Paul Goble
Vienna, July 5 – Russian Orthodox Bishop Diomid enjoys far more support than the Moscow Patriarchate is prepared to admit, some of it reflecting backing for his specific views, another part the product of a belief that the church must be more open and independent of the state, and a third anger at the way his opponents violated canon law to move against him.
In the short term, these three groups, even collectively, are unlikely to be able to defend him in Church councils and courts. But over the longer haul, their size appears already large enough to constitute a serious challenge to the Patriarchate, forcing it to change course or face the probability of a deep split within Russian Orthodoxy.
And at least one commentator has compared the disciplining of Diomid by the Patriarchate to the expulsion of Boris Yeltsin from the Soviet political hierarchy in October 1987, an action that accelerated the demise of the USSR and boosted Yeltsin’s own political prospects (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1430).
The Patriarchate’s official position on the amount of support Diomid enjoys within the Church was provided by Bishop Mark, a deputy to Metropolitan Kirill of the powerful External Affairs Department and an increasingly frequent spokesman for the Russian Orthodox Church as a whole (www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=5&id=21418).
Asked by Blagovest-Infor.ru to react to suggestions that from 20,000 to 300,000 members of the clergy and laity actively support Diomid, Bishop Mark said that such figures were “exaggerated” and represented the efforts of unnamed enemies of the Church to exploit the Diomid case.
Moreover, he said, claims by some that many of the monastic clergy, from which the Church selects its hierarchs, back Diomid are flatly wrong. “I think,” the bishop said, “that his conscious supporters are many time fewer, only a handful in fact.” And even those who have signed appeals on Diomid’s behalf, Mark said, are confused rather than real supporters.
(The bishop said that when he had personally talked to some of Diomid’s supposed backers, he found that most of them simply wanted to have a conversation about various issues, something some hierarchs have been slow to agree to, and were not interested in supporting Diomid as such against the Patriarchate.)
To say this does not mean, the bishop continued, that there have not been differences of opinion on Diomid and other issues in the church. There are, “they are permissible, but only to a certain limit.” Once the duly constituted authorities of the Church have taken a decision, that “means that disagreements are at an end.”
Another churchman, however, one known for less officially constrained commentary on what is going on within the church provided a very different picture. In an interview on Echo Moskvy radio, Deacon Andrey Kurayev said that almost all monasteries of the Orthodox Church share the worldview of Bishop Diomid (www.echo.msk.ru/programs/razvorot/523643-echo/).
More seriously, he suggested that the Diomid case was a symptom of something much larger: “I consider,” Kurayev continued, “that in recent years out church has been balancing on the brink of a split comparable in its scope with the split of the 17th century” which led to the departure of the Old Believers.
“Up to now, the tactic of the Patriarchate was to be patient and hope that somehow the years will pass, people will adapt to new conditions, and everything will be all right. But its action in the case of Diomid shows that there is a limit to this patience” and that the Patriarchate is now prepared to violate its own rules to deal with its opponents.
That is going to force monks, priests, hierarchs, and especially the laity to choose between Diomid and the Patriarchate, Kurayev suggested, and for a wide variety of reasons, including anger at the caesaro-papism of the church, the violations of canon law in this case, and the conservative positions of Diomid, many will come down on his side.
One group almost certain to support him will be the congregations of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, a group that Vladimir Putin and Aleksii II worked so hard to re-subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. According to one Canadian commentator on church affairs, almost all Orthodox abroad are on Diomid’s side.
Some of them, Yevgeny Sokolov said, agree with him on specific issues but more are angry that the Patriarchate violated canon law (For a detailed discussion of that issue, see www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=monitor&id=12475.) and disciplined Diomid far more severely than necessary (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=authority&id=993).
And while Sokolov does not mention this as a factor, at least some Orthodox abroad may be supporting Diomid as a way of indicating their displeasure at the decision of their own hierarchy to enter into closer relations with the Moscow Patriarchate, a church many of them view as little more than a tool of the Kremlin and its security services.
