the Soviet government’s explanation for why it acted as it did (www.fom.ru/topics/3520.html),
Russian leaders have not forgotten that action or even more how the West reacted. Initially, Western governments denounced what Moscow and her satellites had done, but within weeks, Europeans were arguing that East-West contacts were too important to neglect and within only a few years, the U.S was pursuing détente with Moscow – and that during the Cold War!
Given that pattern of Western behavior, it is not surprising that Vladimir Putin, schooled in the Soviet KGB and once stationed in East Germany, on the front lines of the East-West divide, should assume that whatever Moscow does as now in Georgia and however critical the West may be, Western governments can be counted upon to come around more or less quickly.
The second of this week’s anniversaries is that of the beginning of the failed coup in Moscow, an event that led to the demise of the Communist Party, the eclipse of Mikhail Gorbachev, the rise of Boris Yeltsin, and both the recovery of independence by the Baltic states and the ultimate freedom of the 12 Soviet republics.
For Western governments, that event and those that followed it was the final act of the Cold War, the end of Communism in Europe, and the triumph of Western values. Western governments and to a large extent Western publics were so taken by their own propaganda about what had occurred that they were quite willing to speak of “the end of history.”
The end of communism for many meant not only that Russia was now a normal country that could be counted on to integrate into Western institutions as a junior partner or perhaps even more and that, chastened by the tragedies visited upon it by its leaders in the 20th century, would want only to become like the West, a status quo power interested in peace and prosperity.
But on this 17th anniversary, neither many of the Russian people nor their supreme leader Putin view the failed coup in the same way. Most Russians, a new poll finds, do not see it as the triumph of democracy that guaranteed them a better future but as an intra-elite struggle that set their country on the wrong path (www.levada.ru/press/2008081800.html).
And Putin has infamously said that he believes the demise of the Soviet Union was “the greatest tragedy of the 20th century.” Anyone who continues to hold that view is unlikely to celebrate the collapse of the coup and the disintegration of both the communism system and the Soviet empire as something positive.
Instead, it is an indication that he and those who support him would like to see a fundamental revision of the post-1991 settlement, a revision that would elevate the Russian Federation over and at the expense of the independent countries around its borders, just as Moscow is attempting to do now by invading Georgia.
The third and final anniversary to be marked this week is the 1998 default, again an event about which Western governments and the Russians fundamentally diverge. For most in the West, that event reflected the massive corruption and mismanagement of the Yeltsin era, a reason why so many welcomed the stability Putin promised and in his own way delivered.
But for many Russians, August 1998 still haunts them as the kind of threat that is the part of the economic order in which they now live and a tragedy which many believe they will face again. Indeed, in sharp contrast to the other two events, the 1998 default and the possibility or a repetition have been major themes in the Russian media in recent weeks.
And many Russian leaders clearly fear this possibility as well, a possibility that may be exacerbated by the economic shock of capital flight as a result of Russian actions in Georgia and Russian government heavy-handedness in dealing with corporations whose leaders Russian or not are not prepared to go along with every demand of the Kremlin.
When two groups of states draw such different conclusions from the same events, there is a great danger that not only that these divergences will continue to define how they see both the past and the present but also that they will ensure that the two sides will continue to interact as they did, however often either or both proclaim that the present is not like the past.

Window on Eurasia: Moscow Violated Its Own Constitution and Laws by Intervening in Georgia