Exactly how much support Diomid has is thus uncertain, but it is obvious that even if the Patriarchate can control voting on him in church councils now, there is enough to represent a serious challenge to the way in which the Patriarchate has been conducting itself up to now – and that means its current “victories” over the recalcitrant bishop are likely to prove Pyrrhic at best.
Saturday, July 5, 2008
Window on Eurasia: Medvedev Plans to Support ‘Traditional’ Religions
Paul Goble
Vienna, July 4 – In two statements this week – a message to a Moscow conference on the role of Islam in defeating terrorism and a statement to religious leaders in Baku – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev provided the clearest definition yet of how he views religion and how his government will interact with various faiths.
As has been the case in some many policy areas, Medvedev’s remarks on religion give both reason for hope that he will depart from the policies of Vladimir Putin in certain regards and pause for concern that he plans to act on the basis of some of the most discriminatory actions of his predecessor.
On the positive side, Medvedev stressed more than Putin did the importance of serious religious training for and by the clergy, a recognition that people are more likely to become extremists because of an ignorance of their faith be it Christianity, Islam or anything else than because of knowledge about it.
Moreover, he underscored his commitment to promoting inter-religious dialogue, explicitly saying in Baku that such conversations can help promote social stability and prevent the tendency of some to set people against each other on the basis of their religious beliefs or ethnic memberships.
But on the other hand, Medvedev made it clear that just like his predecessor, he sees Russia’s religions as being the four “traditional” ones – Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism – a reification of an idea the Patriarchate’s Metropolitan Kirill has been pushing for a decade and one that excludes the increasingly numerous Protestants, Catholics, and others.
Indeed, the Russian president’s words almost certainly will give aid and comfort to those in the Orthodox Church and the Russian nationalist movement who see all the others as dangerous “sects” against whom they, together with the state, have the right, even the obligation to combat.
(For the text of Medvedev’s message to the international conference in Moscow, see
www.regions.ru/news/2152995/ and www.i-r-p.ru/page/stream-event/index-20598.html. For the text of his remarks in Baku, see www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=25295.)
Vienna, July 4 – In two statements this week – a message to a Moscow conference on the role of Islam in defeating terrorism and a statement to religious leaders in Baku – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev provided the clearest definition yet of how he views religion and how his government will interact with various faiths.
As has been the case in some many policy areas, Medvedev’s remarks on religion give both reason for hope that he will depart from the policies of Vladimir Putin in certain regards and pause for concern that he plans to act on the basis of some of the most discriminatory actions of his predecessor.
On the positive side, Medvedev stressed more than Putin did the importance of serious religious training for and by the clergy, a recognition that people are more likely to become extremists because of an ignorance of their faith be it Christianity, Islam or anything else than because of knowledge about it.
Moreover, he underscored his commitment to promoting inter-religious dialogue, explicitly saying in Baku that such conversations can help promote social stability and prevent the tendency of some to set people against each other on the basis of their religious beliefs or ethnic memberships.
But on the other hand, Medvedev made it clear that just like his predecessor, he sees Russia’s religions as being the four “traditional” ones – Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism – a reification of an idea the Patriarchate’s Metropolitan Kirill has been pushing for a decade and one that excludes the increasingly numerous Protestants, Catholics, and others.
Indeed, the Russian president’s words almost certainly will give aid and comfort to those in the Orthodox Church and the Russian nationalist movement who see all the others as dangerous “sects” against whom they, together with the state, have the right, even the obligation to combat.
(For the text of Medvedev’s message to the international conference in Moscow, see
www.regions.ru/news/2152995/ and www.i-r-p.ru/page/stream-event/index-20598.html. For the text of his remarks in Baku, see www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=25295.)
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Seen Overplaying its Hand Along Its Borders in the Caucasus
Paul Goble
Vienna, July 4 – Even as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev completes his visit to Azerbaijan, Moscow is overplaying its hand in several places along the border between the Russian Federation and the countries of the southern Caucasus, sacrificing its long-standing advantages and creating new problems for itself in pursuit of ephemeral political interests.
By ratcheting up pressure in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow analyst Sergey Mikheyev argues, Moscow is weakening its own position, not only by helping Georgia gain outside support for the territorial integrity of that country but also by destroying the “quiet” that had allowed these two republics to strengthen their de facto independence.
No one in Sukhumi or Tskhinvali expects recognition de jure from Russia let alone any other country anytime soon, and consequently, Mikheyev suggests, “provoking an armed clash in this situation [as some in the Russian Federation appear interested in doing] is extremely dangerous” (www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=6449).
That is especially true in the case of South Ossetia, whose capital is located right on the border with Georgia proper, and “if the Georgians do not have sufficient forces to seize Abkhazia, they could take Tskhinvali if they wanted to,” something that would weaken Russia’s position in the region.
“Unfortunately,” Mikheyev says, the situation concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia has reached “a dead end,” one in which the incompatible positions of Moscow and Tbilisi can be resolved only by force, something that could have unpredictable consequences, or by Georgia transforming itself into a federal state, a step it won’t take.
But South Ossetia, if Moscow continues on its current course, could generate an even bigger problem for the Russian state: demands by some Ossetians north and south of the Russian border for independence. In a Rosbalt commentary yesterday, Ana Amelina discusses what such demands, however “naïve,” could mean (www.rosbaltsouth.ru/2008/07/03/499130.html).
According to the Moscow journalist, Ossetians began talking about the possibility of seeking independence only after Beslan, “when Moscow demonstrated to the Ossetians and the entire world its weakness and insincerity.” Since that time, she says, the idea that only independence will save the Ossetians “has begun to take on political weight.”
Amelina, who professes her skepticism about this idea at every step, analyzes the writings of two of its advocates, Vissarion Aseyev, the local leader of Gari Kasparov’s United Civic Front, and Valery Dzutsev, who reported on developments in North Ossetia for IWPR and Caucasus Knot and now studies at the University of Maryland.
At the end of 2007, Aseyev published a manifesto on Ossetian independence in which he argued that “the contemporary construction of the state system in Russia does not allow for the development of border regions and national territories.” Instead, “Russia is being reborn as an imperial state.”
“Within that empire, not a single ethnos has a future; its future is complete degradation and [ultimately] a withering away.” Consequently, he said, the Ossetians must ask themselves whether they want to survive as a people; and if they do, then, they must seek independence from Russia. “There is no other way.”
But if Aseyev is very clear about the goal he believes his people should seek, his specific recommendations seem minimalist indeed. As a first step, he said, Ossetians must secure elected status for the republic’s president, ensure an open and honest investigation of Beslan, and link north and south Ossetia by public transport.
“Just how all this will make possible ‘the creation of a sovereign, flourishing and democratic Ossetian state,” Amelina suggests, is something that Aseyev and those who support his ideas nowhere make clear.
Dzutsev, Amelina says, provides a kind of road map for that, but again it is one that she clearly has doubts about. He suggests that “Georgia could propose that South Ossetia has the right to unite with North Ossetia if Russia were to recognize the same right for North Ossetia” – the right to exit the Russian Federation and form a single, independent, neutral Ossetian state.
If Moscow refused – as Amelina argues is certain – then Tbilisi could offer South Ossetia broad autonomy – something Georgia is loathe to do –“with the provision that if and when North Ossetia becomes an independent state, Georgia will allow South Ossetia to join it” and thus form a single Ossetia.
Even if one agrees with Amelina that this project is “naïve and utopian in all parameters,” Dzutsev’s argument like that of Aseyev is significant in a double sense. On the one hand, it demonstrates that even in Ossetia, long one of the most loyal parts of the North Caucasus, people are beginning to think seriously about independence from Russia.
And on the other – and this is the more immediately important lesson from their writings – Moscow cannot act here without constraints and without recognizing that other players including the Georgian and Ossetian governments have their own options that they may play if the Russian government continues to behave incautiously.
Obviously, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are the two big issues on the Russian-South Caucasus border, but there are other smaller issues which some in Moscow appear interested in turning up the heat, including most prominently one involving two villages in Azerbaijan whose residents retain Russian passports.