Paul Goble

Vienna, August 18 – Not only did the Russian government violate international law by invading Georgia, but the Kremlin ignored the provisions of the Russian Constitution and Russian laws, even though Moscow officials constantly argued that what they were doing was in full conformity with both.
In a commentary posted on Polit.ru today, legal specialist Ilya Karpyuk outlines the claims officials have made in support of the legality of the Russian operation in Georgia and then points to the ways in which these same officials have violated related provisions of the Russian constitution and Russian law (www.polit.ru/analytics/2008/08/18/medvedev.html).
Indeed, he suggests, the violation of the provisions of the Russian constitution in this case is so severe that it constitutes “a sufficient basis” for removing Dmitry Medvedev and any of those who argued that he should flout Russian law from office – although Karpyuk strongly implies that in today’s Moscow, nothing like that is not going to happen.
On August 8, Karpyuk notes, Medvedev said he was sending Russian forces into South Ossetia “in correspondence with the Constitution and federal law” which specifies that he is “obligated to defend the life and well-being of Russian citizens regardless of where they are located.”
Shortly thereafter, Sergei Mironov, the chairman of the Federation Council, and other commentators invoked part two of paragraph 61 of the Constitution which specifies that “the Russian Federation guarantees its citizens defense and protection beyond its borders.” And on August 13, Valery Zorkin, the head of the Constitutional Court, echoed this argument.
But Karpyuk points out, such arguments ignore other overriding Constitutional provisions which specify that the country’s Federation Council has the right to vote on “the question of the possibility of using the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation beyond the borders” of the country.
“Such a mandate” had been given to the Russian peacekeeping contingent, Karpyuk notes, but that “was given for peacekeepers and not for the entire 58th army which is now being called “the military contingent designed to strengthen the position of peacekeepers in the zone of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict.”
Moreover, the legal analyst says, the Kremlin and the Russian government appear to have forgotten in this case a basic provision of the Constitution: “the organs of state power are not only the government and the president but also the parliament consisting of the State Duma and Federation Council and the entire system of federal courts.”
And consequently, the Constitution and Russian law requires, whatever Medvedev and Zorkin have said, “requires in any case” a vote of support by the upper house of the parliament, because as no one should ever forget “democracy is above all a procedure” and in this case the constitutionally required “procedure was violated.”
. That is important to keep in mind even though there is certainly little doubt that the Federation Council would have gone along had the prime minister or the president of the country bothered to ask. Indeed, on official of the Federation Council’s Defense and Security Committee was openly dismissive of the Constitutional and legal concerns Karpyuk raises.
Viktor Ozerov, the head of the committee’s secretariat, said that for him there was no issue: Russian peacekeepers had been attacked and therefore there was no problem with reinforcing them. Such a view, Karpyuk says, is one that he very much hopes is “not the official position of the Committee,” although it may very well be.
Given the ways in which Medvedev has acted, the Russian legal commentator says, “there is sufficient basis” for removing him from office and at the very least for trying to find out who advised him to ignore the Constitutional and legal provisions governing such situations that the Russian president has sworn to uphold.

Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Calibrated Closure of Russian Borders with Georgia, Azerbaijan

Paul Goble

Vienna, August 19 – If Moscow’s use of Russia’s 58th Army in Georgia was an example of its employment of a blunt instrument to make its point, the Russian government’s announcement today that it was partially closing its borders with Georgia and Azerbaijan represents a carefully calibrated action designed to make a point at minimal cost.
Today’s “Rossiiskaya Gazeta” carried a Russian government decree dated Augusts 12th temporarily and selectively closing Russia’s borders with Georgia and Azerbaijan, a decision that one Moscow critic argues lacks any obvious logic, although he said there must be one somewhere (http://forum.msk.ru/material/news/518136.html).
In fact, the carefully crafted decree advances a number of Russian national interests without entailing the costs that some more sweeping Moscow moves have had in the past, an indication that this decision almost certainly was prepared not on the spur of the moment but had been prepared well in advance of Russia’s moves against Georgia.
The decree specifies that the FSB, together with the transportation and interior ministries and the Federal Customs Service, will temporarily close off transit across the Russian state borders with the Republic of Azerbaijan and Georgia, with several significant and clearly specified exceptions.
First, this border closure will not affect “the Abkhaz sector” of the Russian-Georgian border, “citizens and transport of member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and also the rolling stock of the Latvian Republic, the Lithuanian Republic and the Estonian Republic.”
Both the closure of the borders to all others and the exceptions are intended to send some very clear messages and to advance Moscow’s interests while minimizing any harm to them. With regard to the general message, the Russian government is obviously interested in showing that it has the power to do so and wants to deploy it against all of those it views as outsiders.
But the specific exceptions are where the real implications of this decree lie. First, the Moscow decree specifies that it does not apply to “the Abkhaz sector” of the Russian-Georgian border, an indication that Russia plans to continue to integrate that portion of Georgia into the Russian Federation.
(It is interesting that the decree makes no mention of the border between the Russian Federation and South Ossetia. One possible explanation, especially if this decree was prepared well in advance, is that Moscow expected its conflict with Georgia to be triggered by events in Abkhazia rather than South Ossetia and thus focused on that region rather than the other.)
Second, the decree makes an exception for citizens and transportation of CIS countries, an obvious attempt by Moscow to punish Georgia if it continues its drive to leave that Russian-dominated entity and an effort by the Russian government to suggest to other CIS countries, such as Ukraine, which may be thinking about leaving, that doing so would have certain downsides.
And third – and this almost certainly is what struck the Moscow commentator mentioned above as odd – the decree exempts the rolling stock of the three Baltic countries, all of whom are members of NATO and the European Union and all of whom have taken a tough pro-Georgian position in the current crisis.
Why would Moscow be making an exception in their case? The answer lies in one of the lesser know continuities from Soviet times to the present. Unlike most other Soviet-era organizations, the body that oversees railways for this region includes not only the 12 former Soviet republics but also the three formerly occupied Baltic states.
Continued Baltic participation in that body is important to Moscow: it has prevented the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians from changing the gage of the tracks they use, an arrangement that benefits both sides by allowing Russia to export via the Baltics without having to transfer their cargo to European-gage tracks.
Just when this decree will go into effect remains unclear. Today, an official in the Azerbaijan State Border Service told Trend News in Baku that “there are no changes in the regulations of passing borders between Azerbaijan and Russia” as of yet (news.trendaz.com/index.shtml?show=news&newsid=1274049&lang=EN).