So far, the situation around them remains relatively obscure. Among the most useful recent discussions are khabal.info/?l=rus&act=inf_view&id=135754665700%55969%5554023, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1224656.html and www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1224693.html
But it is perhaps indicative that this week Sergei Markedonov, one of Moscow’s most thoughtful commentators on ethnic issues in the Caucasus, published an article about these villages, an apparent indication that some in the Russian capital may be preparing to put them in play – or at least positioning Moscow to threat to do so (www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=6429).
Vienna, July 4 – Even as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev completes his visit to Azerbaijan, Moscow is overplaying its hand in several places along the border between the Russian Federation and the countries of the southern Caucasus, sacrificing its long-standing advantages and creating new problems for itself in pursuit of ephemeral political interests.
By ratcheting up pressure in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow analyst Sergey Mikheyev argues, Moscow is weakening its own position, not only by helping Georgia gain outside support for the territorial integrity of that country but also by destroying the “quiet” that had allowed these two republics to strengthen their de facto independence.
No one in Sukhumi or Tskhinvali expects recognition de jure from Russia let alone any other country anytime soon, and consequently, Mikheyev suggests, “provoking an armed clash in this situation [as some in the Russian Federation appear interested in doing] is extremely dangerous” (www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=6449).
That is especially true in the case of South Ossetia, whose capital is located right on the border with Georgia proper, and “if the Georgians do not have sufficient forces to seize Abkhazia, they could take Tskhinvali if they wanted to,” something that would weaken Russia’s position in the region.
“Unfortunately,” Mikheyev says, the situation concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia has reached “a dead end,” one in which the incompatible positions of Moscow and Tbilisi can be resolved only by force, something that could have unpredictable consequences, or by Georgia transforming itself into a federal state, a step it won’t take.
But South Ossetia, if Moscow continues on its current course, could generate an even bigger problem for the Russian state: demands by some Ossetians north and south of the Russian border for independence. In a Rosbalt commentary yesterday, Ana Amelina discusses what such demands, however “naïve,” could mean (www.rosbaltsouth.ru/2008/07/03/499130.html).
According to the Moscow journalist, Ossetians began talking about the possibility of seeking independence only after Beslan, “when Moscow demonstrated to the Ossetians and the entire world its weakness and insincerity.” Since that time, she says, the idea that only independence will save the Ossetians “has begun to take on political weight.”
Amelina, who professes her skepticism about this idea at every step, analyzes the writings of two of its advocates, Vissarion Aseyev, the local leader of Gari Kasparov’s United Civic Front, and Valery Dzutsev, who reported on developments in North Ossetia for IWPR and Caucasus Knot and now studies at the University of Maryland.
At the end of 2007, Aseyev published a manifesto on Ossetian independence in which he argued that “the contemporary construction of the state system in Russia does not allow for the development of border regions and national territories.” Instead, “Russia is being reborn as an imperial state.”
“Within that empire, not a single ethnos has a future; its future is complete degradation and [ultimately] a withering away.” Consequently, he said, the Ossetians must ask themselves whether they want to survive as a people; and if they do, then, they must seek independence from Russia. “There is no other way.”
But if Aseyev is very clear about the goal he believes his people should seek, his specific recommendations seem minimalist indeed. As a first step, he said, Ossetians must secure elected status for the republic’s president, ensure an open and honest investigation of Beslan, and link north and south Ossetia by public transport.
“Just how all this will make possible ‘the creation of a sovereign, flourishing and democratic Ossetian state,” Amelina suggests, is something that Aseyev and those who support his ideas nowhere make clear.
Dzutsev, Amelina says, provides a kind of road map for that, but again it is one that she clearly has doubts about. He suggests that “Georgia could propose that South Ossetia has the right to unite with North Ossetia if Russia were to recognize the same right for North Ossetia” – the right to exit the Russian Federation and form a single, independent, neutral Ossetian state.
If Moscow refused – as Amelina argues is certain – then Tbilisi could offer South Ossetia broad autonomy – something Georgia is loathe to do –“with the provision that if and when North Ossetia becomes an independent state, Georgia will allow South Ossetia to join it” and thus form a single Ossetia.
Even if one agrees with Amelina that this project is “naïve and utopian in all parameters,” Dzutsev’s argument like that of Aseyev is significant in a double sense. On the one hand, it demonstrates that even in Ossetia, long one of the most loyal parts of the North Caucasus, people are beginning to think seriously about independence from Russia.
And on the other – and this is the more immediately important lesson from their writings – Moscow cannot act here without constraints and without recognizing that other players including the Georgian and Ossetian governments have their own options that they may play if the Russian government continues to behave incautiously.
Obviously, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are the two big issues on the Russian-South Caucasus border, but there are other smaller issues which some in Moscow appear interested in turning up the heat, including most prominently one involving two villages in Azerbaijan whose residents retain Russian passports.
So far, the situation around them remains relatively obscure. Among the most useful recent discussions are khabal.info/?l=rus&act=inf_view&id=135754665700%55969%5554023, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1224656.html and www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1224693.html
But it is perhaps indicative that this week Sergei Markedonov, one of Moscow’s most thoughtful commentators on ethnic issues in the Caucasus, published an article about these villages, an apparent indication that some in the Russian capital may be preparing to put them in play – or at least positioning Moscow to threat to do so (www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=6429).
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Caught Between Two Kinds of Russian Nationalism
Paul Goble
Vienna, July 4 – Moscow finds itself caught between two kinds of Russian nationalism, an “imperial” variant intended to promote cooperation among the nations of that country and the possibility of restoration of a larger state and an “ethnic” one seeking to establish a Russian nation state.
Although many observers have suggested that these two kinds of nationalism are mutually reinforcing, Georgian analyst Tengiz Ablotiya argues in an essay posted online yesterday that they are deeply antagonistic not only in terms of their goals but even more in terms of the values each seeks to promote (www.apsny.ge/analytics/1215139862.php).
“Imperial nationalism,” he points out, is necessary for the construction of powerful empires and is absolutely unsuitable for the construction of a purely national state. And conversely, ethnic nationalism leads to a separation of peoples and consequently completely excludes an imperial rebirth.”
Because imperial nationalism is in a certain sense “international,” Ablotiya continues, it typically “recognizes the equality of rights of all citizens and subjects of its empire which recognize its power.” The core nation, of course, enjoys certain rights but it must be careful not to “advertise” its “superiority” lest it generate countervailing nationalisms among others.
In the Russian case, he writes, “it is impossible to demand from a Chechen that he recognize himself as a citizen of the empire and at the same time not to give him the possibility to peacefully and without persecution from the cops to live in Moscow.” For this kind of nationalism, Moscow should be “just as much a capital for the Chechen as it is for the Russian.”
Ethnic nationalism is just the reverse. For its followers, their “nation is better than all the others” and thus deserves a special place in the sun. Such an approach, which lies at the basis of most nation states, “has a right to exist,” Ablotiya continues, but “it is absolutely unsuitable for empire building.”
In most countries, governments have to make a choice between these two lest they fall into a “paradoxical” situation. “However, as it well known, Russia is not to be understood by the mind alone: The two-headed eagle looks in various directions.” And at present, Moscow is promoting both kinds of nationalism.
“While dreaming about the rebirth of the empire, Russia is today increasingly under the sway of absolutely ethnic nationalism,” an arrangement, Ablotiya suggests, that is inherently inconsistent and ultimately unsustainable.
The average Russian does not relate well to non-Russians at a personal level, regardless of whether he or she identifies the nation of which they are members as a friend or foe of Russia itself, he writes. Thus, Russians do not like Georgians whom they view as an enemy nation, but they also do not like Armenians, whose nation they tell pollsters is a friend of Russia.
Thus, increasingly unconstrained even virulent ethnic nationalism among Russians undermines the chances for the restoration of the empire, Ablotiya says. But it does far more than that, Ablotiya argues, it threatens the continued existence of the Russian Federation as an integral country.
“One cannot demand that a Daghestani recognize the jurisdiction of the RF but beat him on the head if he walks the streets of Moscow. For Daghestan can be inside the Russian Federation only under conditions of imperial nationalism. But under those of a nationalism which proclaims ‘Russia for the Russians,’ sooner or later will lead to an adequate answer:”
“’Daghestan for the Daghestanis,’ ‘Chechnya for the Chechens,’ ‘Buryatiya for the Buryats’ and so on and on.