Window on Eurasia: Georgian Energy Corridor is and will Remain ‘Unreliable,’ Russians Say

Paul Goble

Vienna, August 19 – The Georgian energy corridor is and will remain for a long time “unreliable,” a Russian financial analyst says, and that exert a small but upward pressure on the price of oil, something that is likely to lead both producers and consumers to look to Russian routes and may cause NATO to move even more quickly to establish bases in Georgia.
In a comment posted on the RosFinCom.ru website, energy analyst Andrei Kochetkov argues that Russia’s military intervention in Georgia means that no one can now or in the near future rely on either the rail or pipeline systems in Georgia to carry Caspian basin hydrocarbons to Europe and the West (www.rosfincom.ru/analytics/27338.html).
The blowing up of a section of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline for which the PKK has claimed responsibility, the destruction of a railway bridge in Georgia which Tbilisi blames Moscow, and British reports that portions of the BTC pipeline have been mined by Russian forces (kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2008/08/19/60357.shtml) lead to that conclusion.
Indeed, Azerbaijan has already stopped shipping oil through Georgia by train, Kochetkov notes, adding that “the single reliable path for the transportation of Azerbaijani energy carriers has again become the Russian pipeline system from Baku to Novorossiisk and tanker transfers up the Volga River.”
The Georgian corridor had had the capacity of transporting approximately 1.5 million barrels of oil each day, approximately one percent of the world’s total production. Consequently, its failure to reach Western markets will have only a small impact on consumers but a major one on suppliers like Azerbaijan.
“The current state of demand for fuel in the world allows for surviving such an inconvenience” at least for the present, Kochetkov continues, but he adds ominously that in his opinion “there is a probability that the situation [in Georgia with regard to energy transit] will last for quite a long time.”
And to the extent that is true, he insists, the problems with the Georgian energy corridor “can become a long-term basis for the support” of higher prices for oil, something that will put pressure on various outside actors to try to modify the situation either by seeking alternate routes or by finding a way to protect the Georgian corridor from similar problems in the future.
“For Europe and the United States,” Kochetkov says, “it is important to secure alternative channels” for oil to flow from the Caspian basin. “Azerbaijan and Georgia are thus now subject to the close attention of Western democracies.” One possible consequence of all this, especially if the West does not choose a Russian route, could be the appearance of NATO bases in Georgia.
Indeed, the RosFinCom analyst argues, “the official explanation of the necessity of the presence of units under the NATO flag may become the defense of energy transport facilities” such as pipelines and railways, although of course the opening of bases there would have broader political implications as well.
Three aspects of Kochetkov’s argument are important. First, it is a clear indication that control over the flow of oil was a major part of Moscow’s calculations when it decided to intervene in Georgia, however unwilling Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin have been to acknowledge that reality.
Second, his article suggests that Moscow is now thinking about how to use the risk that oil prices may rise even a little because of the conflict in Russia to pressure the oil-thirsty and price-sensitive West to back away from a confrontation in the short term lest the cost of gas and oil begin to rise.
And third, whether intended or not, Kochetkov’s argument is also an implicit criticism of what Moscow has done, an indication that the most thoughtful analysts in the Russian capital understand that Moscow’s intervention in Georgia may have precisely the opposite effect that the Kremlin intended, not isolating Tbilisi but leading to the opening of NATO bases in Georgia.