Many Moscow leaders, especially those who have come from or have experience in non-Russian areas, recognize this danger. But today “it is evident that the Kremlin for reasons not obvious to an outsider is playing with ethnic nationalism” by allowing the almost “absolute freedom of action of skinheads and nationalist groups.”
“That won’t bring Russia any good,” Ablotiya concludes, “because it is impossible to build an empire [or even maintain a multi-national state like the Russian Federation] and hate [all or even a significant fraction of] its residents. Especially in the 21st century.”
Vienna, July 4 – Moscow finds itself caught between two kinds of Russian nationalism, an “imperial” variant intended to promote cooperation among the nations of that country and the possibility of restoration of a larger state and an “ethnic” one seeking to establish a Russian nation state.
Although many observers have suggested that these two kinds of nationalism are mutually reinforcing, Georgian analyst Tengiz Ablotiya argues in an essay posted online yesterday that they are deeply antagonistic not only in terms of their goals but even more in terms of the values each seeks to promote (www.apsny.ge/analytics/1215139862.php).
“Imperial nationalism,” he points out, is necessary for the construction of powerful empires and is absolutely unsuitable for the construction of a purely national state. And conversely, ethnic nationalism leads to a separation of peoples and consequently completely excludes an imperial rebirth.”
Because imperial nationalism is in a certain sense “international,” Ablotiya continues, it typically “recognizes the equality of rights of all citizens and subjects of its empire which recognize its power.” The core nation, of course, enjoys certain rights but it must be careful not to “advertise” its “superiority” lest it generate countervailing nationalisms among others.
In the Russian case, he writes, “it is impossible to demand from a Chechen that he recognize himself as a citizen of the empire and at the same time not to give him the possibility to peacefully and without persecution from the cops to live in Moscow.” For this kind of nationalism, Moscow should be “just as much a capital for the Chechen as it is for the Russian.”
Ethnic nationalism is just the reverse. For its followers, their “nation is better than all the others” and thus deserves a special place in the sun. Such an approach, which lies at the basis of most nation states, “has a right to exist,” Ablotiya continues, but “it is absolutely unsuitable for empire building.”
In most countries, governments have to make a choice between these two lest they fall into a “paradoxical” situation. “However, as it well known, Russia is not to be understood by the mind alone: The two-headed eagle looks in various directions.” And at present, Moscow is promoting both kinds of nationalism.
“While dreaming about the rebirth of the empire, Russia is today increasingly under the sway of absolutely ethnic nationalism,” an arrangement, Ablotiya suggests, that is inherently inconsistent and ultimately unsustainable.
The average Russian does not relate well to non-Russians at a personal level, regardless of whether he or she identifies the nation of which they are members as a friend or foe of Russia itself, he writes. Thus, Russians do not like Georgians whom they view as an enemy nation, but they also do not like Armenians, whose nation they tell pollsters is a friend of Russia.
Thus, increasingly unconstrained even virulent ethnic nationalism among Russians undermines the chances for the restoration of the empire, Ablotiya says. But it does far more than that, Ablotiya argues, it threatens the continued existence of the Russian Federation as an integral country.
“One cannot demand that a Daghestani recognize the jurisdiction of the RF but beat him on the head if he walks the streets of Moscow. For Daghestan can be inside the Russian Federation only under conditions of imperial nationalism. But under those of a nationalism which proclaims ‘Russia for the Russians,’ sooner or later will lead to an adequate answer:”
“’Daghestan for the Daghestanis,’ ‘Chechnya for the Chechens,’ ‘Buryatiya for the Buryats’ and so on and on.
Many Moscow leaders, especially those who have come from or have experience in non-Russian areas, recognize this danger. But today “it is evident that the Kremlin for reasons not obvious to an outsider is playing with ethnic nationalism” by allowing the almost “absolute freedom of action of skinheads and nationalist groups.”
“That won’t bring Russia any good,” Ablotiya concludes, “because it is impossible to build an empire [or even maintain a multi-national state like the Russian Federation] and hate [all or even a significant fraction of] its residents. Especially in the 21st century.”
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